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BANCROFT 

LIBRARY 

PAN  -  AMERICAN  ISM 
ITS  BEGINNINGS 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NKW  YORK  •    BOSTON  •   CHICAGO  •   DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •   SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LIMITED 

LONDON  •   BOMBAY  •   CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  LTD. 

TORONTO 


PAN   AMERICANISM 
ITS  BEGINNINGS 


BY 

JOSEPH  BYRNE  LOCKEY 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1920 
All  rights  reserved 


COPYRIGHT,  1920, 
BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Set  up  and  printed.      Published,  April,  1920 


"  Nature  in  making  us  inhabitants  of  the 
same  continent  has  in  some  sort  united  us  in 
the  honds  of  a  common  patriotism." 

MAIA  TO  JEFFERSON. 


PREFACE 

The  history  of  Pan-Americanism  falls  roughly  into  three 
periods.  The  first,  embracing  the  years  of  revolution  and  of 
the  formation  of  new  states,  extends  to  about  1830 ;  the  second 
covers  the  succeeding  three  or  four  decades  to  the  close  of  the 
Civil  War;  and  the  third  extends  from  the  Civil  War  to  the 
present  time.  Of  these  periods  the  first  is  characterized  by  a 
strong  tendency  toward  continental  solidarity,  the  second  by  the 
opposite  tendency  toward  particularism  and  distrust,  and  the 
third  by  the  revival  of  the  earlier  tendency  toward  fraternal 
cooperation.  The  present  study  is  devoted  to  the  early  period, 
the  period  of  beginnings.  It  was  undertaken  and  carried  to 
completion  as  an  academic  task  at  Columbia  University,  under 
the  direction  and  counsel  of  Professor  John  Bassett  Moore,  to 
whom  the  writer  acknowledges  a  deep  debt  of  gratitude.  He 
is  also  under  great  obligations  to  Dr.  Angel  Cesar  Rivas,  who, 
during  the  course  of  the  preparation  of  the  book  and  while  it 
was  in  proof,  made  helpful  suggestions  and  invaluable  criti- 
cisms; to  Miss  S.  Elizabeth  Davis,  who  read  the  proof;  and  to 
Senor  D.  Manuel  Segundo  Sanchez  for  various  favors'  re- 
ceived. Finally,  he  takes  this  method  of  expressing  his  thanks 
to  the  Hispanic  Society  of  America  for  the  use  of  its  valuable 
collection  of  old  newspapers,  and  to  the  ~New  York  Public 
Library,  whose  great  assemblage  of  books  and  pamphlets  re- 
lating to  Spanish  'and  Portuguese  America,  constituted  the 
main  body  of  his  source  material. 

J.  B.  L. 

George  Peabody  College, 
Nashville,  Tennessee. 
April,  1920. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I  MEANING  OF  PAN- AMERICANISM       .     . ,  .     .     ...     ...      1 

II  FORMATION  OP  NEW  STATES      ....     ;,;   .     .     ,     .     36 

in  FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS    .     .     ,     ;     .     .     .     .     82 

IV  UNITED  STATES  AND  HISPANIC  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE     .  134 

V  INTERNATIONAL   COMPLICATIONS    .         .     .     ....     .  172 

VI  HISPANIC  AMERICA  AND  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE    ....  223 

VII    EARLY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION 263 

VIII    THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS 312 

IX    BRITISH  INFLUENCE 355 

X    ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  .     . 393 

XI  ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE     .     .         .     .     .         .     .  434 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 468 

INDEX '.  '•  .  487 


PAN- AMERICANISM: 
ITS  BEGINNINGS 

CHAPTER  I 

MEANING    OF    PAN-AMERICANISM 

IT  is  obviously  desirable  to  know  what  Pan-Americanism 
means,  before  an  attempt  is  made  to  discover  its  beginnings. 
The  term  itself  is  new.  It  is  one  of  an  increasing  number  of 
similar  compounds  which  have  come  to  be  widely  used  since 
the  middle  of  the  last  century.  Modern  tongues  are  indebted 
to  the  ancient  Greek  for  the  prefix  and  for  models  of  its  use 
with  national  names.  Pan-Hellenes,  for  example,  signified  the 
united  Greeks;  Pan-Ionian  was  used  to  describe  whatever  per- 
tained to  all  the  lonians ;  and  the  Panathenaea  was  the  national 
festival  of  Athens,  held  to  celebrate  the  union  of  Attica  under 
Theseus.  Of  the  modern  combinations  Pan-Slavism  and  Pan- 
Slavist  were  the  first  to  gain  currency.  The  movement  for  the 
union  of  all  the  Slavonic  peoples  in  one  political  organization 
originated  in  the  second  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and 
somewhat  later  began  to  be  described  as  Panslavism.  Jowett 
used  Panslavismus  in  1846;  *  and  in  1850  Longfellow,  in  mak- 
ing an  entry  in  his  journal,  defined  the  term  as  "  the  union 
of  all  the  Slavonic  tribes  under  one  head,  and  that  head  Rus- 
sia." 2  About  1860  the  movement  for  the  political  union  of 
all  the  Greeks  began  to  be  called  Pan-Hellenism.  Then  fol- 
lowed Pan-Germanism,  Pan-Islamism,  Pan-Celticism,  and  so 
on,  with  an  ever  increasing  number  of  movements  designated 
by  similar  compounds. 

1  Life  and  Letters,  I,  156. 

2  S.  W.  Longfellow,  Life  of  Henry  Wadsworth  Longfellow,  II,  176. 

1 


2          PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

The  term  Pan- Americanism  was  first  used  in  newspaper  dis- 
cussions relating  to  the  International  American  Conference 
held  at  Washington  in  1889-90.  The  New  York  Evening  Post 
appears  to  have  been  the  first  to  employ  it.3  To  the  Post  is 
also  to  be  credited  the  first  use  of  the  adjective,  Pan-American. 
This  term  was  introduced  into  the  columns  of  the  Post  in 
1882,4  during  the  agitation  of  Mr.  Elaine's  first  proposal  for 
a  conference  of  American  states  at  Washington.  But  it  was 
little  used  until  the  conference  convened  in  1889,  when,  having 
been  adopted  by  other  leading  dailies,  it  soon  won  universal 
acceptance.5  The  substantive,  Pan- Americanism,  did  not  so 
quickly  become  current.  Indeed,  not  until  the  last  decade  or 
two  has  it  been  widely  employed.  To-day  it  is  encountered 
with  ever  increasing  frequency.  It  is  constantly  recurring  in 
newspapers  and  periodicals;  and  gradually  it  is  also  finding  a 
place  in  works  on  international  law  and  diplomacy. 

The  adjective,  Pan-American,  and  the  substantive,  Pan- Amer- 
icanism, were  soon  taken  up  and  defined  by  the  dictionaries; 
but  the  definitions  are  not  satisfactory.  The  adjective  is 
usually  denned  as  including  or  pertaining  to  the  whole  of  Amer- 
ica, both  North  and  South;  which  is  inaccurate,  as  it  pertains, 
by  common  usage,  to  the  independent  part  of  the  continent  only. 
The  definitions  of  the  substantive,  though  not  subject  to  this 
criticism,  are  none  the  less  inaccurate.  Not  only  so,  but  they 
are  widely  divergent  among  themselves. 

To  become  convinced  of  this  requires  but  a  glance  at  the 
definitions  of  some  of  the  standard  dictionaries.  The  New  In- 

3  March  6,  1888. 

*  June  27.  Murray  erroneously  attributes  its  first  appearance  to  the 
issue  of  the  Evening  Post  of  September  27,  1889. 

6  The  New  York  Sun  used  the  term  September  12,  1889;  the  London 
Times,  September  30,  1889;  the  London  Spectator  January  29,  1890;  Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu  in  an  article  published  in  the  Journal  des  Debate  on  Octo- 
ber 15,  1889,  discussed  the  conference  at  length,  but  did  not  describe  it  as 
Pan-American.  On  December  28,  1889,  however,  /,' Economists  Franfaia, 
a  weekly  of  which  Leroy-Beaulieu  was  editor,  admitted  the  word  into  its 
columns.  The  term  Pan-American  appears  to  have  been  introduced  into 
the  other  American  republics  from  the  United  States. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMEKICANISM 

ternational  defines  it  as :  "  The  principle  or  advocacy  of  a 
political  alliance  or  union  of  all  the  states  of  America  " ;  The 
New  Standard,  as  "  The  advocacy  of  a  political  union  of  the 
various  states  of  the  Western  Hemisphere ;  also  the  life  of  the 
American  people  as  represented  in  republican  forms  of  govern- 
ment and  tending  toward  such  a  union  " ;  Murray  as  "  The 
idea  or  sentiment  of  a  political  alliance  or  union  of  all  the 
states  of  North  and  South  America  " ;  La  Grande  Encyclopedic 
as  a  "  Political  doctrine  tending  to  group  all  the  American 
states  in  a  sort  of  federation  under  the  hegemony  of  the  United 
States  " ;  Nouveau  Larousse  as  a  "  Doctrine  according  to  which 
the  people  of  European  origin  who  have  founded  states  in  the 
New  World  aim  to  exclude  other  states  from  the  exercise  of 
sovereignty  over  them  " ;  and  finally,  the  second  supplement  of 
the  Diccionario  Enciclopedico  Hispano- Americano  as  the  "  As- 
piration or  tendency  of  the  peoples  of  the  New  World  to  estab- 
lish among  themselves  ties  of  union;  to  promote  good  under- 
standing and  fraternal  harmony  between  all  the  states  of  the 
continent;  and  to  act  always  in  accord  with  a  view  to  prevent- 
ing the  dominance  or  the  influence  of  European  powers  in 
American  territory." 

The  bringing  of  these  set  definitions  into  juxtaposition  sug- 
gests some  important  questions.  Is  Pan- Americanism  an  ad- 
vocacy, an  idea,  a  sentiment,  an  aspiration,  a  tendency,  a  prin- 
ciple, or  a  doctrine  ?  Is  it  one,  or  all,  or  any  number  of  these 
combined?  Is  it  the  life  of  the  American  people  as  repre- 
sented in  the  republican  form  of  government?  Does  it  aim 
to  federate  the  American  republics  under  the  hegemony  of  the 
United  States?  If  so,  exactly  what  is  meant  by  hegemony? 
Is  its  only  aim  the  exclusion  of  European  powers  from  the  fur- 
ther acquisition  of  territory  or  from  the  exercise  of  sovereignty 
in  the  New  World  ?  To  raise  these  questions  is  to  disclose  the 
necessity  of  further  inquiry. 

That  the  formulation  of  a  precise  definition  of  Pan-Amer- 
icanism would  be  attended  with  great  difficulty  is  evident ;  and 


4          PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

little  would  be  gained  by  attempting  it.  Our  aim,  therefore, 
will  be  rather  to  describe  than  to  define.  With  this  end  in  view, 
we  shall  endeavor  to  discover  in  the  expressions  of  American 
statesmen  and  publicists  the  material  for  such  a  brief  and  exact 
description  as  will  afford  the  reader  an  adequate  conception  of 
the  meaning  of  the  term.  The  views  of  James  G.  Elaine,  the 
dominant  figure  in  the  Washington  Conference  which  furnished 
the  occasion  for  the  adoption  of  the  new  name,  may  be  con- 
sidered first. 

In  an  article  on  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Garfield  adminis- 
tration, which  he  published  in  the  Chicago  Weekly  Magazine 
for  September  16,  1882,  Elaine  set  forth  the  ideas  which  he 
held  at  that  time  on  the  subject  of  the  international  relations 
of  the  American  states.  The  foreign  policy  of  the  Garfield 
administration,  he  said,  had  two  principal  objects  in  view: 
"  First  to  bring  about  peace  and  prevent  future  wars  in  North 
and  South  America;  second,  to  cultivate  such  friendly  com- 
mercial relations  with  all  American  countries  as  would  lead  to  a 
large  increase  in  the  export  trade  of  the  United  States  by  sup- 
plying those  fabrics  in  which  we  are  abundantly  able  to  com- 
pete with  the  manufacturing  nations  of  Europe."  In  order 
to  attain  the  second  object  it  was  necessary,  Elaine  declared,  to 
accomplish  the  first.  "  Instead  of  friendly  intervention  here 
and  there  —  patching  up  a  treaty  between  two  countries  to- 
day, securing  a  truce  between  two  others  to-morrow  —  it  was 
apparent  .  .  .  that  a  more  comprehensive  plan  should  be 
adopted,  if  wars  were  to  cease  in  the  Western  Hemisphere." 
In  short,  Pan-Americanism,  as  Elaine  conceived  it  in  1882, 
was  expressed  in  two  words,  peace  and  commerce,  attained  by 
means  of  the  friendly  counsel  and  cooperation  of  all  the  Amer- 
ican states  and  redounding  equally  to  the  benefit  of  all. 

Seven  years  later,  in  his  address  of  welcome  to  the  delegates 
to  the  International  American  Conference,  he  set  forth  his 
views  with  greater  fullness.  He  said  : 

"  The  delegates  I  am  addressing  can  do  much  to  establish 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMEKICANISM  5 

permanent  relations  of  confidence,  respect,  and  friendship  be- 
tween the  nations  which  they  represent.  They  can  show  to 
the  world  an  honorable,  peaceful  conference  of  eighteen  inde- 
pendent American  powers,  in  which  all  shall  meet  together  on 
terms  of  absolute  equality;  a  conference  in  Which  there  can  be 
no  attempt  to  coerce  a  single  delegate  against  his  own  concep- 
tion of  the  interests  of  his  nation ;  a  conference  which  will  per- 
mit no  secret  understanding  on  any  subject,  but  will  frankly 
publish  to  the  world  all  its  conclusions;  a  conference  which 
will  tolerate  no  spirit  of  conquest  but  will  aim  to  cultivate  an 
American  sympathy  as  broad  as  both  continents,  a  conference 
which  will  form  no  selfish  alliance  against  the  older  nations 
from  which  we  are  proud  to  claim  inheritance  —  a  conference, 
in  fine,  which  will  seek  nothing,  propose  nothing,  endure  noth- 
ing thait  is  not,  in  the  general  sense  of  the  delegates,  timely  and 
wise  and  peaceful. 

"  And  yet  we  cannot  be  expected  to  forget  that  our  common 
fate  has  made  us  inhabitants  of  the  two  continents  which,  at 
the  close  of  four  centuries,  are  still  regarded  beyond  the  seas 
as  the  New  World.  Like  situations  beget  like  sympathies  and 
impose  like  duties.  We  meet  in  firm  belief  that  the  nations 
of  America  ought  to  be  and  can  be  more  helpful,  each  to  the 
other,  than  they  now  are,  and  that  each  will  find  advantage 
and  profit  from  an  enlarged  intercourse  with  the  others. 

"  We  believe  that  we  should  be  drawn  together  more  closely 
by  the  highways  of  the  sea,  and  that  at  no  distant  day  the  rail- 
way systems  of  the  North  and  South  will  meet  upon  the  Isthmus 
and  connect  by  land  routes  the  political  and  commercial  cap- 
itals of  all  America. 

"  We  believe  that  hearty  cooperation,  based  on  hearty  confi- 
dence, will  save  all  American  states  from  the  burdens  and  evils 
which  have  long  and  cruelly  afflicted  the  older  nations  of  the 
world. 

"  We  believe  that  a  spirit  of  justice,  of  common  and  equal 
interest  between  the  American  states,  will  leave  no  room  for  an 


6          PAN^AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

artificial  balance  of  power  like  unto  that  which  has  led  to  wars 
abroad  and  drenched  Europe  in  blood. 

"  We  believe  that  friendship,  avowed  with  candor  and  main- 
tained with  good  faith,  will  remove  from  American  states  the 
necessity  of  guarding  boundary  lines  between  themselves  with 
fortifications  and  military  force. 

"  We  believe  that  standing  armies,  beyond  those  which  are 
needful  for  public  order  and  the  safety  of  internal  administra- 
tion, should  be  unknown  on  both  American  continents. 

"  We  believe  that  friendship  and  not  force,  the  spirit  of  just 
law  and  not  violence  of  the  mob,  should  be  the  recognized  rule 
of  administration  between  American  nations  and  in  American 
nations."  6 

Permanent  relations  of  confidence,  respect,  and  friendship; 
equality;  no  coercion;  no  secret  understandings;  no  conquest; 
no  selfish  alliance  against  the  older  nations  from  which  we  are 
sprung;  no  balance  of  power;  no  threatening  armies;  mutual 
helpfulness;  commerce;  the  spirit  of  just  law  as  the  rule  of 
administration  between  American  nations  and  in  American  na- 
tions —  this  was  Elaine's  later  conception  of  the  guiding  prin- 
ciples of  Pan-Americanism.  And  with  this  conception  the 
statesmen  and  publicists  of  all  the  American  republics  have 
been  subsequently  in  substantial  agreement. 

President  Roosevelt,  in  his  instructions  to  the  United  States 
delegates  to  the  second  International  American  Conference, 
which  met  at  Mexico  City  in  October,  1901,  declared  among 
other  things,  that  "  The  chief  interest  of  the  United  States  in 
relation  to  the  other  republics  upon  the  American  continent  is 
the  safety  and  permanence  of  the  political  system  which  under- 
lies their  and  our  existence  as  nations  —  the  system  of  self- 
government  by  the  people.  It  is,  therefore,  to  be  desired  that 
all  the  American  republics  should  enjoy  in  full  measure  the 
blessings  of  perfect  freedom  under  just  laws,  each  sovereign 

fl  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  I,  40-42. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  7 

community  pursuing  its  own  course  of  orderly  development 
without  external  restraint  or  interference. 

"  Nothing,"  he  added,  "  is  of  greater  importance  from  a  po- 
litical point  of  view  than  that  the  United  States  should  be 
understood  to  be  the  friend  of  all  the  Latin- American  republics 
and  the  enemy  of  none.  To  this  end  it  will  be  prudent  to  pro- 
pose nothing  radical,  to  favor  a  free  expression  of  views  among 
the  delegates  of  the  other  powers,  and  to  favor  and  support 
only  such  measures  as  have  the  weight  of  general  acceptance 
and  clearly  tend  to  promote  the  common  good."  7 

When  the  third  International  Conference  met  at  Rio  de 
Janeiro  in  1906,  Roosevelt  still  being  President,  the  United 
States  delegates  were  provided  with  a  copy  of  the  instructions 
of  1901,  by  which  they  were  to  be  guided,  as  a  review  of  those 
instructions  indicated  no  occasion  for  changing  them  except 
in  some  minor  details.  The  delegates,  however,  were  reminded 
by  Mr.  Root,  who  was  then  Secretary  of  State,  that  "  The  true 
function  of  such  a  conference  is  to  deal  with  matters  of  com- 
mon interest  which  are  not  really  subjects  of  controversy,  but 
upon  which  comparison  of  views  and  friendly  discussions  may 
smooth  away  differences  of  detail,  develop  substantial  agree- 
ment, and  lead  to  cooperation  along  common  lines  for  the  at- 
tainment of  objects  which  all  really  desire."  And  he  added 
that  the  least  of  the  benefits  anticipated  from  the  conference 
would  be  "  the  establishment  of  agreeable  personal  relations, 
the  removal  of  misconceptions  and  prejudices,  and  the  habit 
of  temperate  and  kindly  discussion  among  the  representatives 
of  so  many  republics."  8 

It  was  during  the  summer  of  1906  that  Mr.  Root  made  his 
celebrated  visit  to  South  America.  Though  not  a  delegate  to 
the  conference  at  Rio,  he  was  present  for  a  few  days  during 
its  progress.  On  July  31  he  made  a  speech  at  an  extraordinary 

7  Int.  Am.  Conf.   (1902),  report  of  the  U.  S.  delegates,  31,  32. 

8  Int.  Am.  Conf.   (1906),  report  of  the  U.  S.  delegates,  39,  40. 


8          PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

session  of  the  conference,  in  which  he  made  the  following  dec- 
laration which  has  often  been  quoted : 

"  We  wish  for  no  victories  but  those  of  peace ;  for  no  terri- 
tory except  our  own ;  for  no  sovereignty  except  the  sovereignty 
over  ourselves.  We  deem  the  independence  and  equal  rights 
of  the  smallest  and  weakest  member  of  the  family  of  nations 
entitled  to  as  much  respect  as  those  of  the  greatest  empire,  and 
deem  the  observance  of  that  respect  the  chief  guaranty  of  the 
weak  against  the  oppression  of  the  strong.  We  neither  claim 
nor  desire  any  rights,  or  privileges,  or  powers  that  we  do  not 
freely  concede  to  every  American  republic.  We  wish  to  in- 
crease our  prosperity,  to  expand  our  trade,  to  grow  in  wealth, 
in  wisdom,  and  in  spirit,  but  our  conception  of  the  true  way 
to  accomplish  this  is  not  to  pull  down  others  and  profit  by  their 
ruin,  but  to  help  all  friends  to  a  common  prosperity  and  a  com- 
mon growth,  that  we  may  all  become  greater  and  stronger  to- 
gether." 9 

In  his  message  of  December  7,  1915,  President  Wilson,  de- 
claring that  we  had  been  put  to  the  test  in  the  case  of  Mexico, 
and  that  we  had  stood  the  test,  characterized  Pan- Americanism 
as  follows: 

"  The  moral  is,  that  the  states  of  America  are  not  hostile 
rivals  but  cooperating  friends,  and  that  their  growing  sense  of 
community  of  interest,  alike  in  matters  political  and  in  matters 
economic,  is  likely  to  give  them  a  new  significance  as  factors 
in  international  affairs  and  in  the  political  history  of  the  world. 
It  presents  them  as  in  a  very  deep  and  true  sense  a  unit  in 
world  affairs,  spiritual  partners,  standing  together  because 
thinking  together,  quick  with  common  sympathies  and  common 
ideals.  Separated,  they  are  subject  to  all  the  cross-currents  of 
the  confused  politics  of  a  world  of  hostile  rivalries;  united  in 
spirit  and  purpose,  they  cannot  be  disappointed  of  their  peace- 
ful destiny.  This  is  Pan-Americanism.  It  has  none  of  the 
spirit  of  empire  in  it.  It  is  the  embodiment,  the  effectual  em- 

»  Root,  Latin  America  and  the  United  States,  Addressee,  10. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMEKICANISM  9 

bodiment,  of  the  spirit  of  law  and  independence  and  liberty 
and  mutual  service."  10 

Before  the  second  Pan- American  Scientific  Congress,  which 
met  at  Washington  in  the  latter  part  of  1915,  Mr.  Lansing, 
Secretary  of  State,  made  an  address  in  which  he  expressed  at 
some  length  his  views  on  the  subject  of  Pan- Americanism.  Ac- 
cording to  him,  "  there  has  grown  up  a  feeling  that  the  repub- 
lics of  this  hemisphere  constitute  a  group  separate  and  apart 
from  the  other  nations  of  the  world."  .  .  .  This  feeling,  he  said, 
we  term  "  the  Pan- American  spirit,"  and  from  it  springs  the 
"  international  policy  of  Pan- Americanism."  Continuing,  he 
declared :  "  If  I  have  correctly  interpreted  Pan- Americanism 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  relations  of  our  governments  with 
those  beyond  the  seas,  it  is  in  entire  harmony  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  national  policy  of  the 
United  States;  Pan- Americanism  is  an  international  policy  of 
the  Americas.  The  motives  are  to  an  extent  different ;  the  ends 
sought  are  the  same.  Both  can  exist  and,  I  trust,  will  ever 
exist  in  all  their  vigor.  .  .  .  Pan- Americanism  is  an  expression 
of  the  idea  of  internationalism.  America  has  become  the 
guardian  of  that  idea,  which  will  in  the  end  rule  the  world. 
Pan-Americanism  is  the  most  advanced  as  well  as  the  most 
practical  form  of  that  idea.  It  has  been  made  possible  because 
of  our  geographical  isolation,  of  our  similar  political  institu- 
tions, and  of  our  common  conception  of  human  rights."  n 

In  a  speech  delivered  before  the  Pan- American  Financial 
Conference,  which  also  met  at  Washington  in  1915,  Mr.  John 
Bassett  Moore  declared  that  the  idea  of  America's  being  not 
simply  a  geographical  term,  but  a  term  representing  a  com- 
munity of  interests,  has  existed  so  long  that  there  is  a  fair 
presumption  that  it  is  not  a  term  that  misleads  us,  but  a  term 
that  is  thoroughly  and  persistently  leading  us  in  the  right  di- 
rection. Continuing,  he  said:  "  The  word  'America/  be- 

10  Scott,  President  Wilson's  Foreign  Policy,  129. 

11  World  Peace  Foundation,  Pamphlet  Series,  VI,  99-101. 


10         PAST-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

ginning  with  the  early  part  of  the  last  century,  during  the 
struggles  of  our  neighbors  for  independence,  represented  the 
idea  of  a  community  of  political  interests,  in  which,  as  Henry 
Clay  said,  we  should  be  regarded  as  standing  together  for  the 
establishment  of  a  human  freedom  league;  and  this  idea  has 
gradually  advanced  until  to-day  we  are  undertaking  to  estab- 
lish a  community  of  interests  with  regard  to  all  our  activities. 
.  .  .  Identity  of  political  interests  we  have  had  for  many  years. 
We  now  proceed  to  make  the  circuit  complete  by  establishing 
the  identity  of  our  material  interests  on  the  broad  basis  of  jus- 
tice, contentment,  and  good-fellowship."  12 

In  the  introduction  to  his  "  Principles  of  American  Di- 
plomacy," Mr.  Moore  makes  the  following  important  statement : 

"  The  idea  of  Pan- Americanism  is  obviously  derived  from  the 
conception  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  an  American  system; 
that  this  system  is  based  upon  distinctive  interests  which  the 
American  countries  have  in  common ;  and  that  it  is  independent 
of  and  different  from  the  European  system.  To  the  extent  to 
which  Europe  should  become  implicated  in  American  politics, 
or  to  which  American  countries  should  become  implicated  in 
European  politics,  this  distinction  would  necessarily  be  broken 
down,  and  the  foundations  of  the  American  system  would  be 
impaired;  and  to  the  extent  to  which  the  foundations  of  the 
American  system  were  impaired,  Pan-Americanism  would  lose 
its  vitality  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  its  accustomed  and  tangible 
meaning."  13 

The  views  of  representative  men  of  the  other  republics  of 
the  continent  must  now  be  considered ;  for  Pan- Americanism  is 
not  what  only  one  of  the  American  family  of  nations  may  con- 
ceive it  to  be.  It  is  what  the  common  opinion  and  the  common 
action  of  all  the  states  concerned  make  it. 

The  government  of  Peru,  in  replying  to  the  invitation  of  the 
United  States  to  take  part  in  the  first  International  American 

12  Proceedings  of  the  First  Pan- American  Financial  Congress,  481. 
is  Moore,  John  Bassett,  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  X. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  11 

Conference  at  Washington,  declared  that  the  idea  of  increasing 
and  strengthening  the  bonds  which  connect  the  American  na- 
tions with  each  other,  and  in  this  way  improving  for  the  com- 
mon good  the  opportunities  afforded  by  their  geographical  po- 
sition, and  affording  the  union  which  nature  itself  created 
when  it  filled  this  continent  with  a  galaxy  of  free,  independent, 
vigorous,  and  youthful  nations,  was  necessarily  hailed  by  the 
government  of  Peru  with  feelings  of  sympathy  and  good  will.14 
In  the  addresses  made  by  the  Hispanic-American  delegates  in 
the  conference  there  also  occur  many  expressions  of  a  similar 
nature.  It  was  not  until  some  time  later,  however,  that  any- 
thing approximating  a  definition  of  Pan-Americanism  was  set 
forth  by  leading  men  of  the  Latin  republics. 

In  a  report  which  the  Argentine  delegation  made  to  the  sec- 
ond International  American  Conference,  it  was  declared: 

"  In  order  that  Pan-Americanism  be  not  ...  a  mere  thesis 
under  discussion,  and  that  the  recommendations  and  the  pro- 
fessions of  principles  may  not  remain  idle  words,  it  is  necessary 
to  descend  from  abstract  heights,  to  conform  ourself  to  the 
spirit  of  modern  times,  and  to  map  out  the  great  lines  of  a 
positive  policy,  inspired  in  justice,  in  equality,  in  territorial 
integrity,  and  in  commercial  relations,  founded  upon  a  compe- 
tition open  to  all."  15 

A  few  months  before  the  meeting  of  the  third  International 
American  Conference  at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  in  1906,  a  special  ses- 
sion of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science 
was  held  at  Philadelphia  in  honor  of  Senor  don  Joaquin  D. 
Casasus,  Mexican  ambassador  at  Washington.  The  subject  for 
discussion  was  the  Pan-American  conferences  and  their  signifi- 
cance. Speaking  of  the  tendency  of  nations,  as  time  elapses,  to 
meet  more  frequently  in  conferences  and  congresses  for  the  pur- 
pose of  avoiding  conflicts,  dissipating  prejudices,  reestablishing 


.  Am.  Conf.  (1889-90),  I,  22. 
10  Informe   que  la  Delegacidn  Argentina  Presenta  a   la  Segunda   Con- 
ferenoia  Pan-Americana,  3. 


12        PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

peace,  and  for  other  similar  purposes,  Senor  Casasus  declared 
that  the  labors  of  the  Pan- American  Conferences  were  for  con- 
cord and  peace;  that  they  did  not  seek,  like  the  Congress  of 
Laibach  or  that  of  Vienna,  to  restore  a  form  of  government 
and  authorize  a  nation  to  reconquer  her  colonies;  that  they 
were  not  inspired,  as  was  the  Congress  of  Panama,  with  the 
necessity  of  uniting  the  persecuted  to  resist  the  attacks  of  a 
common  aggressor;  but  that  they  sought  rather  the  union  of 
all  in  common  effort,  and  the  establishment  of  a  basis  of  peace 
by  means  of  the  amicable  solution  of  international  conflicts.16 

In  an  address  which  he  made  upon  his  election  as  per- 
manent president  of  the  third  International  American  Confer- 
ence, Senhor  Nabuco,  for  many  years  Brazilian  ambassador  to 
the  United  States,  declared  that  the  aim  of  the  conferences  was 
intended  to  be  the  creation  of  an  American  opinion  and  of  an 
American  public  spirit.  He  believed  that  they  should  never 
aim  at  forcing  the  opinion  of  a  single  one  of  the  nations  taking 
part  in  them ;  that  in  no  case  should  they  intervene  collectively 
in  the  affairs  or  interests  that  the  various  nations  might  wish 
to  reserve  for  their  own  exclusive  deliberation.  "  To  us,"  he 
said,  "  it  seems  that  the  great  object  of  these  conferences  should 
be  to  express  collectively  what  is  already  understood  to  be 
unanimous,  to  unite,  in  the  interval,  between  one  and  another 
what  may  already  have  completely  ripened  in  the  opinion  of 
the  continent,  and  to  impart  to  it  the  power  resulting  from 
an  accord  amongst  all  American  nations."  17 

Two  years  later  Senhor  Nabuco  declared  on  the  occasion 
of  the  laying  of  the  corner  stone  of  the  building  of  the  Pan- 
American  Union  at  Washington,  that  there  had  never  been  a 
parallel  for  the  sight  which  that  ceremony  presented  — "  that 
of  twenty-one  nations,  of  different  languages,  building  together 
a  house  for  their  common  deliberations."  Continuing,  he  said : 

i«  "  Proceedings  of  Special  Session  of  the  Am.  Acad.  of  Pol.  and  Soc. 
Science,  February  24,  1906,  7. 

.  Am.  Con/.  (1906),  report  of  the  delegates  of  the  U.  S.,  57. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  13 

"  The  more  impressive  is  the  scene  as  these  countries,  with  all 
possible  differences  between  them  in  size  and  population,  have 
established  their  union  on  the  basis  of  the  most  absolute  equal- 
ity. Here  the  vote  of  the  smallest  balances  the  vote  of  the 
greatest.  So  many  sovereign  states  would  not  have  been  drawn 
so  spontaneously  and  so  strongly  together,  as  if  by  irresistible 
force,  if  there  did  not  exist  throughout  them,  at  the  bottom 
or  at  the  top  of  each  national  conscience,  the  feeling  of  a  destiny 
common  to  all  America."  18 

At  the  opening  session  of  the  third  International  American 
Conference,  the  Brazilian  statesman,  Baron  de  Eio  Branco,  in 
adverting  to  the  fact  that  the  meeting  of  the  conference  might, 
perhaps,  give  rise  to  the  suspicion  that  an  international  league 
against  interests  not  represented  was  being  formed,  declared: 
"  It  is  necessary  therefore  to  affirm  that,  formally  or  im- 
plicitly, all  interests  will  be  respected  by  us ;  that  in  the  discus- 
sions of  political  and  commercial  subjects  submitted  for  con- 
sideration to  the  conference  it  is  not  our  intention  to  work 
against  anybody,  and  that  our  sole  aim  is  to  bring  about  a 
closer  union  among  American  nations,  to  provide  for  their 
well-being  and  rapid  progress ;  and  the  accomplishment  of  these 
objects  can  only  be  of  advantage  to  Europe  and  the  rest  of  the 
world."  19 

At  the  special  session  of  the  third  International  American 
Conference  held  in  honor  of  Mr.  Root,  to  which  reference  has 
been  made  above,  Senor  Cornejo,  a  delegate  for  Peru,  made  in 
the  course  of  a  short  address  the  following  remarks: 

"  These  congresses,  gentlemen,  are  the  symbol  of  that  soli- 
darity which,  notwithstanding  the  ephemeral  passions  of  men, 
constitutes,  by  the  invincible  force  of  circumstances,  the  essence 
of  our  continental  system.  They  were  conceived  by  the  organ- 
izing genius  of  the  statesmen  of  Washington  in  order  that  the 
American  sentiment  of  patriotism  might  be  therein  exalted, 

is  Pan-American  Union  Bulletin,  May,  1908. 

i»/n*.  Am.  Con.  (1906),  report  of  the  delegates  of  the  U.  S.,  56. 


14        PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGHSnSTHSTGS 

freeing  it  from  that  national  egotism  which  may  be  justified 
in  the  difficult  moments  of  the  formation  of  states,  but  which 
would  be  to-day  an  impediment  to  the  development  of  the  Amer- 
ican idea,  destined  to  demonstrate  that  just  as  the  democratic 
principle  has  been  to  combine  liberty  and  order  in  the  consti- 
tution of  states,  it  will  likewise  combine  the  self-government  of 
the  nations  and  fraternity  in  the  relations  of  the  peoples."  20 

On  the  occasion  of  Mr.  Root's  visit  to  Uruguay,  the  president, 
Senor  Battle  y  Ordonez,  said  in  the  course  of  an  address  that 
America  will  be  the  continent  of  a  just  peace,  founded  on  the 
respect  for  the  rights  of  all  nations,  a  respect  as  great  for  the 
weakest  nations  as  for  the  most  vast  and  most  powerful  em- 
pires. A  Pan-American  public  opinion  would  be  created  and 
made  effective,  he  thought,  by  systematizing  international  con- 
duct with  a  view  to  suppressing  injustice,  and  to  establishing 
amongst  the  nations  ever  more  and  more  profoundly  cordial 
relations.  Continuing,  he  declared  that  the  Pan-American 
conferences  were  destined  to  become  a  modern  Amphictyon  to 
whose  decisions  all  the  great  American  questions  would  be 
submitted. 

Dr.  Luis  M.  Drago,  the  well-known  Argentine  publicist,  au- 
thor of  the  Drago  doctrine,  speaking  on  the  occasion  of  Mr. 
Root's  visit  to  Buenos  Aires,  said: 

"  Enlightened  patriotism  has  understood  at  last  that  in  this 
continent,  with  its  immense  riches  and  vast,  unexplored  exten- 
sions, power  and  wealth  are  not  to  be  looked  for  in  conquest 
and  displacement,  but  in  collaboration  and  solidarity,  which 
will  people  the  wilderness  and  give  the  soil  to  the  plow.  It 
has  understood,  however,  that  America,  by  reason  of  the  na- 
tionalities of  which  it  is  composed,  of  the  nature  of  the  repre- 
sentative institutions  which  they  have  adopted,  by  the  very 
character  of  their  peoples,  separated  as  they  have  been  from 
the  conflicts  and  complications  of  European  governments,  and 
even  by  the  gravitation  of  peculiar  circumstances  and  wants, 

20  Root,  Latin  America  and  the  U.  8.,  Addresses,  12. 


MEANING  OF  PAN- AMERICANISM  15 

has  been  constituted  a  separate  political  factor,  a  new  and  vast 
theater  for  the  development  of  the  human  race,  which  will 
serve  as  a  counterpoise  to  the  great  civilizations  of  the  other 
hemisphere,  and  so  maintain  the  equilibrium  of  the  world/'  21 

In  1910,  at  the  opening  session  of  the  fourth  International 
American  Conference,  the  Argentine  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, Dr.  V.  de  la  Plaza,  said : 

"  It  had  come  to  be  the  inveterate  custom  of  the  powers  to 
deliberate  among  themselves  on  the  destinies  of  incipient  and 
weak  nations,  as  if  dealing  with  states  or  sovereignties  pos- 
sessing neither  voice  nor  weight  in  the  control  and  develop- 
ment of  the  rules,  principles,  and  declarations  inherent  in  hu- 
man societies,  recognized  as  independent  and  sovereign  in  their 
international  relations.  This  condition  of  precarious  autonomy 
and  liberty  of  action,  and  the  constant  danger  of  being  sub- 
jugated or  of  suffering  the  mutilation  of  their  territory,  would 
have  continued  among  these  weak  states  but  for  the  wise  and 
famous  declaration  of  President  Monroe,  to  which  we  ought  to 
render  due  homage;  and  but  for  the  constant  action  of  other 
continental  powers  of  somewhat  greater  strength  in  the  defense 
of  their  territory  and  sovereignties  as  well  as  their  declared  in- 
tention to  cooperate  for  the  protection  of  those  states  which 
were  endowed  with  less  strength  and  fewer  means  of  self- 
defense."  22 

The  foregoing  statements  made  by  responsible  men  in  public 
life  in  the  Hispanic  American  republics  may  be  fairly  con- 
sidered as  representative  of  the  best  thought  in  that  section  of 
the  continent.  It  is  not  to  be  inferred,  however,  that  unanim- 
ity of  opinion  exists.  On  the  contrary  there  is 'much  diversity 
and  not  a  few  writers  of  more  or  less  note,  and  occasionally 
men  in  public  life  advocate  a  closer  union  of  the  Hispanic 
states  for  the  purpose  of  resisting  the  threatening  (as  they 
believe)  encroachments  of  the  United  States.  These  views 

21  Root,  Latin  America  and  the  U.  8.,  Addresses,  95. 

22  Int.  Am.  Conf.  (1910),  report  of  the  delegates  of  the  U.  S.,  46. 


16        PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

need  not  be  discussed  at  length.  A  bare  reference  to  two  or 
three  of  the  best-known  writers  of  this  group  will  suffice.  A 
Illusdo  Americana  by  a  Brazilian,  Eduardo  Prado,  is  typical. 
Appearing  some  three  decades  ago,  soon  after  the  establishment 
of  the  Brazilian  republic,  this  book  expressed  great  skepticism 
respecting  the  fraternity  of  the  American  nations  in  general, 
and  manifested  particularly  a  hostile  spirit  toward  the  tendency 
of  the  Hispanic  republics  to  establish  more  intimate  relations 
with  the  United  States.  More  recently  an  Argentine  writer, 
Manuel  Ugarte,  has  gained  an  extensive  notoriety  by  his  propa- 
ganda against  Pan- Americanism.  His  ideas  are  set  forth  in  a 
book  which  he  published  in  1911  under  the  title  of  El  Porvenir 
de  la  America  Latina.  Finally,  an  article  by  Jacinto  Lopez  on 
what  he  calls  Monroismo  y  Pan-Americanismo,  appearing  in 
Cuba  C ontempordnea  for  April,  1916,  may  be  taken  as  repre- 
sentative of  the  more  serious  adverse  criticisms  which  have  in 
recent  years  been  made  in  Hispanic  American  periodicals. 
Monroeism,  according  to  this  writer,  means  empire,  and  Pan- 
Americanism  is  the  mask  of  imperialism.  The  significance  of 
Monroeism,  he  thinks,  is  clear;  but  Pan- Americanism  is  am- 
biguous, incomprehensible,  susceptible  of  all  sorts  of  interpre- 
tations. The  remedy  for  the  situation,  in  Lopez's  opinion,  is 
to  be  found  in  the  union  of  Hispanic  American  states  as  a  coun- 
terpoise to  the  preponderant  influence  of  the  United  States. 

On  the  other  hand  such  opinions  are  offset  by  those  of  other 
Hispanic  American  writers  and  publicists  who  in  a  private  ca- 
pacity maintain  and  justify  the  existence  of  Pan- Americanism. 
Alejandro  Alvarez,  a  Chilean  publicist,  viewing  the  subject 
from  the  historical  standpoint,  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  notion 
of  international  solidarity  is  essentially  American  and  that  it 
manifested  itself  in  most  brilliant  fashion  in  the  struggle  of  the 
Spanish  colonies  for  independence.  This  sense  of  unity  which 
existed  between  the  belligerent  Spanish  colonies  was,  he  be- 
lieves, different  in  its  origin  and  in  its  manifestations  from  the 
sentiment  of  international  fraternity  about  which  certain  of  the 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  17 

eighteenth-century  philosophers  had  written.  The  sentiment, 
however,  according  to  Alvarez,  did  not  develop  between  the  new 
Spanish  American  nations  and  Brazil,  because  there  was  no 
common  action  in  the  struggle  for  independence.  When  Brazil 
became  an  empire  in  1822,  it  was  still  regarded  as  semi-Euro- 
pean. 

Between  the  new  Spanish  American  powers  and  the  United 
States,  on  the  other  hand,  there  existed  a  solidarity,  different, 
it  is  true,  from  the  other,  but  no  less  effective.  That  soli- 
darity, though  it  did  not  yet  embrace  Brazil,  was,  according 
to  Alvarez,  Pan- American.  It  had  its  basis  in  the  fact  that 
the  struggling  colonies  were  in  the  same  continent  with  the 
United  States;  that  the  United  States  had  a  few  years  before 
conducted  a  similar  struggle  to  achieve  its  freedom;  that  it 
furnished  a  model  for  the  political  institutions  of  the  new 
states;  and  that  it  could  establish  economic  relations  with  the 
new  nations  with  greater  facility  than  with  the  countries  of 
Europe.23 

What  Alvarez  calls  Latin  American  solidarity  —  that  is  the 
unity  of  the  Spanish-speaking  states  with  Brazil  —  did  not 
develop,  according  to  his  view,  until  about  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  It  was  then  brought  about  by  the  identity 
of  political  and  international  problems  with  which  the  Latin 
states  were  all  alike  confronted.  Thus,  according  to  this  writer, 
there  are  three  phases  of  American  solidarity  —  Spanish  Amer- 
ican, Pan-American,  and  Latin  American,  which  developed  in 
the  order  named.24  Some  further  views  of  Senor  Alvarez  will 
be  noted  below. 

In  Cuba  Contempordnea  for  October,  1916,  there  was  pub- 
lished a  lengthy  article  on  Pan-Americanism  by  the  well-known 
Peruvian  writer,  Francisco  Garcia  Calderon.  The  following 
extracts  will  give  a  fair  idea  of  his  conception  of  Pan-Ameri- 
canism : 

as  La  Diplomacia  de  Chile,  65. 

2*  Alvarez,  Droit  International  Am&ricain,  245. 


18         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

"  The  likeness  of  peoples  whom  a  doctrine  and  a  policy  strive 
to  unite  is  not  always  complete.  They  may  differ  in  religion 
as  is  the  case  with  the  diverse  dominions  of  the  Slavs,  or  the 
different  provinces  of  German  speech.  The  systems  of  govern- 
ment of  the  Spaniards  of  the  Old  and  of  the  New  World  are 
diverse  as  also  is  the  case  with  Saxons  of  the  Monarchical 
Island  and  the  Republican  Continent.  Among  the  immense 
number  of  Slavs  the  creed,  the  language,  the  customs,  and  po- 
litical order  vary ;  and  yet  they  are  moved  by  a  common  spirit. 
In  America,  unity  is  geographical  and  moral.  Republicanism, 
liberalism,  democracy,  tolerance,  constitute  from  north  to  south 
aspects  of  a  common  social  gospel.  Germanized  Saxons  and 
Latinized  Spaniards  succeed  in  defining  similar  aspirations  and 
aversions.  Though  the  North  American  is  Protestant  and  the 
Ibero- American  is  Catholic;  though  they  speak  different  lan- 
guages and  respond  to  a  different  logic,  yet  they  derive  from 
like  lands,  from  a  uniform  system  of  government,  from  a  growth 
free  from  secular  traditions,  from  the  absence  of  rigid  castes, 
from  a  community  of  generous  principles,  such  as  arbitration 
and  the  love  of  peace,  and  from  general  enterprises  of  utility, 
an  active  Pan- Americanism,  theory  and  militant  reality,  prac- 
tical crusade  and  romantic  apostleship. 

"  It  is  not,  as  in  the  book  of  Mr.  Stead,25  a  plan  for  the 
Americanization  of  the  southern  continent,  a  mask  for  pacific 
penetration.  Whoever  defines  this  international  system  fixes 
its  characteristics  in  free  competition,  and  in  organization  based 
upon  harmonious  wills,  and  closer  relations  of  peoples  who 
neither  obey  the  command  of  a  despotic  overlord,  nor  renounce, 
upon  associating,  a  strong  spirit  of  nationalism.  Although  in 
the  history  of  the  last  century  violence  frequently  prevailed 
over  union  and  the  expansion  of  the  strongest  was  transformed 
into  conquest,  yet  upon  the  development  of  a  Pan-American 
ambition  the  United  States  announces  that  the  era  of  unjust 
policy  is  at  an  end  and  that  in  the  new  moral  federation  con- 
as  W.  T.  Stead,  The  Americanization  of  the  World. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  19 

sent  is  an  essential  virtue.  ...  In  ideal  Pan-Americanism, 
free  from  ancient  appetites,  fraternal  republics  construct  an 
economic  and  moral  association,  formulate  aspirations  for  lib- 
erty and  for  peace  which  will  affect  continents  grown  old  in 
wars  of  spoliation  and  slavery." 

The  views  of  a  sufficient  number  of  representative  men  of 
both  North  and  South  America  have  now  been  set  forth  to 
show  whether  or  not  there  is  a  consensus  of  opinion  as  to  the 
general  characteristics  of  Pan-Americanism.  Before  any  at- 
tempt is  made,  however,  to  deduce  from  these  particulars  and 
from  the  pertinent  facts  of  international  American  relations  a 
concise  description  of  Pan- Americanism,  it  is  indispensable  to 
inquire  into  a  point  about  which  there  is  some  difference  of 
opinion ;  namely,  the  doctrine  of  equality  as  applied  to  certain 
of  the  republics  of  this  hemisphere.  In  this  question  is  in- 
volved the  position  of  the  United  States  in  the  American  fam- 
ily of  nations. 

The  equality  of  nations  as  a  principle  of  international  law 
is  not  universally  accepted.  Lorimer,  for  example,  says: 
"  Men  are  not  and  never  will  be,  equal :  their  equalization  is 
not  within  the  reach  of  human  will ;  and  as  the  inequalities  of 
classes  and  the  inequalities  of  states  are  the  direct  and  neces- 
sary results  of  the  inequalities  of  individuals,  they  are  equally 
certain  and  equally  permanent.  However  fondly  the  dream 
of  equality  may  be  cherished  by  the  envious  or  the  vain,  whether 
it  be  manifested  as  an  individual  or  a  natural  aspiration,  it  is 
a  chimera  as  unrealizable  as  the  union  of  the  head  of  a  woman 
and  the  tail  of  a  fish."  But  he  goes  on  to  say  that  "  To  the 
same  category  of  absolute  impossibilities  belong  all  schemes 
which,  in  this  changing  world,  assume  as  existing,  or  seek  to 
establish,  permanent  relations  of  superiority  or  inferiority, 
whether  between  individuals,  or  classes,  or  states,  in  place  of 
accepting  as  their  basis  the  facts  presented  by  the  contemporary 
history  of  mankind."  26 

26  Institutes  of  the  Law  of  Nations,  II,  193. 


20         PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

The  weight  of  opinion,  however,  from  Grotius  to  the  present 
time  supports  the  doctrine  of  equality.  Phillipson,  in  a  recent 
edition  of  Wheaton,  says  that  sovereign  states  possessing  legal 
personality  as  members  of  the  society  of  nations  enjoy  equal- 
ity before  international  law;  but  that  from  the  political  point 
of  view  it  cannot  be  said  that  all  the  states  of  the  world  are 
equal.  "  In  Europe  the  concert  of  the  six  great  powers,  and 
on  the  American  continent  the  United  States,"  he  says,  "  exer- 
cise a  leadership  which,  in  each  case,  is  real  and  possesses  the 
greatest  weight,  though  it  is  not  determined  by  definite  rules."  27 

Westlake,  one  of  the  profoundest  of  recent  writers  on  inter- 
national law,  says  on  the  subject  of  the  political  inequality  of 
states  in  Europe  that  "  when  a  matter  arises,  and  the  states 
which  are  agreed  as  to  the  mode  of  dealing  with  it  carry  their 
plan  into  effect  as  far  as  it  is  possible  to  do  so  by  their  own 
action,  without  directly  compelling  a  state  which  does  not  agree 
with  them  to  join  in  their  action  and  without  directly  affecting 
that  state,  they  do  not  violate  its  independence.  But  their  ac- 
tion may  indirectly  compel  that  state  to  join  in  it,  or  to  endure 
without  opposition  a  conduct  which  it  deems  to  affect  it  in- 
juriously though  indirectly,  or  of  which  it  disapproves  in  the 
general  interest  of  the  European  system.  In  that  case  a  po- 
litical victory  has  been  gained  over  the  state  in  question.  And 
a  state  may  be  so  weak  that  it  is  not  much  or  at  all  consulted 
by  the  other  powers,  and  that  little  attention  is  paid  to  its 
opinion,  if  given.  In  that  case  it  is  in  a  position  of  political 
inferiority,  and  many  states  of  the  European  system  are  per- 
manently in  such  a  situation  toward  what  are  called  the  great 
powers,  yet  their  equality  is  not  necessarily  infringed 
thereby."  28 

Declaring  that  at  no  time  in  no  quarter  of  the  globe  can 
small  states  ever  have  been  admitted  by  large  ones  to  political 
equality  with  themselves,  Westlake  reviews  the  control  of  Euro- 

ZT  Wheaton' 8  Elements  of  International  Law,  261. 
zs  Collected  Papers,  92. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  21 

pean  affairs  during  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  by 
the  great  powers,  and  reaches  the  conclusion  that  a  certain  sort 
of  political  inequality  is  compatible  in  the  European  system 
with  legal  equality.  This  fact  he  thinks  is  not  one  to  be  con- 
demned ;  for  it  may  prove  to  be  a  step  toward  the  establishment 
of  a  European  government,  and  in  no  society,  he  holds,  can 
peace  and  order  be  permanently  enjoyed  without  a  government. 

If,  then,  such  political  inequality  as  has  long  subsisted  in 
Europe  is  not  incompatible  with  legal  equality  —  equality  be- 
fore international  law  —  it  follows  that  in  the  American  fam- 
ily of  nations  political  inequality,  if  it  exists,  is  not  incom- 
patible with  legal  equality.  It  will  be  remarked  that  Westlake 
makes  no  specific  reference  to  the  American  situation.  Law- 
rence points  out  the  disparity  in  strength  and  influence  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  any  other  power  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  and  he  accords  to  this  republic  because  of  its  pre- 
ponderant strength  and  influence  a  position  in  America  sim- 
ilar to  that  occupied  in  Europe  by  the  great  powers.  But  he 
is  careful  to  point  out  differences,  the  most  important  of  which 
is  that  the  United  States  is  not  called  upon  in  the  exercise  of 
its  primacy  to  dictate  territorial  arrangements  with  a  view  to 
maintaining  a  shifting  balance  of  power.29  This  difference  is 
so  fundamental  and  the  preponderant  influence  of  the  United 
States  is  exercised  in  a  manner  so  different  from  the  way  in 
which  the  European  concert  is  made  effective,  that  the  com- 
parison between  the  two  systems  is  hardly  valid.  The  marks 
of  contrast  are  rather  more  striking. 

In  1895  there  occurred  an  incident  which  led  not  a  few 
observers  to  believe  that  the  United  States  contemplated  the 
assertion  of  its  preponderant  influence  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  reduce  the  less  powerful  American  states  to  a  species  of 
vassalage.  Reference  is  made  to  the  intervention  of  the  Cleve- 
land administration  in  the  boundary  dispute  between  Great 
Britain  and  Venezuela.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that  Secre- 

z»  Principles  of  International  Law,  242. 


22         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

tary  of  State  Olney  declared  in  his  instructions  of  July  20, 
1895,  to  Mr.  Bayard,  the  American  ambassador  at  London, 
that  "  To-day  the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  this 
continent,  and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  subjects  to  which  it  confines 
its  interposition  "  ;30  and  that  President  Cleveland  in  his  mes- 
sage to  Congress  on  December  17,  1895,  affirmed  that,  "  If  the 
balance  of  power  is  justly  a  cause  for  jealous  anxiety  among 
the  governments  of  the  Old  World  and  a  subject  for  our  abso- 
lute noninterference,  none  the  less  is  an  observance  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  of  vital  concern  to  our  people  and  their  govern- 
ment." 31 

The  statement  of  Secretary  Olney,  standing  alone,  is  per- 
haps susceptible  of  such  an  interpretation  as  was,  for  example, 
given  to  it  by  The  Nation  to  the  effect  that  it  was  "  the  first 
assertion  of  sovereignty  over  the  whole  Western  Hemisphere 
since  the  Pope's  Bull,  and,  of  course,  makes  us  responsible  for 
all  wrong-doing  from  Canada  to  Cape  Horn."  32  And  the 
words  of  President  Cleveland,  quoted  above,  give  color  to  the 
assumption  that  it  was  desired  to  have  the  United  States  oc- 
cupy a  position  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  similar  to  that 
occupied  by  the  great  powers  in  Europe.  Such  criticisms  were 
not  confined  to  the  United  States.  In  discussing  a  resolution 
defining  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which  had  been  introduced  into 
the  United  States  Congress  as  a  result  of  the  Anglo- Venezuelan 
boundary  agitation,  the  London  Times,  in  its  issue  of  January 
22,  1896,  says  that  it  was  understood  that  some  of  the  South 
American  republics  had  expressed  themselves  decidedly  against 
the  proposed  definition,  which  they  considered  would  impair 
their  independence  and  reduce  them  to  a  condition  of  vassalage 
to  the  United  States.  The  Paris  Temps  strongly  expressed  a 
similar  opinion  in  the  interests  of  the  minor  American  com- 
munities, while  entering  at  the  same  time  an  emphatic  protest 

so  Foreign  Rel.  of  the  U.  8.,  1895,  558. 
si  Id.,  543. 
82LXI,  469. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  23 

in  the  name  of  Europe  against  what  it  called  "  the  moral  an- 
nexation, pure  and  simple,  of  the  two  continents  of  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere."  33 

If  these  critics  had  paid  heed  to  Secretary  Olney's  instruc- 
tions as  a  whole,  their  criticisms,  no  doubt,  would  have  been 
less  severe.  After  making  the  declaration  that  to-day  the 
United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  this  continent,  Mr. 
Olney  goes  on  to  explain  what  he  means.  "  It  is  not/7  he 
said,  "  because  of  the  pure  friendship  or  good  will  felt  for  it. 
It  is  not  simply  by  reason  of  its  high  character  as  a  civilized 
state,  nor  because  wisdom  and  justice  and  equity  are  the  in- 
variable characteristics  of  the  dealings  of  the  United  States. 
It  is  because  in  addition  to  all  other  grounds,  its  infinite  re- 
sources combined  with  its  isolated  position  render  it  master  of 
the  situation  and  practically  invulnerable  as  against  any  or  all 
other  powers.  All  the  advantages  of  this  superiority  are  at 
once  imperiled  if  the  principle  be  admitted  that  European  pow- 
ers may  convert  American  states  into  colonies  or  provinces  of 
their  own."  34 

Moreover,  Mr.  Olney  expressly  disclaimed  any  intention  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  the  other  American  republics.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  he 
said,  "  Does  not  establish  any  general  protectorate  by  the  United 
States  over  the  other  American  states.  .  .  .  The  rule  in  ques- 
tion has  but  a  single  purpose  and  object.  It  is  that  no  Euro- 
pean power  or  combination  of  powers  shall  forcibly  deprive  an 
American  state  of  the  right  and  power  of  self-government  and 
of  shaping  for  itself  its  own  political  fortunes  and  destinies."  35 

Subsequently  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  Cuba 
and  certain  other  republics  in  the  region  of  the  Caribbean  have 
led  to  renewed  discussion.  According  to  Phillipson,36  Cuba, 
since  the  treaty  of  June  12,  1901,  by  which  the  island  was 

33  Cf.  also  Des  Jardins  in  Revue  General  de  Droit  Int.  Public,  III,  159. 

34  For.  Rel  of  the  U.  8.,  1895,  558. 

35  For.  Rel.  of  the  U.  8.,  1895,  554. 

3«  Wheaton's  Elements  of  Int.  Law,  63. 


24        PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

made  over  to  the  Cuban  people,  has  occupied,  with  respect  to 
the  United  States,  a  position  which  "  seems  "  to  bring  it  within 
the  category  of  international  protectorates.  Though  it  man- 
ages its  own  internal  and  external  affairs,  it  is  precluded  from 
entering  into  any  treaty  with  a  foreign  power  which  might 
endanger  its  independence;  and  it  undertakes  to  contract  no 
debt  for  which  the  current  revenue  will  not  suffice,  and  to  con- 
cede to  the  United  States  the  right  of  intervention  to  preserve 
Cuban  independence,  to  maintain  a  government  adequate  for 
the  protection  of  life,  property,  and  individual  liberty,  and  the 
right  to  use  its  harbors  as  naval  stations. 

Phillipson,  however,  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  as  con- 
ditions are  at  present,  there  does  not  appear  to  be  unanimity 
of  opinion  as  to  the  precise  international  status  of  the  republic. 
Benton,  for  example,  in  his  International  Law  and  Diplomacy 
of  the  Spanish- American  War,  holds  that  it  is  a  fully  sover- 
eign state,  and  Whitcomb,  in  La  Situacion  International  de 
Cuba,  maintains  that  it  is  a  semi-sovereign  state.  But  even 
admitting  that  the  weak  constitutional  tie  by  which  Cuba  is 
bound  to  the  United  States  has  the  effect  of  reducing  it  to  the 
status  of  semi-sovereignty,  yet  since  other  states  accept  it  as 
being  sovereign  and  independent,  its  equality  remains  unim- 
paired ;  that  is,  the  identity  of  rights  and  obligations  for  all  is 
admitted;  which  is  merely  to  say  that  the  international  law 
which  they  recognize  is  a  body  of  general  rules  and  not  of  par- 
ticular solutions.87 

In  his  fifth  annual  message,  communicated  to  Congress  De- 
cember 5,  1905,  President  Roosevelt  discussed  the  relations  of 
the  United  States  with  the  Dominican  Republic,  which  may 
be  taken  as  a  case  typical  of  these  weaker  republics.  For  a 
number  of  years  conditions  in  that  republic  had  been  growing 
from  bad  to  worse,  until  finally,  according  to  Roosevelt,  society 
was  on  the  verge  of  dissolution.  Fortunately,  however,  a  ruler 
sprang  up  who,  with  his  colleagues,  saw  the  dangers  threatening 

»T  Westlake,  Collected  Papers,  89. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  25 

their  country  and  appealed  to  the  friendship  of  the  United 
States.  There  was  imminent  danger  of  foreign  intervention. 
The  previous  rulers  of  Santo  Domingo  had  recklessly  incurred 
debts;  and,  owing  to  internal  disorders,  the  republic  had  been 
unable  to  provide  means  to  meet  its  obligations.  Roosevelt  had 
accordingly  negotiated  a  treaty  under  which  the  United  States 
undertook  to  help  the  Dominican  people  rehabilitate  their 
finance  by  taking  charge  of  and  administering  their  custom- 
houses. The  treaty  at  the  time  this  message  was  sent  to  Con- 
gress was  pending  before  the  Senate.  An  intervention  such 
as  the  President  had  been  foreshadowing  in  his  previous  mes- 
sages had  at  last  taken  place.  And  in  his  message  of  December 
5,  giving  an  account  of  it  to  the  Congress,  he  said : 

"  We  must  recognize  the  fact  that  in  South  American  coun- 
tries there  has  been  much  suspicion  lest  we  should  interpret 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  in  some  way  inimical  to  their  interests, 
and  we  must  try  to  convince  all  the  other  nations  of  this  con- 
tinent once  and  for  all  that  no  just  and  orderly  government  has 
anything  to  fear  from  us.  There  are  certain  republics  to  the 
south  of  us  which  have  already  reached  such  a  point  of  sta- 
bility, order,  and  prosperity  that  they  themselves,  though  as 
yet  hardly  consciously,  are  among  the  guarantors  of  this  doc- 
trine. These  republics  we  now  meet  not  only  on  a  basis  of 
entire  equality,  but  in  a  spirit  of  frank  and  respectful  friend- 
ship, which  we  hope  is  mutual.  .  .  .  Under  the  proposed  treaty 
the  independence  of  the  island  is  scrupulously  respected,  the 
danger  of  the  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  the  interven- 
tion of  foreign  powers  vanishes,  and  the  interference  of  our 
government  is  minimized,  so  that  we  shall  only  act  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  Santo  Domingo  authorities  to  secure  the  proper 
administration  of  the  customs,  and  therefore  to  secure  the  pay- 
ment of  just  debts  and  to  secure  the  Dominican  Government 
from  demands  for  unjust  debts."  38  This  treaty  failed  of  rati- 
fication; but  a  new  one  was  concluded  and  ratified  in  1907. 

38  The  Works  of  Theodore  Roosevelt,  IV,  607. 


26         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

In  the  addresses  which  he  delivered  on  his  South  American 
trip  in  1913,  Mr.  Roosevelt  made  statements  which  clearly  in- 
dicate a  classification  of  the  American  states  in  two  categories : 
those  enjoying  political  equality  with  the  United  States  and 
those  politically  inferior.  He  nowhere  says  or  implies,  of 
course,  that  all  American  states  do  not  enjoy  legal  equality. 
This  difference  must  be  kept  in  mind  in  interpreting  his  re- 
marks. In  an  address  delivered  at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  he  said,  in 
speaking  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  that  "  all  of  the  American 
nations  which  are  sufficiently  advanced,  such  as  Brazil  and  the 
United  States,  should  participate  on  an  absolute  equality  in  the 
responsibility  and  development  of  this  doctrine,  as  far  as  the 
interests  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  as  a  whole  are  con- 
cerned." 89 

At  Buenos  Aires  he  declared  that  certain  of  the  Hispanic 
American  nations  had  grown  with  astonishing  speed  to  a  posi- 
tion of  assured  and  orderly  political  development,  material 
prosperity,  readiness  to  do  justice  to  others,  and  potential 
strength  to  enforce  justice  from  others.  "  Every  such  na- 
tion," he  continued,  "  when  once  it  has  achieved  such  a  posi- 
tion, should  become  itself  a  sponsor  and  guarantor  of  the  doc- 
trine; and  its  relations  with  the  other  sponsors  and  guarantors 
should  be  those  of  equality."  40  In  Chile,  Roosevelt  declared 
that  relations  between  certain  Hispanic  American  countries, 
among  which  he  included  Chile,  were  based  on  exact  equality 
of  right  and  mutuality  of  respect.41 

Representative  of  the  best  Hispanic  American  opinion  on 
this  subject  are  the  views  of  Dr.  Emilio  Frers,  who,  on  the 
occasion  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  visit  to  Buenos  Aires  in  1913,  ad- 
mitted the  political  inequality  of  certain  American  states  with- 
out conceding  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  intervene  in  the 

3»  The  Outlook,  CV,  474. 

40  Frers,  American  Ideals,  23. 

«  Souvenir  of  the  Visit  of  Colonel  Roosevelt  to  Chile,  47. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  27 

affairs  of  those  states  either  for  their  own  good  or  in  the  inter- 
ests of  the  American  republics  in  general.  He  said : 

"  The  nations  of  Latin  America  will  not  feel  at  their  ease 
so  long  as  they  do  not  rest  in  the  security  that  no  master  may 
arise  for  them  either  from  within  or  from  without,  and  that 
no  one,  no  matter  where  he  may  come  from,  may  place  in  dan- 
ger their  integrity  or  their  independence  and  sovereignty.  The 
sentiment  of  nationality  and  of  independence  is  so  deeply  rooted 
and  is  so  exalted  among  these  nations,  that  it  perhaps  consti- 
tutes the  dominant  feature  of  their  patriotism.  .  .  .  Fortu- 
nately there  are  now  many  states  in  South  America  which  have 
well  implanted  institutions  and  which  have  fully  entered  upon 
an  orderly  and  constitutional  life.  The  Argentine  republic, 
among  them,  may  rest  in  the  confidence  of  its  own  advances. 
.  .  .  But  her  origin  and  her  history  inevitably  bind  her  to  the 
other  Spanish  American  nations,  and  if,  perchance,  her  people 
feel  inclined  to  recognize  the  necessity  of  imposing  peace  and 
civilization  on  those  who  are  fulfilling  a  less  happy  destiny 
than  hers,  I  do  not  think  it  would  sympathize  with  the  idea  of 
acknowledging  the  right  of  rich  and  powerful  nations  to  rise  up 
in  self -constituted  authority  and  judgment  over  the  weaker  and 
more  disorderly  nations,  or  to  impose  penalties  upon  them,  even 
though  it  be  for  their  offenses  against  civilization." 

Dr.  Frers  foreshadowed  a  possible  solution  of  the  difficulty 
in  the  following  words :  "  Perhaps  it  may  not  be  difficult  to 
find  the  solution  which  is  inevitably  produced  whenever  turbu- 
lent or  disorderly  states  commit  offenses  against  civilization 
and  expose  the  prestige  of  the  entire  continent.  Perhaps  in  a 
more  or  less  distant  future  some  high  authority  may  be  con- 
stituted Which  shall  have  jurisdiction  in  these  questions  of 
offenses  against  civilization,  which  may  settle  such  questions 
with  absolute  impartiality,  and  which  may  acquire  confidence 
and  establish  peace.  The  undeniable  fact  is  that  some  means 
must  be  sought  for  to  resolve  these  conflicts  between  the  right 


28         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

to  independence  and  autonomy  and  the  supreme  right  of  Amer- 
ican civilization  which  must  be  defended  as  the  common  heritage 
of  the  New  World."  42 

With  a  brief  reference  to  the  views  of  Dr.  Alejandro  Al- 
varez, the  eminent  Chilean  authority,  this  discussion  must  be 
brought  to  a  close.  According  to  Dr.  Alvarez  43  the  first  part 
of  the  Monroe  message  of  1823  contained  an  implicit  recogni- 
tion of  the  political  equality  of  all  the  states  of  the  New  World 
and  consequently  the  negation  of  the  right  of  one  state  to  in- 
tervene in  the  affairs  of  the  others.  But  this  idea,  Alvarez 
affirms,  has  not  been  adhered  to  by  the  United  States,  espe- 
cially since  the  development  of  its  hegemony,  which  he  defines 
as  the  exercise  by  the  United  States  of  preponderance  when 
its  interests  are  involved. 

Calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  policy  of  hegemony 
applies  almost  exclusively  to  the  countries  in  the  neighborhood 
of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea,  Alvarez  declares 
that  the  policy  is  the  inevitable  fruit  of  the  prodigious  and 
rapid  development  of  the  United  States  and  of  its  great  terri- 
torial, economic  and  maritime  superiority,  compared  with  the 
other  American  republics.  What  has  contributed  to  its  success 
is  the  fact  that  it  is  always  presented  as  the  logical  consequence 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  the  powerful  states,  far  from  op- 
posing it,  have  always  respected  it.  It  is  interesting  to  note, 
says  Alvarez,  that  in  certain  cases  where  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
might  have  been  applied  it  was  not  invoked,  and  that  frequently 
it  is  invoked  as  an  act  of  hegemony,  in  order  to  make  it  appear 
as  being  founded  in  a  traditional  policy,  generally  accepted. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  publicists  seldom  distinguish  between 
the  one  policy  and  the  other;  that  is,  between  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine and  hegemony. 

Alvarez  maintains  that  the  hegemony  of  the  United  States 
takes  two  distinct  forms,  corresponding  to  different  situations. 

42  American  Ideals,  15. 
48  Droit  Int.  Am.,  13«. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  29 

The  first  he  calls  a  policy  of  the  maintenance,  application,  and 
development  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  this  form  of  the 
policy  the  United  States  voices  the  needs  and  aspirations  of  the 
whole  of  America.  Under  the  second  form  the  policy  becomes 
personal;  that  is,  it  becomes  a  policy  (1)  aimed  at  assuring  the 
preponderance  of  the  United  States  in  the  New  World,  and  (2) 
a  policy  of  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  certain  Latin  American 
states.  Recognizing  the  benefits  which  the  American  republics 
have  derived  from  the  hegemony  of  the  United  States  as  well 
as  from  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  Alvarez  raises  the  question 
whether  it  might  not  be  better  for  both  policies  to  be  maintained 
by  the  active  cooperation  of  all  the  American  states.  He  thinks 
he  is  able  to  note  in  recent  events  a  tendency  in  this  direction. 

It  may  be  said  in  passing  that  the  supremacy  which  the 
United  States  enjoys  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  by  virtue  of 
its  preponderant  strength  and  influence  and  which  it  main- 
tains under  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  cannot  be  in  any  historical 
sense  of  the  word  properly  denominated  hegemony.  The  hege- 
mony of  Athens  was  imperialistic.  Athens  stood  in  the  rela- 
tion of  sovereign  to  certain  members  of  the  Delian  League. 
The  league  was  not  one  of  equal  states.  And  if  in  the  Pelo- 
ponnesian  confederation  the  states  were  equal,  the  hegemony 
of  Sparta  was  military  in  its  nature.  Its  leadership  was  exer- 
cised for  the  purpose  of  waging  war  more  effectively  upon 
other  states.  And  finally  the  supremacy  of  Prussia  in  the  Ger- 
man Confederation,  to  which  the  term  has  often  been  applied, 
was  wholly  different  from  the  position  of  the  United  States  in 
the  American  family  of  nations.  Though  admitting  that  the 
United  States  is  preponderant,  it  is  undoubtedly  misleading  to 
call  its  preponderance  hegemony.  It  is  better,  therefore,  to 
avoid  the  term  unless  a  definite  meaning  such  as  that  given  to 
it  by  Alvarez  in  his  Droit  International  Americain  be  agreed 
upon.  And  even  then  its  two  aspects,  as  defined  by  him,  are 
likely  to  lead  to  confusion. 

The  attempt  must  now  be  made  to  deduce  from  this  lengthy 


30         PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNING'S 

discussion  a  description  of  Pan-Americanism  as  exact  and  as 
concise  as  the  nature  of  the  conception  will  permit.  It  has  al- 
ready been  found  that  the  lexicographers  do  not  agree  among 
themselves  as  to  the  precise  meaning  of  the  term.  Indeed  it 
may  well  be  doubted  whether  an  adequate  definition  per  genus 
et  differentia  is  possible.  As  genus  none  of  the  terms  employed 
—  principle,  advocacy,  idea,  sentiment,  aspiration,  tendency, 
doctrine  —  satisfies  the  logical  and  inquiring  mind  as  to  what 
the  real  nature  of  Pan- Americanism  is.  And  even  though  the 
genus  were  agreed  upon  the  differentiae  of  these  set  definitions 
would  still  fail  to  describe  the  concept  in  a  manner  sufficiently 
explicit.  A  choice  from  among  the  various  descriptions  given 
by  statesmen  and  publicists  would  be  but  little  more  satisfactory. 
Mr.  Lansing  calls  Pan-Americanism  an  international  policy 
of  the  Americas.  Now  a  policy  may  be  defined  as  a  course  of 
action  adopted  and  pursued,  or  intended  to  be  pursued,  by  a 
government,  party,  ruler,  statesmen,  or  by  some  nonpolitical 
body  or  by  an  individual.  If  Pan- Americanism  is  a  policy, 
what  is  the  body  which  adopts  and  pursues  the  course  of  action 
which  makes  it  effective  ?  Evidently  it  cannot  be  a  policy  with- 
out such  a  formulating  and  directing  force.  Does  the  Interna- 
tional Union  of  American  Republics,  formed  in  1890,  consti- 
tute such  a  body  ?  It  is  with  the  greatest  difficulty  that  it  may 
be  so  conceived.  The  course  of  action  which  this  union  adopts 
in  its  periodical  conferences,  and  which  it  pursues  through  the 
agency  of  its  bureau  at  Washington  and  through  the  activity 
of  the  separate  governments,  is  extremely  limited  in  scope. 
But  supposing  that  it  were  not  so  limited,  the  question  would 
arise  whether  or  not,  according  to  this  conception,  Pan-Ameri- 
canism existed  prior  to  1890.  Evidently  it  could  not  be  an 
international  policy  of  the  Americas  until  some  international 
American  body  had  adopted  it  as  an  appropriate  course  of  ac- 
tion. The  separate  action  of  the  American  states  could  not 
make  it  an  international  policy.  The  ineffective  international 
conferences  which  now  and  then  took  place  from  1826  to  1889 


MEANING  OF  PAJST-AMEKICANISM  31 

between  some  of  the  American  states  could  not  make  it  such 
a  policy.  Was  it  something  other  than  a  policy,  if  it  existed  at 
all,  prior  to  the  meeting  of  the  first  International  American 
Conference  ?  That  Pan- Americanism  was  brought  into  exist- 
ence through  the  action  of  the  representatives  of  the  American 
states  who  met  at  Washington  in  1889  is  not  a  tenable  proposi- 
tion. It  was  in  existence,  at  least  in  its  beginnings,  long  lo&- 
fore  the  Washington  conference  took  place.  As  Ambassador 
Nabuco  put  it,  the  conferences  merely  express  collectively  what 
is  already  felt  to  be  unanimous. 

There  is  another  way  of  viewing  the  matter  which  may  help 
to  dissipate  the  confusion.  Cornejo,  in  the  address  cited  above, 
speaks  of  "  our  continental  system  "  ;  Drago  conceives  of  Amer- 
ica as  constituting  a  "  separate  political  factor  " ;  and  Moore 
states  that  "  Pan- Americanism  is  obviously  derived  from  the 
conception  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  an  American  system." 
This  conception  of  America  as  a  separate  political  entity  is  not 
new.  Monroe  declared  in  his  famous  message  that  "  it  is  im- 
possible that  the  allied  powers  should  extend  their  political 
system  to  any  portion  of  either  continent  without  endangering 
our  peace  and  happiness,  nor  can  any  one  believe  that  our 
southern  brethren,  if  left  to  themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their 
own  accord."  And  two  years  and  a  half  before  Monroe  made 
his  declaration  Henry  Clay  said  on  the  floor  of  Congress :  "It 
is  in  our  power  to  create  a  system  of  which  we  shall  be  the 
center,  and  in  which  all  South  America  will  act  with  us.  ... 
We  should  become  the  center  of  a  system  which  would  consti- 
tute the  rallying  point  of  human  wisdom  against  all  the  des- 
potism of  the  Old  World."  44 

It  will  be  recalled  that  Lawrence  compared  the  primacy  of 
the  United  States  in  the  New  World  to  the  primacy  of  the 
great  powers  in  the  Old.45  As  has  already  been  pointed  out 

4*  Moore,  Henry  Clay  and  Pan-Americanism,  in  Columbia  Univ.  Quar., 
Sept.,  1915,  351. 

*5  Principles  of  Int.  Law,  242. 


32         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  differences  between  the  two  are  so  great  as  to  destroy,  prac- 
tically, the  validity  of  the  comparison.  But  a  view  of  the 
European  system  may  help  to  determine  the  nature  of  Pan- 
Americanism.  Von  Gentz,  writing  in  1806,  conceived  of  the 
balance  of  power  as  "  a  constitution  subsisting  between  neigh- 
boring states,  more  or  less  connected  with  one  another,  by  vir- 
tue of  which  no  one  among  them  can  injure  the  independence 
or  essential  rights  of  another."  46  Fenelon  even  considered  the 
whole  of  Christendom  as  "  a  kind  of  universal  republic  "  all 
the  members  of  which  owed  it  to  one  another,  for  the  common 
good,  to  prevent  the  progress  of  any  other  members  who  should 
seek  to  overthrow  the  balance  existing  between  them.47  West- 
lake  has  the  same  idea  in  mind  with  regard  to  the  balance  of 
power  when  he  speaks  of  it  as  possibly  being  a  step  toward  the 
establishment  of  a  European  government.  And  Lorimer  con- 
siders the  balance  of  power  as  an  indirect  solution  of  what  he 
called  the  ultimate  problem  in  international  law;  that  is,  how 
to  find  the  international  equivalents  known  to  national  law 
as  legislation,  jurisdiction,  and  execution.48  In  short,  these 
authorities  consider  the  balance  of  power  as  a  political  system 
constituting  the  beginnings  of  an  international  government. 
Now  if  the  American  nations  constitute  a  separate  political 
factor  in  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  their  political  sys- 
tem may  be  regarded  as  a  step  —  and  nothing  more  than  a 
step  —  toward  an  international  American  government.  But  a 
step  toward  government  implies  a  step  toward  constitution,  for 
constitution,  however  vague  and  ill-defined,  is  necessary  for  the 
guidance  of  government.  By  constitution  is  meant  a  collection 
of  principles  according  to  which  the  powers  of  government,  and 
the  rights  of  the  governed  and  the  relations  between  the  govern- 
ment and  the  governed,  are  adjusted.  It  may  have  no  outward 

«•  Taylor,  Treatise  on  Int.  Public  Law,  98. 

4T/&W*.,   09. 

*8  Institutes  of  Int.  Law,  II,  193. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  33 

form  of  expression  further  than  is  given  by  precedents  and 
habits  of  political  action.49 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  progress  thus  far  achieved  has  pro- 
duced any  clearly  denned  organ  of  government.  The  Inter- 
national Conferences  of  American  Republics  may  be  considered 
as  such  an  organ  only  in  the  vaguest  and  most  tenuous  sense 
of  the  term.  But  back  of  this  organization  lies  a  moral  union 
of  American  states  founded  upon  a  body  of  principles  growing 
out  of  the  common  struggle  for  independence.  It  is  to  this 
body  of  principles  that  we  must  turn  for  the  meaning  of  Pan- 
Americanism.  They  are: 

1.  Independence.     Not  merely  nominal  independence  with 
Old  World  attachments  remaining;  but  independence  in  the 
sense  of  complete  political  separation,  American  states  neither 
interfering  in  the  affairs  of  the  European  powers  nor  allowing 
those  powers  to  interfere  in  their  own  affairs.     These  princi- 
ples, first  formally  proclaimed  by  Washington  in  his  farewell 
address  and  by  Monroe  in  his  message  of  1823,  subsequently 
received,  by  tacit  assent  and  by  express  governmental  action, 
the  sanction  of  the  Hispanic  American  states.     The  establish- 
ment of  the  League  of  Nations  tends  rather  to  confirm  than  to 
invalidate  this  principle. 

2.  Community  of  Political  Ideals.     The  fact  that  the  Amer- 
ican states  are  all  republics  is  not  so  much  the  bond  of  union 
between  them,  as  the  fact  that  they  all  cherish  common  political 
ideals.     It  is  the  spirit  of  their  governments  rather  than  their 
form  which  serves  to  bring  them  together.     It  is  not  likely  that 
if  Brazil  had  continued  as  a  constitutional  monarchy  the  prog- 
ress of  Pan-Americanism  would  have  been  seriously  retarded. 

3.  Territorial  Integrity.     The  states  of  this  hemisphere  re- 
gard the  principle  of  conquest  as  inadmissible  in  American 
public  law.     The  uti  possidetis  of  1810  was  generally  adopted 
as  a  rule  for  the  settlement  of  the  boundary  questions  between 

*»  Woolsey,  Political  Science,  I,  284, 


34         PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  new  states,  and  while  the  application  of  the  rule  has  given 
rise  to  numerous  international  conflicts,  and  important  cessions 
of  territory  have  been  made  as  a  result  of  wars  growing  out  of 
other  causes,  the  spirit  of  conquest  has  not  generally  prevailed 
among  the  American  states.  The  repeated  declarations  of  the 
United  States  to  the  effect  that  it  neither  covets  the  territory 
of  its  neighbors  nor  seeks  to  aggrandize  itself  by  conquest,  give 
additional  sanction  to  the  rule.  Roosevelt,  December  3,  1901 ; 
Root,  July  31,  1906 ;  Knox,  February  28  and  March  6,  1912 ; 
Wilson,  October  27,  1913 ;  Lansing,  December  27,  1915. 

4.  Law  Instead  of  Force.     The  American  states  rely  upon 
law  and  amicable  adjustments  to  settle  their  international  diffi- 
culties rather  than  upon  force.     In  their  international  confer- 
ences action  is  taken  by  unanimous  consent.     As  far  as  con- 
cerns itself,  every  state  is  left  free  to  interpose  a  negative  to 
whatever  measure  it  may  consider  prejudicial  to  its  interests. 
This  device  of  requiring  unanimous  consent  has  tended  to  pre- 
vent the  development  of  the  idea  of  the  balance  of  power  in  this 
continent.     The  system  of  voting  by  the  absolute  majority  tends 
to  the  formation  of  two  groups  more  or  less  evenly  divided 
along  sectional  or  economic  lines,  and  this  in  turn  tends  to  the 
formation  of  a  balance  of  power.     Moreover,  if  the  will  of  the 
majority  is  to  prevail,  it  must  be  supported  by  force.     Unan- 
imous consent  precludes  the  use  of  force.     Although  this  rule 
has  had  definite  application  only  since  the  organization  of  the 
Pan-American  Conferences,  it  has  prevailed  none  the  less  in 
spirit  from  the  beginning. 

5.  Nonintervention.     Believing  that  "  every  nation  has  the 
right  to  independence  in  the  sense  that  it  has  the  right  to  the 
pursuit  of  happiness  and  is  free  to  develop  itself  without  inter- 
ference or  control  from  other  states,"  50  the  American  powers 
have  never,  as  a  body,  undertaken  to  intervene  in  the  affairs 
of  any  particular  state  or  states.     There  has  been  in  recent  years 

0o  American  Journal  of  Int.  Law,  X,  213. 


MEANING  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  35 

a  tendency  toward  the  joint  use  of  good  offices,  but  no  tendency 
toward  dictatorial  interference. 

6.  Equality.     The  American  powers  not  only  recognize  the 
principle  of  the  equality  of  states  under  international  law,  but 
in  the  conduct  of  their  international  union  they  observe  it  to 
the  fullest  extent,  presenting  in  this  respect  a  striking  contrast 
to  the  Concert  of  Europe.     Only  the  great  powers  are  admitted 
to  the  European  conferences  on  a  basis  of  equality.     On  the 
other  hand  all  the  American  states  are  admitted  to  the  Amer- 
ican conferences,  and  the  vote  of  the  weakest  republic  has  as 
much  weight  as  that  of  the  most  powerful.     The  political  in- 
equality of  certain  American  states  gives  rise  to  the  exercise  by 
the  United  States  of  international  police  power ;  but  this  is  an 
individual  policy  of  the  United  States  and  not  Pan-American. 

7.  Cooperation.     The  American  states,  forming  a  separate 
political  system,  a  distinct  family  of  nations,  entertaining  the 
same  political  ideals,  cooperate  in  a  spirit  of  fraternal  friend- 
ship, in  the  promotion  of  their  common  interests,  whether  these 
be  political,  economic,  or  cultural. 

These  principles  may  indeed  be  considered  as  bases  of  the 
constitution  of  what,  by  the  free  choice  of  all  concerned,  may 
develop  into  an  international  American  government.  Taken 
together  with  the  whole  mass  of  precedents  and  habits  of  polit- 
ical acting  which  have  emerged  from  the  international  relations 
of  the  states  of  the  Western  Hemisphere,  they  constitute  the 
particulars  from  which,  by  a  process  of  generalization,  the 
abstract  concept  Pan- Americanism  is  derived. 


CHAPTER  II 

FORMATION    OF    NEW    STATES 

THE  intervention  of  Napoleon  in  the  affairs  of  Spain  in 
1808  marks  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  events  of  the  highest 
importance  to  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  resistance  of  the 
Spanish  people  to  the  rule  of  Joseph  Bonaparte,  whom  the 
emperor  had  placed  on  the  throne  of  Spain  in  place  of  Ferdi- 
nand VII,  was  reflected  in  a  movement  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic,  which,  evolving  through  different  phases,  finally  cul- 
minated in  the  independence  of  the  vast  expanse  of  Spanish 
territory  extending  from  Mexico  to  Buenos  Aires.  And  the 
flight  of  the  Portuguese  prince  regent,  John,  afterward  King 
John  VI,  with  his  court  to  Brazil,  to  escape  the  fate  which  had 
overtaken  the  Spanish  king,  proved  to  be  the  first  step  toward 
the  conversion  of  that  wide  domain  into  an  independent  em- 
pire. 

By  the  end  of  the  year  1824  the  process  of  emancipation  was 
about  complete,  though  there  was  still  much  to  be  done  in  the 
way  of  the  political  organization  of  the  nascent  states.  The 
transformation  in  Brazil  was  rapid,  and  the  establishment  of 
an  independent  government  was  for  obvious  reasons  relatively 
easy.  The  residence  of  the  Portuguese  court  at  Rio  de  Janeiro 
for  a  considerable  length  of  time,  and  the  elevation  of  the  col- 
ony in  1815  to  the  rank  of  a  kingdom  coordinate  with  that  of 
Portugal,  had  already  given  Brazil  a  consciousness  of  its  virtual 
independence.  The  return  of  John  VI,  therefore,  to  Portugal 
in  1821,  leaving  his  son,  Dom  Pedro,  as  regent  in  Brazil,  was 
quickly  followed  by  the  complete  severing  of  the  slight  bonds 
which  still  held  the  two  kingdoms  together.  The  year  follow- 
ing the  king's  departure,  independence  was  formally  declared 

36 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  37 

and  Pedro  was  proclaimed  "  Constitutional  Emperor  and  Per- 
petual Defender  of  Brazil."  *  The  opposition  which  the  Por- 
tuguese forces  in  the  country  interposed  to  the  assertion  of  inde- 
pendence was  so  insignificant  that  the  revolution  was  accom- 
plished almost  without  bloodshed.  The  young  empire  was  thus 
permitted  to  enter  at  once  upon  the  undisturbed  enjoyment  of 
its  freedom. 

The  Spanish  colonies,  on  the  other  hand,  achieved  their  in- 
dependence only  after  long  and  bitter  warfare.  It  was  not  un- 
til the  victory  of  Ayacucho  was  won  in  the  mountains  of  Peru 
on  December  9,  1824,  that  the  outcome  of  the  struggle  was  defi- 
nitely assured.  Being  driven,  as  an  immediate  consequence  of 
that  battle,  from  the  Andean  plateau  where  they  were  making 
a  last  stand,  the  Royalist  forces  were  reduced  to  the  possession 
of  a  mere  foothold  in  southern  Chile,  of  the  fortresses  of  Callao, 
in  Peru,  and  of  San  Juan  de  Ulua  in  Mexico.  These  they 
were  soon  to  be  forced  also  to  relinquish;  San  Juan  de  Ulua 
in  September,  1825,  and  the  other  places  in  January  of  the 
following  year.  While  these  great  changes  were  occurring  on 
the  mainland,  the  island  colonies  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  had 
likewise  been  stirred  by  the  spirit  of  revolution,  but  their  at- 
tempts at  independence  failed  and  they  were  destined  to  remain 
under  Spanish  rule  till  the  intervention  of  the  United  States 
in  behalf  of  Cuba  three  quarters  of  a  century  later. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  French  colony  of  St.  Domingue,  later 
the  republic  of  Haiti,  met  with  a  wholly  different  result.  If 
not  the  first  of  the  revolting  colonies  to  establish  beyond  per- 
adventure  its  independence,  it  was  at  least  the  first  to  declare 
it  formally,  its  declaration  being  made  in  1804,2  whereas  the 

1  This  title  was  later  sanctioned  by  the  constitution  which  was  put  into 
effect  in  1824.     Cf.  Carvahlo  Moreira,  Conatitucdo  do  Imperio  do  Brasil, 
45.     A  translation  into  Spanish  of  the  constitution  of  1824  is  found  in 
Arosemena,   Estudios  constitucionales  sobre   los  gobiernos   de  la  America 
Latino,,  I,  1-27   (2nd  ed.)     A  French  translation  is  found  in  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  936-958. 

2  The  declaration  was  signed  and  proclaimed  by  Dessalines,  the  leader 


38         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

first  of  the  formal  declarations  upon  the  part  of  the  Spanish 
colonies  was  made  seven  years  later.  Considering  the  ignorance 
of  the  mass  of  the  population  and  its  lack  of  experience  in  self- 
government,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  political  organ- 
ization of  this  new  state  was  accomplished  with  great  difficulty. 
Years  of  disorder  and  of  frightful  excesses  followed  the  separa- 
tion from  France.  Jean  Pierre  Boyer,  who  assumed  the  presi- 
dency in  1818,  was  the  first  of  the  numerous  rulers  to  unify 
the  country  and  to  maintain  order  throughout  all  its  parts. 
For  some  years  prior  to  his  accession,  two  rival  states  strug- 
gled for  supremacy,  one  of  these  being  a  republic  in  the  south 
and  the  other  a  monarchy  in  the  north.  In  1820,  Boyer,  who 
had  succeeded  to  the  chief  magistracy  of  the  republic,  managed 
to  unite  the  two  states  under  one  government;  and  two  years 
later,  when  the  former  Spanish  colony  of  Santo  Domingo  de- 
clared its  independence  3  and  was  seeking  annexation  to  the 
republic  of  Colombia,  he  marched  an  army  into  that  part  of  the 
island  and  forced  the  leaders  of  the  movement  to  accept  union 
with  Haiti.  Thus,  with  the  whole  of  the  island  under  his  con- 
trol, Boyer  remained  in  office,  under  a  provision  of  the  consti- 
tution giving  the  president  a  life  tenure,4  until  1843,  when  he 
was  forced  to  resign.  The  following  year  the  eastern  portion 
of  the  island  withdrew  and  set  up  the  independent  republic  of 
Santo  Domingo. 

On  the  continent,  the  struggles  of  the  Spanish  colonies  for  in- 
dependence, and  the  subsequent  essays  of  their  people  in  the 
field  of  political  organization,  present  a  varied  and  interesting 
record.  The  vicissitudes  of  the  republic  of  Colombia  are  fully 

of  the  revolution,  on  January  1st  of  the  year  indicated.  Cf.  Madion,  His- 
toire  d' Haiti,  III,  115-118. 

s  For  the  "  Constitutive  Act  of  the  provisional  government  of  the  inde- 
pendent state  of  the  Spanish  part  of  Haiti,"  see  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  VIII,  557-570. 

*  Boyer  took  office  under  the  republican  constitution  of  1816.  From 
1801  to  1816  there  had  been  adopted  five  different  constitutions.  The  in- 
strument under  which  Boyer  ruled  remained  in  force  as  long  as  he  con- 
tinued to  exercise  the  chief  magistracy.  Cf.  Janvier,  Lea  Constitution* 
d' Haiti,  1-154. 


FOKMATIOX  OF  NEW  STATES  39 

considered  hereafter,  in  a  chapter  dealing  with  the  ideals  of 
Simon  Bolivar;  but  it  is  proper  here  to  remark  that  this  new 
state,  erected  within  the  bounds  of  the  old  viceroyalty  of  New 
Granada  and  comprising  what  is  to-day  Venezuela,  Colombia, 
and  Ecuador,  attained  during  the  first  years  of  its  existence  a 
position  of  the  greatest  promise.  A  republican  constitution  had 
been  adopted  in  1821,5  and  the  executive,  legislative,  and  judi- 
cial branches  of  the  government  had  entered  at  once  upon  the 
exercise  of  their  several  functions.  The  Colombians  them- 
selves believed  that  the  foundation  of  a  happy  and  prosperous 
nation  had  been  laid;  and  foreign  observers  were  equally  con- 
vinced that  the  new  republic,  by  virtue  of  the  extent  of  its 
territory,  the  abundance  of  its  natural  resources,  and  the  energy 
of  its  inhabitants,  would  soon  take  high  rank  among  the  na- 
tions of  the  world.6  Moreover  Colombia  had  acquired  great 
prestige  among  the  other  new  states  by  virtue  of  the  contribu- 

|5  For  an  English  translation  of  this  constitution,  see  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  XIX,  698-722.  A  French  translation  was  published  at  Paris 
in  1822  under  the  title  of  Constitution  de  la  Republique  de  Colombia. 

6  In  1823  J.  Q.  Adams,  then  Secretary  of  State,  in  his  instructions  to 
Anderson,  the  first  minister  to  Colombia,  said :  "  The  republic  of  Co- 
lombia, if  permanently  organized  to  embrace  the  whole  territory  which 
it  now  claims,  and  blessed  with  a  government  effectually  protective  of  the 
rights  of  its  people,  is  undoubtedly  destined  to  become  hereafter  one  of 
the  mightiest  nations  of  the  earth.  Its  central  position  upon  the  surface 
of  the  globe,  directly  communicating  at  once  with  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic 
oceans,  north  and  south  with  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
brings  it  into  relations  of  proximity  with  every  other  part  of  the  world: 
while  the  number  and  variety  of  its  ports  on  every  sea  by  which  it  is  sur- 
rounded, the  magnitude  and  extent  of  its  navigable  rivers,  three  of  which, 
the  Amazon,  the  Orinoco,  and  the  Magdalena,  are  among  the  largest  in 
the  world,  intersecting  with  numberless  tributary  streams,  and  in  every  di- 
rection, the  continent  of  South  America,  and  furnishing  the  means  of  water 
communication  from  every  point  of  its  circumference  to  every  spot  upon 
its  surface;  the  fertility  of  its  soil,  the  general  healthiness  and  beauty  of 
its  climate,  the  profusion  with  which  it  breeds  and  bears  the  useful  metals, 
present  a  combination  of  elements  unparalleled  in  the  location  of  the  human 
race  and  relieve,  at  least  from  all  charge  of  enthusiasm,  the  sentiment 
expressed  by  the  late  Mr.  Torres  (Colombian  minister  to  the  United  States) 
that  this  republic  appeared  to  have  been  destined  by  the  Author  of  Nature 
'  as  the  center  and  the  empire  of  the  human  family.' "  American  State 
Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  V,  894. 


40         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

tion  which  it  had  made,  in  leadership  and  in  men  and  material, 
to  the  final  dissolution  of  Spanish  dominion  in  the  southern 
continent. 

The  provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata  and  the  former  captaincy- 
general  of  Chile,  though  as  successful  on  the  whole  as  Colombia 
in  throwing  off  the  Spanish  yoke,  were  less  fortunate  in  their 
early  efforts  at  political  organization.  Buenos  Aires,  loosely 
confederated  with  a  number  of  the  provinces  which  had  consti- 
tuted the  vice-royalty  of  La  Plata,  maintained  its  independence 
in  fact,  after  the  first  revolt  in  1810,  though  the  formal  declara- 
tion was  postponed  until  1816 ;  but  conflicts  between  two  oppos- 
ing systems  of  government,  the  unitary  and  the  federal,  long 
delayed  the  organization  of  a  constitutional  regime,  and  no 
doubt  caused  the  loss  of  a  large  part  of  the  territory  which  the 
leaders  of  Buenos  Aires  aspired  to  consolidate  into  a  single  na- 
tion. 

The  province  to  the  east  of  the  river  Uruguay,  known  as  the 
Banda  Oriental,  having  rebelled  against  the  government  of 
Buenos  Aires,  was  occupied  in  1817  by  Brazil  and  held  by  that 
empire  7  for  a  decade  until,  as  a  result  of  a  war  between  the 
two  claimants,  the  disputed  territory  was  recognized,  by  way  of 
compromise,  as  the  independent  republic  of  Uruguay.  Para- 
guay likewise  declined  to  submit  to  Buenos  Aires,  and  after 
successfully  resisting  a  military  expedition  sent  against  it  by 
the  central  authorities,  its  leaders  set  up  an  independent  govern- 
ment which  quickly  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  dictator,  Francia, 
under  whose  rule  it  was  to  remain  almost  completely  isolated 
from  the  world  until  his  death  in  1840.  Efforts  were  also  made 
to  bring  the  territory  known  as  Upper  Peru,  which  formerly 
constituted  a  part  of  the  vice-royalty  of  La  Plata,  under  the 
authority  of  the  government  at  Buenos  Aires,  but  the  forces 

7  The  revolt  of  the  Banda  Oriental  against  Buenos  Aires  was  led 
by  the  famous  Jos6  Artigas,  who  also  opposed  the  occupation  of  the 
province  by  Brazil.  Defeated  by  the  Brazilians  in  1820  Artigas  was 
compelled  to  seek  asylum  in  Paraguay,  where  he  remained  until  his 
death  in  1850. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  41 

sent  to  wrest  it  from  the  royalists  were  defeated.  Its  libera- 
tion was  not  effected  until  1825,  when  the  victorious  patriot 
army  under  General  Sucre  marched  into  the  country  and  organ- 
ized a  provisional  government  which  was  shortly  afterward 
superseded  by  the  definitely  constituted  republic  of  Bolivia. 

Throughout  the  period  of  the  wars  of  independence  and  for 
a  generation  afterward,  the  provinces  which  later  united  to  form 
the  Argentine  Republic  remained  in  a  state  of  disorganization. 
A  constitution  framed  by  a  constituent  assembly  composed  of 
representatives  of  the  several  provinces  was  rejected  in  1819, 
because,  among  other  reasons,  it  failed  to  provide  for  local  au- 
tonomy. During  the  next  five  years  there  was  practically  no 
national  government,  though  the  government  of  the  province 
of  Buenos  Aires,  which  was  then  conducted  in  a  wise  and  or- 
derly manner,  served,  by  virtue  of  treaty  arrangements  with  the 
other  provincial  governments,  as  the  representative  of  all  in  the 
conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  In  December,  1824,  a  new  con- 
stituent congress  met  at  Buenos  Aires,  but  the  constitution  for 
the  "  Argentine  Nation,"  which,  two  years  later,  it  adopted, 
was  also  rejected  by  the  provinces.  The  state  of  anarchy  which 
followed  was  taken  advantage  of  by  the  dictator,  Rosas,  to  im- 
pose his  will  upon  the  country,  and  it  was  not  until  his  over- 
throw, in  1852,  that  any  real  progress  was  made  toward  the 
organization  of  a  national  government.8 

Chile,  unlike  the  Argentine  provinces,  met  with  serious  re- 
verses in  the  achievement  of  its  independence.  In  1814  the 
authority  of  Spain  was  reestablished  throughout  the  colony  and 
Chilean  independence  might  have  been  long  delayed  but  for 
the  aid  furnished  by  Argentine  forces  under  San  Martin. 
Born  in  1778  at  Yapeyu,  a  village  in  the  viceroyalty  of  La 
Plata,  near  the  frontier  of  Paraguay,  San  Martin  received  his 
education  in  Spain  and  served  in  the  Spanish  army  against  the 
Trench  until  1811,  attaining  the  rank  of  colonel;  but  he  aban- 

8  Vedia,  Constitucidn  Argentina,  13-15;  Arosemena,  Estudios  consfc 
tucionales  sobre  los  gobiemos  fa  la,  America  Latino,  (2d  ed.),  I,  176, 


42         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGHSTNTJSTGS 

doned  his  promising  military  career  in  Spain  to  devote  himself 
to  the  cause  of  the  revolution  in  America.  On  his  arrival  in 
Buenos  Aires  he  was  entrusted  with  the  organization  of  the 
national  army.  He  later  commanded  the  Patriot  forces  against 
the  Royalists  in  Upper  Peru,  where,  becoming  convinced  that 
independence  could  not  be  assured  so  long  as  the  Spaniards  re- 
mained in  possession  of  Lima,  he  conceived  the  plan  of  driving 
them  from  that  stronghold  by  first  liberating  Chile  and  then 
advancing  on  Peru  by  way  of  the  Pacific.9 

With  this  great  project  in  mind,  he  obtained  his  appointment 
as  governor  of  the  province  of  Cuyo,  situated  on  the  eastern 
slope  of  the  Andes  at  the  gateway  to  Chile;  and  although  the 
province  was  exceedingly  poor,  yet,  with  the  help  of  Buenos 
Aires  and  the  accession  of  Chileans  who  had  fled  across  the 
Andes  to  escape  Royalist  persecution,  he  eventually  succeeded 
in  organizing  and  equipping  an  army  which  he  considered  ade- 
quate to  his  task.  Accordingly,  in  January,  1817,  San  Martin 
led  his  band  of  Patriots  across  the  Andes,  and  on  February  12, 
with  the  cooperation  of  Chilean  forces,  won  at  Chacabuco 
a  decisive  victory  over  the  Royalist  forces.  The  viceroy  of 
Peru,  on  learning  of  the  Royalist  defeat,  sent  a  new  expedi- 
tion against  the  Chileans;  but  on  April  5,  1818,  the  Patriots, 
after  having  suffered  several  severe  reverses,  were  again  vic- 
torious in  the  decisive  battle  of  Maipo.  The  independence  of 
Chile  being  now  firmly  established,  San  Martin  turned  his  atten- 
tion to  the  final  step  —  the  destruction  of  Spanish  power  in 
Peru;  but  the  execution  of  this  design  was  complicated  by  po- 
litical events  in  Chile. 

After  the  battle  of  Chacabuco  the  Royalists  abandoned  San- 
tiago, the  capital  of  the  new  Chilean  republic,  and  a  popular 
assembly,  convened  on  the  day  the  Chilean  army  entered  the 
city,  voted  to  place  the  supreme  authority  of  the  state  in  the 

»  For  a  full  account  of  the  formation  of  San  Martfn's  army  and  of  his 
passage  of  the  Andes,  see  Mitre,  Hiatoria  de  San  Martin,  I,  409-632. 
A  good,  brief  account  in  English  is  found  in  the  tffmoira  of  General 
Miller,  I.  90-108. 


FOKMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  43 

hands  of  San  Martin.  But  the  Patriot  leader,  believing  that 
the  acceptance  of  such  a  post  would  be  prejudicial  to  the  ac- 
complishment of  his  chief  object,  declined  the  honor,  and  on 
the  following  day  the  assembly  named  in  his  stead  General 
Bernardo  O'Higgins,  who  assumed  office  under  the  title  of  Su- 
preme Director.10 

O^Higgins,  like  San  Martin  and  other  leaders  of  the  revolu- 
tion, had  been  educated  in  Europe.  His  mother  was  a  native 
Chilean.  His  father,  Ambrose  O'Higgins,  was  an  Irishman, 
who,  having  been  sent  as  a  child  to  Spain  to  be  educated,  pro- 
ceeded to  seek  his  fortune,  about  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  in  the  Spanish  colonies.  After  trading  as  an  itinerant 
merchant  from  Costa  Firme  to  Buenos  Aires,  he  eventually 
settled  in  Chile  and  entered  the  royal  service.  Promoted  in 
time  to  the  captaincy-general  of  the  province,  he  was  afterward 
appointed  by  the  king  viceroy  of  Peru,  a  post  which  he  contin- 
ued to  hold  until  his  death  in  1801.  The  son  Bernardo,  born 
in  1778,  was  sent  at  the  age  of  sixteen  to  Spain,  but  he  soon 
passed  over  to  England,  where  he  remained  in  school  till  1799. 
He  then  returned  to  Spain,  and,  in  1802,  after  some  misadven- 
tures, embarked  for  Chile.  In  Europe  he  met  Miranda,  San 
Martin,  and  other  Spanish  American  pioneers  in  the  cause  of 
colonial  independence,  and  imbibed  their  views.  He  therefore 
returned  to  Chile  with  ideas  inimical  to  the  Spanish  regime; 
and,  from  the  beginning  of  the  revolt  until  he  became  Supreme 
Director  of  Chile,  he  contributed  increasingly  important  serv- 
ices to  the  cause  of  independence.11 

During  the  vigorous  and  effective  administration  of  O'Hig- 
gins, the  country  enjoyed  peace  and  prosperity.  But  his  rule 
was  autocratic.  Believing  that  the  deliberations  of  a  national 
congress  under  the  conditions  then  existing  would  result  only 

loBarros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  X,  628-632;  Mitre,  His- 
toria  de  San  Martin,  II,  24. 

11  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XI,  663-680.  Cf .  also  La- 
valle,  Galeria  de  retratos  de  los  gobernadores  y  mrreyes  del  Perti,  and 
Mehegan,  O'Higgins  of  Chile. 


44         PAN-AMEEICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

in  arousing  civil  dissension,  he  employed  his  influence  and  the 
power  of  his  office  to  frustrate  all  attempts  to  assemble  such  a 
body.  Likewise,  in  order  to  avoid  the  calling  together  of  rep- 
resentatives of  the  people  to  sanction  the  declaration  of  inde- 
pendence, he  hit  upon  the  device  of  opening  registers  through- 
out the  country  in  which  the  citizens  could  record  their  wishes 
on  the  subject.  By  the  same  unique  method  he  secured  the 
acceptance  of  a  provisional  constitution  framed  by  a  commis- 
sion which  he  appointed  for  the  purpose.12  This  constitution, 
though  intended  to  appease  the  demand  for  popular  government, 
served  to  give  the  color  of  legality  to  the  autocratic  system 
already  adopted.  Attempts  to  disturb  the  established  order, 
whether  due  to  the  personal  ambition  of  military  chiefs  or  to  a 
more  or  less  sincere  desire  to  give  the  people  a  greater  share  in 
the  management  of  their  affairs,  he  firmly  repressed,  by  means 
of  the  military  forces  at  his  command.13 

By  the  middle  of  the  year  1820  widespread  discontent  had 
come  to  prevail  and  the  demand  for  political  reform  had  become 
more  and  more  insistent.  Kealizing  the  necessity  of  making 
some  concession  to  public  clamor,  the  Supreme  Director  caused 
a  convention  to  be  assembled  at  Santiago  in  1822  for  the  pur- 
pose of  framing  a  new  constitution.  But  the  convention  was  so 
clearly  a  creature  of  the  administration  and  the  constitution 
which  it  hurriedly  adopted  so  evidently  failed  to  make  effective 
the  desired  reforms,  that  the  prevailing  discontent  was  in  no 
wise  allayed.  Toward  the  close  of  the  year  1822,  open  rebel- 
lion broke  out  in  the  provinces  of  Coquimbo  and  Concepcion. 
In  the  latter  province  the  movement  was  led  by  General  Kamon 
Freire,  whose  distinction  as  a  military  leader  was  second  only 
to  that  of  O'Higgins.  The  troops  sent  to  suppress  the  revolt 
abandoned  the  government  and  joined  the  rebels.  In  Santiago 

12  See  Proyecto  de  Conatituci6n  Provisoria  para  el  Estado  de  Chile,  pub- 
lished in  1818,  to  which  was  appended  an  exposition  of  the  proposed  method 
of  ratification. 

is  Barros  Arana,  Hiatoria  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XI,  346,  520,  526. 


FOKMATIOlSr  OF  NEW  STATES  45 

the  feeling  of  dissatisfaction,  though  manifested  in  a  less  vio- 
lent manner,  was  no  less  acute,  and  in  January,  1823,  a  pop- 
ular assembly  met  in  that  city  to  consider  means  for  remedying 
the  evils  of  which  the  country  complained.  Unwilling  to  strug- 
gle longer  against  such  formidable  opposition,  O'Higgins  relin- 
quished to  a  junta,  named  by  the  assembly,  the  authority  with 
which  he  had  been  invested  six  years  before.14 

This  junta  was  composed  of  three  influential  citizens  of  the 
capital ;  and  it  was  hoped  that,  with  public  confidence  restored, 
the  new  provisional  authority  would  proceed  to  the  definitive 
political  and  administrative  organization  of  the  republic.  But 
the  steps  taken  to  that  end  did  not  meet  with  universal  appro- 
bation. In  the  province  of  Concepcion  the  local  assembly, 
backed  by  General  Freire,  declared  that  the  provisional  govern- 
ment should  be  composed  of  a  representative  of  each  of  the  three 
provinces  into  which  the  republic  was  then  divided;  namely, 
Concepcion,  Santiago,  and  Coquimbo.  Authorized  to  put  this 
plan  into  execution,  Freire  transferred  his  army  by  sea  to  Val- 
paraiso, whence  he  marched  upon  Santiago.  Encamping  a  few 
miles  from  the  capital,  he  entered  into  negotiations  with  the 
junta,  and  soon  reached  an  agreement  by  which  the  solution  of 
the  anomalous  situations  was  entrusted,  in  accordance  with  his 
demands,  to  a  so-called  congress  of  plenipotentiaries,  composed 
of  a  representative  of  each  of  the  three  provinces.15 

This  "  congress  of  plenipotentiaries  "  immediately  set  up  a 
provisional  government  similar  in  every  way  to  the  autocratic 
system  which  had  been  the  cause  of  O'Higgins's  downfall,  only 
three  short  months  before.  Freire  was  made  Supreme  Direc- 
tor. But  the  leaders  in  reality  desired  to  organize  the  govern- 
ment on  a  democratic  basis,  and  Freire  convoked  a  constituent 
assembly  which  met  in  August,  1823,  and  toward  the  close  of 
the  year  adopted  a  constitution.  Early  in  its  proceedings,  how- 

nBarros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XIII,  695,  732,  817.  After 
his  abdication  O'Higgins  lived  in  retirement  in  Peru  until  his  death  in 
1842. 

isBarros  Arana,  op.  tit.,  XIII,  830;  XIV,  18,  39. 


46         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

ever,  the  assembly  gave  constitutional  sanction  to  the  office  of 
Supreme  Director,  and  unanimously  designated  Freire  to  fill 
it  for  a  period  of  three  years.  The  constitution  was  promul- 
gated amid  great  rejoicing  in  January,  1824;  but  it  was  ill- 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  situation.  Its  framers,  besides  de- 
vising a  complicated  form  of  government,  failed  to  take  into 
account  the  established  institutions  and  customs  of  the  coun- 
try. In  any  circumstances  the  new  system  would  have  been 
difficult  to  administer;  and,  with  a  state  of  disorder  pervading 
the  country,  the  Supreme  Director,  after  a  few  months  of  trial, 
became  convinced  of  his  inability  to  fulfill  the  duties  of  his 
office  under  the  constitution  and  offered  his  resignation.  It  is 
hardly  surprising  that,  instead  of  being  permitted  to  resign,  he 
was  clothed  anew  with  the  dictatorial  powers  which  had  been 
found  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order.  Thus  the 
constitution  of  1823  became  a  dead  letter.16 

Though  the  first  attempts  to  establish  popular  government  in 
Chile  were  failures,  many  of  the  leaders  continued  to  cherish 
the  hope  that  success  would  eventually  crown  their  efforts. 
Among  these  was  Freire  himself.  Returning  to  Santiago  from 
the  south,  where  he  had  brought  to  a  happy  termination,  early 
in  1826,  the  final  campaign  against  the  few  Spanish  troops  who 
still  remained  on  Chilean  soil,  he  convoked  a  constituent  con- 
gress, to  which  he  presented  his  resignation.  Adopting  a  reso- 
lution to  the  effect  that  in  future  the  official  title  of  the  chief 
executive  should  be  that  of  president,  the  congress  accepted 
Freire's  resignation  and  elected  Manuel  Blanco  Encalada  in  his 
stead.  Thereafter  the  executive  played  a  less  important  part 
in  the  affairs  of  the  country.  The  congress  also  passed  an 
act  providing  for  the  adoption  of  the  federal  system.  In  Jan- 
uary, 1827,  it  proceeded  to  consider  the  draft  of  a  complete 
constitution.  This  project,  it  appears,  was  based  on  the  Mexi- 
can constitution  of  1824.  Its  discussion  was  attended  with 
heated  debates  as  to  whether  the  system  should  be  unitary  or 

ie  Barros  Arana,  op.  tit.,  XIV,  43,  125,  320,  391,  395. 


FOKMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  47 

federal,  and  on  this  question  the  congress  closed  its  sessions 
without  reaching  an  agreement.  In  February,  1828,  a  new 
assembly  took  up  the  task  which  its  predecessor  had  abandoned, 
and,  thanks  to  its  labors,  the  country  was  soon  provided  with  a 
fundamental  law  which,  when  promulgated,  was  received 
throughout  the  republic,  as  had  been  the  case  in  1824,  with 
manifestations  of  great  satisfaction.17 

Although  the  constitution  of  1828  was  by  far  the  best  evi- 
dence which  the  Chileans  had  yet  given  of  their  capacity  for 
political  organization,  yet  it  did  not  merit  unqualified  praise, 
nor  did  it  in  practice  satisfy  the  general  aspiration  for  a  strong, 
vigorous  government.  Agitation  continued,  and  in  1833,  the 
system  which  had  been  adopted  —  a  compromise  between  the 
federal  and  the  unitary  system  —  was  replaced  by  one  from 
which  every  vestige  of  federalism  was  removed.  With  this 
accomplished  the  republic  at  last  settled  down  to  a  condition 
of  political  stability.18 

Returning  now  to  the  expedition  for  the  liberation  of  Peru,19 
it  may  be  observed  that  O'Higgins,  who  was  in  complete  accord 
with  San  Martin,  lent  to  the  latter  his  most  cordial  and  ef- 
fective cooperation  in  the  recruiting  and  equipping  of  the  expe- 
ditionary force.  The  enterprise,  however,  was  beset  with  enor- 
mous difficulties.  To  form,  in  a  country  of  limited  resources, 
and  impoverished  by  years  of  conflict,  an  army  sufficient  to  dis- 

17  Barros  Arana,  op.  cit.,  XV,  5,  32,  128,  144,  158,  269. 

is  Barros  Arana,  op.  cit.,  XVI,  62;  for  the  constitution  of  1833  and  a 
brief  account  of  the  early  attempts  to  organize  politically  the  republic  of 
Chile,  see  Arosemena,  Estudios  constitucionales  sobre  los  gobiernos  de  la 
America  Latina,  I. 

i«  For  a  full  history  of  the  expedition  see  Historia  de  la  Espedicion  Li- 
bertadora  del  Peru  (2  vols.),  by  the  Chilean  historian,  Bulnes.  Barros  Ar- 
ana, Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  treats  the  subject  fully.  The  best  Argentine 
account  is  given  by  Mitre  in  his  Historia  de  San  Margin.  For  an  account 
from  the  Peruvian  standpoint,  see  Paz  Soldan,  Historia  del  Peru  Independi- 
ente.  The  account  given  by  one  of  the  principal  actors,  Lord  Cochrane,  may 
be  found  in  his  Narrative  of  Services  in  the  Liberation  of  Chile,  Peru,  and 
Brazil  (2  vols.).  Another  foreigner  (General  William  Miller),  who  took 
an  active  part  in  the  expedition,  has  left  an  account  in  his  Memoirs 
(2  vols.). 


48         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

lodge  and  disperse  the  Royalist  forces  entrenched  in  the  Pe- 
ruvian capital  and  in  occupation  of  advantageous  positions  in 
the  interior  of  the  country  was  an  undertaking  no  less  serious 
than  that  of  obtaining  transports  for  the  troops  and  the  im- 
provising of  a  naval  force  to  convoy  the  expedition  to  its  desti- 
nation and  give  it  effective  support.  Nevertheless,  in  spite  of 
these  difficulties  and  of  the  inability  of  the  government  of 
Buenos  Aires  to  provide  the  pecuniary  assistance  which  it  had 
promised,  preparations  went  forward  with  commendable  ra- 
pidity, so  that  toward  the  middle  of  1820  the  expedition  was 
ready  to  strike  the  blow  which,  it  was  confidently  believed, 
would  put  an  end  to  Spanish  power  in  America. 

The  land  forces,  comprising  about  4500  men,  consisted  of  two 
divisions.  One  of  these,  composed  chiefly  of  the  remnants  of 
the  army  which  had  accomplished  the  remarkable  feat  of  cross- 
ing the  Andes  in  1817,  was  recruited  with  Chilean  soldiers. 
The  other,  which  was  less  numerous,  contained  Chileans  only, 
though  it  was  officered  in  part  by  men  who  had  owed  allegiance 
to  Buenos  Aires.  Whether  the  majority  of  the  men  constitut- 
ing the  two  divisions  were  Argentine  or  Chilean  is  a  point  upon 
which  historians  of  the  two  countries  do  not  agree.20  But,  as 
a  large  proportion  of  the  troops  and  the  greater  part  of  the 
officers  were  Argentine,  the  expedition  affords  an  excellent  ex- 
ample of  the  spirit  of  solidarity  which  prevailed  among  the 
people  then  struggling  for  freedom  from  Spanish  rule.  In 
December,  1818,  the  naval  forces  were  put  in  charge  of  Lord 
Cochrane,  who,  although  he  had  been  dismissed  from  the  British 
navy,  enjoyed  unimpaired  the  fame  which  he  had  previously 
acquired  as  a  naval  officer.  Under  his  direction  the  incipient 
Chilean  navy  had  already  obtained  the  ascendancy  over  the 
Spanish  squadron  in  the  Pacific,  and,  when  the  expedition  was 
ready  to  sail,  adequate  naval  protection  was  afforded.  In  all 
seven  warships,  mounting  231  guns,  were  provided,  their  crews 

20  Bulnes,  Historia  de  la  Espedicidn  Libertadora  del  Peru,  I,  207 ;  Mitre 
Hittoria  de  San  Martin,  II,  532. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  49 

swelling  the  total  number  of  men  in  the  expedition  to  more 
than  6000. 

The  expedition,  which  was  placed  under  the  general  com- 
mand of  San  Martin,  was,  as  originally  planned,  to  be  carried 
out  under  the  joint  authority  of  Chile  and  the  United  Provinces 
of  Rio  de  la  Plata,  and  a  treaty  to  that  end  was  concluded  be- 
tween those  governments.21  By  this  treaty  the  contracting  par- 
ties engaged  to  assist  the  inhabitants  of  Peru,  in  conformity 
with  their  expressed  desires,  in  achieving  independence,  but 
were  to  leave  them  absolutely  free  to  establish  their  own  govern- 
ment, and,  when  the  object  of  the  expedition  had  been  attained, 
were  to  withdraw  the  army  from  Peru,  unless  the  three  govern- 
ments should  agree  to  retain  it  there  for  a  longer  period.  The 
cost  of  the  undertaking  was  to  be  jointly  borne  by  the  contract- 
ing parties,  it  being  understood  that  as  soon  as  an  independent 
government  had  been  established  at  Lima,  that  government 
should  reimburse  Chile  and  the  United  Provinces  for  the  ex- 
penses incurred  on  account  of  the  expedition.  The  government 
at  Buenos  Aires  having  failed  to  ratify  the  treaty,  Chile  as- 
sumed sole  responsibility  for  the  expedition;  but,  while  no 
formal  instructions  were  given  to  San  Martin  relative  to  the 
conduct  which  he  should  observe  in  Peru,  it  appears  to  have 
been  generally  understood  that  the  spirit  of  the  unratified 
treaty  should  nevertheless  control  the  relations  between  the  ex- 
peditionary forces  and  the  state  which  it  was  proposed  to  bring 
into  existence.22 

21  Bulnes,  Historia  de  la  Espedicion  Libertadora  del  Peru,  I,  115.     The 
treaty  was  signed  at  Buenos  Aires  on  February  5,   181 9,  and  ratified  by 
Chile  on  March  15  following.     Cf.  Recopilacidn  de  tratados  y  convenciones 
celebrados  entre  la  republica  de  Chile  y  las  potencias  extranjeras,  I,  5. 
Also,  Colecci6n  de  tratados  celebrados  por  la  Republica  Argentina  con  las 
naciones  extranjeras,  I,  39. 

22  Mitre,  Historia  de  San  Martin,  II,  536,  Dundonald   (Lord  Cochrane), 
Narrative  of  Services,  I,  78.     Instructions  were  prepared  by  the  Chilean 
Senate  but  were  never  delivered  by  O'Higgins  to  San  Martin.     According 
to  these  instructions  the  objects  of  the  expedition  were:     The  emancipation 
of  the  inhabitants  of  Peru  from  the  slavery  and  domination  of  the  King  of 
Spain;  the  establishment  of  a  uniform  system  of  civil  and  national  liberty 


50         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

While  the  rest  of  Spanish  America  had  been  swept  into  the 
movement  for  independence,  the  viceroyalty  of  Peru  remained 
nominally  loyal  to  the  home  government.  The  great  mass  of 
the  population  was  composed  of  Indians  of  an  exceedingly  docile 
character.  Accustomed  under  Inca  rule  to  submission  to  a  pa- 
ternal government,  they  had  been  easily  conquered  by  a  handful 
of  Spanish  adventurers,  who  superimposed  upon  the  social  and 
political  organization  of  the  Inca  regime  a  system  which  left 
the  population  in  the  state  of  serfdom  to  which  it  had  for  cen- 
turies been  subjected.  Thus  three  hundred  years  of  Spanish 
rule  had  done  little  to  change  the  condition  or  the  character  of 
these  people.  An  inert  mass,  without  the  spirit  of  independ- 
ence or  the  power  of  initiative,  they  were  not  easily  moved  to 
revolution;  and  although  there  existed  in  Peru  a  creole  class, 
such  as  furnished  the  directing  force  of  the  movement  for  inde- 
pendence, it  found  greater  difficulty  in  pursuing  its  designs 
there  than  it  did  elsewhere  in  Spanish  America;  for,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  listlessness  of  the  lower  classes,  it  was  obliged  to 
reckon  with  the  fact  that  the  upper  classes  were  generally  op- 
posed to  revolutionary  movements.  Not  only  did  the  large 
number  of  Spaniards  employed  in  the  government  service,  or 
engaged  in  commercial  or  other  pursuits,  constitute  a  conserv- 
ative element,  but  the  nobility,  at  the  top  of  the  social  scale, 
formed,  by  virtue  of  the  number  and  distinction  of  its  members, 
an  important  factor,  the  majority  of  whom  used  their  influence 
to  maintain  the  established  order,  in  the  fear  that  the  titles 
which  they  so  highly  prized  might  otherwise  be  placed  in 
jeopardy.  In  a  society  thus  organized,  the  viceroy  had  been 
able,  with  the  abundance  of  resources  at  his  command,  not  only 
to  suppress  every  outbreak  occurring  within  the  territory  of 

throughout  South  America;  the  destruction  of  the  servile  partisans  of  Fer- 
dinand VII,  who,  quartered  in  that  section,  were  carrying  on  an  obstinate 
and  destructive  warfare;  and  the  constitution  of  new,  independent  states, 
which,  united  with  those  already  liberated,  would  present  an  impenetrable 
front  to  the  power  of  Spain.  The  instructions  are  printed  in  Odriozola, 
Documentoa  Ifistdricoa  del  Peru,  IV,  5-9.  See,  also,  Bulnes,  HisVoria  de  la 
Espedicidn  Libertadora  del  Peru,  I,  214. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  51 

Peru,  but  even  to  send  troops  to  reduce  to  submission  other 
sections  in  revolt.  The  Spanish  power  in  Peru  therefore  con- 
stituted a  menace,  the  destruction  of  which  was  one  of  the  chief 
aims  of  the  preparations  which  had  been  going  on  in  Chile.23 

The  expedition  landed  on  the  coast  of  Peru  in  September, 
1820.  It  was  well  received  by  the  Peruvians,  many  of  whom 
joined  the  invading  army ;  and  after  some  months  San  Martin, 
without  risking  a  battle,  succeeded,  with  the  aid  of  the  fleet,  in 
compelling  the  forces  of  the  viceroy  to  abandon  the  capital  and 
retire  into  the  mountains.  Possession  was  then  taken  of  the 
city,  and  on  July  28,  1821,  independence  was  formally  de- 
clared, pursuant  to  an  act  signed  by  an  assemblage  of  citizens 
previously  convened  by  the  Municipal  Council  of  Lima  for  the 
purpose  of  giving  expression  to  the  popular  will.24  A  few 
days  later  San  Martin  issued  a  decree  establishing  a  provi- 
sional government,  the  supreme  civil  and  military  authority 
of  which  he  himself  exercised  under  the  title  of  Protector. 
The  only  machinery  of  government  for  which  the  decree  pro- 
vided was  a  cabinet  of  three  members,  whom  it  designated  as 
follows:  Juan  Garcia  del  Rio,  a  Colombian,  Minister  of  For- 
eign Relations ;  Bernardo  Monteagudo,  an  Argentine,  Minister 
of  War  and  Marine ;  and  Hipolito  Unanue,  a  Peruvian,  Minis- 
ter of  Finance.  By  the  terms  of  the  decree  this  arrangement 
was  to  continue  in  force  until  the  representatives  of  the  Pe- 
ruvian nation  should  organize  the  government  and  take  its  ad- 
ministration into  their  own  hands.25 

Prior  to  the  evacuation  of  Lima,  negotiations  were  begun  be- 
tween San  Martin  and  the  Viceroy,  Pezuela,  looking  to  some 
form  of  accommodation.  Pezuela  proposed  an  arrangement  by 
which  the  government  of  Chile  and  the  expeditionary  army 
should  agree  to  submit  to  the  authority  of  Ferdinand  VII,  un- 

23  Bulnes,  Historia  de  la  Espedicidn  Libertadora  del  Peru,  I,  347,  et  seq.; 
Paz  Soldan,  Historia  del  Peru,  Independiente,  I,  27. 

2*  Odriozola,  Documentos  Histdricos  del  Peru,  IV,  262,  271. 

25  Ibid.,  318-320.  See,  also,  Hall,  Extracts  from  a  Journal  Written  on 
the  Coast  of  Chile,  Peru,  and  Mexico,  I,  266-270, 


52         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

der  the  Spanish  constitution  of  1812.  This  constitution  had 
been  cast  aside  by  Ferdinand  upon  his  return  to  the  throne  in 
1814,  but  in  March,  1820,  it  was  restored  in  the  Peninsula, 
and  it  had  just  been  promulgated  by  the  Royalist  government 
at  Lima.  The  exchanges  came  to  nothing  because  of  the  Pa- 
triot leader's  insistence  upon  the  recognition  of  the  independ- 
ence of  Peru  as  a  prerequisite  to  conciliation.  Subsequently, 
however,  through  the  interposition  of  an  agent  of  the  Spanish 
Government,  Manuel  Abreu,  who  had  just  arrived  in  Peru, 
negotiations  were  renewed.  Conferences  were  begun  in  May 
and  were  not  finally  broken  off  until  the  evacuation  of  Lima  by 
the  Royalists,  two  months  later.  These  negotiations,  like  the 
first,  were  fruitless;  but  they  gave  rise  to  a  proposal  which 
is  of  more  than  passing  interest.  In  common  with  many  of  his 
contemporaries,  San  Martin  believed  that  the  form  of  govern- 
ment best  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  new  states  was  the  mon- 
archical. With  a  view  therefore  to  its  establishment  in  Peru, 
he  proposed,  in  substance,  that  the  independence  of  the  coun- 
try be  declared  by  the  joint  action  of  the  two  armies;  that  a 
provisional  government  be  organized  under  a  regency,  the  pres- 
ident of  which  should  be  La  Serna,  who  had  succeeded  Pezuela 
as  viceroy;  and  that  commissioners  be  dispatched  to  Spain  to 
ask  the  king  to  consent  to  the  placing  of  a  prince  of  his  family 
upon  the  new  throne.  Though  La  Serna  was  at  first  inclined 
to  regard  with  favor  the  solution  thus  proposed  by  San  Martin, 
he  afterward  declined  to  accept  it,  thus  putting  an  end  to  the 
project  of  founding  an  independent  kingdom  in  Peru  with  the 
cooperation  of  the  Royalist  authorities.26 

But  San  Martin  did  not  abandon  the  plan.  Conditions  in 
Peru  appeared  to  him  and  to  his  political  advisers  to  offer  but 
little  promise  for  the  success  of  the  republican  form.  On  the 
other  hand,  for  the  monarchical  form,  the  indispensable  ele- 

zepaz  Soldan,  Historia  del  Peril  Independiente,  I,  69,  164-172;  Bulnes, 
Historia  de  la  Espedicitn  TAbertadora  del  Pent,  II,  93-129.  The  documents 
relating  to  these  conferences  are  published  in  Odriozola,  Pocumentos  His- 
tdricos  del  Pert,  IV,  139-238. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  53 

ment  of  aristocracy  was  already  at  hand,  while  the  traditions 
of  reverence  and  respect  for  everything  pertaining  to  royalty 
had  continued  to  be  cherished  among  both  the  Creole  and  the 
native  element  of  the  population.  The  social  organization  and 
the  example  of  the  viceregal  court  had  indeed  made  monarchical 
customs  and  practices  much  more  familiar  in  Peru  than  else- 
where in  Spanish  America,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Mex- 
ico. Thus  the  establishment  of  a  republic  meant  in  Peru  an 
especially  violent  break  with  the  past,  which,  with  the  resulting 
disorders,  San  Martin  desired  to  avoid.  Accordingly,  when  he 
assumed  the  title  of  Protector,  he  took  steps  to  revive  the  mon- 
archical project.  Though  personally  a  man  of  great  modesty, 
he  preserved  in  the  new  government  all  the  pomp  and  cere- 
mony of  the  viceregal  court;  he  validated  the  titles  of  the 
nobles  of  the  old  regime,  created  a  new  aristocratic  order  called 
the  Order  of  the  Sun,  and  appointed  a  council  of  state ;  he  also 
established  a  patriotic  society  whose  real  object,  it  soon  became 
clear,  was  to  carry  on  a  propaganda  in  favor  of  the  monarchical 
form  of  government.27 

Having  thus  adopted  measures  to  counteract  the  further  de- 
velopment of  republican  sentiment  in  Peru,  San  Martin  ap- 
pointed two  agents,  Juan  Garcia  del  Rio  and  Diego  Paroissen, 
to  proceed  to  Europe  with  a  view  to  secure  a  monarch  for  the 
Peruvian  throne.  These  envoys,  who  were  to  solicit  enroute 
the  cooperation  of  the  governments  of  Chile  and  Buenos  Aires, 
were  instructed  to  go  first  to  England,  where  they  were  to  en- 
deavor to  arrange  with  the  government  for  the  acceptance  of 
the  crown  by  the  Prince  of  Saxe-Coburg,28  or,  if  that  were  not 
practicable,  by  a  prince  of  the  reigning  family,  preferably  the 
Duke  of  Sussex.  In  the  event  of  failure  in  England,  they 
were  to  negotiate  in  turn  with  Russia,  Austria,  France,  Portu- 
gal, and  lastly  with  Spain.  Moreover,  ministers  plenipoten- 

27Bulnes,  op.  tit.,  373  ff.;   Paz  Soldan,  op.  cit.,  I,  268.     Villanueva,  La 
Monarquia  en  America:  BoUvar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  190-194. 
28  Leopold,  afterward  King  of  the  Belgians. 


54         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

tiary  were  accredited  by  San  Martin  to  the  governments  of  the 
new  Spanish  American  states,  with  instructions  to  use  every 
possible  means  to  induce  them  to  follow  the  lead  of  Peru  in  the 
matter  of  political  organization.29 

It  is  not  desired  to  create  the  impression  that  San  Martin's 
zeal  for  the  monarchical  form  of  government  so  far  influenced 
his  conduct  as  to  lead  him  to  disregard  the  moral  obligation 
which  he  owed  to  the  people  of  Peru,  to  allow  them  the  fullest 
freedom  in  adopting  for  themselves  whatever  political  system 
they  might  prefer.  He  believed  not  only  that  he  was  acting 
in  harmony  with  the  general  sentiment,  but  also  that  the  estab- 
Jishment  of  a  republic  would  result  in  anarchy  and  perhaps  in 
the  loss  of  independence.  Being  himself  without  ambition,  he 
desired  unselfishly  to  contribute  to  the  permanent  welfare  of 
Peru  and  of  the  other  new  states  formerly  colonies  of  Spain, 
by  giving  them  the  only  kind  of  government  which,  in  his  opin- 
ion, could  maintain  order  and  insure  for  them  a  free  and  pros- 
perous development.  He  did  not  intend  to  erect  a  throne  at 
Lima  in  defiance  of  the  will  of  the  Peruvian  people.30  On  the 
contrary,  although  he  had  little  faith  in  popular  assemblies, 
yet  he  convoked  a  congress  to  which  he  committed  the  respon- 
sibility of  deciding  upon  the  form  of  government  and  of  fram- 

29  Paz  Soldan,  Historic,  del  Perti,  Independiente,  I,  270-27S. 

3<>  Captain  Basil  Hall  of  the  British  navy  who  was  in  Peru  at  this  time 
had  several  interviews  with  San  Martin  and  was  impressed  with  his  dis- 
interestedness. In  his  Extracts  from  a  Journal  Written  on  the  Coasts  of 
Chile,  Peru,  and  Mexico,  the  following  interesting  passage  occurs  (I,  229)  : 
"  When  all  was  quiet  in  the  capital,  I  went  to  Callao,  and  hearing  that  San 
Martin  was  in  the  roads,  waited  on  him  on  board  his  yacht.  I  found  him 
possessed  of  correct  information  as  to  all  that  was  passing,  but  he  seemed 
in  no  hurry  to  enter  the  city,  and  appeared,  above  all  things,  anxious  to 
avoid  any  appearance  of  acting  the  part  of  a  conqueror.  '  For  the  last  ten 
years,'  said  he,  '  I  have  been  unremittingly  employed  against  the  Spaniards, 
or  rather,  in  favor  of  this  country,  for  I  am  not  against  any  one  who  is  not 
hostile  to  the  cause  of  independence.  All  I  wish  is,  that  this  country  should 
be  managed  by  itself,  and  by  itself  alone.  As  to  the  manner  in  which  it 
is  to  be  governed,  that  belongs  not  at  all  to  me.  I  propose  simply  to  give 
the  people  the  means  of  declaring  themselves  independent,  and  of  establish- 
ing a  suitable  form  of  government;  after  which  I  shall  consider  I  have  done 
enough  and  leave  them.'" 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  55 

ing  a  constitution  in  harmony  with  the  system  which  might 
be  adopted. 

But  San  Martin's  plans  were  doomed  to  failure.  Contrary 
to  his  expectation,  there  was  an  increasing  trend  of  opinion 
toward  republican  institutions.  Many  of  his  administrative 
measures  aroused  bitter  opposition.  He  was  unpopular  in  the 
army.  Conspiracies  were  hatched  against  him.  Some  of  the 
ablest  officers  became  disgusted  and  quit  the  service.  Lord 
Cochrane  openly  defied  his  authority  and  sailed  away  with  the 
warships  under  his  command.  The  government  of  Buenos 
Aires  was  unfriendly.  Misunderstandings  arose  with  Chile 
over  the  pay  of  the  expeditionary  forces  and  with  Colombia 
over  the  possession  of  Guayaquil.  The  severe  defeat  of  a  di- 
vision of  the  patriot  army  added  to  the  difficulties  of  the  situa- 
tion. As  a  consequence,  the  Royalists,  who  had  never  been 
dislodged  from  the  greater  part  of  Peru,  took  courage  and  be- 
gan to  threaten  the  very  existence  of  the  new  government. 

Desiring  to  placate  public  opinion  and  hoping  to  obtain  ma- 
terial assistance  in  completing  the  emancipation  of  Peru,  San 
Martin  delegated  early  in  1822  to  a  Peruvian,  the  Marquis  of 
Torre  Tagle,  the  supreme  authority  which  he  as  Protector  had 
been  exercising,  and  prepared  to  make  a  journey  to  Guayaquil 
to  confer  with  Bolivar,  who  appeared  to  be  in  a  situation  which 
would  permit  him  to  furnish  the  desired  help.  San  Martin 
expected  Colombian  aid  not  only  on  the  ground  of  common 
interest  but  also  on  the  ground  of  reciprocity,  for  troops  from 
Peru  were  then  fighting  side  by  side  with  those  of  Colombia 
in  freeing  the  province  of  Quito.  Moreover,  apart  from  the 
question  of  military  support,  he  wished  to  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  Bolivar  in  regard  to  the  form  of  government  to 
be  adopted  by  the  new  states,  as  well  as  to  determine  the  ques- 
tion of  the  status  of  Guayaquil,  which,  as  has  been  seen,  was 
an  object  of  contention  between  Colombia  and  Peru. 

The  conference  did  not  take  place  until  July,  1822.31     Mean- 
si  San  Martin  gives  a  brief  account  of  this  celebrated  conference  in  a 


56         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

while,  Bolivar  had  completed  the  liberation  of  Quito,  and  by  his 
aggressive  action  had  assured  the  annexation  of  Guayaquil  to 
Colombia.  San  Martin,  by  accepting  the  result,  permitted  this 
question  to  be  eliminated.  Upon  the  other  questions,  he  found, 
after  exchanging  views  with  Bolivar,  that  it  was  impossible  to 
reach  a  satisfactory  agreement.  The  Liberator  would  neither 
furnish  adequate  assistance  to  San  Martin,  nor  would  he  accept 
the  latter' s  invitation  to  take  command  of  the  combined  forces 
of  the  two  countries,  in  which  the  Argentine  leader  offered  to 
serve  in  a  secondary  capacity.  Bolivar's  objections  were  that 
the  Colombian  laws  did  not  permit  the  extension  of  his  opera- 
tions beyond  the  limits  of  the  republic,  and  that  he  was  disin- 
clined, for  reasons  of  delicacy,  to  have  under  his  command  so 
great  a  general  as  San  Martin.  As  to  the  remaining  question, 
the  views  of  the  two  leaders  were  hopelessly  divergent.  San 
Martin,  as  we  have  seen  above,  had  taken  steps  looking  to  the 
establishment  of  a  monarchy  in  Peru  with  a  prince  of  some 
European  house  as  sovereign ;  and  to  assure  success  he  wished  to 
have  thrones  erected  in  the  other  new  states.  Bolivar  on  the 
other  hand  was  a  partisan  of  republicanism  and  San  Martin 
was  unable  to  shake  his  attachment  to  that  system.  This  diver- 
gence, was,  doubtless,  a  still  more  effective  reason  for  the  Libera- 
tor's present  unwillingness  to  place  the  Colombian  army  at  the 
disposal  of  Peru. 

Thus,  San  Martin  failed  to  attain  any  of  the  objects  for  which 
he  had  made  the  journey  to  Guayaquil.  Disheartened,  he  re- 
turned to  Lima  in  August,  1822,  only  to  find  the  city  in  a 
state  of  growing  discontent.  During  his  absence  Monteagudo, 

letter  to  General  William  Miller,  dated  Brussels,  April  19,  1827.  Cf.  San 
Martfn,  8u  Correspondencia  (3d  ed.),  70-74.  For  other  accounts  see  Lar- 
razabal,  Vida  del  Libertador;  Paz  Soldan,  Historia  del  Peru  Independiente, 
I,  308-312;  Mitre,  Historia  de  San  Martin,  III,  602-635;  Villanueva,  Bo- 
livar y  el  General  San  Martin,  235-251.  See  also  Destruje,  La  entrevista 
de  Bolivar  y  Kan  Martin  en  Guayaquil;  La  Cruz,  La  entrevista  de  Guaya- 
quil; Goenaga,  La  entrevista  de  Guayaquil.  This  latter  work,  containing 
the  report  of  the  interview  by  Bolivar's  secretary  general,  which  until 
1910  remained  unpublished,  throws  new  light  on  the  subject. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  57 

his  chief  political  adviser,  who  had  exercised  a  controlling  in- 
fluence in  the  administration  of  the  government,  had,  by  reason 
of  certain  harsh  and  oppressive  measures,  become  so  obnoxious 
that  the  people  finally  took  matters  into  their  own  hands,  com- 
pelling him  to  resign  and  go  into  banishment.  This  incident 
still  further  discouraged  San  Martin  and  strengthened  his  re- 
solve to  quit  the  country ;  and  when,  a  month  after  his  return 
to  Lima,  the  congress  assembled,  he  resigned  all  authority  into 
the  hands  of  the  representatives  of  the  people  and  immediately 
embarked  for  Chile.  Passing  thence  to  his  estate  in  the  prov- 
ince of  Cuyo,  he  tarried  there  until  the  beginning  of  1824, 
when,  in  order  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  the  civil  strife  with 
which  the  provinces  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  were  continually 
afflicted,  he  took  passage  for  Europe,  where  he  spent  the  re- 
mainder of  his  days  in  obscurity.32 

The  people  of  Peru  being  at  last  left  free  to  establish  their 
own  form  of  government,  the  congress,  in  the  reaction  against 
the  centralization  of  power  which  existed  under  the  protector- 
ship of  San  Martin,  appointed  three  of  its  own  members  as  a 
commission  to  exercise  the  executive  authority  under  the  title 
of  junta  gubernativa,  until  a  constitution  should  be  adopted 
and  a  government  organized  in  accordance  with  its  provisions.33 
No  autocrat,  no  foreign  prince,  would  be  tolerated.  The  pow- 
ers and  instructions  given  to  San  Martin's  agents  in  Europe, 
in  so  far  as  they  related  to  the  establishment  of  a  monarchy  in 
Peru,  were  declared  to  be  without  effect.  In  December,  1822, 
a  provisional  constitution,  providing  for  a  popular,  representa- 
tive government  with  the  customary  division  of  powers,  was 
adopted.  Eleven  months  later  a  definitive  constitution,  based 
on  these  principles,  was  formally  promulgated,  but,  for  reasons 
which  will  now  appear,  it  never  became  effective. 

The  junta  gubernativa  having  proved  to  be  an  unsatisfactory 

32  Bulnes,  Espedicidn  Libertadora  del  Perti,  II,  484.  San  Martin  died  at 
Boulogne,  France,  in  1850. 

sspaz  Soldan,  Historia  del  Perti  Independiente,  II,  6, 


58         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

executive  body,  the  severe  defeat  of  an  expedition  which  it  had 
sent  against  the  Royalists  was  made  use  of  to  precipitate  a 
change.  In  compliance  with  a  petition  of  the  officers  of  the 
army  and  in  response  to  a  general  public  demand,  the  congress 
abolished  the  junta  and  created  the  office  of  president,  to  which 
it  appointed  Jose  de  la  Riva  Agiiero,  a  Peruvian  patriot  who 
had  long  been  active  in  the  cause  of  independence.  As  the  na- 
tion's executive  and  as  commander  in  chief  of  its  armed  forces, 
Riva  Agiiero  displayed  great  activity,  and  within  a  few  brief 
months  greatly  improved  the  situation.  He  augmented  the 
army  and  sent  a  formidable  expedition  against  the  Royalists 
in  the  south ;  he  organized  reserves  and  strengthened  the  navy ; 
he  obtained  an  auxiliary  force  from  Colombia,  and  in  general 
put  the  country  in  a  better  posture  for  offensive  and  defensive 
operations.  But  in  spite  of  these  measures  more  serious  re- 
verses were  in  store.  In  June,  1823,  upon  learning  that  Lima 
had  been  weakened  by  the  withdrawal  of  troops  for  the  expedi- 
tion to  the  south,  the  able  Royalist  leader,  Canterac,  marched 
upon  the  capital  and  took  it  without  a  struggle,  the  Patriot 
forces  having  in  the  meantime  retired  to  the  fortress  of  Callao. 
In  consequence  the  congress  was  dispersed,  some  of  the  mem- 
bers remaining  in  Lima,  others  fleeing  the  country  or  escaping 
to  neighboring  provinces,  and  still  others  following  the  army 
to  Callao.  This  latter  group,  though  constituting  a  minority, 
continued  to  meet  as  the  congress  of  Peru. 

Riva  Agiiero  was  blamed  for  the  loss  of  the  capital  and  had 
to  suffer  accordingly.  Not  only  did  the  congress  deprive  him 
of  the  chief  military  command,  but,  as  a  further  mark  of  dis- 
approval, resolved  to  transfer,  contrary  to  his  expressed  wish, 
the  seat  of  government  to  the  town  of  Trujillo,  some  three  hun- 
dred miles  to  the  north  of  Lima.  The  command  of  the  army 
was  intrusted  to  General  Sucre,84  commander  of  the  Colombian 

a*  Antonio  Jos6  de  Sucre  wa&  born  in  Cumanft,  Venezuela,  in  1795.  En- 
rolling in  the  patriot  army  in  1812,  he  rapidly  rose  to  high  rank  and 
before  the  close  of  the  wars  of  independence  had  become  Bolivar's  most 


FORMATION  OF  JSTEW  STATES  59 

auxiliary  force  and  Bolivar's  diplomatic  representative,  who, 
by  a  later  decree  of  the  congress,  was  also  authorized  to  exer- 
cise full  power,  civil  as  well  as  military,  in  the  area  in  which 
the  war  was  actively  prosecuted.  But,  when  Sucre  took  the 
field,  he  delegated  the  civil  authority  to  Torre  Tagle.  Thus 
two  governments  were  set  up  —  one  at  Trujillo  under  Riva 
Agiiero,  and  the  other  at  Callao,  and  later  at  Lima,  under  Torre 
Tagle.35 

The  confusion  into  which  the  country  had  fallen  caused  the 
Peruvian  patriots  to  forget  local  pride  and  petty  jealousies  and 
to  look  abroad  for  a  leader  skillful  enough  to  unite  the  conflict- 
ing factions  and  strong  enough  to  save  the  nation  from  the 
certain  consequence  of  anarchy  —  resubjugation  to  the  Spanish 
crown.  This  was  the  opportunity  for  which  Bolivar  had  been 
waiting.  Although  the  Peruvians  had  already  entered  into 
correspondence  with  him,  they  had  been  unwilling  to  grant  him 
the  authority  which  he  required.  But,  with  San  Martin  out 
of  the  way,  there  was  no  longer  a  leader  whose  achievements 
were  comparable  with  his  own.  The  Peruvians  had  made  an 
essay  at  self-government  and  had  failed.  The  moment  was 
auspicious.  Accordingly,  when  a  commission  arrived  from 
Peru  to  renew  the  invitation,  Bolivar  accepted  without  further 
cavil,  and,  duly  authorized  by  the  congress  of  Colombia,  set 
out  to  win  new  glory  in  the  emancipation  of  Peru. 

He  reached  Lima  on  September  1,  the  Royalists  having 
again  evacuated  the  city.  The  next  day  he  was  granted  au- 

trusted  lieutenant.  He  was  personally  in  command  of  the  united  Patriot 
forces  at  Ayacucho  —  Bolivar  being  absent  at  the  time  the  battle  was 
fought  —  and  on  account  of  that  great  victory  he  was  made  Grand  Marshal 
of  Ayacucho.  After  driving  the  Royalists  from  upper  Peru  he  aided  in 
the  establishment  of  the  republic  of  Bolivia  and  became  its  first  president. 
He  returned  to  Colombia  in  1828  and  met  death  two  years  later  at  the 
hands  of  an  assassin.  Second  to  none  of  his  contemporaries  as  a  military 
leader,  he  was  no  less  eminent  as  a  diplomatist  and  as  a  political  adminis- 
trator. See  for  his  letters,  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  I.  See  also,  Irisarri,  His- 
toria  Critica  del  Asesinato  cometido  en  la  persona  del  Gran  Mariscal  de 
Ayacucho. 

ss  Paz  Soldan,  Historia  del  Peru  Independiente,  II,  83,  99. 


60         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

thority  to  settle  the  anomalous  situation  which  had  arisen  out 
of  the  establishment  of  the  two  governments  under  Torre  Tagle 
and  Riva  Agiiero.  On  September  10  he  was  invested  by  the 
congress  with  full  military  and  political  authority  under  the 
title  of  Liberator,  Torre  Tagle  being  permitted  to  retain  only 
minor  functions;  and  when,  in  November,  Riva  Agiiero  was 
arrested  on  a  charge  of  treasonable  correspondence  with  the 
enemy  and  banished  from  the  country,  the  Liberator  remained 
in  undisputed  control  of  the  whole  of  the  emancipated  terri- 
tory. It  was  during  this  period  that  the  constitution  of  1823 
was  adopted  and  promulgated.  But  in  order  that  the  Liberator 
might  not  be  embarrassed  by  restrictions,  the  congress  passed 
a  resolution  on  February  10,  1824,  amplifying  his  dictatorial 
powers  and  authorizing  him  in  particular  to  suspend  those 
articles  of  the  constitution  which  "  might  be  incompatible  with 
the  salvation  of  the  republic."  The  congress  then  adjourned 
subject  to  the  dictator's  call.36 

The  outcome  of  the  war  has  already  been  indicated.  After 
its  conclusion,  Bolivar  gave  his  attention  exclusively  to  the 
realization  of  certain  political  plans  which  had  long  been  re- 
volving in  his  mind.  As  this  subject  receives  full  considera- 
tion in  a  subsequent  chapter,  a  brief  reference  to  it  at  this 
point  will  suffice.  Shortly  after  the  victory  of  Ayacucho,  which 
assured  the  independence  of  Peru  and  relieved  the  other  new 
states  of  the  fear  of  resubjugation,  Bolivar  assembled  the  Pe- 
ruvian congress  87  and  resigned  into  its  hands  the  dictatorial 
authority  with  which  it  had  invested  him.  His  resignation 
was  not  accepted.  On  the  contrary,  his  dictatorial  powers  were 
extended  until  the  congress  should  meet  in  1826,  and,  as  pro- 
vided in  the  constitution  of  1823,  take  steps  to  organize  the 
government  on  a  legal  basis.  But,  when,  in  September,  1826, 

so  The  decrees  referred  to  are  found  in  Analea  Parlamentarios  del  Peru, 
I,  497,  499. 

a?  The  congress  here  referred  to  was  the  first  congress  convoked  by  San 
M;ti-)iii  in  1821.  After  being  in  session  for  a  short  time  it  was  dissolved 
(March  10,  1825). 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  61 

events  in  Colombia  compelled  him  to  return  to  that  country, 
he  had  not  been  divested  of  his  authority,  a  new  congress  hav- 
ing assembled  and  adjourned  without  taking  action.  Before 
embarking  for  Colombia,  therefore,  Bolivar  delegated  his  pow- 
ers to  General  Santa  Cruz,  in  the  hope  that,  by  retaining  a  hold 
on  Peru,  the  plan  which  was  then  uppermost  in  his  mind  — 
the  federation  of  Colombia,  Peru,  and  Bolivia  —  might  be 
more  readily  advanced.  Once  freed,  however,  from  the  domi- 
nating influence  of  Bolivar's  personality,  the  national  spirit 
of  Peru  asserted  itself.  Early  in  1827  the  authority  which 
the  Liberator  still  attempted  to  exercise  through  Santa  Cruz 
was  thrown  aside  and  a  provisional  government  under  the 
constitution  of  1823  was  organized.  A  convention  was  then 
called  to  revise  the  constitution.  The  result  was  a  new  instru- 
ment which  was  promulgated  in  1828,  from  which  date  con- 
stitutional government  in  Peru  definitely  takes  its  beginning.38 
Mexico  and  Central  America  formed  a  group  apart.  Dur- 
ing the  three  centuries  of  Spanish  domination,  intercourse  be- 
tween the  colonies  to  the  south  of  the  Isthmus  and  those  to  the 
north  of  it  was  infrequent.  Mexico  and  Guatemala  were  for- 
bidden to  trade  by  way  of  the  Pacific  with  Peru  and  New 
Granada;  and,  although  all  commercial  restrictions  were  re- 
laxed during  the  last  quarter  of  the  eighteenth  century,  suffi- 
cient time  had  not  elapsed  to  permit  the  development  of  inti- 
mate relations  between  the  two  sections.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  fleet  system,  which  involved  the  distribution  of  all  goods 
for  the  southern  colonies  through  Porto  Bello  and  Cartagena, 
led  to  a  constant  movement  back  and  forth  from  the  shores  of 
the  Caribbean  overland  to  Quito  and  from  Porto  Bello  across 
the  Isthmus  to  Panama,  thence  by  water  to  Lima,  and  then 
on  by  land  to  the  closed  port  of  Buenos  Aires.39  The  habits 
of  generations,  therefore,  had  prepared  the  colonies  of  the 

ss  Vargas,  Historia  del  Peru  Independiente,  III,  243 ;  Arosemena,  Consti- 
tuciones  Politicas    (2d  ed.),  II,  424. 

39  Bourne,  Spain  in  America,  291 ;  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mexico,  I,  112, 


62         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

southern  continent  for  cooperation ;  whereas  between  the  south- 
ern and  the  northern  groups  the  situation  was  just  the  reverse. 
Besides,  as  communication  by  land  between  Mexico  and  South 
America  was  not  feasible,  contact  between  the  two  sections, 
during  the  wars  of  independence,  was  rendered  extremely  diffi- 
cult; for  Spain  controlled  the  seas. 

Beginning  in  1810,  the  revolution  in  Mexico  continued  for 
a  decade  without  positive  results.  During  its  first  stage,  under 
the  leadership  of  the  priest,  Miguel  Hidalgo,  there  appears  to 
have  been  no  well-defined  plan  of  political  organization,  though 
the  object  of  the  movement  was  declared  by  Hidalgo  himself 
to  be  that  of  wresting  the  control  of  the  government  from  the 
"  Europeans  " ;  that  is,  the  Spaniards,  who  had  fallen  under 
the  domination  of  the  French.40  During  the  second  stage  of 
the  revolution,  from  1811  to  1815,  under  the  leadership  of  an- 
other priest,  Jose  Maria  Morelos,  the  situation  became,  from 
the  political  standpoint,  somewhat  more  clearly  defined,  yet  it 
must  be  remarked  that  harmony  of  purpose  and  of  action  was 
by  no  means  attained.  When  in  1811  Hidalgo  was  taken  pris- 
oner and  executed,  one  of  his  ministers  and  his  ablest  sup- 
porter, Ignacio  Lopez  Rayon,  took  the  initiative  in  organizing 
a  revolutionary  government.  Following  the  example  which 
had  been  set  in  Spain  and  in  different  parts  of  America,  Rayon 
formed  a  junta  to  govern  in  the  name  of  Ferdinand  VII.  In 
the  limited  territory  controlled  by  the  Patriots,  however,  obedi- 
ence was  never  generally  accorded  to  this  junta.  Morelos  him- 
self, though  maintaining  friendly  relations  with  it,  never  recog- 
nized its  authority.  To  him  a  government  in  the  name  of  the 
Spanish  king  was  utterly  repugnant. 

Desiring  to  establish  a  government  whose  authority  would 
be  respected  by  all  who  were  attached  to  the  Patriot  cause, 
Morelos  convoked  a  congress,  which  assembled  at  Chilpancingo 
in  September,  1813.  This  congress,  after  electing  Morelos  as 

*oAlaman,  Hiatoria  de  Mfaico,  I,  361,  376;  Zavala,  Ensayo  Histdrico  de 
las  Ifevoluciones  de  Mexico,  I,  65. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  63 

commander  in  chief,  proclaimed  on  November  6  the  independ- 
ence of  Mexico.  During  the  next  year,  though  compelled  to 
migrate  frequently  from  place  to  place  in  order  to  escape  cap- 
ture, it  framed  a  provisional  constitution  which  was  promul- 
gated on  October  24,  1814.41  This  instrument  was  an  adapta- 
tion of  the  Spanish  constitution  of  1812  to  the  republican  form 
of  government.  But  its  operation,  even  within  the  narrow 
limits  of  the  territory  controlled  by  the  revolutionists,  was  only 
nominal,  and  its  duration  was  brief,  for  the  congress  was  soon 
dispersed  and  Morelos,  the  main  support  of  the  new  regime, 
was,  like  his  predecessor,  Hidalgo,  captured  and  executed.42 
For  the  next  four  or  five  years  the  revolution  was  prosecuted 
in  a  desultory  fashion,  without  organization  and  without  ef- 
fectiveness, until  it  entered  upon  its  final  stage  under  circum- 
stances which  will  now  be  briefly  related. 

By  the  year  1820  the  fires  of  the  revolution  appear  to  have 
been  almost  extinguished.  With  the  exception  of  a  band  under 
General  Vicente  Guerrero,  now  driven  to  seek  refuge  in  the 
mountains  of  the  south,  no  considerable  force  remained  on 
foot  to  oppose  the  disciplined  troops  at  the  command  of  the 
Viceroy.  In  reality,  as  the  result  of  a  lack  of  leadership,  of 
organization,  and  of  unity  of  purpose,  the  revolutionary  wars 
had  been  characterized  by  such  ineffectiveness  and  by  such 
excesses  that  the  Mexican  nobility,  the  higher  clergy,  the  great 
landed  proprietors,  and  in  general  the  more  enlightened  glasses 
had  been  rather  confirmed  in  their  attachment  to  the  Royalist 
cause  than  attracted  to  that  of  independence.  And  yet  the 
upper  classes  of  Mexican  society  were  not  hostile  to  the  idea 
of  independence  itself.  On  the  contrary,  they  generally  fa- 
vored separation  from  the  mother  country,  provided  it  could 
be  effected  without  jeopardizing  their  special  interests.  That 
is  to  say,  if  the  character  of  the  revolution  were  changed  from 

4i  For  the  declaration  of  independence  and  the  constitution  of  1814,  see 
Gamboa,  Leyes  Constitucionales  de  Mexico  durante  el  Siglo,  XIX,  235, 
237  ff. 

«Alaman,  Historia  de  Mexico,  III,  545;  IV,  166,  313,  334. 


64         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

a  popular  to  an  aristocratic  movement,  their  opposition  to  it 
would  largely  disappear.  An  event  which  occurred  in  Spain 
early  in  1820  furnished  the  occasion  for  just  such  a  change  and 
led  to  the  rapid  consummation  of  independence  under  condi- 
tions more  or  less  satisfactory  to  all  elements  of  the  popula- 
tion. 

The  event  referred  to  was  the  reestablishment  of  the  Spanish 
constitution.  The  restoration  of  Ferdinand  VII  in  1814  and 
his  putting  aside  of  the  constitution  of  1812  had  caused  great 
rejoicings  among  the  Loyalists  in  Mexico,  and  now  that  a  lib- 
eral system  was  again  to  prevail,  they,  and  especially  the  clergy, 
became  greatly  concerned  as  to  the  security  of  their  special  in- 
terests. The  first  impulse  was  to  prevent  the  promulgation  of 
the  constitution  and  to  offer  Ferdinand  an  asylum  in  Mexico, 
where  absolute  government  might  be  maintained  unimpaired. 
But  wiser  counsels  prevailed.  The  constitution  was  proclaimed 
and  the  new  order  of  things  was  nominally  accepted.  Mean- 
while, plans  were  laid  to  unite  all  parties  on  a  program  whose 
end  was  independence.43 

Colonel  Augustin  Iturbide,  a  Mexican  who  had  won  distinc- 
tion in  the  royalist  army  against  the  insurgents  and  who  up  to 
this  moment  had  remained  loyal  to  the  king,  was  chosen  to 
carry  the  plans  into  effect.  It  was  essential  to  win  the  support 
of  those  who  had  for  a  decade  been  fighting  for  independence, 
or  if  any  should  oppose,  to  break  their  power  of  resistance. 
Guerrero  with  his  followers  in  the  south  appeared  to  present 
the  most  serious  obstacle,  and  Iturbide  determined  to  deal  with 
him  as  the  first  step  in  the  accomplishment  of  his  enterprise. 
Obtaining  from  the  viceroy,  who  was  not  a  party  to  the  con- 
spiracy, a  commission  to  put  down  the  remnant  of  the  insurgent 
forces,  Iturbide  marched  against  Guerrero  late  in  the  year 
1820.  After  a  few  skirmishes  in  which  the  rebels  were  suc- 
cessful, Iturbide  became  convinced  that  the  insurrection  could 

«  Alamfin,  Historia  de  Mexico,  V,  14,  60;  Zavala,  Ensayo  Histdrico  de 
las  Revolucionee  de  Meorico,  I,  108;  Poinsett,  Notes  on  Mexico,  264. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  65 

not  be  terminated  by  force  as  readily  as  he  had  hoped.  He 
therefore  resolved  to  try  a  different  procedure.44 

Entering  into  communication  with  the  rebel  leader,  Iturbide 
obtained  without  great  difficulty  the  promise  of  his  adhesion  to 
the  revolution  in  its  new  form.  In  the  meantime  agents  had 
been  sent  to  win  over  the  leaders  in  different  parts  of  the  coun- 
try. Progress  was  rapid,  and  Iturbide  was  soon  ready  to  make 
an  open  avowal  of  his  intentions.  Accordingly,  on  February 
24,  1821,  he  issued  a  proclamation  which,  while  explaining  the 
causes  that  impelled  the  separation  of  Mexico  from  the  mother 
country,  set  forth  the  principles  on  which  it  was  proposed  to 
found  the  new  order.  This  declaration  of  principles,  being 
associated  in  name  with  the  place  at  which  it  was  published, 
is  known  to  history  as  the  Plan  of  Iguala.45  Its  essential  pro- 
visions were:  First,  the  conservation  of  the  Catholic  religion 
without  tolerance  of  any  other;  secondly,  absolute  independ- 
ence under  a  constitutional  monarchy  to  be  known  as  the  Mex- 
ican Empire ;  and  thirdly,  the  intimate  union  of  Americans  and 
Europeans;  that  is,  citizenship  and  equality  of  rights  for  all, 
regardless  of  place  of  birth.  Thus,  under  the  device,  religion, 
independence,  union,  the  Mexican  revolution  entered  upon  its 
final  stage. 

The  Plan  of  Iguala  provided  that  the  crown  be  offered  to 
Ferdinand  VII,  and  in  the  event  of  his  failure  to  accept  it,  to 
the  other  members  of  his  family  in  succession.  It  further 
provided  that  the  country  should  be  ruled  in  the  interregnum 
by  a  body  of  regents,  the  presidency  of  which  was  offered  to 
the  Viceroy,  Apodaca,  in  the  expectation  that  he  would  not 
be  unwilling  to  give  his  support  to  the  scheme  as  it  was  set 
forth  in  Iturbide' s  proclamation.  But  Apodaca,  far  from  giv- 
ing the  movement  his  support,  prepared  to  resist  it  by  every 
means  in  his  power.  He  did  not  proceed,  however,  with  the 

**Alainan,  Historia  de  Meaaico,  V,  57,  84. 

45  The  Plan  of  Iguala  is  printed  in  full  in  the  Appendix  to  Vol.  V  of 
Alaman's  Historia  de  Mexico,  and  in  Gamboa's  Leyes  y  Constituciones  de 
Mexico,  283. 


66         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

vigor  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  officers  of  the  Royalist  army, 
the  occasion  demanded,  and  they  deposed  him,  appointing  one 
of  their  own  number,  Francisco  Novella,  in  his  stead.  This 
step  did  not  result,  as  it  was  hoped  it  would,  in  arresting  the 
progress  of  the  revolution.  On  the  contrary,  the  revolutionary 
ranks  continued  to  fill  with  recruits  from  all  sides  and  the 
country  gradually  passed  into  the  control  of  the  Patriots. 
Early  in  August,  1821,  Iturbide  entered  the  city  of  Puebla, 
which  for  some  time  had  been  invested,  and  from  this  advan- 
tageous position  he  disposed  his  troops  to  begin  the  siege  of  the 
capital  itself.46 

Shortly  before  the  fall  of  Puebla  a  new  viceroy,  Juan 
O'Donoju  by  name,  arrived  at  Vera  Cruz.  Being  a  liberal  in 
politics,  O'Donoju  was  little  inclined  to  employ  force  to  reduce 
the  Mexicans  to  submission;  and,  when  he  perceived  that  all 
the  important  interests  in  the  country  had  at  last  been  drawn 
into  the  movement  for  independence,  he  readily  concluded  that 
the  continuance  of  the  struggle  was  futile.  He  therefore  en- 
tered into  negotiations  with  Iturbide,  and  on  August  24  con- 
cluded with  him,  though  without  authority,  an  agreement  con- 
firmatory of  the  Plan  of  Iguala.  This  agreement,  known  as 
the  Treaty  of  Cordova  47  because  of  its  having  been  signed  at 
a  little  town  by  that  name  some  hundred  miles  inland  from 
Vera  Cruz,  departed  in  one  important  particular  from  the 
Plan  of  Iguala;  that  is,  it  authorized  the  Mexican  Cortes  to 
elect  an  emperor  in  the  event  that  none  of  the  Spanish  Bour- 
bons should  accept  the  crown.  By  this  change  the  way  to  the 
throne  was  opened  to  the  ambition  of  Iturbide. 

Because  of  O'Donoju's  lack  of  authority  to  conclude  such 
an  agreement,  Novella  and  the  leaders  of  the  Royalist  army 
declined  to  abide  by  it.  Nevertheless  Iturbide  was  able  to  take 
possession  of  the  city  of  Mexico  and  to  set  up  a  government 

*«  Alaman,  op.  cit.,  V,  257  if. 

*7  A  translation  of  the  treaty  is  found  in  American  State  Papers,  Foreign 
Relations,  IV;  see  also,  Alaman,  Hiatoria  de  Mexico,  V,  Appendix;  and 
Gamboa,  op.  cit.,  286. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  67 

without  serious  interference  from  the  Royalists.  The  Regency, 
under  the  Plan  of  Iguala,  was  organized  with  Iturbide  as  its 
president,  to  which  office  was  attached  the  chief  command  of 
the  armed  forces  on  land  and  sea.  O'Donoju,  who  had  en- 
tered the  capital  with  the  Patriot  troops,  was  made  one  of  the 
regents ;  but  he  died  suddenly  a  few  days  later.  In  February, 
1822,  a  national  congress,  convoked  by  the  regency,  met  in  the 
City  of  Mexico.  In  this  assembly  opposition  to  the  regency 
was  at  once  manifested  by  the  former  followers  of  Hidalgo  and 
Morelos  —  the  "  old  patriots  " —  because  of  the  evident  inten- 
tion of  Iturbide  to  usurp  the  throne.  Of  the  five  members  of 
the  regency,  three,  who  were  strong  partisans  of  Iturbide,  were 
deposed  and  were  replaced  with  persons  hostile  to  him.  More- 
over an  active  propaganda  was  begun  in  the  press  in  favor  of 
the  establishment  of  a  republic,  and  conspiracies  were  formed 
with  that  end  in  view. 

In  due  time  news  arrived  of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  of 
Cordova  by  the  Spanish  Government.  Iturbide  then  deter- 
mined to  gain  possession  of  the  throne  without  further  delay. 
The  situation  was  serious  and  uncertain,  and  the  method  of 
his  procedure  was  altogether  irregular.  On  the  night  of  May 
18,  1822,  disorganized  bands  of  soldiers  and  crowds  of  the 
lowest  class  of  people,  known  in  Mexico  as  leperos,  acclaimed 
him  as  emperor;  and  on  the  following  day  a  mob  composed  of 
like  elements  of  the  population  invaded  the  halls  of  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  and  by  threats  of  violence  compelled  that  body 
to  give  its  approval  to  the  choice  of  the  populace.  If  the  cir- 
cumstance of  intimidation  had  not  deprived  the  action  of  the 
congress  of  its  legal  force,  the  further  circumstance  that  less 
than  a  majority  of  the  deputies  were  present  and  that  a  re- 
spectable number  of  these  voted  in  the  negative,  would  have 
sufficed  to  cast  grave  doubt  upon  the  validity  of  the  emperor's 
title.48 

48  Mexican  historians  are  in  substantial  agreement  as  to  the  facts  relat- 
ing to  the  establishment  of  the  empire,  Cf.  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mexico, 


68         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Although  the  conditions  under  which  Iturbide  assumed  the 
crown  were  not  such  as  to  inspire  confidence,  yet,  if  he  had 
possessed  political  sagacity,  had  had  the  good  judgment  to 
conciliate  the  partisans  of  representative  government,  and  had 
not  committed  all  manner  of  political  blunders,  he  might  have 
been  able  to  induce  the  leaders  of  the  various  groups  to  give 
the  new  regime  their  united  support.  But,  lacking  penetra- 
tion and  balance,  he  pursued  a  contrary  course.  In  the  first 
place,  he  made  his  government  ridiculous  in  the  eyes  of  many 
of  his  subjects  by  forming  an  imperial  court  whose  members 
were  premitted  to  enact  the  farce  of  imitating  manners  and 
customs  to  which  the  precedents  of  generations  alone  gave  sanc- 
tion in  the  monarchies  of  the  Old  World.  In  the  second  place, 
he  aroused  •  bitter  opposition  on  the  part  of  those  who  were 
hostile  to  arbitrary  government  by  gradually  usurping  the  pow- 
ers of  the  congress  and  finally  by  dissolving  it  altogether.49 

The  inevitable  result  was  the  downfall  of  the  empire.  In  De- 
cember, 1822,  Colonel  Antonio  Lopez  de  Santa  Anna,  destined 
to  occupy  the  center  of  the  stage  in  Mexican  affairs  for  long 
years  to  come,  raised  the  standard  of  revolt  at  Vera  Cruz. 
Declaring  in  favor  of  the  republican  form  of  government,  he 
was  soon  joined  by  Victoria,  Guerrero,  and  other  veterans  of 
the  early  struggles  for  independence.  The  uprising  spread  rap- 
idly and  soon  became  so  formidable  that  the  emperor  attempted 
to  check  it  by  reassembling  the  congress  which  he  had  boldly 
dissolved  a  few  months  before.  But  his  efforts  were  of  no 
avail.  Realizing  at  length  that  his  situation  was  hopeless,  he 
sent  to  the  congress  on  March  19,  exactly  ten  months  after  his 
elevation  to  the  throne,  a  formal  renunciation  of  the  imperial 
crown.  This  renunciation  the  congress,  in  order  to  avoid  even 

V,  591  ff.;  Zavala,  En^ayo  Histdrioo,  I,  164  ff.;  Bustamente,  Cuadro  His- 
t6rico,  VI,  91  ff.  Both  Zavala  and  Bustamente  were  members  of  the  con- 
gress. A  good,  brief  account  is  given  by  J.  R.  Poinsett  in  his  Notes  on 
Mexico,  265-274. 

4»Alaman,  Historia  de  Mtxico,  V,  637,  662;  Zavala,  Ensayo  Histdrico, 
I,  175. 


FOKMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  69 

an  implied  recognition  of  his  right  to  the  thing  renounced,  re- 
fused to  accept ;  but  it  voted  to  permit  him  to  quit  the  country 
and  to  pay  him  an  annual  stipend  of  25,000  pesos,  on  condition 
that  he  establish  his  residence  in  Italy.50  To  this  condition 
Iturbide  agreed. 

His  subsequent  career  was  as  brief  as  it  was  tragic.  Placed 
aboard  a  British  vessel  chartered  for  the  purpose,  he  was  con- 
ducted to  Italy;  but  he  remained  there  only  a  short  time. 
Making  his  way  to  England,  where  he  arrived  in  January, 
1824,  he  informed  the  Mexican  Government  of  his  movements, 
attributing  his  breach  of  agreement  to  the  desire  to  aid  in  re- 
pelling an  attack,  which,  he  declared,  Spain  was  preparing,  in 
conjunction  with  the  Holy  Alliance,  upon  the  independence  of 
Mexico.  The  Mexican  congress,  however,  fearing  that  it  was 
his  purpose  to  regain  the  imperial  throne,  decreed  that  he  should 
be  dealt  with  as  a  traitor  and  an  outlaw,  if,  upon  any  pretext 
whatever,  he  should  set  foot  upon  Mexican  soil.  Ignorant  of 
this  measure,  Iturbide,  some  four  months  after  his  arrival  in 
England,  embarked  for  Mexico.  About  the  middle  of  July  his 
ship  cast  anchor  on  the  coast  near  Soto  la  Marina,  where,  ac- 
companied by  Colonel  Beneski,  a  Polish  officer  who  had  for- 
merly been  in  the  imperial  service  in  Mexico,  he  went  ashore. 
But  in  spite  of  his  disguise  he  was  recognized  and  placed  under 
arrest.  The  commandant  of  the  district,  Felipe  la  Garza,  be- 
ing in  doubt  as  <to  whether  he  should  at  once  give  effect  to  the 
proscription,  resolved  to  consult  the  provincial  congress  of 
Tamaulipas,  which  was  in  session  at  the  neighboring  town  of 
Padilla.  No  sooner  was  the  matter  presented  to  that  body 
than  Garza  was  ordered  immediately  to  proceed  with  the  execu- 
tion of  the  law,  and  in  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  July  19, 
Iturbide  was  shot  in  the  public  square.51 

so  Bustamente,  Historia  del  Emperador  D.  Agustin  de  Iturbide,  135. 

si  The  best  account  of  the  capture  and  execution  of  Iturbide  is  that 
given  by  Garza  in  his  official  report,  which  is  found  in  full  in  Bustamente's 
Historia  del  Emperador,  249-258.  Iturbide's  Memoirs  were  published  in 
England  by  M.  J.  Quin,  on  the  eve  of  the  former  Emperor's  return  to  Mexico. 


70         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Meanwhile,  progress  had  been  made  toward  the  establish- 
ment of  popular  government  in  Mexico.  Upon  the  abdication 
of  Iturbide  the  congress  vested  the  executive  authority  of  the 
nation  in  a  junta  of  -three  members,  each  of  whom  was  author- 
ized to  serve  for  alternate  periods  of  one  month  in  the  office  of 
president.  In  response  to  a  general  demand  a  new  congress 
was  convoked  to  meet  the  following  October  for  the  purpose 
of  framing  a  constitution.  Political  parties  at  once  began  to 
form  on  the  issue  of  a  unitary  system  with  little  local  autonomy, 
as  opposed  to  a  federal  system  with  a  weak  central  authority. 
Monarchism  practically  disappeared.  The  Bourbonists  —  that 
is,  those  who  had  favored  the  establishment  of  a  Bourbon  em- 
pire in  Mexico,  and  who  had  never  become  reconciled  to  the 
elevation  of  Iturbide  to  the  throne  —  gave  their  support  to  the 
group  which  stood  for  a  strong  centralized  government;  while 
the  Iturbidists,  moved  in  part,  no  doubt,  by  resentment  against 
the  Bourbonists,  whom  they  blamed  for  the  emperor's  down- 
fall, joined  forces  with  the  partisans  of  a  federal  system.  The 
centralists  drew  into  their  ranks  a  majority  of  the  Spaniards 
resident  in  the  country,  the  higher  clergy,  and  the  men  of 
wealth  and  standing  in  the  community;  while  the  federalists, 
composed  in  the  main  of  the  humble  sort  of  folk,  gained 
strength  and  prestige  by  the  adhesion  of  the  "  old  patriots  " — 
now  regarded  as  the  real  national  heroes  —  to  their  cause. 
Thus  the  two  parties  came  to  be  distinguished  not  only  as  cen- 
tralistic  and  federalistic,  but  as  aristocratic  and  democratic,  re- 
spectively.52 

The  same  year  the  volume  was  translated  and  published  in  French  under 
the  following  title:  Memoirea  Autographes  de  don  Agustin  Iturbide,  ex- 
empereur  du  Mexique,  oontenant  le  detail  des  principaux  evenements  de  sa 
vie  politique,  avec  une  preface  et  des  pieces  justificatives.  A  pamphlet  by 
Beneski,  entitled:  A  Narrative  of  the  Last  Moments  of  the  Life  of  Don 
Agustin  de  Iturbide,  ex-emperor  of  Mexico,  was  published  in  New  York  in 
1825.  The  following  recent  studies  of  Iturbide  have  appeared:  La  Guerra 
de  Independencia,  Hidalgo  —  Iturbide  (1910),  by  Francisco  Bulnes,  and 
Don  Agustin  de  Iturbide  by  Augustin  de  Iturbide  in  the  Records  of  the 
American  Catholic  Historical  Society  for  December,  1915,  and  March,  1916. 
82  Alamfln,  Historia  de  Mexico,  V,  703;  Zavala,  Ensayo  Hist6rico,  I,  254. 


FOBMATIOK  OF  NEW  STATES  71 

.When  the  new  congress  assembled  it  was  seen  that  the  feder- 
alists were  in  the  majority;  in  fact,  they  all  appeared  to  have 
been  federalists,  differing  only  in  the  degree  of  local  autonomy 
which  they  severally  favored.  A  Constituent  Act  setting 
forth  the  fundamental  principles  upon  which  it  was  proposed 
to  found  the  government  was  the  first  matter  to  receive  consid- 
eration. The  adoption  of  Articles  5  and  6  of  the  Act,  provid- 
ing that  the  form  of  government  should  be  that  of  .a  federal 
republic  composed  of  states  "  free  and  sovereign  "  in  all  mat- 
ters pertaining  to  their  internal  administration,  was  the  point 
upon  which  discussion  principally  turned.  One  of  the  repre- 
sentatives, Father  Mier,  a  man  of  learning,  whose  long  resi- 
dence and  varied  experiences  in  Europe  and  in  the  United 
States  added  authority  to  his  words,  made  a  notable  address  in 
which  he  pointed  out  the  dangers  attendant  upon  too  great 
decentralization  in  the  government.  The  prosperity  of  the 
United  States  under  a  loosely  federated  system  had  served,  he 
thought,  to  blind  the  Spanish  American  countries  to  important 
differences  between  the  two  sections.  He  called  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  Thirteen  Colonies  were  originally  separate  and 
independent  states  and  that  they  had  formed  a  federation  for 
the  purpose  of  opposing  their  united  strength  to  the  oppression 
of  England.  For  Mexico,  already  united,  to  break  up  into  a 
loose  federation  would  be  but  to  weaken  itself  by  division  and 
to  give  free  rein  to  the  very  evils  which  it  was  desired  to  hold 
in  check.  The  want  of  enlightenment  among  the  masses,  the 
political  inexperience  of  those  who  would  be  called  upon  to 
administer  the  local  governments,  the  necessity  for  vigorous 
action  to  maintain  order  and  preserve  independence,  and  finally 
the  very  geographical  configuration  of  the  country,  demanded 
that  power  should  be  retained  for  the  most  part  in  the  hands 
of  the  central  authorities.  The  speaker  did  not,  however,  con- 
demn the  principle  of  federation  itself.  He  merely  opposed 
the  application  of  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  weaken  the  effective- 
ness of  the  national  government.  His  ideal  was  a  system  mid- 


72         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

way  between  that  of  the  United  States,  where  an  excess  of  local 
autonomy  prevailed,  and  that  of  Colombia  and  Peru,  where 
centralization  of  authority  was  carried  to  an  extreme.53 

But  argument  was  in  vain.  The  Act  was  passed  and,  being 
promulgated  in  January,  1824,  served  as  a  fundamental  law 
until  the  following  October,  when  the  constitution  was  com- 
pleted and  put  into  effect.54  In  respect  to  the  general  provi- 
sions which  this  instrument  made  for  the  organization  of  the 
executive,  legislative,  and  judicial  powers  of  the  government, 
as  well  as  in  respect  to  the  large  measure  of  local  control  which 
it  permitted  to  the  provinces  —  henceforth  to  be  called  states 

—  it  followed  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  more  or 
less  closely.     It  is  not  to  be  inferred,  however,  that  the  Mexi- 
can constitution  was  a  servile  imitation  of  that  of  the  United 
States;  for  throughout,  in  form  as  well  as  in  spirit,  it  shows 
unmistakable  evidences  of  having  been  strongly  influenced  by 
the  Spanish  constitution  of  1812.55     In  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  the  new  fundamental  law,  a  president  was  elected 

—  the  choice  falling  to  General  Victoria  who  had  already  been 
elected  provisionally  — and  the  United  Mexican  states  appeared 
at  last  to  have  attained  definite  political  organization.     Four 
years  later,  however,  Victoria's  term  of  office  came  to  a  close 
amid  circumstances  of  the  greatest  disorder.     The  constitution 
from  which  so  much  had  been  expected  was  violated.     The 
presidential  succession  was  determined  by  force  and  a  period 
of  anarchy  from  which  Mexico  was  long  to  suffer  was  begun.86 

Amid  the  upheavals  which  for  years  had  been  stirring  the 
other  Spanish  American  countries,  the  captaincy-general  of 

53  The  speech  is  published  in :  Gonzalez,  Biografia  del  Benemtrito  Mexi- 
cano  D.  Servando  Teresa  de  Mier  Noriega  y  Guerra,  350-363 ;  and  in  Busta- 
mente,  Historia  del  Emperador  Agustin  de  Iturbide,  200-216. 

6*  For  the  constitution  see  Gamboa,  Leyes  y  Constituciones  de  Mexico, 
313-357. 

55  Cf.  an  article  by  James  Q.  Dealey  on  The  Spanish  Source  of  the  Mex- 
ican Constitution  of  1824,  in  the  Quarterly  of  the  Texas  State  Historical 
Association  for  January,  1900. 

66  Alaman,  Historia  de  Mexico,  V,  812-843. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  73 

Guatemala,  embracing  the  provinces  of  Guatemala,  Chiapas, 
Honduras,  San  Salvador,  Leon  (Nicaragua),  and  Costa  Rica, 
had  remained  in  a  state  of  relative  tranquillity.  There  had 
been  revolts,  it  is  true,  but  being  sporadic  they  had  been  easily 
suppressed.  Not  until  1820,  when  the  Spanish  constitution 
was  restored  and  freedom  of  speech  was  extended  to  the  colonies, 
did  a  general  movement  in  favor  of  independence  make  itself 
felt  throughout  Central  America.  The  proclamation  of  the  Plan 
of  Iguala,  to  which  Chiapas  adhered,  had  the  effect  of  hasten- 
ing decisive  action  on  the  part  of  the  other  provinces.  Guate- 
mala, the  capital,  declared  its  independence  on  September  15, 
1821;  but,  as  the  captain-general,  Gainza,  and  the  other  co- 
lonial authorities  joined  in  the  declaration,  they  were  con- 
tinued in  office  under  a  consultative  junta,  which  was  author- 
ized to  exercise  a  general  supervision  over  their  acts.  A  con- 
gress was  called,  to  which  the  other  provinces  were  invited  to 
send  delegates,  to  decide  whether  or  not  independence  should  be 
made  general  and  absolute,  and  if  so,  to  determine  the  form  of 
government  and  to  frame  a  constitution.  The  way  was  thus 
purposely  left  open  for  a  possible  agreement,  which  Gainza  and 
many  others  favored,  for  incorporation  in  the  Mexican  Empire 
under  the  Plan  of  Iguala.  This  idea,  however,  was  not  gener- 
ally approved,  and,  when  Gainza  took  the  oath  of  allegiance 
under  the  new  order,  he  was  required  to  employ  a  formula  de- 
claring specifically  that  Guatemala  was  independent  of  Mexico 
and  of  all  other  nations.57 

Guatemala's  declaration  had  the  effect  of  precipitating  action 
on  the  part  of  the  other  provinces.  All  declared  their  inde- 
pendence of  Spain,  but  not  all  entertained  the  same  opinion 
as  to  their  future  status.  San  Salvador  was  inclined  to  main- 
tain an  independent  position  without  connection  with  either 
Guatemala  or  Mexico.  Nicaragua  was  divided,  a  part  of  the 
province  being  in  favor  of  incorporation  in  the  empire  of 

57  Marure,  Bosquejo  Histdrico  de  las  Revoluciones  de  Centra  America,  I, 
25.     Alaman,  Historia  de  Mtxico,  V,  344. 


74         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Mexico  and  a  part  preferring  union  with  Guatemala.  Hon- 
duras was  similarly  divided,  while  Costa  Rica  declared  its  in- 
dependence of  all  powers  and  resolved  to  await  the  outcome  of 
events  to  decide  upon  its  future  connections.58 

When  the  news  reached  Mexico  that  the  province  of  Chiapas 
had  expressed  a  desire  to  become  incorporated  in  the  Mexican 
empire  under  the  Plan  of  Iguala,  the  regency,  but  recently 
created,  proclaimed  its  incorporation  and  ordered  that  in  the 
convocation  of  the  Cortes  an  invitation  to  send  deputies  to  that 
body  should  be  extended  not  only  to  Chiapas  but  to  any  other 
province  or  part  of  a  province  manifesting  a  desire  to  unite 
with  Mexico.59  Soon  afterward,  when  Guatemala's  action  be- 
came known  at  the  Mexican  capital,  Iturbide,  as  president  of 
the  regency,  addressed  a  communication  to  Gainza,  in  which 
he  declared  that  Guatemala,  instead  of  attempting  to  remain 
independent,  ought  to  unite  with  Mexico  to  form  a  great  em- 
pire; that  Guatemala  was,  in  fact,  incompetent  to  govern  her- 
self; and  that,  as  it  might  fall  a  victim  to  foreign  ambition,  a 
strong  Mexican  army  was  already  marching  southward  to  give 
it  protection. 

While  Iturbide's  designs  were  made  manifest  by  this  letter, 
his  agents  and  partisans,  who  were  growing  in  number,  set  on 
foot  an  agitation  to  bring  about  their  realization.  Late  in  No- 
vember, 1821,  the  Guatemalan  junta,  which  now  included  in 
its  membership  representatives  of  the  other  provinces,  resolved 
to  lay  the  proposal  of  union  before  all  the  municipal  govern- 
ments and  request  them  to  take  the  sense  of  their  several  com- 
munities upon  it.  Thirty  days  were  allowed  for  their  replies ; 
and,  when  the  returns  received  by  the  end  of  that  period  were 
canvassed,  it  was  found  that  a  majority  were  in  favor  of  im- 
mediate annexation.  Thereupon,  without  waiting  for  the  re- 
sponses of  a  number  of  municipalities,  the  junta,  in  spite  of 
its  previous  announcement  that  it  would  commit  the  question 

ss  G6mez  Carrillo,  Compendia  de  Historia  de  la  America  Central,  163-171. 
09  Alamfin,  Historia  de  Mexico,  V,  346. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  75 

to  a  congress  for  final  decision,  declared,  on  January  5,  1822, 
that  the  provinces  of  Central  America  were  henceforth  "  in- 
corporated "  in  the  empire  of  Mexico.  This  hasty  action  was 
deemed  necessary  in  order  to  avoid  a  civil  war,  which  would, 
it  was  feared,  destroy  the  political  harmony  which  the  provinces 
had  so  long  enjoyed  under  a  common  government.  Moreover, 
the  incorporation  was  agreed  to  on  condition  that,  if  the  prov- 
inces should  in  future  find  it  practicable  to  constitute  an  inde- 
pendent state,  they  were  to  be  permitted  to  do  so.60 

Although  action  of  the  junta  was  generally  acquiesced  in, 
San  Salvador  disputed  its  legality  and  prepared  to  maintain 
her  independence  by  force.  Gainza,  acting  in  the  name  of  the 
empire,  attempted  to  reduce  the  province  to  submission  and 
an  armed  conflict  ensued.  Shortly  afterward  General  Filisola, 
who  had  been  appointed  by  the  Mexican  government  as  captain- 
general  with  full  military  and  political  power  over  the  newly 
acquired  territory,  arrived  on  the  scene,  and,  desiring  to  end 
the  conflict  without  further  bloodshed,  arranged  an  armistice 
and  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  authorities  of  the  recalci- 
trant province ;  but,  after  some  months  of  fruitless  negotiations, 
he  resolved  to  settle  the  difficulty  by  arms.  Victorious  in  a 
number  of  encounters,  he  took  the  capital  and  finally  compelled 
the  remnant  of  the  republican  army  to  capitulate.61  But  the 
victory  proved  to  be  fruitless;  for,  a  month  after  the  war  was 
brought  to  a  close,  the  fall  of  the  empire  made  inevitable  the 
reestablishment  of  Central  American  independence. 

Of  San  Salvador's  resistance  to  forcible  annexation  to  Mex- 
ico, there  was  an  incident  which  merits  a  passing  notice.  Dur- 
ing the  negotiations  between  Filisola  and  the  Salvadorean  gov- 
ernment, the  latter  proposed  to  unite  with  Mexico  on  condi- 
tions which  would  be  disclosed  to  the  Mexican  congress  alone. 
Filisola  refused  to  transmit  the  proposal  without  full  knowl- 

eoMarure,  Bosquejo  Hist6rico,  I,  31-38.     For  the  act  of  incorporation, 
see  Ibid.,  Appendix,  doc.  2. 

siMarure,  Bosquejo  Histdrico,  I,  50-51. 


Y6         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

edge  of  its  terms,  and,  in  conformity  with  his  instructions,  de- 
manded that  the  Salvadoreans  lay  down  their  arms  as  a  condi- 
tion preliminary  to  any  form  of  accommodation.62  The  con- 
gress of  San  Salvador  replied  by  an  Act  providing  for  annexa- 
tion to  the  United  States,  and  declaring  that  in  the  name  of 
the  latter  the  attack  of  the  Mexican  forces  would  be  repelled.63 
This  move  produced  upon  Filisola  no  deterrent  effect.  On  the 
contrary,  adverting  to  the  fact  that  Mexico  was  at  peace  with 
the  United  States,  and  declaring  the  opinion  that  territory  be- 
longing to  the  empire  would  not  be  admitted  into  the  Anglo- 
American  federation  without  a  previous  agreement  between  the 
two  governments,  he  proceeded  with  his  military  operations. 
Nevertheless,  the  measure  encouraged  the  Salvadoreans  to  con- 
tinue their  resistance,  in  the  belief  that  succor  would  soon  come 
to  them  from  the  United  States.  At  one  time,  indeed,  a  base- 
less rumor  prevailed  that  American  warships  were  actually  on 
the  way  to  protect  the  province  and  redress  its  wrongs.64 

Nor  is  it  to  be  inferred  that  San  Salvador,  in  invoking  the 
protection  of  the  United  States,  was  moved  solely  by  opposition 
to  incorporation  into  the  Mexican  Empire.  The  fact  that  the 
congress  dispatched  three  commissioners  to  the  United  States 
with  full  powers  to  conclude  an  arrangement  would  appear  to 
indicate  that  the  proposal  of  union  was  not  a  mere  makeshift. 
The  commissioners  landed  at  Boston  in  May,  1823,  and  pro- 
ceeded later  to  Washington.65  Meanwhile  the  situation  in  Mex- 
ico had  changed.  Iturbide  had  abdicated,  and,  a  republic  hav- 
ing succeeded  the  empire,  a  more  generous  conception  of  liberty 
had  come  to  prevail.  The  Mexican  congress,  acknowledging 
the  right  of  the  Central  American  provinces  to  determine  for 

«2  Ibid.,  I,  48.  Garcia,  Documentos  para  la  Hiatoria  de  Mexico,  XXXVI, 
150-154. 

63  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  I,  583,  citing  Clay,  Secretary  of 
State  to  Williams,  chargd  d'affaires  to  the  Federation  of  the  Center  of 
America,  February  10,  1826.  Mas.  Inat.  to  Ministers,  XI,  5. 

«*  Marure,  Boaquejo  Hiatdrico,  I,  49. 

"Torrens  to  Alaman,  May  31,  1823;  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  10. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  77 

themselves  their  future  political  status,  accorded  them  a  free 
choice  as  to  withdrawal  from  the  union ;  and  San  Salvador  cast 
in  its  fortunes  with  those  of  the  other  Central  American  states.66 
During  the  interval  of  several  months  between  the  fall  of  the 
Mexican  Empire  and  the  definite  establishment  of  the  Central 
American  Republic,  the  Salvadorean  commissioners  remained  in 
the  United  States,  apparently  awaiting  further  instructions. 
Torrens,  the  Mexican  charge  d'affaires  at  Washington,  kept  his 
government  advised  regarding  their  movements.  In  a  dispatch 
dated  August  21,  1823,67  he  reported  that  he  had  talked  with 
two  of  the  commissioners,  Arce  and  Rodriguez,68  who  informed 
him  that  since  Mexico  had  become  a  republic  they  preferred 
union  with  it,  and  that  their  colleague,  Castillo,  had  set  out 
for  the  Mexican  capital  to  inform  himself  respecting  the  situa- 
tion there  and  to  discover  the  attitude  of  the  new  regime  toward 
San  Salvador.  In  the  same  dispatch,  Torrens  stated  that  the 
commissioners  were  generally  regarded  as  representing  not  a 
part  but  the  whole  of  the  ancient  kingdom  of  Guatemala,  and 
had  been  treated  by  the  public  with  great  cordiality ;  and  that, 
even  if  San  Salvador  should,  as  they  desired,  decide  in  favor 
of  union  with  Mexico,  they  had  intended  to  approach  the  gov- 
ernment at  Washington  at  least  for  the  purpose  of  explaining 
why  the  plan  of  annexation  to  the  United  States  had  been 
abandoned.  He  further  stated,  however,  that  one  of  them, 
Arce,  had  just  departed  in  great  haste  for  New  York  under 
circumstances  calculated  to  arouse  suspicion;  that  he  had  been 

66  Moore,  op.  cit.,  I,  582. 

67  La  Diplomacies  Mexicana,  II,  20. 

68  In  his  dispatch  of  May  31,  cited  above,  Torrens  declared  that  four  com- 
missioners had  arrived;  namely,  Rafael  Castillo,  Manuel  Jose  Arce,  Juan 
Manuel  Rodriguez,  and  Cayetano  Vedoya.     A  fifth,  Manuel  Zelago,  Torrens 
learned,  had  died  at  sea  on  the  way  to  the  United  States.     Apparently, 
however,  not  all  of  these  were  commissioned  to  treat  with  the  United  States 
on  the  subject  of  annexation.     Marure  mentions  only  one   commissioner, 
Rodriguez.     Valladares,  in  his  biographical  sketch  of  Arce  (Prdceres  de  la 
Independencia)  refers  to  Arce's  activities  in  the  United  States,  but  does  not 
mention  the  question  of  annexation.     Clay,  in  his  instructions  to  Williams 
says  that  there  were  three  commissioners,  but  does  not  mention  their  names. 


78         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

commissioning  military  and  naval  officers  and  had  at  his  dis- 
posal, either  at  Boston  or  New  York,  an  armed  vessel  and  a 
quantity  of  military  supplies.  Torrens  was  thus  induced  to 
believe  that  the  Americans  had  persuaded  Arce  to  lead  an  ex- 
pedition to  Central  America  with  a  view  to  annex  to  the  United 
States  not  only  San  Salvador  but  all  the  other  Central  Amer- 
ican provinces.  The  expedition  never  set  out,  if  indeed  it  was 
ever  seriously  contemplated  by  any  one.  A  month  later  Tor- 
rens informed  his  government  that  the  commissioners  had  re- 
turned to  San  Salvador.69  Although  they  had  received  en- 
couragement from  private  individuals,  yet  persons  in  authority 
appear  to  have  manifested  but  little  interest  in  their  mission. 
They,  in  fact,  left  the  country  without  having  seen  either  the 
President  or  the  Secretary  of  State.70 

In  June,  1823,  a  congress  met  at  the  city  of  Guatemala,  and, 
although  composed  of  representatives  of  but  two  provinces, 
Guatemala  and  San  Salvador,  declared,  on  July  1,  the  former 
captaincy-general  of  Guatemala,  as  a  whole,  to  be  independent 
of  Mexico  and  of  all  other  powers ;  adopting  as  the  title  of  the 
new  nation  the  "  United  Provinces  of  the  Center  of  America," 
in  the  hope  that  the  other  provinces  would  join  the  federa- 
tion.71 San  Salvador  from  the  first  bore  a  leading  part  in  the 
formation  of  the  new  state.  The  president  of  the  congress  and 
two  members  of  the  triumvirate,  to  which  the  executive  author- 
ity was  provisionally  entrusted,  were  Salvadoreans.  Possibly 
these  developments  may  have  had  an  influence  in  causing  San 
Salvador  to  abandon  any  thought  of  annexation  to  the  United 
States.  Owing,  however,  to  the  infrequency  of  communica- 

69  According  to  Valladares  (Proceres  de  la  Independenda,  99),  Arce  sailed 
from  New  York  on  October  18,  bound  for  Tampico  in  the  interest  of  a 
scheme  which  he  had  been  promoting  in  the  United  States  for  the  libera- 
tion of  Cuba. 

TO  Torrens  to  Alaman,  September  18,  1823;  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana, 
II,  32. 

TiMarure,  Basque  jo  Histdrico,  I,  62  ff.  For  the  declaration  of  July  1, 
see  ibid.  Appendix,  doc.  4. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  79 

tion,  the  events  took  place  long  before  they  were  known  to  the 
Salvadorean  commissioners. 

Honduras,  Nicaragua,  and  Costa  Rica,  as  was  expected,  soon 
united  their  fortunes  with  those  of  Guatemala  and  San  Sal- 
vador; and  in  December,  1823,  a  congress,  composed  of  rep- 
resentatives of  all  the  provinces,  adopted  the  bases  of  a  federal 
constitution,  in  accordance  with  whose  provisions  the  provinces 
were  erected  into  states  and  a  national  government  was  organ- 
ized. In  November,  1824,  a  definitive  constitution  was  adopted 
and  promulgated.72  Modeled  in  its  essential  principles  upon 
the  constitution  of  the  United  States,73  it  contained  some  im- 
portant departures  from  that  instrument,  due  in  part,  as  in 
Mexico,  to  the  influence  of  the  Spanish  constitution,  and  in 
part  to  the  influence  of  local  conditions.  It  especially  provided 
that  the  republic  should  be  known  as  the  "  Federation  of  Cen- 
tral America."  This  provision,  however,  was  not  strictly  ob- 
served in  state  papers,  the  old  title  being  occasionally  used,  and, 
with  yet  greater  frequency,  the  variant,  "  Federated  Republic 
of  Central  America."  74 

A  presidential  election  was  held  in  1824,  in  advance  of  the 
formal  adoption  of  the  constitution.  There  were  two  candi- 
dates for  the  office.  One  of  these  was  Jose  del  Valle,  a  man 
of  learning,  and  an  able  advocate  of  American  unity.  The 
other  was  Manuel  Jose  de  Arce,  the  Salvadorean  whose  activi- 
ties in  the  United  States  during  the  summer  of  1823  have  been 
mentioned.  The  election  resulted  in  a  contest  which  was  not 
resolved  until  February,  1825,  when  the  first  congress  under 
the  constitution  decided  in  Arce's  favor.  On  the  face  of  the 
returns,  Valle  appears  to  have  received  a  majority  of  the 

72  For  the  constitution,  see  Gaceta  del  Gobierno  Supremo  de  Guatemala, 
No.  1.     A  translation  is  found  in  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII, 
725-747. 

73  Marure,  Bosquejo  Histdrico,  I,  112  ff. 

74  See,  for  example,  the  treaty  concluded,  March  15,  1825,  and  December 
5,  1825,  with  Colombia  and  the  United  States  respectively.     Marure,  Bos- 
quejo  Histdrico,  I,  Appendix,  doc.  10, 


80         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

electoral  vote,  and  the  action  of  the  congress  not  unnaturally 
embittered  him;  but,  unfortunately,  his  hostility  to  the  new 
administration  was  but  one  of  the  many  factors  that  produced 
in  the  new  republic  a  serious  state  of  discord.75  Conflicts  be- 
tween state  and  national  authorities,  local  quarrels  of  long 
standing,  personal  animosities,  the  alliance  of  the  president  with 
the  enemies  of  the  constitution,76  and  the  general  tendency  to 
disregard  the  provisions  of  that  instrument  rapidly  brought 
about  a  condition  of  affairs  bordering  upon  anarchy.  Oppo- 
sition to  Arce  finally  became  so  strong  that  he  was  obliged  to 
resign.  His  retirement,  however,  did  not  save  the  situation. 
Order  was  not  restored ;  and  although  the  federation  nominally 
continued  to  exist  until  18 39,77  it  had  long  before  that  time 
fallen  into  practical  dissolution. 

Briefly  summarizing  our  account  of  the  formation  of  the  new 
American  states,  we  have  seen  that,  upon  the  ruins  of  the  Euro- 
pean colonial  systems  then  remaining  in  the  New  World,  there 
were  erected,  during  the  second  and  third  decades  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  eleven  independent  powers.  One  of  these, 
Haiti,  successor  to  the  colony  which  the  French  had  long  main- 
tained in  the  western  part  of  Santo  Domingo,  was  later  tem- 
porarily extended  by  conquest  over  the  eastern  part  of  the 
island,  where,  except  for  a  short  period,  Spanish  control  had 
been  supreme.  Another,  the  empire  of  Brazil,  embraced  the 
whole  of  the  vast  Portuguese  territory  in  the  continent  of 
South  America.  The  rest  —  Mexico,  Central  America,  Colom- 
bia, Peru,  Bolivia,  Chile,  the  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la 
Plata,  Uruguay,  and  Paraguay,  all  of  Spanish  origin  —  formed 
an  unbroken  chain  of  independent  states  extending  from  the 
northern  limits  of  California  to  the  southernmost  bounds  of 
Chile  and  the  Argentine.  As  between  the  nations  of  this  group, 
composed  of  former  colonies  of  Spain,  abundant  evidence  has 

75  Marure,  Boaquejo  Hiat&rico,  I,  93,  139. 

feValladares  (Prdcerea  de  la  Independencia,  112  ff.)  presents  Arce  in  a 
more  favorable  light. 

77  Q6mez  Carrillo,  Compendia  de  Historia  de  la  America  Central,  202. 


FORMATION  OF  NEW  STATES  81 

been  adduced  of  the  existence  of  a  unity  of  purpose  during  the 
struggle  for  independence.  As  colonies  they  had  been  subject 
for  three  hundred  years  to  a  common  rule ;  they  had  a  common 
ethnic  origin;  they  spoke  a  common  language;  they  were  in- 
fluenced by  common  social  traditions  and  practices ;  and  finally, 
they  achieved  their  independence  in  a  common  struggle  against 
a  common  enemy.  Their  cohesion  was  therefore  the  natural 
result  of  causes  which  operated  only  indirectly,  in  the  forma- 
tion of  the  more  inclusive  sentiment  of  Pan- Americanism.  It 
remains  to  be  seen  what  were  the  forces  that  drew  together  the 
nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  irrespective  of  political 
origin,  of  racial  composition,  of  religion,  of  customs,  or  or  lan- 
guage. To  make  this  clear  will  be  the  purpose  of  the  succeed- 
ing chapters. 


CHAPTEE  III 

FAILURE    OF    MONABCHICAL    PLOTS 

SOME  reference  has  been  made  in  the  preceding  chapter  to 
the  efforts  of  San  Martin  to  set  up  an  independent  monarchy 
in  Peru,  and  the  history  of  Mexico's  experiment  as  an  empire 
under  Iturbide  has  also  been  briefly  related.  Whether  the  new 
states  should  adopt  the  republican  or  the  monarchical  form  of 
government  was  a  question  of  vital  importance ;  for,  if  the  lat- 
ter form  had  prevailed,  and  if  dynastic  connections  had  been 
maintained  by  the  new  governments  with  the  reigning  houses 
of  Europe,  the  development  of  a  separate  political  system  on 
this  continent  would  have  been  impossible.  The  subject,  there- 
fore, deserves  further  consideration. 

Although  the  series  of  revolutions  which  took  place  through- 
out Hispanic  America  during  the  second  and  third  decades  of 
the  last  century  did  undoubtedly  involve,  from  the  first,  an  idea 
of  separation  from  the  mother  country,  yet  the  movements 
were  not  aimed  primarily  at  the  attainment  of  independence. 
Hence  there  was  little  thought,  in  the  beginning,  of  the  form 
of  government  most  convenient  to  adopt.  The  conception  of 
absolute  freedom  from  European  control  and  of  an  independent 
existence  under  a  republican  regime  was  slowly  evolved  out  of 
the  struggle.  Moreover,  loyalty  to  the  Spanish  sovereign  was 
a  remarkable  characteristic  of  the  revolution  in  its  early  stages. 
Napoleon's  usurpation  of  the  throne  of  Spain  met  with  scant 
sympathy  or  support  in  the  Spanish  dominions  in  America. 
On  the  contrary,  the  colonial  authorities,  on  hearing  of  the 
emperor's  designs,  proclaimed  Ferdinand  VII  as  their  lawful 
king  and  established  relations  with  the  revolutionary  junta, 
which  had  been  formed  in  Seville  to  govern  in  the  name  of  the 

82 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS  83 

captive  monarch.  In  some  quarters,  however,  doubt  was  ex- 
pressed as  to  the  right  of  that  body  to  exercise  supreme  author- 
ity and,  in  1810  when  the  junta  was  forcibly  dissolved,  there 
followed,  generally,  a  movement  in  the  colonies  to  establish 
governmental  committees  owning  no  superior  authority  in  the 
mother  country.  Still  these  provisional  governments  professed 
to  act  in  the  name  of  Ferdinand  VII.1 

In  spite  of  the  general  indifference  toward  independence, 
there  were  numerous  leaders  throughout  Spanish  America  who 
looked  forward  to  and  labored  to  establish,  a  new  order  of 
things.  Among  these  was  the  Chilean,  Juan  Martinez  de  Rozas, 
whose  work  may  be  mentioned  to  illustrate  the  conflict,  which 
must  have  been  going  on  in  the  minds  of  many,  between  loyalty 
to  the  Spanish  king  and  the  desire  for  a  free  national  existence. 
In  1810  there  were  circulated  in  Chile  2  manuscript  copies  — 
there  was  no  printing  press  in  the  province  at  that  time  —  of 
a  pamphlet  entitled  "  Politico-Christian  catechism  arranged  for 
the  instruction  of  the  free  peoples  of  South  America,"  of  which 
Rozas  was  believed  to  be  the  author.  After  considering  the 
evils  of  a  monarchy  in  all  its  forms  he  concluded  that  "  a 
democratic-republican  government  in  which  the  people  rule  by 
means  of  representatives  or  deputies  whom  they  elect  is  the 
only  government  which  preserves  the  dignity  and  majesty  of  a 
people;  brings  men  nearest  the  equality  in  which  God  has 
created  them;  is  least  exposed  to  the  horrors  of  despotism  and 
arbitrariness;  is  the  most  moderate,  the  freest,  and  therefore 
the  best  calculated  to  make  rational  beings  happy."  And  yet 
he  recommended  that  a  government  be  constituted  in  the  name 
of  Ferdinand  VII,  because  that  unfortunate  prince  merited 
the  sympathy  and  the  tender  consideration  of  every  American 
heart.  If  Ferdinand  should  not  return  to  his  throne,  however, 
Rozas  believed  that  a  government  should  be  formed  free  from 
the  control  of  "  usurping  kings,  or  of  the  English,  or  of  Prin- 

iVillanueva,  Resumen  de  la  Historia  de  America,  212-218. 
2  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  VII,  184,  185. 


84         PAN-AMEEICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

cess  Charlotte,  or  of  the  Portuguese,  or  of  foreign  domination 
of  any  kind  whatever."  3 

By  the  time  the  restoration  of  Ferdinand  had  been  effected 
in  1814,  the  inevitable  drift  of  the  revolution  toward  independ- 
ence had  attained  irrepressible  momentum.  Moreover,  the  re- 
actionary attitude  of  Ferdinand  seriously  impaired  what  re- 
mained of  the  traditional  loyalty  to  Spain  and  inclined  the 
colonies  more  decidedly  toward  independence.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  success  of  the  Royalist  arms  and  the  growing  anarchy 
within  the  Patriot  ranks  led  many  of  the  leaders  of  the  revolu- 
tion to  believe  that  independence  was  not  to  be  achieved,  nor 
internal  order  and  tranquillity  restored  except  through  the  pro- 
tection of  some  powerful  nation,  or  through  the  rule  of  a  prince 
of  some  one  or  another  of  the  reigning  families  of  Europe. 

This  was  the  condition  of  affairs  especially  in  the  United 
Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata,  There  the  masses  of  the  people 
warmly  championed  the  idea  of  a  federal  republic,  but  many 
of  the  leaders  were  of  the  opinion  that  a  constitutional  monarchy 
was  the  only  form  of  government  capable  of  meeting  the  ex- 
traordinary conditions  which  had  arisen.  Accordingly  two 
agents,  Manuel  Belgrano  and  Bernardino  Rivadavia,  were  com- 
missioned to  proceed  to  Europe  with  secret  instructions  to  se- 
cure independence  by  negotiating  the  establishment  of  a  con- 
stitutional monarchy  with  a  Spanish  or  an  English  prince  as 
sovereign;  or  in  their  default  one  of  any  other  powerful  house 
of  Europe.4  They  were  further  instructed  to  go  by  way  of 

s  Reference  is  here  made  to  the  different  proposals  which  had  been  made 
for  the  disposition  of  the  Spanish  colonies. 

*  Neither  Rivadavia  nor  Belgrano,  according  to  Mitre,  was  at  heart  a 
monarchist,  as  the  sum  total  of  their  public  life  goes  to  show.  In  speak- 
ing of  this  chimerical  mission,  Mitre  says:  "These  two  great  citizens,  the 
two  loftiest  representatives  of  Argentine  democracy,  always  admired  and 
supported  one  another  and  continued,  until  separated  by  death,  in  their 
mutual  esteem.  Misled  for  the  moment  in  their  political  principles,  this 
passing  error,  motived  by  their  love  of  the  public  welfare  involves  a  moral 
lesson,  which  teaches  to  what  extent  contemporary  happenings  may  becloud 
the  minds  of  the  most  intelligent  and  lead  astray  the  moral  sense  of  even 
the  most  noble  characters."  Mitre,  Hietoria  de  San  Martin,  II,  285. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS  85 

Rio  de  Janeiro  and  there  to  open  negotiations  with  Lord  Strang- 
ford,  British  minister  at  the  court  of  Brazil. 

Shortly  after  the  departure  of  these  agents  the  Director  of 
the  United  Provinces  resigned  and  was  succeeded  by  Carlos 
Alvear.  The  new  Director  appointed  Manuel  Jose  Garcia  con- 
fidential agent  to  the  court  of  Brazil  with  instructions  to  co- 
operate in  the  task  intrusted  to  Belgrano  and  Rivadavia.  In 
the  face  of  serious  internal  disorders,  which  the  acts  of  Alvear 
himself  had  served  to  aggravate,  it  was  deemed  expedient  to 
take  steps  to  place  the  United  Provinces  under  the  protection  of 
Great  Britain.  Garcia  was  made  the  bearer  of  two  notes,  one 
of  which  was  addressed  to  the  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs. In  this  note  Alvear  declared  that  the  provinces  desired 
to  belong  to  Great  Britain;  that  they  wished  to  receive  her 
laws;  to  obey  her  government  and  to  live  under  her  powerful 
influence ;  that  they  placed  implicit  trust  in  the  generosity  and 
good  faith  of  the  English  people.5  The  note  closed  with  an 
urgent  request  that  troops  be  sent  to  restore  order  and  that  some 
person  of  authority  and  standing  be  designated  to  take  charge 
of  the  colony  and  begin  to  mold  the  country  to  the  will  of  the 
British  king  and  nation.  The  second  note  was  addressed  to 
Lord  Strangford,  and  in  matter  and  form  was  of  similar  pur- 
port to  the  one  directed  to  the  Foreign  Office  at  London.6 

Garcia  arrived  at  Rio  early  in  1815.  Though  he  shared  with 
Alvear  the  opinion  that  it  would  be  better  in  the  last  extremity 
to  surrender  the  colony  to  England  than  to  submit  again  to  the 
domination  of  Spain,  he  was  not  convinced,  as  was  Alvear,  that 
the  situation  had  become  hopeless.  Counseled  by  Rivadavia, 
to  whom  he  confided  his  instructions,  and  comprehending  the 
gravity  of  the  proposed  step,  which  partook  somewhat  of  the 

Barros  Arana  says  that  both  were  republicans  in  character,  habits,  and 
principles.  He  expresses  the  opinion  that  the  majority  of  the  leaders  were 
likewise,  by  instinct  and  conviction,  believers  in  the  republican  system. 
Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XII,  24-25. 

5  Mitre,  Historia  de  Belgrano,  II,  261  (ed.  1902) . 

e  Mitre,  Historia  de  Belgrano,  II,  256-261. 


86         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

nature  of  a  criminal  act,  to  use  his  own  characterization,  Gar- 
cia resolved  to  disobey  his  instructions.  In  accordance  with 
this  resolution  he  withheld  the  note  directed  to  the  British 
minister  at  Rio  and  presented  the  matter  to  him  orally,  in  a 
less  humiliating  form.  But  Garcia  found  that  Lord  Strang- 
ford  not  only  lacked  authority  to  negotiate,  but  had  been  in- 
structed by  his  government  to  act  in  harmony  with  Spain  in 
matters  relating  to  the  war  in  America. 

Thus,  disappointed  in  their  first  efforts  7  the  commissioners 
set  out  for  England,  where  they  arrived  in  May,  1815.  A  more 
unfavorable  time  for  treating  with  Great  Britain  could  scarcely 
be  imagined.  The  whole  of  Europe  was  in  arms  against  Napo- 
leon, who,  having  shortly  before  escaped  from  the  island  of 
Elba,  had  again  assumed  the  crown  of  France.  Since  the  prin- 
ciple of  legitimacy  was  being  strongly  invoked  in  the  new  strug- 
gle against  the  emperor,  it  was  clear  that  England  was  not  in 
a  position  to  give  encouragement  to  a  plan  which  would  have 
been  in  direct  violation  of  that  principle.  Moreover,  by  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  of  July  5,  1814,  between  Great  Britain  and 
Spain,  of  whose  existence  the  Argentine  agents  appear  to  have 
been  ignorant  until  their  arrival  in  England,  the  two  countries 
entered  into  an  alliance  in  consequence  of  which  they  agreed 
to  forward  by  all  possible  means  their  respective  interests.8 
On  August  28  of  the  same  year  additional  articles  were  signed, 
the  third  article  of  which  was  as  follows :  "  His  Britannic 
Majesty  being  anxious  that  the  troubles  and  disturbances  which 

7  It  appears  that  the  commissioners  during  their  stay  at  Rio  de  Janeiro 
entered  into  negotiations  with  the  Brazilian  chancellery  and  that  on  Jan- 
uary 15,  1815,  an  agreement  was  reached  which  was  to  serve  later  as  the 
basis  of  new  negotiations. 

According  to  this  agreement,  Brazil  was  to  be  permitted  to  occupy,  with- 
out resistance  on  the  part  of  Buenos  Aires,  the  Banda  Oriental,  and  the 
government  of  Buenos  Aires  engaged  to  see  that  the  congress  should  seek 
annexation  to  Brazil,  thus  forming  an  independent  empire  under  the  scepter 
of  the  Prince  Regent  of  Brazil,  who  should  take  the  title  of  the  Emperor  of 
South  America.  Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  El  General  San  Martin,  31-32; 
52-57. 

8  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1814,  I,  273. 


FAILUKE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS  87 

unfortunately  prevail  in  the  dominions  of  his  Catholic  Majesty 
in  America  should  entirely  cease,  and  the  subjects  of  those 
provinces  should  return  to  their  obedience  to  their  lawful  sov- 
ereign, engages  to  take  the  most  effectual  measures  for  pre- 
venting his  subjects  from  furnishing  arms,  ammunition,  or 
any  other  warlike  article  to  the  revolted  in  America."  9  It 
was  evident,  therefore,  that  no  help  was  to  be  obtained  from 
England. 

Under  the  circumstances  the  Argentine  commissioners,  ac- 
cepting the  advice  of  Manuel  Sarratea,10  resident  agent  of  the 
Buenos  Aires  Government  in  London,  resolved  to  forego  all 
efforts  to  treat  with  the  government  of  Great  Britain  or  that  of 
Spain,  and  instead  to  open  negotiations  with  the  deposed  Span- 
ish king,  Charles  IV,  who  was  at  the  time  domiciled  in  Rome. 
Charles  IV,  it  will  be  recalled,  had  been  forced  to  abdicate, 
as  a  result  of  the  rebellion  of  Aranjuez,  shortly  before  the  Na- 
poleonic invasion  of  Spain,  and  the  Prince  of  Asturias  had 
been  proclaimed  as  Ferdinand  VII.  During  the  occupation 
of  Spain  by  the  armies  of  Napoleon,  Charles  and  Ferdinand, 
as  well  as  other  members  of  the  royal  family,  were  held  as  pris- 
oners in  France.  By  the  treaty  of  Valengay,11  the  crown  of 
Spain  was  restored  to  Ferdinand,  who  being  released  returned 
to  his  kingdom  in  the  spring  of  1814.  The  regency  and  the 
Cortes,  representing  the  liberal  element  of  the  population,  had 

9  Hid.,  292. 

10  Sarratea,  who,  according  to  Mitre,  was  a  man  of  versatility,  a  gifted 
conversationalist,  a  consummate  political  speculator,  not  lacking  in  ability 
or  breadth  of  view,  suffered  the  least  illusion  of  any  of  those  concerned  in 
the  project,  with  respect  to  its  desirability  or  the  possibility  of  realizing 
it,  though  he  was  its  real  author.     He  entered  upon  the  affair  merely  as 
an  interesting  adventure.     Historia  de  Belgrano,  II,  277. 

n  After  the  invasion  of  Spain  in  1808  Ferdinand  was  held  as  a  prisoner 
at  Valengay.  Charles  was  detained  at  Marseilles.  Toward  the  end  of 
1813  the  continued  success  of  the  allies  drove  Napoleon  to  enter  into  negotia- 
tions with  Ferdinand,  in  the  hope  that  by  restoring  him  to  the  throne  of 
Spain  he  might  embroil  that  power  with  its  British  ally.  A  treaty  was 
concluded  on  December  11,  1813,  which  stipulated,  among  other  things,  that 
Ferdinand  should  be  recognized  by  the  emperor  as  King  of  Spain  and  the 
Indies.  Alison,  History  of  Europe,  XII,  423,  426. 


88         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

refused  to  ratify  the  treaty,  and  they  were  opposed  to  recog- 
nizing Ferdinand  except  on  condition  that  he  swear  to  the  con- 
stitution of  1812.  But  the  Liberals  were  a  small  minority. 
The  great  mass  of  the  people  acclaimed  Ferdinand,  and  soon 
he  was  recognized  on  all  sides  as  the  lawful  king.12 

After  the  fall  of  Napoleon  there  was  no  disposition  on  the 
part  of  the  powers  to  insist  upon  the  return  of  Charles  IV  to 
the  throne,  although  his  abdication  was  originally  brought 
about  and  was  afterward  maintained  by  force,  in  violation  of 
the  principle  of  legitimacy.  Charles,  therefore,  left  without 
support  from  any  quarter,  signed,  January  14,  1815,  a  species 
of  family  pact  in  the  form  of  a  declaration  renouncing  forever 
in  favor  of  Ferdinand  VII  all  claims  to  the  throne  of  Spain.13 
But  it  was  thought  that  this  agreement,  ratified  as  it  was  at 
the  moment  of  Napoleon's  triumphant  return,  lacked  binding 
force ;  that  the  very  fact  of  the  coalition  of  the  powers  against 
Napoleon  placed  Charles  in  a  position  of  vantage,  for,  in  order 
to  be  consistent  with  their  declarations  and  maintain  in  all 
its  vigor  the  principle  of  legitimacy,  the  members  of  the  coali- 
tion could  not  fail  to  recognize  him  as  the  lawful  King  of 
Spain.  Moreover,  a  failure  of  the  allies  to  support  him  might 
result  in  his  being  thrown  into  the  arms  of  Napoleon. 

The  commissioners  proposed,  therefore,  first,  to  obtain  from 
Charles  IV  a  declaration  as  sovereign  recognizing  the  separa- 
tion of  the  colonies  from  Spain  and  constituting  two  or  more 
independent  monarchies  upon  whose  thrones  should  be  placed 
Spanish  princes;  secondly,  to  induce  Charles  to  communicate 
the  plan  to  the  sovereigns  of  Europe  and  to  request  them  to 
support  it  against  the  opposition  of  Ferdinand  VII.  It  was 
believed  that  in  this  way  the  hostility  of  the  absolutist  govern- 
ments of  Europe  could  be  overcome,  and  at  a  single  stroke  in- 
dependence attained  and  the  war  ended.  From  the  standpoint 

12  Cambridge  Modern  History,  X,  212. 

is  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  1814,  II,  873. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS  89 

of  European  politics,  the  plan  was  not  lacking  in  plausibility, 
for  it  offered  a  solution  based  on  legitimacy.  Nevertheless,  it 
was  destined  to  failure.  Before  the  negotiations  were  well  un- 
der way  Napoleon's  power  had  been  destroyed,  and  in  view  of 
this  turn  of  affairs  Charles  IV  refused  outright  to  give  the 
scheme  his  approval,  thus  bringing  the  negotiations  to  an  abru  pt 
end.14 

This  venture  having  failed,  Belgrano  returned  to  America, 
leaving  Rivadavia  to  continue  negotiations  in  Europe.  In 
March,  1816,  shortly  after  Belgrano's  arrival  at  Buenos  Aires, 
the  congress  of  Tucuman  convened  to  consider  a  number  of 
questions  of  vital  importance  to  the  provinces,  among  them 
being  the  declaration  of  independence  and  the  form  of  govern- 
ment to  be  adopted.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Buenos  Aires  Government,  though  actually  an 
accomplished  fact,  had  not  yet  been  expressly  declared.  This 
step  had  been  awaiting  the  selection  of  the  form  of  government, 
for  upon  that  would  depend  the  question  of  recognition  and 
the  possibility  of  forming  much  desired  alliances.  Belgrano, 
strongly  impressed  by  the  course  of  events  in  Europe,  declared 
in  a  secret  session  of  the  congress  that  the  whole  tendency  of 
European  politics  was  toward  monarchy  and  away  from  re- 
publicanism. He  had  become  convinced,  however,  of  the  de- 
sirability of  separation  from  Spain,  and  he  accordingly  recom- 
mended the  immediate  declaration  of  independence.  As  to  the 
form  of  government  he  inclined  toward  monarchy  and  he  sug- 
gested the  resuscitation  of  the  ancient  Inca  empire,  by  erecting 
a  throne  at  Cuzco  and  placing  upon  it  a  descendant  of  the  Inca 
kings.  The  congress  accepted  this  recommendation  with  ref- 
erence to  the  declaration  of  independence,  a  resolution  to  that 
effect  being  passed  on  July  9,  but  though  the  body  was  over- 
whelmingly in  favor  of  the  principle  of  monarchy,  it  rejected 
the  proposal  for  the  restoration  of  the  Inca  dvnasty,  as  there 

i*  Mitre,  Historia  de  Belgrano;  II,  271-282, 


90        PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

were  other  schemes  under  consideration  which  appeared  to  be 
more  feasible.18 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  congress  of  Tucuman  was  the 
election  of  Juan  Martin  de  Pueyrredon  as  supreme  director  of 
the  United  Provinces.  Pueyrredon  on  assuming  the  directorate 
became  interested  in  the  promotion  of  plans  for  the  conversion 
of  the  government  of  the  provinces  into  a  monarchy.  As  early 
as  1808,  when  Napoleon  usurped  the  crown  of  Spain,  Princess 
Charlotte,  wife  of  the  prince  regent  of  Brazil  and  sister  of 
Ferdinand  VII,  had  begun  to  intrigue  to  get  possession  of  the 
Spanish  dominions  in  America,16  considering  them  lost  to  Spain. 
Out  of  these  intrigues  grew  a  number  of  proposals,  among  which 
was  one  to  create  in  Buenos  Aires  a  monarchy  with  Princess 
Charlotte  as  regent.  But  this  and  other  similar  schemes  being 
opposed  by  Great  Britain,  as  the  ally  of  Spain  and  virtual  pro- 
tector of  Portugal,  came  to  nothing,  though  they  did  not  lack 
supporters  among  the  American  subjects  of  Ferdinand,  par- 
ticularly in  Buenos  Aires.17 

The  idea  of  establishing  some  sort  of  political  connection  be- 
tween the  governments  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Buenos  Aires 
was  kept  alive.  Shortly  before  the  congress  of  Tucuman  de- 
clared the  independence  of  the  united  provinces,  a  communica- 
tion was  received  from  Garcia  proposing  that  the  King  of  Por- 
tugal be  recognized  as  sovereign.  The  congress  after  consider- 
ation appointed  a  special  agent  to  negotiate  with  the  Brazilian 
court  on  the  basis  of  the  following  alternative  projects:  First, 

is  Mitre,  Historia  de  Belgrano,  II,  329-333. 

is  According  to  a  report  made  by  Joel  R.  Poinsett  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment, November  4,  1818,  on  his  mission  to  South  America,  manifestoes  were 
published  by  the  Infante  dom  Pedro,  nephew  of  Charles  IV  of  Spain,  and  by 
the  Infanta  Carlota  setting  forth  their  right  to  the  Spanish  dominions  in 
America.  These  manifestoes  were  accompanied  by  letters  addressed  to  the 
viceroy  and  governors  of  provinces  and  were  circulated  from  Buenos  Aires 
to  Mexico.  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  IV,  342-3.  See  also  Barros  Arana, 
Historia  de  Chile,  VIII,  92-100. 

IT  Villanueva,  La  Monarqula  en  America:  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Mar- 
tin, 10-17.  Mitre,  Historia  de  Belgrano,  II,  201-206;  III,  188-192. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS  91 

the  reestablishment  of  the  Inca  dynasty  and  the  union  of  that 
dynasty  with  the  house  of  Braganza;  secondly,  the  crowning 
in  the  United  Provinces  of  a  Brazilian  prince  or  some  European 
prince  not  Spanish  who  would  marry  a  Brazilian  princess ;  and 
finally,  as  a  last  resort,  the  recognition  of  the  King  of  Portugal 
on  condition  that  he  remain  on  American  soil.  The  agent  des- 
ignated, however,  did  not  accept  the  post  and  the  Director, 
under  authority  of  the  congress,  continued  the  negotiations, 
employing  for  the  purpose  as  before  the  agent,  Garcia.18 

Pueyrredon,  though  born  in  Buenos  Aires,  was  the  son  of 
a  Frenchman  and  having  been  educated  in  France  naturally 
felt  a  predilection  for  that  nation.  Though  he  continued  ne- 
gotiations with  Brazil,19  he  turned  his  attention  preferably  to 
the  prosecution  of  plans  aimed  at  placing  a  French  prince  upon 
the  prospective  throne  of  the  united  provinces.  It  appears 
that  about  this  time  he  received  proposals  in  connection  with  a 
plot  which  had  as  its  object  the  establishment  of  a  great  His- 
pano-American  confederation,  at  the  head  of  which  was  to  be 
placed  Joseph  Bonaparte,  who  had  not,  it  seems,  abdicated  his 
title  of  King  of  the  Indies.20  The  promoters  of  this  scheme 
were  exiled  followers  of  the  Great  Napoleon.21  They  proposed 
to  raise  a  body  of  Indian  troops  in  the  western  part  of  the 
United  States,  invade  Mexico,  and  once  in  possession  of  that 
country,  extend  their  operations  to  the  colonies  further  south. 
The  French  minister  at  Washington,  Hyde  de  Neuville,  having 
learned  of  the  plot,  entered  a  protest  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
against  its  further  prosecution  on  the  ground  of  the  violation 
of  neutrality.  He  was  joined  in  this  protest  by  the  ministers 
of  Great  Britain  and  Spain.  The  American  Government  took 

is  Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  51-57. 
is  Mitre,  Historia  de  Belgrano,  III,  310-326. 

20  Villanueva,  Resumen  de  la  Historia  de  America,  253. 

21  The  scholar  and  statesman,  Lakanal,  Marshal  Clauzel,  and  General  Des- 
monettes  are  mentioned  by  Villanueva.      (Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin, 
59.)      A  colony  of   French  exiles  received  from  congress  a  grant  of  land 


92         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

steps  to  comply  with  its  obligations,  and  whether  for  this  reason 
or  some  other  the  scheme  was  soon  abandoned.22 

Hyde  de  Neuville,  having  the  opportunity  to  note  the  de- 
velopment of  the  revolution  in  the  Spanish  colonies  and  be- 
lieving its  success  to  be  inevitable,  unless  Spain  changed  her 
colonial  policy,  recommended  to  the  Due  de  Richelieu  that  two 
constitutional  monarchies  be  set  up  in  America;  one  in  the 
region  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  and  the  other  in  Mexico.23  These 
two  monarchies,  backed  by  that  of  Brazil,  would  be  able,  he 
thought,  to  smother  the  insurrection  in  the  rest  of  the  colonies, 
destroy  the  spirit  of  republicanism  wherever  it  existed,  and  put 
an  end  to  the  predominance  of  Washington  and  London  in  the 
affairs  of  Spanish  America.  He  supported  his  recommendation 
as  to  Mexico  by  an  observation  of  the  French  consul  at  Balti- 
more to  the  effect  that  unless  Mexico  were  given  a  Bourbon 
king  it  would  fall  under  the  direct  influence  of  the  United  States 
and  thus  be  lost  to  Europe ;  and  as  to  the  United  Provinces,  by 
a  statement  of  Secretary  Adams  to  the  effect  that  within  a  few 
months  the  United  States  would  be  obliged  to  recognize  their 
independence.  Richelieu  favored  the  plan  of  Hyde  de  Neu- 
ville and  discussed  it  with  the  representatives  of  the  powers. 
In  August,  1818,  he  proposed  to  Spain  that  either  the  Prince 
of  Lucca  or  the  infante,  Francisco  de  Paula,  be  crowned  at 
Buenos  Aires;  and  he  offered  to  take  the  matter  before  the 
congress  which  was  soon  to  meet  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,24  if  Spain 
so  desired.  But  the  negotiations  failed,  for  Ferdinand  VII 
maintained  an  uncompromising  attitude,  proudly  refusing  to 
acknowledge  that  he  was  powerless  to  prevent  the  further  dis- 
integration of  his  crumbling  empire.25 

on  the  Tombigbee  River  in  Alabama  and  settled  there  in  the  winter  and 
spring  of  1816-1817.  Pickett,  History  of  Alabama,  623-633. 

22  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  9,  19,  20. 

28  Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  62,  citing  Hyde  de  Neu- 
ville to  Richelieu,  May  14,  1817. 

2*  Villanneva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  83-88. 

25  Other  efforts  were  made  to  extend  the  influence  of  this  congress  to  the 
Spanish  colonies,  but  they  were  defeated  by  the  stubborn  attitude  of  Fer- 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS  93 

While  these  negotiations  were  going  on  in  Europe,  Pueyrre- 
don and  his  colleagues  were  taking  steps  at  Buenos  Aires  which 
were  intended  to  lead  to  a  definite  agreement  with  France. 
After  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  communicate  directly  with 
the  Due  de  Richelieu,  Pueyrredon  received  an  agent,  Le  Moyne, 
by  name,  of  the  French  Government  who  had  been  sent  to 
Buenos  Aires  by  the  Marquis  of  Osmond,  French  ambassador 
at  London,  for  the  purpose  of  counteracting  the  influence  of 
the  Bonapartists  who  were  in  the  councils  of  Pueyrredon,  and 
of  announcing  that  Europe  would  view  with  extreme  repugnance 
the  establishment  of  a  republic  in  South  America.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1818,  Le  Moyne  reported  to  Osmond  26  that  the  Buenos 
Aires  Government  was  strongly  in  favor  of  a  close  political 
connection  with  France,  that  San  Martin  and  Belgrano,  who 
were  formerly  partisans  of  England,  were  now  convinced  that 
France  offered  greater  advantages;  that  the  monarchical  sys- 
tem was  generally  preferred  to  the  republican ;  that  Chile  and 
Peru  would  immediately  unite  with  a  monarchy  set  up  at 
Buenos  Aires;  that  the  constitution  which  was  at  that  time  in 
preparation  was  being  given  as  strong  a  monarchical  charac- 
ter as  circumstances  would  permit ;  and  finally,  that  if  a  mon- 
archy were  negotiated  the  Duke  of  Orleans  would  be  acceptable 
as  sovereign.27 

Early  in  1819,  at  the  instance  of  Pueyrredon,  Le  Moyne 
returned  to  Europe  to  report  in  person  upon  the  favorable  dis- 
position of  the  Buenos  Aires  Government.  He  was  followed 
shortly  afterward  by  Jose  Valentin  Gomez,28  who  was  author- 

dinand  VII  and  the  opposition  of  Great  Britain.     Cambridge  Modern  His- 
tory, X,  19. 

26  Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  91-96;  109-121. 

27  Afterward  King  Louis  Philippe  of  France. 

28  In  his  credentials  it  was  declared  "  that  the  state  of  affairs  in  Europe 
and  America  had  led  to  the  decision  to  appoint  SeSor  G6mez  near  the  courts 
of  Europe  with  authority  to  establish  his  residence  at  Paris,  Sefior  Riva- 
davia  returning  to  London;  and  that  he  was  empowered  to  negotiate  and 
make  proposals  to  the  ministry  of  France  to  the  end  of  causing  the  cessa- 
tion of  the  hostilities  which  were  inundating  with  blood  the  provinces  of 
Rio  de  la  Plata,  which  deserved  a  better  fate.     For  this  result  the  native 


94        PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

ized  by  Pueyrredon  to  negotiate  with  the  French  Government 
the  establishment  of  an  Orleanist  monarchy  with  its  seat  at 
Buenos  Aires.  France,  however,  was  not  in  a  position  which 
would  enable  her  to  follow  an  independent  course  in  a  matter 
of  such  great  importance,  for  she  was  not  yet  free  from  re- 
strictions placed  by  the  powers  on  her  freedom  of  action.29 
Dessolle,  successor  of  the  Due  de  Richelieu,  therefore  renewed 
negotiations  at  Madrid  with  a  view  to  obtaining  the  agreement 
of  Spain  to  the  erection  of  a  monarchy  in  the  region  of  the  Rio 
de  la  Plata  with  a  Spanish  prince  as  sovereign,  though  this 
procedure  was  not  approved  by  Gomez.  Failing  to  win  the 
consent  of  Ferdinand,  Dessolle  proposed  to  Gomez  as  candi- 
date for  the  Argentine  throne  Charles  Louis  of  Bourbon,  Prince 
of  Lucca,  and  grandson  of  Charles  IV  of  Spain.  It  is  not 
clear  whether  Dessolle  made  this  proposal,  so  close  upon  the 
heels  of  his  failure  at  Madrid,  merely  as  a  device  to  prevent 
Gomez  from  treating  with  some  other  court,  or  whether  he  made 
it  sincerely  in  the  expectation,  as  he  averred,  of  securing  the 
cooperation  of  Russia  and  Austria  in  inducing  Ferdinand  to 
accept.30 

Gomez  objected  to  the  candidacy  of  the  Prince  of  Lucca  on 
the  ground  that  while  it  might  facilitate  the  negotiation  with 
Madrid,  it  would  have  an  opposite  effect  in  Buenos  Aires,  where 
a  Spanish  prince,  he  thought,  would  not  be  acceptable.  Never- 
theless he  communicated  the  scheme  to  his  government,  and  the 
matter  was  laid,  by  the  Director,  before  the  congress.  On 
November  12,  1819,  this  body  voted  to  accept  the  project  un- 
der conditions  which  may  be  briefly  summarized  as  follows: 
That  the  King  of  France  would  agree  to  obtain  the  consent 
of  the  great  powers  of  Europe  and  especially  of  England  and 
Spain;  that  he  would  use  his  influence  to  effect  the  union  of 

inhabitants  were  crying  out,  longing  for  the  moment  of  this  happy  meta- 
morphosis, though  resolved  to  maintain  to  the  last  their  independence." 
Mitre,  op.  tit.,  Ill,  331. 

29  Cambridge  Modern  History,  X,  18. 

so  Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  127-146. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS  95 

the  Prince  of  Lucca  with  a  Brazilian  princess  and  to  secure 
the  abandonment  of  the  Brazilian  claims  in  the  Banda  Oriental ; 
that  the  new  kingdom  should  embrace  at  least  the  territory 
which  constituted  formerly  the  viceroyalty  of  La  Plata;  that 
the  constitution  already  adopted,31  with  such  minor  changes 
only  as  were  necessary  to  adapt  it  to  a  monarchical  regime, 
be  accepted;  that  France,  in  case  of  resistance  on  the  part  of 
Spain,  should  engage  to  furnish  the  Prince  of  Lucca  with 
troops  to  carry  out  the  enterprise;  and  that  if  England  offered 
armed  opposition  the  project  should  be  abandoned.32  The 
events  which  followed  made  the  realization  of  the  scheme  im- 
possible. 

In  the  United  Provinces  the  period  of  relative  order  under 
the  directorate  of  Pueyrredon  was  followed  by  an  increase  of 
unrest  resulting  in  civil  war.  Rondeau,  who  succeeded  Puey- 
rredon upon  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  of  1819,  was  like 
his  predecessor,  of  French  descent  and  partial  to  France  and 
a  monarchy.  Taking  the  field  against  the  rebels  he  was  de- 
feated by  them  in  February,  1820,  and  compelled  to  resign. 
Sarratea,  whose  activities  in  London  have  been  noticed  above, 
now  assumed  the  office  of  governor  of  the  province  of  Buenos 
Aires.  Championing  the  cause  of  republicanism  he  published 
a  pamphlet  33  exposing  the  intrigues  of  the  monarchists.  This 

si  The  constitution  was  promulgated  on  May  25,  1819.  In  the  manifesto 
recommending  it  to  the  people,  the  state  was  thus  described:  "It  is  not 
the  democracy  of  Athens,  nor  the  regime  of  Sparta,  nor  the  patrician  aris- 
tocracy or  the  plebeian  effervescence  of  Rome,  nor  the  absolute  government 
of  Russia,  nor  the  despotism  of  Turkey,  nor  the  complicated  confederation  of 
some  other  states.  It  is  a  state  midway  between  democratic  convulsion  and 
the  abuse  of  limited  power."  But  as  a  compromise  between  these  extremes 
it  was  not  a  success,  giving  satisfaction  to  neither  party.  Mitre,  Historia 
de  Belgrano,  III,  333-335.  For  the  constitution  of  1819  and  the  manifesto 
see  Lemoult,  Constitution  des  Provinces  Unies  de  I'Amerique  du  Sud  ( Paris, 
1819). 

32  Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,   146-151.     Mitre.  His- 
toria de  Belgrano,  III,  335    (ed.   1902). 

33  Proceso  original  justificativo  contra  los  reos  acusados  de  alta  traicidn 
en   el    Congreso    y   Directorio,    Buenos    Aires,    1820.     Cf.    Blanco- Azpurua 
Documentos,  VII,  110-127, 


96         PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

publication  was  inspired,  it  was  believed,  by  the  partisans  of 
England  in  Buenos  Aires,  Sarratea  himself  being  among  this 
number.  The  supporters  of  the  candidacy  of  the  Prince  of 
Lucca  being  thus  driven  from  office  were  unable  to  carry  the 
negotiations  forward.  And  if  this  had  not  been  the  case,  fail- 
ure would  have  been  inevitable  in  Europe ;  for,  apart  from  the 
fact  that  France  failed  to  receive  the  expected  support  from 
the  Holy  Alliance,  England,  informed  of  the  project,  made 
known  her  hostility  and  would  have  been  able,  no  doubt,  to 
interpose  successful  resistance  to  its  execution,  had  it  been  per- 
sisted in.  Though  the  idea  of  a  monarchy  was  not  yet  com- 
pletely banished  from  Argentine  soil,  there  were  henceforth  to 
be  no  more  official  efforts  to  establish  that  system  of  govern- 
ment there.34 

The  projects  which  have  just  been  considered,  although  they 
were  put  forward  with  reference  mainly  to  the  provinces  of 
the  Rio  de  la  Plata,  yet  extended  in  scope  to  Chile  and  Peru. 
The  latter,  held  in  strict  subjection  to  the  peninsular  authori- 
ties, took  no  part  in  the  negotiations.  Chile,  however,  while 
much  less  inclined  to  the  monarchical  system  than  the  United 
Provinces  and  usually  refraining  from  active  participation  in 
the  plans  looking  to  the  establishment  of  that  system,  did  send 
an  agent,36  Antonio  Jose  Irisarri,  at  the  solicitation  of  the 
government  of  Buenos  Aires,  to  take  part  in  the  negotiations 
which  issued  in  the  candidacy  of  the  Prince  of  Lucca.  Irisarri 
was  instructed  to  proceed  to  London  and  to  let  it  be  known 
in  the  conferences  which  he  might  have  with  the  ministers  of 
England  and  the  ambassadors  of  the  European  powers,  that  it 

3*  Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  151-160. 

SB  Barros  Arana  declares  that  if  there  was  in  Chile  at  this  time  a 
deeply  rooted  sentiment  it  was  that  of  nationality;  that  no  consideration 
whatever  could  have  overcome  the  desire  of  Chile  to  form  a  separate  nation ; 
that  O'Higgins,  in  obedience  to  national  sentiment,  would  never  have  lent 
his  sanction  to  any  plan  violating  that  sentiment;  and  that  if  this  intrigue 
for  establishing  a  monarchy  in  Chile  had  become  known  there  would  have 
been  aroused  against  it  a  storm  of  public  opinion.  Historia  de  Chile,  XII, 
41,  42. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS  97 

was  the  ultimate  aim  of  the  government  of  Chile  to  adopt  the 
"  continental  system  of  Europe  " ;  that  Chile  would  not  be  in- 
disposed to  set  up  a  constitutional  monarchy,  such  form  of 
government  being  better  adapted  than  any  other  to  the  legis- 
lation, customs,  conventions,  and  religious  organization  of  Chile ; 
but  that  having  no  prince  to  whom  the  government  could  be 
intrusted,  the  country  was  willing  to  accept,  subject  to  the  con- 
stitution which  was  being  framed,  a  prince  of  any  of  the 
neutral  powers,  who,  under  the  protection  of  the  dynasty  to 
which  he  belonged  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  influence  derived 
from  relations  with  European  courts,  would  fix  his  empire 
in  Chile,  thus  assuring  its  independence  of  Ferdinand  VII  and 
of  his  successors  and  of  every  other  foreign  power.36 

Irisarri,  proceeding  overland  to  Buenos  Aires  on  his  way  to 
Europe  found,  after  reaching  San  Luis  in  the  province  of  Cuyo, 
that  the  instructions  which  had  been  given  him  did  not  bear  the 
signature  of  the  Supreme  Director  nor  of  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs.  Returning  the  papers  therefore  to  Santiago, 
to  be  signed  and  dispatched  to  England  by  sea,  he  continued 
his  journey.  Upon  the  return  of  the  documents,  O'Higgins, 
who  had  probably  not  read  the  instructions  before  with  care, 
now  refused  to  sign  them,  and  as  no  new  instructions  were 
drawn  up  the  Chilean  envoy  was  left  without  a  definite  guide 
for  his  diplomatic  functions  in  Europe.  It  appears,  however, 
that  he  put  himself  in  touch  with  the  Argentine  agents  and 
sent  dispatches  to  his  government  concerning  the  project  for 
crowning  the  Prince  of  Lucca  at  Buenos  Aires.  It  is  not  clear 
whether  or  not  he  favored  the  project;  for  shortly  afterward 
O'Higgins  had  all  the  papers  referring  to  the  matter  burned.37 

se  Barros  Arana,  Historic,  de  Chile,  XII,  48.  Mitre,  Historia  de  San 
Martin,  IV,  486  (ed.  1890). 

37  Barros  Arana,  Historia  de  Chile,  XII,  51,  52.  Irisarri  left  Santiago 
December  12,  1818,  and  reached  his  destination  in  May,  1819.  While  in 
London  he  was  the  principal  editor  of  El  Censor  Americano,  which  was 
published  in  that  city  from  July  to  October,  1820.  Sanchez,  Bibliografia 
Venezolanista,  176. 

Villanueva   states   that   Irisarri   urged   O'Higgins   to    accept   the   plan. 


98         PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

It  was  two  years  after  the  failure  of  this  scheme  for  estab- 
lishing a  monarchy  in  southern  South  America  with  the  Prince 
of  Lucca  as  sovereign,  that  San  Martin,  as  has  been  noted 
above,  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  viceroy  of  Peru  with 
the  aim  of  securing  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the 
viceroyalty  through  its  erection  into  a  kingdom  with  a  Spanish 
prince  on  the  throne.  With  the  breaking  off  of  these  negotia- 
tions and  the  retirement  of  San  Martin  from  Peru  before  his 
plans  for  further  negotiations  with  other  reigning  houses  of 
Europe  had  matured,  the  monarchical  form  of  government 
came  to  be  regarded  by  the  leaders  of  opinion  in  the  newly 
formed  states  in  this  section  of  South  America  as  less  suitable 
to  their  peculiar  needs  than  the  republican  form. 

Some  attention  must  now  be  given  to  the  northern  part  of 
the  continent ;  that  is,  to  Venezuela,  New  Granada,  and  Quito. 
Here  republican  tendencies  were,  perhaps,  not  essentially 
stronger  than  in  the  south,  but  they  found  more  positive  expres- 
sion in  the  early  years  of  the  struggle.  On  December  11,  1811, 
a  constituent  congress  which  had  been  assembled  at  Caracas 
adopted  for  Venezuela  a  federal  constitution  similar  to  that  of 
the  United  States,  though  containing  certain  substantial  varia- 
tions. It  is  significant  that  the  congress  rejected  at  the  same 
time  an  aristocratic  plan,  neither  republican  nor  monarchical, 
proposed  by  Francisco  de  Miranda.38  A  constitution  adopted 
by  the  "  State  of  Cundinamarca "  April  5,  1811,  contained 
elements  taken  from  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  and 
from  that  of  France  under  the  Directory.  This  instrument, 
however,  provided  that  Ferdinand  VII  should  be  recognized 
as  head  of  the  state.  Shortly  afterward,  this  constitution  was 
overthrown,  and  on  November  27,  1811,  an  act  was  adopted 
constituting  the  "  United  Provinces  of  New  Granada,"  and 

He  does  not,  however,  give  his  authority.     Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin, 
147. 

ss  Robertson,  Francisco  de  Miranda.  An.  Rep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn.  1907,  I, 
417-421,  456.  Cf.  also  Gil  Fortoul,  Historia  Constitutional  de  Venezuela, 
I,  156-172. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS  99 

declaring  that  no  official  appointed  by  Spain  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  people  of  New  Granada  would  be  recognized.  At 
about  the  same  time  Cartagena  set  up  an  independent  govern- 
ment under  a  republican  constitution.  Quito  continued  under 
the  authority  of  Spain  until  1822.39 

The  years  immediately  following  these  first  essays  in  self- 
government  were  full  of  trials  and  disappointments  for  the 
Patriots.  They  were  crushed  by  the  Royalists  on  every  hand. 
Miranda,  who  for  a  brief  space  was  the  hope  of  the  revolution, 
was  taken  prisoner  and  transported  to  Spain,  where  he  died 
in  1816.  Bolivar,  though  continuing  the  struggle  and  winning 
important  victories,  was  finally  compelled  to  abandon  the  coun- 
try. With  the  exception  of  a  few  localities  where  guerrilla 
warfare  was  continued  both  Venezuela  and  New  Granada  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Royalists.  Meanwhile,  Bolivar,  who  had 
fled  to  the  island  of  Jamaica  and  afterward  to  Haiti,  devoted 
his  energies  to  the  organization  and  development  of  plans  for 
renewing  the  war.  Of  his  career  as  military  leader,  no  more 
need  be  said  here  than  to  recall  the  fact  that  he  returned  in 
1816,  after  an  exile  of  about  a  year,  at  the  head  of  an  expedi- 
tion, fitted  out  through  the  magnanimity  of  President  Petion 
of  Haiti;  that  he  overcame  tremendous  difficulties,  gradually 
making  himself  master  of  Venezuela  and  New  Granada,  then 
of  Quito  and  finally  of  Peru  and  Bolivia;  that  in  1821  he  was 
made  president  of  the  republic  of  Colombia,  a  state  nearly 
equal  in  area  to  the  part  of  the  United  States  east  of  the  Missis- 
sippi ;  and  that  within  a  little  more  than  a  year  thereafter  he 
had  become  the  arbiter  of  the  destiny  of  the  Spanish-speaking 
peoples  from  the  Orinoco  to  the  borders  of  Chile  and  the  Argen- 
tine. It  will  be  of  interest  therefore  to  study  for  a  moment 
this  great  leader's  political  ideals. 

During  his  exile  in  1815,  Bolivar  wrote  what  has  been  called 
his  "  prophetic  letter,"  setting  forth  the  political  principles 
which  he  held  at  the  time  and  which  no  doubt  served  in  great 

39  Villanueva,  Resumen  de  la  Historia  de  America,  200-237. 


100       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

measure  to  guide  his  conduct  during  the  succeeding  eventful 
years  of  his  lifetime.  The  letter  was  written  in  reply  to  one 
received  from  a  person  in  Jamaica,  whose  name  does  not  ap- 
pear, requesting  information  as  to  what  the  political  situation 
in  each  colony  was ;  whether  preference  was  being  shown  for  the 
republican  or  for  the  monarchical  system,  and  whether  it  was 
desired  to  establish  a  single  great  republic  or  a  monarchy  of 
like  extent.40  The  following  extract  from  Bolivar's  reply  ex- 
presses his  view: 

"  Above  all  men  I  desire,"  he  said,  "  to  see  formed  in  Amer- 
ica the  greatest  nation  on  earth ;  greatest  not  so  much  by  virtue 
of  its  extent  and  its  wealth,  as  by  virtue  of  its  liberty  and  its 
glory.  Though  I  long  for  a  high  degree  of  excellence  in  the 
government  of  my  native  land,  I  cannot  persuade  myself  to 
believe  that  the  New  World  will,  for  the  present,  be  organized 
as  a  great  republic.  Since  it  is  impossible  to  set  up  such  a 
state  I  do  not  dare  to  wish  for  it ;  and  much  less  do  I  desire  a 
monarchy  embracing  the  whole  of  America ;  41  for  that  is  like- 
wise impossible.  Under  so  great  a  state  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  correct  the  abuses  which  we  at  present  endure,  and 
hence  our  emancipation  would  be  fruitless.  The  American 
states  need  paternal  governments  to  cure  the  sores  and  wounds 
of  despotism  and  war.  If  such  a  general  government  were 
organized  the  metropolis  would  be  Mexico,  the  only  country 
whose  intrinsic  strength  could  give  it  such  a  position.  But  let 
us  suppose  it  were  Panama,  which  is  more  central.  Would 
not  all  the  parts  continue  to  be  as  weak  and  as  badly  governed 
as  at  present?  For  a  single  government  to  be  able  to  infuse 

40  The  letter  was  first  published  in  a  newspaper  of  Kingston.     From  that 
source  General  O'Leary  obtained  it  and  republished   it  in  his  Memorias, 
XXVII,  291-309. 

41  The  context  appears  to  show  that  Bolivar  here  meant  Spanish  America. 
Contemporary   writers  in   Spanish   frequently  used  the  terms  "  America " 
and  "  Nuevo  Mundo  "  to  refer  to  the  former  colonies  of  Spain.     In  the  same 
way  America  del  8eptentri6n  was  sometimes  used  to  designate  Mexico.     Cf. 
Alaman,  Historia  de  Mtvico,  V,  587. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS          101 

life  into  the  New  World,  touch  all  the  springs  of  public  pros- 
perity, carry  out  reforms  and,  in  general,  bring  about  a  state 
of  relative  perfection,  it  would  need  to  be  possessed  of  the  au- 
thority of  a  god  and  of  all  the  intelligence  and  virtue  of  men."  42 
A  monarchy  of  such  vast  proportions,  he  concludes,  would  be 
a  deformed  colossus  which  would  break  to  pieces  from  its  own 
weight  upon  suffering  the  least  strain. 

With  regard  to  the  kind  and  number  of  governments  that 
should  be  established,  Bolivar  referred  to  the  fact  that  the 
Abbe  de  Pradt  had  suggested  the  division  of  America  into  fif- 
teen or  more  independent  monarchies  governed  by  as  many 
monarchs.  As  to  the  number  of  separate  nations  he  was  in 
agreement  with  the  abbe ;  but  not  so  with  respect  to  the  nature 
of  the  governments  that  should  be  given  them.  Small  repub- 
lics, he  thought,  were  to  be  preferred  because  the  legitimate 
sphere  of  their  activity  is  the  pursuit  of  national  welfare  and 
the  conservation  of  independence.  Their  distinctive  mark  is 
permanence,  while  that  of  great  states  is  change,  with  a  tend- 
ency to  imperialism.  Nearly  all  small  republics,  he  affirms, 
have  had  a  long  life.  The  fact  that  Rome  survived  some  cen- 
turies as  a  republic  was  due  to  its  being  governed  as  a  republic 
at  the  capital  only,  other  laws  and  institutions  prevailing  in  the 
rest  of  the  territory  under  its  sway.43 

Discussing  the  kinds  of  government  which  the  different  di- 
visions would  be  likely  to  set  up  he  predicted  that  some  would 
choose  the  federal  republic  and  others  the  unitary  or  central- 
ized republic;  but  that  the  more  important  sections  would  in- 
evitably incline  to  monarchy.  He  thought  a  union  of  New 
Granada  and  Venezuela  likely  to  occur,  and  he  suggested  that 
their  government  might  imitate  that  of  England,  with  the 
difference  that  the  executive  should  be  elected,  preferably  for 
life.  A  hereditary  senate  would  check  the  waves  of  popular 

42-O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVII,  303. 
« Ibid.,  304. 


102       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

passion.  The  lower  house  should  be  elected  without  other  re- 
strictions than  such  as  applied  to  the  British  House  of  Com- 
mons.44 

Such  a  scheme  Bolivar  was  destined  to  attempt  to  carry  out, 
at  least  in  its  main  features.  Upon  renewing  the  war  in  1816, 
he  was  accorded  dictatorial  powers.  Having  made  considerable 
progress  toward  the  recovery  of  the  country  from  the  enemy, 
he  called  a  congress  which  met  at  Angostura,  afterward  Ciudad 
Bolivar,  February  8,  1819,  for  the  purpose  of  restoring  con- 
stitutional government.  Into  the  hands  of  the  congress,  Bo- 
livar resigned  the  extraordinary  authority  which  he  had  been 
exercising,  and  recommended  the  adoption  of  the  constitution 
of  which  he  presented  a  draft.  In  an  address  to  the  congress, 
he  set  forth  more  fully  than  he  had  previously  done  his  political 
principles.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  only  a  democracy  is 
susceptible  of  absolute  liberty.  "  But,"  he  asks,  "  what  demo- 
cratic government  has  united  at  one  time  power,  prosperity, 
and  permanence?  Is  it  not  true,  on  the  contrary,  that  aris- 
tocracy and  monarchy  have  been  the  foundation  of  the  great 
and  powerful  empires  which  have  lasted  for  centuries  ?  What 
government  has  endured  longer  than  that  of  China?  What 
republic  has  been  more  durable  than  that  of  Sparta,  or  that 
of  Venice?  Did  not  the  empire  of  Rome  conquer  the  earth? 
Has  not  France  been  a  monarchy  for  fourteen  centuries? 
What  power  is  greater  than  England?  These  nations  have 
been,  nevertheless,  either  aristocratic  or  monarchical." 

In  spite  of  these  painful  reflections,  he  felt  great  satisfac- 
tion in  the  steps  taken  by  the  republic  of  Venezuela.  She  had 
achieved  her  independence,  had  proscribed  monarchy  and  priv- 
ilege, had  set  up  a  democratic  government,  had  declared  the 
rights  of  man.  But  admirable  as  was  the  constitution  of  Ven- 
ezuela, it  was  not  suited  to  existing  conditions.  In  his  opin- 
ion it  was  a  marvel  that  its  model  in  North  America  had  hap- 
pily endured,  without  being  overthrown  at  the  first  appearance 
«  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVII,  306. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS          103 

of  difficulty  or  danger.  The  people  of  the  United  States  in 
many  respects  were  unique;  they  were  models  of  political  vir- 
tue ;  they  breathed  the  atmosphere  of  liberty ;  yet  it  was,  after 
all,  he  repeated,  astonishing  that  a  weak,  complicated  federal 
system  such  as  theirs  should  have  survived  the  trials  through 
which  it  had  passed.  Be  that  as  it  may,  he  had  not  the  remot- 
est intention  of  trying  to  adopt  the  system  of  a  people  so  differ- 
ent from  Spanish  Americans  as  were  the  Anglo-Americans. 
Venezuela  should  have  a  constitution  adapted  to  the  political 
conditions  of  the  country ;  to  the  religion,  customs,  inclinations, 
of  its  inhabitants;  to  the  degree  of  liberty  which  they  were 
prepared  to  receive.  This  was  the  code  they  should  consult, 
and  not  that  of  Washington.45 

The  model,  he  insisted,  should  be  the  British  constitution. 
The  principle  of  federation  should  be  abolished,  the  adminis- 
tration centralized,  and  the  triumvirate  which  constituted  the 
executive  authority,  under  the  constitution  of  1811,  be  re- 
placed by  a  president  with  greatly  enlarged  powers.  The  office, 
though  filled  by  election,  should  be  analogous  to  that  of  the 
British  sovereign.  The  ministers  alone  should  be  responsible. 
The  president  of  a  republic  should  be  invested  with  even  greater 
authority  than  that  exercised  by  the  chief  magistrate  of  a  mon- 
archy; for  the  throne  is  protected  by  the  veneration  of  the 
people,  by  the  loyalty  of  the  nobility,  and  by  the  fraternal  in- 
terest of  other  monarchs,  whereas  the  president  of  a  republic 
stands  alone,  resisting  the  combined  attacks  of  opinion,  inter- 
ests, and  passions  of  the  whole  social  body  of  the  state.40  Bo- 
livar did  not  on  this  occasion  propose  that  the  president  be 
elected  for  life,  but  he  warmly  championed  the  hereditary 
senate. 

The  congress,  in  spite  of  Bolivar's  great  prestige,  was  not 

«  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVII,  499. 
4«  Ibid.,  506-519. 

For  Bolivar's  address  to  the  congress  of  Angostura,  Feburary  15,  1819, 
see  Blanco-Azpurtia,  Documentos,  VI,  585-598. 


104       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

inclined  to  accept  his  aristocratic  scheme  without  due  consid- 
eration. Their  deliberations  continued  for  six  months,  at  the 
end  of  which  time  the  project  was  adopted  with  no  important 
changes  other  than  the  rejection  of  the  hereditary  senate,  and 
the  elimination  of  the  provision  for  a  fourth  power  to  be  known 
as  the  "  censors."  47 

In  the  meantime,  having  provisionally  accepted  the  presi- 
dency, Bolivar  continued  operations  against  the  enemy,  and 
having  met  with  important  successes  in  New  Granada,  in  the 
liberation  of  which  he  had  been  invited  to  cooperate,  he  returned 
to  Angostura  in  December,  1819.  In  an  address  to  the  con- 
gress he  gave  an  account  of  his  campaign  and,  declaring  that 
the  people  of  New  Granada  were  generally  convinced  of  the  de- 
sirability of  a  union  of  the  two  provinces,  he  urged  the  adop- 
tion of  the  steps  necessary  to  effect  such  a  union.  The  con- 
gress acceded  to  his  wishes  and,  consulting  the  expressed  desire 
of  the  people  of  New  Granada  for  a  political  union  with 
Venezuela,  enacted  a  "  fundamental  law  "  on  December  17, 
1819,  creating  the  republic  of  Colombia.  As  but  one  province 
of  New  Granada  was  represented  in  the  passage  of  the  act  it 
was  provided  that  a  general  congress  should  meet  at  Rosario  de 
Cucuta,  on  January  1,  1821,  for  the  purpose  of  framing  a  con- 
stitution for  the  United  Provinces.  It  was  determined,  how- 
ever, that  the  constitution  adopted  shortly  before  at  Angostura 
should  meanwhile  remain  in  force  and  serve  as  a  basis  for  the 
new  instrument.48  No  sooner  had  the  free  provinces  of  New 
Granada  heard  of  the  step  taken  by  the  congress  of  Angostura 
than  meetings  were  held,  and  formal  sanction  was  given  to 
the  union.49 

In  due  time  the  congress  met  at  Cucuta  and  adopted  a  con- 
stitution, thus  definitively  effecting  the  union  of  Venezuela 

47  The  sections  of  Bolivar's  project  referring  to  the  "  Censors  "  or  "  Moral 
Power  "  may  be  consulted  in  Gil  Fortoul's  Hiatoria  Constitutional  de  Ve- 
nezuela, I,  545-551. 

480'Leary,  Memorial,  XXVIII,  18-21. 

49  Ibid.,  26. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS          105 

and  New  Granada.  The  republic  was  divided  into  depart- 
ments, at  the  head  of  which  were  placed  intendants  directly 
responsible  to  the  president.  The  legislative  branch,  contrary 
to  Bolivar's  desire,  was  vested  with  the  exercise  of  the  chief 
authority,  except  in  times  of  invasion  or  of  internal  commo- 
tion, when  the  president  was  authorized  to  assume  absolute 
control.  Moreover  the  judiciary  was  made  wholly  independ- 
ent of  the  executive.  Bolivar,  believing  as  he  did  in  the  neces- 
sity for  the  centralization  of  authority  in  the  chief  magistrate, 
naturally  was  not  pleased  at  the  weakening  of  this  office  by  the 
relative  increase  of  the  power  and  of  the  independence  of  the 
other  branches  of  the  government.50 

Elected  president,  and  accepting  the  post  reluctantly,  the 
Liberator  left  the  administration  of  the  state  to  the  vice  presi- 
dent, and  under  the  authority  of  the  congress  continued  to  lead 
his  armies  against  the  enemy  in  the  south.51  It  was  as  a  re- 
sult of  his  conquests  in  that  quarter  that  he  was  finally  to  have 
the  opportunity  to  give  concrete  expression  to  his  political  ideals 
in  the  constitution  of  Bolivia,52  which  was  adopted  by  that 
republic  in  October,  1826.  A  brief  reference  to  some  provi- 
sions of  that  instrument  will  throw  further  light  upon  the 
Liberator's  political  views. 

The  outstanding  feature  of  the  Bolivian  constitution  was 
the  provision  for  a  president  to  be  chosen  for  life.  Great  au- 
thority was  concentrated  in  his  hands,  and  he  was  declared  not 
to  be  responsible  for  his  administrative  acts.53  The  vice  presi- 

so  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  101,  102. 
si  IUd.,  107. 

52  This  constitution,  together  wtih  Bolivar's  address  to  the  congress  on 
presenting  his  project,  is  found  in  the  Blanco-Azpurua  collection  of  Docu- 
mentos,  X,  341-358. 

53  Article  79  of  the  constitution  is  as  follows :     "  El  Presidente  de  la 
Republica  es  el  jefe  de  la  administration  del  Estado,  sin  responsabilidad  por 
los  actos  de  dicha  administration."     Blanco-Azpurua,  Documentos,  X,  353. 

Freeman  in  his  essay  on  presidential  government  declares  that  the  main 
difference  between  a  king  and  a  president  is  that  the  president  is  distinctly 
responsible  to  the  law;  that  he  may  be  judged  and  deposed  by  a  legal 
process.  Historical  Essays,  first  series,  p.  379. 


106       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

dent  was  appointed  by  the  president  and  confirmed  by  the 
legislature.  This  body,  however,  was  obliged  to  accept  one 
of  three  candidates  whom  the  president  might  name.54  The 
parts  of  the  constitution  relating  to  the  executive  were  adopted 
only  after  long  debate,  and  then  not  unanimously,  as  was  the 
case  with  practically  the  whole  of  the  rest  of  the  project  The 
body  of  "  censors/7  for  which  provision  had  been  made  in  the 
Angostura  project,  was  included  in  the  Bolivian  scheme,  the 
censors  forming  a  third  house  of  the  legislative  body,  and  the 
provision  was  now  adopted.  With  the  exception  of  an  article 
declaring  Roman  Catholicism  to  be  the  religion  of  the  state, 
which  congress  inserted  of  its  own  initiative,  Bolivar's  draft 
was  adopted  practically  as  presented.  In  the  original  project 
nothing  had  been  said  about  religion. 

The  preparation  of  a  constitution  for  Bolivia  was  but  one 
phase  of  a  great  scheme  which  had  been  revolving  in  the  mind 
of  the  Liberator  for  some  time ;  namely,  the  union  of  the  states 
of  Colombia,  Peru,  and  Bolivia.  His  plan  is  set  forth  in  a 
letter  to  General  La  Fuente  written  at  Lima  shortly  before  sub- 
mitting his  draft  of  a  constitution  to  the  Bolivian  congress. 
He  said: 

"  At  last  I  have  finished  the  constitution  of  Bolivia,  and  am 
commissioning  my  aid-de-camp,  Wilson,  to  take  it  to  General 
Sucre,  who  will  present  it  to  the  congress  of  Upper  Peru.  I 
may  say  to  you  now,  therefore,  that  this  constitution  is  going 
to  be  the  ark  in  which  we  shall  be  saved  from  the  shipwreck 
which  on  all  sides  threatens  us,  and  especially  from  a  direction 
which  you  would  least  suspect.  A  few  days  ago  Senor  Pando 
arrived  from  Panama,  and  the  picture  which  he  paints  of  af- 
fairs in  general  and  of  the  situation  in  Colombia  in  particular 
has  excited  my  attention  and  for  some  days  past  has  forced  me 
to  the  most  distressing  meditations.  You  have  learned,  no 
doubt,  that  party  spirit  has  divided  Colombia ;  that  her  treasury 
is  empty ;  that  her  laws  have  become  oppressive ;  that  the  num- 

5*  Blanco- Azpurrta,  Documentoa,  X,  352,  354. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS         107 

ber  of  state  employees  increases  with  the  decline  of  the  treas- 
ury; and  finally,  you  must  know  that  in  Venezuela  they  are 
clamoring  for  an  empire.  This  is  a  very  brief  statement  of 
the  condition  of  things  in  Colombia ;  but  it  is  sufficient  to  give 
you  an  idea  of  what  I  feel  under  the  circumstances.  This  is 
not  all,  my  dear  general.  The  worst  is  that  if  the  trend  con- 
tinues as  at  present  we  shall  in  time  experience  the  same  re- 
sults in  Peru;  and  here  as  well  as  there  we  shall  lose  what  we 
have  achieved  by  our  sacrifices.  After  careful  consideration 
we  have  agreed  —  men  of  the  best  judgment  and  myself  — 
that  the  only  remedy  that  we  can  apply  in  this  serious  situa- 
tion is  a  general  federation  of  Bolivia,  Peru,  and  Colombia, 
closer  than  that  of  the  United  States,  ruled  by  a  president  and 
vice  president  under  the  Bolivian  constitution,  which,  the  neces- 
sary changes  being  made,  might  serve  for  each  state  and  the 
federation  as  well.  The  intention  is  to  attain  the  most  perfect 
union  possible  under  the  federal  system.  The  government  of 
each  of  the  federal  states  will  remain  in  the  hands  of  a  vice 
president  and  two  legislative  chambers.  These  governments 
will  deal  with  questions  of  religion,  justice,  civil  administra- 
tion, economic  matters,  and,  in  short,  everything  not  relating 
to  foreign  affairs  and  war.  Each  department  will  send  a 
deputy  to  the  Federal  Congress  which  will  be  divided  into 
three  chambers,  each  chamber  having  a  third  of  the  deputies 
of  each  republic.  These  three  chambers  with  the  vice  presi- 
dents and  the  secretaries  of  state,  who  will  be  elected  from  the 
republic  at  large,  will  govern  the  federation.  The  Liberator, 
as  supreme  chief,  will  visit  yearly  the  departments  of  each 
state.  The  capital  will  be  a  central  point.  Colombia  should 
be  divided  into  three  states :  Cundinamarca,  Venezuela,  and 
Quito.  The  federation  will  take  whatever  name  may  be  chosen 
for  it.55  There  will  be  one  flag,  one  army,  and  a  single  nation. 
It  is  indispensable  that  Peru  and  Bolivia  should  begin  in  some 

55  It  is  this  proposed  federation  that  Villanueva  calls  El  Imperio  de  los 
Andes  in  his  book  of  that  title. 


108       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

way  to  put  this  plan  into  effect,  since  their  situation  makes 
them  more  dependent  upon  one  another.  Later  it  will  be  easy 
for  me  to  induce  Colombia  to  adopt  the  only  means  left  for 
her  salvation.  Upper  and  Lower  Peru  united,  Arequipa  will 
be  the  capital  of  one  of  the  three  great  departments  into  which 
these  united  states  will  then  be  divided,  after  the  manner  of 
the  great  divisions  of  Colombia."  56 

The  Seiior  Pando,  to  whom  Bolivar  refers  above,  was  Jose 
M.  Pando,  one  of  the  representatives  sent  by  Peru  in  1825  to 
take  part  in  the  Congress  of  Panama.  In  June,  1825,  shortly 
before  that  body  finally  convened,  Pando  was  recalled  by 
Bolivar  and  made  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Peru.  The 
fact  that  Pando  upon  his  return  began  a  vigorous  propaganda 
in  favor  of  the  federation  of  Bolivia,  Peru,  and  Colombia 
makes  it  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  the  Liberator,  hav- 
ing great  confidence  in  that  statesman's  ability  and  judgment, 
recalled  him  for  the  purpose  of  furthering  the  scheme.  Pando 
brought  from  Panama  alarming  reports  to  the  effect  that  the 
Spanish  had  concentrated  great  forces  in  Cuba  with  the  inten- 
tion of  attacking  some  point  on  the  coast  of  Colombia,  and 
that  another  expedition  equally  strong  was  being  prepared  in 
Spain  for  the  same  purpose ;  that  the  Spanish  squadron  in  the 
harbor  of  Havana  was  greatly  superior  to  the  small  Colombian 
fleet;  that  Mexico  intended  to  make  a  separate  peace;  that 
France  was  offering  to  pay  the  expenses  of  the  military  opera- 
tions of  Spain;  that  the  Holy  Alliance  was  resolved  to  reduce 
the  republics  of  America  to  obedience  to  the  mother  country, 
and  that  Great  Britain,  desirous  of  seeing  the  democratic  foun- 
dations of  the  new  states  swept  away,  would  not  be  opposed  to 
the  plans  of  the  continental  powers.87 

The  external  dangers  were  exaggerated,  no  doubt,  in  order 
to  bring  the  people  of  Colombia,  Peru,  and  Bolivia  to  a  realiza- 

56  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXVIII,  507-508. 

"  Ibid.,  503-505. 

Ibid.     (Bolivar  to  Santander,  April  23,  1826),  655-658. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS          109 

tion  of  the  necessity  of  organizing  strong,  effective  governments 
to  prevent  internal  disorder,  as  well  as  to  repel  invasion. 
Pando,  in  accordance  with  what  appears  to  have  been  a  pre- 
concerted plan,  urged  the  establishment  of  an  empire  embracing 
the  territory  from  Potosi  to  the  Orinoco.  His  views  were 
shared  by  many  others.  Among  this  number  was  General  Ga- 
marra,  afterward  president  of  the  republic  of  Peru,  who  of- 
fered to  support  Bolivar  in  the  establishment  of  the  only  sys- 
tem, the  monarchical,  which  in  his  opinion  could  destroy 
anarchy  and  make  independence  a  blessing.58 

O'Leary  affirms  that  Bolivar  never  countenanced  these  mon- 
archical schemes ;  that  though  he  believed  the  adoption  of  such 
a  system  might  assure  for  the  new  states  the  protection  of 
Europe  it  would  inevitably  result  in  war  between  the  partisans 
of  republicanism  and  those  of  monarchy.59  Bolivar's  public 
utterances  appear  to  bear  out  O'Leary's  contention.  In  his 
letter  to  General  La  Fuente,  the  Liberator  mentions  the  fact 
that  in  Venezuela  they  were  clamoring  for  an  empire.  He 
had  in  fact  received  a  letter  from  General  Paez,  commandant 
of  the  military  forces  in  Venezuela,  who  wrote  as  the  leader  of 
a  movement  of  revolt  there,  proposing,  as  Bolivar  expressed 
it,  Napoleonic  ideas.60  In  a  letter  to  Vice  President  Santander 
under  date  of  February  21,  1826, 61  Bolivar  said  that  in  reply- 
ing to  General  Paez  he  would  direct  his  attention  to  the  draft 
of  the  constitution  for  Bolivia,  and  that  he  wished  opinion 
turned  in  favor  of  this  instrument,  for  he  believed  it  would 
satisfy  the  most  extreme  views.  He  thought  that  the  over- 

ss  La  Fuente  also  favored  the  federation.  Haigh  gives  an  account 
(Sketches,  183)  of  a  banquet  given  by  La  Fuente  to  promote  good  feeling 
between  Colombia  and  Peru  and  between  these  and  Great  Britain. 

59  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  57-60. 

eo  IUd.,  57,  60. 

General  Paez  declares  in  his  autobiography  that  the  letter  referred  to  is 
not  in  accordance  with  the  original  and  he  gives  what  he  claims  is  the  cor- 
rect version.  Autobiografia,  I,  487-490. 

ei  Villanueva,  El  Imperio  de  los  Andes,  citing  Consul  Watts  to  Mr.  Can- 
ning, Cartagena,  May  20,  1826. 


110       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

confidence  which  led  to  Iturbide's  downfall  ought  to  be  guarded 
against ;  or  rather  that  the  thing  to  be  guarded  against  was  the 
just  suspicion  on  the  part  of  the  people  that  a  new  aristocracy 
would  destroy  equality.  The  plan  for  establishing  an  empire 
offended  him  more  than  all  the  insults  of  his  enemies,  because 
it  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  he  was  a  man  of  vulgar 
ambition,  capable  of  putting  himself  on  a  level  with  Iturbide 
and  other  such  miserable  usurpers.  According  to  those  who 
proposed  such  a  plan  nobody  could  be  great  except  after  the 
manner  of  Alexander,  Csesar,  and  Napoleon.  "  I  wish  to  sur- 
pass them  all,"  he  said,  "  in  unselfishness,  since  I  cannot  equal 
them  in  deeds."  62 

A  few  days  later  (March  6)  he  wrote  to  Paez  reminding 
him  that  Colombia  was  not  France  nor  he  himself  Napoleon, 
suggesting  a  possible  solution  of  all  difficulties  through  the 
adoption  of  the  Bolivian  constitution,  and  in  general  discourag- 
ing any  effort  to  promote  plans  for  the  establishment  of  a 
monarchy.63 

Realizing  that  the  open  discussion  of  the  question  of  mon- 
archy would  lead  to  the  formation  of  warring  factions,  Bolivar 
availed  himself  of  the  opportunity,  on  different  occasions,  to 
make  declarations  disclaiming  any  intention  on  his  part  to 
establish  such  a  form  of  government.  As  early  as  September, 
1823,  at  a  banquet  given  him  in  Lima,  he  expressed  the  hope 
that  the  American  people  might  never  consent  to  the  elevation 
of  thrones  in  their  territory;  that  as  Napoleon  was  sent  into 
exile  and  the  new  Emperor  Iturbide  driven  from  the  throne 
of  Mexico,  so  might  the  usurpers  of  the  rights  of  the  American 
people  be  dealt  with.  He  wished  to  see  not  a  single  would-be 
sovereign  triumphant  in  the  whole  extent  of  the  New  World.64 

In  June,  1824,  Bolivar  made  certain  remarks  to  an  officer, 
sent  by  Commodore  Hull  of  the  United  States  Navy  to  treat 

«z  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXVIII,  651-653. 

«3/&tU,  653-655. 

«*  Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  279. 

Odriozola,  Documentos  Histdricos  del  Peru,  V,  328. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS          111 

with  him,  respecting  matters  affecting  American  vessels  in  the 
Pacific,  which  confirm  the  view  that  he  was  opposed  to  the 
establishment  of  monarchical  governments.  "  They  say,"  the 
Liberator  declared,  "  that  I  wish  to  found  an  empire  in  Peru 
or  join  Peru  to  Colombia  and  establish  an  absolute  government 
with  myself  at  the  head  of  it ;  but  this  is  all  false  and  does  me 
great  injustice.  If  my  heart  does  not  deceive  me  I  shall  follow 
in  the  footsteps  of  Washington.  I  would  rather  have  an  end 
like  his  than  be  monarch  of  the  whole  earth,  and  of  this  all 
those  who  know  me  are  convinced.  My  only  ambition  is  the 
glory  of  Colombia  and  the  desire  to  see  my  native  land  assume 
its  place  in  the  circle  of  enlightened  nations."  65  This  was 
said  in  the  presence  of  officers  of  the  Patriot  army. 

But  these  declarations  antedated  two  years  or  more  the  Bo- 
livian constitution  and  the  efforts  to  found  the  "  Empire  of 
the  Andes."  Had  Bolivar  changed  from  republican  to  mon- 
archist ?  The  so-called  "  prophetic  letter  "  cited  above  and  his 
address  to  the  congress  of  Angostura  show  that  he  was  early 
convinced  that  his  people  were  not  ready  for  democratic  insti- 
tutions ;  and  that  he  wished  to  see  established  strongly  central- 
ized governments  with  certain  aristocratic  tendencies.  The  fol- 
lowing extract  from  the  report  of  a  conference  between  the 
Liberator  and  Captain  Mailing  of  the  British  Navy,  which  took 
place  in  March,  1825,  serves  to  recall  his  former  expressions 
and  to  raise  anew  the  question  of  his  republicanism.  Begin- 
ning the  conversation  with  a  reference  to  the  reports  that  had 
reached  him  from  Bogota,  relative  to  the  fear  of  an  attack  by 
France  upon  Colombia,  Bolivar  said: 

"  But  what  can  France  or  Spain  expect  to  gain  ?  They  can 
never  obtain  a  permanent  footing  in  our  country.  France  has 
declared  that  she  will  not  tolerate  popular  governments,  that 
revolutions  have  distracted  Europe  during  the  last  thirty  years, 
and  that  America  can  never  see  peace  so  long  as  she  gives  way 
to  the  popular  cry  of  equality ;  and,  in  truth,  I  am  of  the  opin- 
es Blanco- Azpurfia,  Documentos,  IX,  322. 


112       PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

ion  of  France,  for,  although  no  man  is  a  greater  advocate  for 
the  rights  and  liberties  of  mankind  than  I,  and  I  have  proved 
this  by  devoting  my  fortune  and  the  best  years  of  my  life  to 
their  attainment,  still  I  must  confess  this  country  is  not  ready 
for  government  by  the  people,  which  one  must  allow,  after  all, 
is  generally  better  in  theory  than  in  practice.  No  country  is 
more  free  than  England  under  a  well-regulated  monarchy.  She 
is  the  envy  of  all  the  countries  of  the  world,  and  the  pattern 
all  would  wish  to  follow  in  forming  a  new  constitution  or  gov- 
ernment. Of  all  countries  South  America  is,  perhaps,  the  least 
fitted  for  republican  government.  What  does  its  population 
consist  of  but  Indians  and  negroes  ?  —  who  are  more  ignorant 
than  the  vile  race  of  Spaniards  we  are  just  emancipated  from. 
A  country  represented  and  governed  by  such  people  must  go  to 
ruin.  We  must  look  to  England  for  relief,  and  you  have  not 
only  my  leave  but  my  request  that  you  will  communicate  our 
conversation  and  bring  the  matter  under  the  consideration  of 
H.B.M.  government  in  any  manner  which  may  seem  best  to 
you,  either  officially  or  otherwise.  You  may  say  that  I  never 
have  been  an  enemy  of  monarchies,  upon  general  principles. 
On  the  contrary,  I  think  it  essential  to  the  respectability  and 
well  being  of  new  nations,  and  if  any  proposal  ever  comes 
from  the  British  Cabinet  for  the  establishment  of  an  orderly 
government  —  that  is,  of  a  monarchy  or  monarchies  in  the  New 
World  —  they  will  find  in  me  a  steady  and  firm  promoter  of 
their  views,  perfectly  ready  to  uphold  the  sovereign  whom  Eng- 
land may  propose  to  place  and  support  upon  the  throne. 

"  I  know  it  has  been  said  of  me  I  wish  to  be  a  king,  but  it 
is  doubtful  [sic]  not  so.  I  would  not  accept  the  crown  for  my- 
self, for  when  I  see  this  country  made  happy  under  a  good  and 
firm  government,  I  shall  again  retire  into  private  life.  I  re- 
peat to  you  if  I  can  be  of  service  in  forwarding  the  wishes  and 
views  of  the  British  Government  in  bringing  about  this  de- 
sirable object,  they  may  depend  upon  my  services. 

"  I  owe  it  to  England.     I  would  infinitely  sooner  be  indebted 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS         113 

to  England  for  its  always  generous  and  liberal  assistance  than  to 
any  other  country.  France  or  Spain  would  treat  with  me,  no 
doubt,  were  I  to  make  similar  proposals  to  them,  but  never  will 
I  submit  to  any  interference  with  America  on  the  part  of  those 
odious  and  treacherous  nations. 

"  The  title  of  king  would  perhaps  not  be  popular  at  first  in 
South  America  and  therefore  it  might  be  as  well  to  meet  the 
prejudice  by  assuming  that  of  Inca  66  that  the  Indians  are  so 
much  attached  to.  This  enslaved  and  miserable  country  has 
hitherto  only  heard  the  name  of  king  confiled  [sic]  with  its 
miseries,  and  Spanish  cruelties  and  a  change  of  vice  kings  has 
invariably  proved  a  change  of  one  rapacious  oppressor  for  an- 
other. Democracy  has  its  charms  for  the  people,  and  in  theory 
it  appears  plausible  to  have  a  free  government  which  shall 
exclude  all  hereditary  distinctions,  but  England  is  again  our 
example. 

"  How  infinitely  more  respectable  your  nation  is,  governed 
by  its  king,  lords,  and  commons,  than  that  which  prides  itself 
upon  an  equality  which  holds  but  little  templation  [sic]  to 
exertion  for  the  benefit  of  the  state;  indeed  I  question  much 
whether  the  present  state  of  things  will  continue  very  long  in 
the  United  States.  In  short  I  wish  you  to  be  well  assured  I 
am  not  an  enemy  of  kings  or  of  aristocratical  governments, 
provided  that  they  be  under  necessary  restraints,  which  your 
constitution  imposes  upon  the  three  degrees.  If  we  are  to  have 
a  new  government,  let  it  be  modeled  on  yours,  and  I  am  ready 
to  give  my  support  to  any  sovereign  England  may  give  us."  67 

66  This  title  was  proposed  in  Miranda's  draft  of  a  constitution  prepared 
in  London  in  1808.  Gil  Fortoul,  Historia  Constitutional  de  Venezuela,  I, 
517. 

er  Rojas,  Tiempo  Perdido,  8-11;  Villanueva,  Fernando  VII  y  los  Nuevos 
Estados,  257-261,  citing  archives  of  the  British  Government.  Foreign  office, 
Peru,  1825,  No.  6.  Captain  Mailing  to  Lord  Melville,  Chorrillos,  March  20, 
1825. 

Rojas  gives  what  purports  to  be  an  exact  copy  of  the  letter  in  the 
original  English.  His  version  is  followed  here.  Apparently,  however, 
errors  have  been  made  in  transcribing  and  in  printing  the  letter.  Such 


114       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

The  letter  of  Captain  Mailing  reached  the  Admiralty  July 
25,  1825,  and  on  August  1  a  copy  of  it  was  sent  to  Canning. 

No  action  was  taken  by  the  Foreign  Office.  This  unusual 
method  of  carrying  on  diplomatic  intercourse  is  explained  by 
the  fact  that  the  consul-general,  Thomas  Rowcroft,  whom  the 
government  of  Great  Britain  had  sent  out  to  Lima  in  October, 
1823,  and  through  whom  the  correspondence  ordinarily  would, 
have  been  conducted,  had  been  accidentally  killed  a  few  months 
before  the  conversation  with  Captain  Mailing  took  place.  That 
Bolivar  did  not  employ  Peruvian  or  Colombian  agents  for  this 
particular  purpose  was  due,  in  the  opinion  of  certain  Vene- 
zuelan writers,  to  his  lack  of  faith  in  their  loyalty ;  68  and  they 
cite  in  evidence  of  this  the  fact  that  of  his  aids-de-camp  in  whom 
he  most  fully  confided,  three,  O'Leary,  Wilson,  and  Ferguson, 
were  British,  and  another,  Peru  de  la  Croix,  was  French. 
That  Bolivar  trusted  these  foreigners  on  his  staff  is  true;  but 
it  does  not  follow  that  he  distrusted  his  own  countrymen.  Nor 
do  his  conversations  on  the  subject  of  a  monarchy  necessarily 
disclose  his  real  convictions.  His  aim  may  have  been  nothing 
more  than  to  make  soundings.  Such,  at  least,  seems  to  have 
been  the  object  of  his  conference  with  the  French  admiral, 
Rosamel.  At  about  the  time  of  the  conference  with  Captain 
Mailing,  Bolivar  received  Rosamel,  and  expressed  to  him  views 
substantially  the  same  as  those  which  he  had  made  known  to 
Captain  Mailing.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  manifest  a  de- 
sire to  have  France  take  the  initiative  in  the  matter  of  setting 
up  monarchies  in  South  America.  On  other  occasions  the  Lib- 
erator expressed  himself  with  similar  freedom.69  One  example 
may  be  given.  While  Bolivar  was  an  exile  in  Haiti  in  1816, 

errors  as  were  plainly  typographical  have  been  corrected  in  the  above 
extract. 

es  Villanueva,  Fernando  VII  y  los  Nuevos  Estados,  261.  Bolivar,  at  this 
time,  says  Rojas  ( Tiempo  Perdido  11 ) ,  did  not  confide  in  any  Colombian  or 
Peruvian  with  the  exception  of  General  Sucre,  who  alone  merited  his  full 
confidence. 

«»  Villanueva,  El  Imperio  de  los  Andes,  72-74. 


FAILUKE  OF  MONAECHICAL  PLOTS         115 

lie  received  aid  in  fitting  out  an  expedition  from  an  influential 
British  merchant  by  the  name  of  Sutherland.  Bolivar  held 
Sutheiland  in  high  esteem,  and  it  appears  spoke  freely  to  him 
on  the  subject  of  government  in  the  new  states.70  The  British 
merchant  related  his  impressions  afterward  to  his  son,  Kobert 
Sutherland,  who,  as  British  consul  at  Maracaibo,  wrote  Canning 
on  July  5,  1824,  as  follows : 

"  I  must  observe  to  you  that  it  was  all  along  Bolivar's  inten- 
tion to  change  the  form  of  government,  as  he  had  expressed  such 
an  intention  to  the  late  Mr.  Sutherland,  his  most  cordial  friend. 
...  In  another  conversation  with  Mr.  Sutherland  Bolivar  re- 
marked that  he  was  aware  that  a  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment was  not  suited  to  the  genius  of  the  Colombians,  but  that 
he  felt  it  necessary  to  cry  it  up  to  aid  the  revolution  and  to 
attribute  to  Ferdinand  all  the  despotic  acts  of  the  former  sys- 
tem, but  when  I  get  rid  of  the  Spaniards  and  you  visit  me  I 
shall  have  you  kneeling  and  kissing  my  hands.  This  was  said 
in  a  jocular  way.  These  are  anecdotes  which  I  believe  are 
alone  known  to  me."  71 

Do  Bolivar's  confidences  to  foreigners  and  his  political 
philosophy  as  expressed,  particularly  in  his  Angostura  address 
and  in  his  Bolivian  constitution,  justify  the  conclusion  that  he 
was  at  heart  a  monarchist?  Were  the  opinions  which  he  ex- 
pressed to  foreigners,  especially  to  representatives  of  Great 
Britain  and  France,  his  real  political  convictions?  Were  the 
frequent  declarations  which  he  made  to  his  fellow  countrymen 
of  loyalty  to  the  principles  of  popular  representative  govern- 
ment mere  political  strategy?  And  finally,  was  the  real  pur- 
pose of  his  Bolivian  constitution  to  serve  as  an  easy  means  of 
transition  from  the  already  established  republican  institutions 
and  democratic  tendencies  to  an  aristocratic  monarchical  sys- 
tem, frankly  avowed?  A  brief  review  of  the  Liberator's  po- 

70  Villamieva,  Fernando  VII  y  los  Nuevos  Estados,  250.     El  Imperio  de 
los  Andes,  97-108;  285. 

71  Villanueva,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  278;   citing  British  ar* 
chives,  Foreign  office.     O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVII,  340.  , 


116       PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

litical  activity  during  the  four  succeeding  years,  up  to  his  death 
in  1830,  will  help  to  answer  these  questions. 

At  about  the  time  Bolivar  presented  his  draft  of  a  constitu- 
tion to  the  congress  of  Bolivia,  the  situation  in  Colombia  had 
really  become  acute.  An  insurrection  in  Venezuela  had  re- 
sulted in  the  virtual  separation  of  that  province  from  the 
republic.  General  Paez  had  been  proclaimed  civil  and  mili- 
tary chief  and  empowered  to  continue  in  office  as  long  as  cir- 
cumstances might  demand,  or  until  the  return  of  Bolivar,  whose 
authority  as  president  there  was  no  intention  of  disputing.72 
The  spirit  of  rebellion  soon  spread  to  the  south.  On  July  19, 
1826,  the  municipality  of  Quito  in  secret  session  passed  reso- 
lutions urging  the  Liberator  to  perpetuate  himself  in  the  office 
of  chief  executive  with  the  title  of  life  president,  or  with  what- 
ever other  title  he  might  find  most  suitable.73  After  several 
months  of  agitation  the  citizens  and  members  of  the  local  gov- 
ernment of  Guayaquil  met,  on  August  28,  and  "  reassumed  " 
their  sovereignty  to  resign  it  forthwith  to  Bolivar,  "  the  father 
of  the  country."  This  assembly  declared  that  the  Liberator 
should  have  absolute  control  of  the  destinies  of  the  nation  until 
he  had  rescued  it  from  the  impending  ruin ;  and  that  until  the 
system  of  government  should  be  definitely  determined  the  Bo- 
livian constitution  should  prevail.74  On  September  6,  the  au- 
thorities and  citizens  of  Quito  in  public  assembly  adhered  to  the 
action  taken  at  Guayaquil.76 

Moved  by  these  reports  from  the  north,  encouraged  by  the 
leaders  of  the  rebellious  factions  to  believe  that  his  presence 
there  was  indispensable,  and  convinced  that  the  moment  had 
arrived  for  giving  concrete  form  to  his  project  of  federating 
Colombia,  Peru,  and  Bolivia,  the  Liberator  resolved  to  quit 
Peru  and  return  to  Colombia.  The  announcement  of  his  in- 

72  For  a  full  account  of  this  insurrection  see  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII, 
603-640. 

73  O'Leary,  Memorias,  II,  644-645. 

74  Odriozola,  Documentos  Histdricos  del  Peru,  VII,  151-154. 
7P  Ibid.,  VII,  155. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS         117 

tention  was  the  cause  of  anxiety  in  Peru;  for  no  satisfactory 
governmental  machinery  had  been  organized.  Bolivar's  rule 
had  been  that  of  a  beneficent  despot.  It  was  feared,  therefore, 
that  on  his  departure  the  country  would  fall  into  a  state  of 
anarchy  similar  to  that  with  which  it  had  been  afflicted  prior 
to  his  coming.  Every  effort  accordingly  was  made  to  induce 
him  to  remain  in  Peru.  Memorials  of  citizens  and  of  civic 
and  ecclesiastical  corporations  poured  in  from  every  part  of  the 
republic,  beseeching  him  not  to  abandon  the  country.  And 
finally,  as  a  last  resort,  the  electoral  colleges  were  convoked  and 
the  Bolivian  constitution  was  submitted  to  them  for  approval. 
They  voted  almost  unanimously  in  favor  of  its  adoption  and 
designated  at  the  same  time  the  Liberator  as  life  president. 
These  measures,  however,  did  not  have  the  desired  effect,  for 
on  September  4,  having  delegated  the  authority  which  he  had 
been  exercising  as  Dictator  to  the  grand  marshal,  Santa  Cruz, 
Bolivar  embarked  for  Guayaquil.76 

The  Bolivian  constitution,  it  may  be  said  in  passing,  was 
proclaimed  in  Peru  on  December  9,  1826.  Its  life  was  short. 
On  January  26,  1827,  the  Colombian  troops  still  in  Peru  re- 
volted, declaring  against  the  constitution.  It  was  charged  that 
Vice  President  Santander  of  Colombia  had  fomented  the  re- 
bellion in  order  to  check  Bolivar's  imperial  designs  and  to  safe- 
guard the  Colombian  constitution  which  was  then  threatened. 
On  January  27  the  government  of  Peru  resolved  to  put  into 
force  the  Peruvian  constitution  of  1823;  and  a  congress  was 
convoked  to  meet  on  May  1  for  the  purpose  of  electing  a  presi- 
dent and  vice  president.  Bolivar  had  foreseen  the  breakdown 
of  his  system  in  Peru;  for,  writing  to  Santa  Cruz  in  October, 
while  on  his  way  to  Bogota,  he  predicted  the  nationalistic  reac- 
tion and  counseled  his  friends  not  to  oppose  it,  not  to  support 
his  "  American  plans  "  as  against  purely  Peruvian  aims.77 

When  Bolivar  reached  Guayaquil  toward  the  middle  of  Sep- 

76  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  526-527. 

77  Vargas,  Historia  del  Peru  Independiente,  III,   185,  233,  240-245. 


118       PAN- AMERICANISM :  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

tember,  1826,  he  learned  of  the  revolutionary  movement  which 
had  shortly  before  taken  place  in  that  department.  In  view 
of  the  reports  which  had  for  some  time  past  been  reaching  him, 
respecting  the  state  of  affairs  in  Colombia,  he  was  doubtless  not 
surprised  at  what  had  occurred,  nor  was  he  disposed  to  con- 
demn the  acts  of  rebellion.  On  the  contrary,  his  mild  reproof 
of  the  insurrectionists  and  his  promotion  of  the  intendant, 
Mosquera,  who  had  lent  his  support  to  the  uprising,  warrant 
the  suspicion  that  the  Liberator  might  have  regarded  with  satis- 
faction the  movement  to  overthrow  the  established  order.  His 
procedure  shortly  afterward  at  Quito,  where  he  granted  amnesty 
to  those  who  had  renounced  the  constitution,  gives  further 
ground  for  the  suspicion.78  Before  he  had  been  long  in  the 
republic  it  became  clear  that  his  powerful  influence  was  not 
to  be  exerted  toward  the  restoration  of  the  constitution  of  1821. 
That  instrument  had  never  met  with  his  hearty  acquiescence 
and  it  now  stood  in  the  way  of  the  realization  of  his  political 
plans.  By  its  own  provisions  it  could  not  be  legally  super- 
seded until  after  a  period  of  ten  years  from  the  time  of  its 
adoption.  The  empire  of  the  Andes  could  not  wait.  Bolivia 
and  Peru  had  just  adopted  the  Bolivian  constitution.  Colom- 
bia must  find  the  means  to  do  likewise  and  the  union  of  the 
three  republics  must  at  once  be  accomplished.  Otherwise,  the 
golden  opportunity  for  the  establishment  of  a  great  South  Amer- 
ican state  would  be  forever  lost. 

Bolivar  arrived  at  Bogota  in  November.  Assuming  the  of- 
fice of  president  to  which  he  had  been  reflected  the  year  before, 
he  immediately  suspended  the  constitutional  guarantees,  in  ac- 
cordance with  a  provision  of  the  constitution  granting  the  chief 
executive  that  authority  in  times  of  extraordinary  danger,  and 
at  the  same  time  issued  a  proclamation  to  the  Colombian  people 
declaring  that  he  had  returned  anxious  to  comply  with  the  will 
of  the  nation.  He  added,  however,  that  he  had  taken  upon  him- 
self with  repugnance  the  exercise  of  the  supreme  power,  he- 
rs O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXVIII,  671-674;  Ibid.,  XXIV,  432-434. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS          119 

cause  by  so  doing  he  laid  himself  open  to  the  charge  of  being 
ambitious  and  of  desiring  to  establish  a  monarchy.  "  What," 
he  exclaimed,  "  am  I  believed  to  be  so  insensate  as  to  desire  to 
descend?  Is  not  the  destiny  of  Liberator  more  sublime  than 
the  throne  ?  "  79  Nevertheless  he  continued  to  exercise  dic- 
tatorial authority.  Instead  of  taking  steps  to  compel  the  re- 
bellious departments  in  the  south  to  render  obedience  to  the 
fundamental  law,  he  permitted  them  to  maintain  an  anomalous 
status  with  responsibility  to  himself  alone.  A  little  later  he 
made  a  similar  arrangement  with  Paez  in  Venezuela;  and  as 
other  sections  of  the  republic  had  repudiated  the  constitution 
while  protesting  allegiance  to  Bolivar  personally,  the  situation 
appeared  to  favor  the  execution  of  his  plans. 

Accordingly,  at  the  instance  of  Bolivar,  the  Colombian  con- 
gress, in  August,  18 27,  convoked  an  assembly  to  meet  at  Ocana, 
early  the  next  year,  ostensibly  to  revise  the  constitution  of  1821, 
but  really  to  adopt  the  Bolivian  constitution.  For  some  months 
past,  opposition  to  the  Liberator's  plans  had  been  gaining  ground 
under  the  leadership  of  Vice  President  Santander,  and  when 
the  convention  assembled  it  was  discovered  that  the  partisans  of 
Bolivar  were  in  the  minority.  By  skillfully  appealing  to  the 
sentiment  of  respect  for  the  law,  and  by  taking  a  stand  in  favor 
of  the  growing  demand  for  the  adoption  of  the  federal  system 
in  Colombia,  Santander  had  been  able  to  attract  to  his  standard 
a  sufficient  number  of  followers  to  defeat  the  ends  of  the  oppos- 
ing party.  Finding  that  they  were  outnumbered,  Bolivar's 
partisans  withdrew  from  the  convention,  and  as  this  left  it 
without  a  quorum,  the  attempt  to  revise  the  constitution  was 
abandoned.80 

As  soon  as  this  was  known  at  Bogota,  the  public  authorities 
and  a  number  of  the  citizens  of  the  capital  assembled  and 

79  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  512. 

so  Gil  Fortoul,  Historia  Constitutional  de  Venezuela,  I,  423-433.  For  a 
full  account  of  this  attempt  at  constitutional  reform  see  a  work  by  Jose" 
Joaqufn  Guerra  entitled  La  Convencidn  de  Ocana. 


120       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

adopted  a  resolution  requesting  the  Liberator  to  assume  full 
authority  and  to  continue  to  exercise  it  until  he  should  deem  it 
convenient  to  convoke  a  national  assembly.  The  example  of 
Bogota  was  followed  in  time  by  a  number  of  municipalities  in 
other  parts  of  the  republic.  But  Bolivar  did  not  wait  for  a 
further  expression  of  the  popular  will.  In  June,  1828,  he  re- 
turned to  Bogota  —  he  had  been  spending  the  past  few  months 
at  Bucaramanga  —  and  resumed  the  chief  magistracy,  virtually 
as  dictator.  Three  months  later  his  enemies  made  an  unsuc- 
cessful attempt  to  dislodge  him  from  power  by  force  of  arms, 
and  this  led  him  to  cast  aside  the  few  remaining  constitutional 
restraints  in  order  that  he  might  employ  the  most  stringent 
means  to  maintain  order  and  prevent  the  dissolution  of  the  re- 
public.81 

Foreign  complications  no  less  than  domestic  troubles  now 
demanded  the  attention  of  the  Liberator.  Late  in  1828  hos- 
tilities broke  out  with  Peru,  and,  taking  the  field  to  direct  opera- 
tions against  the  enemy  who  had  invaded  the  southern  depart- 
ments, Bolivar  remained  in  the  South  until  the  autumn  of 
1829,  when,  peace  having  been  restored,  he  returned  to  the 
capital.  During  his  absence  he  continued,  in  spite  of  his  pre- 
occupation with  military  matters,  to  give  to  the  question  of  the 
political  organization  of  the  state  all  the  attention  the  circum- 
stances would  permit.  He  was  particularly  anxious  on  the 
one  hand  to  lay  the  rumors  which  were  being  spread  abroad  by 
his  enemies,  charging  him  with  plotting  the  establishment  of 
a  monarchy,  and  on  the  other  to  keep  before  the  minds  of  the 
people  the  fact  that  they  themselves  were  to  determine  the  fate 
of  the  republic  through  their  representatives  soon  to  be  con- 
vened in  a  new  assembly.82  But  as  time  passed  he  despaired 
of  effecting  without  foreign  assistance  the  political  stability 
which  he  so  ardently  desired  for  Colombia  and  for  the  other 
countries  to  whose  emancipation  he  had  so  largely  contributed. 

si  Gil  Fortoul,  Historia  Constitutional  de  Venezuela,  I,  434-436. 

82  Bolivar  to  Vergara,  Dec.  16,  1828.     O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXXI,  264. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS         121 

In  April,  1829,  Bolivar  wrote  from  Quito  to  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Eelations  at  Bogota  recommending  that  he  speak 
in  a  confidential  manner  with  the  diplomatic  representatives  of 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  respecting  the  state  of 
anarchy  into  which  the  South  American  countries  would  likely 
fall  unless  some  great  Power  should  intervene  in  their  af- 
fairs. A  few  months  later  his  Secretary,  who  'accompanied 
him  in  the  South  and  who  doubtless  faithfully  expressed  the 
views  of  his  chief,  put  the  matter  more  insistently.  "  How  is 
America,"  he  wrote,  "  to  be  freed  from  the  anarchy  which  is 
consuming  it  and  from  the  European  colonization  which  threat- 
ens it?  There  was  convened  an  Amphictyonic  Congress 
(that  of  Panama)/7  he  continued,  "  and  its  work  was  disdained 
by  the  nations  most  interested  in  its  decisions.  There  was 
proposed  a  partial  federation  of  three  sovereign  states  and 
maledictions  and  scandal  were  raised  to  the  skies.  In  short, 
America  needs  a  regulator.  .  .  .  His  Excellency  has  not  the 
remotest  personal  interest  in  this  matter  further  than  that  of 
Colombia  and  of  America.  He  adheres  not  to  the  word  but 
to  the  thing.  Call  it  what  you  will,  if  only  the  result  corre- 
sponds with  his  desire  that  America  be  placed  under  the  cus- 
tody, protection,  mediation  or  influence  of  one  or  more  power- 
ful states,  who  shall  preserve  it  from  the  destruction  to  which 
it  is  being  led  by  systematic  anarchy  and  from  the  colonial 
regimen  by  which  it  is  threatened.  Did  not  England  offer  spon- 
taneously her  mediation  between  Brazil  and  Rio  de  la  Plata? 
Did  she  not  intervene  by  arms  between  Turkey  and  Greece? 
Let  us  seek  therefore,  Sir,  something  to  which  to  cling,  or  re- 
sign ourselves  to  sink  beneath  the  flood  of  evils  which  rise  to 
overwhelm  unhappy  America."  83 

The  Council  of  Ministers,  upon  whom  the  duties  of  govern- 
ment devolved  in  Bolivar's  absence,  took  this  note  under  con- 
sideration on  September  3,  1829,  and,  convinced  that  the  Lib- 
erator's idea  could  not  be  carried  into  execution  until  there 

83  Gil  Fortoul,  Historia  Constitutional  de  Venezuela,  I,  459, 


122       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

should  be  in  Colombia  a  "  stable  government,"  directed  tbe 
Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  to  open  negotiations  with  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  England  and  France  in  accord- 
ance with  instructions  which  were  substantially  as  follows : 

1.  It  should  be  made  clear  why  Colombia  found  it  necessary 
to  change  its  form  of  government  from  a  republic  to  a  consti- 
tutional monarchy.     Although  the  nation  had  the  indisputable 
right  of  adopting  the  form  of  government  which  it  deemed  most 
appropriate,  yet  in  order  to  act  in  harmony  with  his  Britannic 
Majesty  and  his  Most  Christian  Majesty,  the  Council  of  Min- 
isters desired  to  know  whether  those  governments,  in  the  event 
the  congress  should  agree  to  establish  a  constitutional  mon- 
archy, would  give  their  assent  to  it. 

2.  In  case  assent  were  obtained,  it  was  the  opinion  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers  that  Bolivar  should  rule  for  the  rest  of  his 
life,  using  the  title  of  Liberator,  and  that  the  title  of  king  or 
emperor  should  not  be  employed  until  his  successor  should  come 
into  power. 

3.  Inquiry  should  be  made  as  to  whether  Colombia  would 
be  left  free  to  designate  the  Liberator  and  such  prince,  house, 
or  dynasty  to  succeed  him  as  the  interests  of  the  country  might 
demand. 

4.  Finally,  the  importance  of  the  steps  which  Colombia  con- 
templated with  a  view  to  its  own  political  organization  and  that 
of  the  rest  of  America  should  be  made  clear  to  the  representa- 
tives of  Great  Britain  and  France.     But  as  it  was  probable 
that  the  United  States  and  the  other  American  republics  would 
become  alarmed  at  the  action  of  Colombia,  the  effective  and 
powerful  intervention  of  England  and  France  should  be  sought 
to  the  end  that  Colombia  be  not  disturbed  in  the  exercise  of 
her  right  to  adopt  the  form  of  government  that  she  might  find 
most  acceptable.     It  should  be  made  clear  to  France,  though 
without  entering  into  any  engagement  on  the  subject,  that  in  the 
event  some  branch  of  the  royal  families  of  Europe  should  be 
selected,    Colombia  would   prefer   a  prince  of  the  house   of 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS         123 

France,  for  he  would  have  the  same  religion  as  that  which 
prevailed  in  Colombia,  and  for  other  reasons  of  a  political  na- 
ture would  be  most  acceptable  to  the  Colombian  people.84 

The  Colombian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  complied  with 
the  instructions,  and  without  delay  the  project  was  brought  to 
the  attention  of  the  governments  of  Great  Britain  and  France. 
But  the  plan  was  not  well  received.  France  did  not  wish  to 
take  any  steps  which  might  make  it  appear  that  she  opposed  the 
reestablishment  of  Spanish  power  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
England  was  no  less  opposed  to  the  scheme  in  so  far  as  it  in- 
volved the  royal  families  of  Great  Britain  and  of  France.  In 
a  dispatch  dated  December  16,  1829,  the  minister  of  Colombia 
in  London  gave  the  verbal  reply  of  Lord  Aberdeen  to  the  pro- 
posal. "  The  government  of  his  Majesty,"  said  Lord  Aber- 
deen, "  far  from  opposing  the  establishment  in  Colombia  of  a 
government  similar  to  that  of  this  country,  would  be  very  glad 
to  see  such  a  reform  effected,  for  they  are  convinced  that  it 
would  contribute  to  the  order  and  therefore  to  the  prosperity  of 
that  part  of  America;  but  the  British  Government  would  not 
permit  a  prince  of  the  French  house  to  cross  the  Atlantic  to 
be  crowned  in  the  New  World.  .  .  .  And  in  order  that  you  may 
be  convinced  that  there  is  no  inconsistency  or  ulterior  motive 
on  our  part,  I  declare  also  that  the  government  of  his  Majesty 
could  not  allow  a  prince  of  the  royal  family  to  rule  in  any  part 
of  Spanish  America,  if  this  were  proposed."  85 

This  attitude  of  the  British  cabinet  is  confirmed  in  a  dispatch, 
dated  February  20,  1830,  from  the  Spanish  minister  at  Lon- 
don to  his  government.  Lord  Aberdeen,  he  said,  had  told  him 
confidentially  that  the  existing  government  of  the  so-called 
republic  of  Colombia  had  lately  sent  an  official  communication 
to  the  British  Government,  indicating  that  the  pretended  Lib- 
erator, Simon  Bolivar,  who  was  soon  to  be  given  supreme  au- 
thority for  life  with  the  title  of  president,  dictator,  king,  em- 

s*  Gil  Fortoul,  Historia  Constitutional  de  Venezuela,  I,  460. 
ss  Ibid.,  I,  465. 


124:       PAN^AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

peror,  or  other  such  title,  and  to  be  vested  with  the  power  to 
appoint  his  successor,  proposed  to  England  that  the  succession 
be  allowed  to  fall  upon  a  prince  of  the  reigning  family;  or  if 
this  were  not  agreeable,  that  no  opposition  be  made  to  the  elec- 
tion of  a  prince  of  some  other  royal  family  of  Europe.  Lord 
Aberdeen  declared,  furthermore,  that  while  opposing  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  member  of  any  of  the  reigning  families  of  Europe, 
with  the  exception  of  that  of  Spain,  upon  the  throne  of  Bogota, 
there  was  no  objection  to  Colombia's  placing  the  supreme  au- 
thority of  the  state  in  the  hands  of  one  of  its  own  citizens  un- 
der the  form  of  government  which  might  be  deemed  most  suit- 
able. But  the  whole  plan  seemed  to  Lord  Aberdeen  imprac- 
ticable, and  the  Spanish  minister  was  given  to  understand  that 
the  British  Government  would  not  encourage  it  in  any  form.86 

Bolivar  did  not  approve  the  step  taken  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  Late  in  the  autumn,  while  on  his  way  to  the  capi- 
tal he  directed  after  "  mature  reflection  "  his  Secretary,  Espi- 
nar,  to  write  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  at  Bogota  re- 
questing that  "  every  proceeding  tending  to  forward  the  pending 
negotiation  with  the  governments  of  Erance  and  England  "  be 
suspended  in  view  of  the  "  resolution  of  his  excellency  to  in- 
vite the  nation  to  freely  express  its  preference  respecting  the 
political  system  which  should  be  established."  8T  Years  after- 
ward Vergara,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  declared  that 
the  whole  responsibility  belonged  to  the  Council  of  Ministers,88 
and  that  the  Liberator  was  in  no  wise  to  be  blamed  unless  it 
were  for  his  delay  in  officially  disapproving  a  project  which 
was  repugnant  to  his  sentiments.  Thus  by  the  close  of  1829 
monarchical  plotting  in  Colombia  had  come  to  an  end. 

Some  months  later  however  a  dying  echo  of  the  Colombian 
plots  was  heard  in  Peru.  It  appears  that  during  the  month 
of  April,  1830,  there  were  circulated  in  Lima  copies  of  alleged 

se  Ibid.,  I,  467. 

s?  Posada  Gutierrez,  Memoriae  histdrico-politicas,  I,  211. 

ssMonsalve,  El  ideal  politico  del  Libertador  8im6n  Bolivar,  391. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS          125 

instructions  given  by  Bolivar  to  Mosquera,  the  Colombian 
minister  to  Peru.89  These  instructions  were  said  to  have  been 
sent  to  the  Peruvian  capital  by  General  Demarquet,  one  of 
Bolivar's  aids-de-camp,  who,  through  failure  to  observe  due 
precaution,  allowed  copies  of  them  to  be  made.  The  sup- 
posed instructions  were  thus  secretly  passed  from  hand  to  hand 
in  Peru;  and  in  Chile,  where  they  were  sent,  extracts  of 
them  were  published.  A  manuscript  copy  was  obtained  by 
the  United  States  minister,  Larned,  at  Lima  and  sent  by  him 
to  the  Secretary  of  State  at  Washington.90  On  June  30,  El 
Conciliador,  a  government  organ  published  at  Lima,  gave  a 
summary  of  the  instructions  but  maintained  with  well  grounded 
reasons  that  they  were  apocryphal. 

The  instructions  were  in  substance  as  follows :  "  The  em- 
pire will  be  realized  or  rivers  of  blood  will  flow  in  America; 
therefore,  I  charge  you  to  act  with  energy  and  constancy. 
What  have  you  to  fear  from  those  impotent  Peruvians  ?  Have 
you  not  already  obtained  the  assent  of  Gamarra  and  of  La 
Fuente  ?  91  Are  not  our  friends  in  control  of  the  cabinet  ? 
.  .  .  Are  they  not  protected  by  our  warships  and  by  our 
power?  Leave  the  llanero,  Paez,  and  these  doctors  of  Bogota 
to  me.  If  you  do  your  work  well  there,  I  will  answer  for  the 
outcome ;  not,  it  is  true,  as  soon  as  I  should  like.  In  the  mean- 
time let  the  government  of  Peru  destroy  the  liberals  on  the  pre- 
text of  anarchy.  .  .  .  Lead  Gamarra  on  by  telling  him  that  he 
will  have  the  best  dukedom,  the  richest,  the  most  civilized,  and 
the  most  extensive,  for  it  will  stretch  from  the  Santa  to  the 
Apurimac.  There  could  not  be  a  better  division.  Tell  La 
Fuente,  confidentially,  the  same  thing  with  reference  to  his 
dukedom  which  will  embrace  the  territory  between  the  Apuri- 
mac and  the  Desaguadero;  and  maintain  continual  jealousies 
between  them  and  Elespuru. 

89  Odriozola,  Documentos  Histdricos  del  Perti,  X,  130. 

»o  Larned  to  Van  Buren,  June  24,  1830,  No.  25:  MSS.  State  Department 

91  President  and  vice  president  respectively. 


126       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

"  Proceed  in  the  fullest  harmony  with  General  Santa  Cruz,92 
and  when  you  note  that  he  is  becoming  uneasy  about  his  fate, 
because  of  what  he  may  learn  from  talebearers,  inform  him  that 
I  intend  to  give  the  dukedom  of  Bolivia  to  Sucre,  and  that  he 
may  rely  on  my  word  of  honor  to  award  him  the  dukedom  of 
Lima,  by  which  means  I  shall  punish  Gamarra  for  his  past  un- 
faithfulness. Much  care  with  O'Higgins.93  Have  him  main- 
tain discord  in  Chile  so  that  I  may  be  compelled  finally  to  in- 
tervene in  that  country  in  his  behalf  with  the  forces  of  Peru. 
Do  not  extend  your  activities  to  Buenos  Aires,  for  I  have  my 
spies  and  agents  there.  .  .  .  See  that  the  squadron  is  well  sup- 
plied. Let  it  be  your  principal  care  to  disarm  the  Peruvian 
forces,  whether  they  be  civil,  veteran,  or  naval.  .  .  .  You  un- 
derstand the  necessity  for  putting  men  devoted  to  me  in  the 
public  offices ;  so  you  must  intervene  in  the  government  in  their 
behalf. 

"  I  do  not  need  to  warn  you  to  prevent  those  who  are  not 
good  Colombians  from  getting  into  positions  of  influence  with 
Gamarra  and  La  Fuente;  for  they  might  bring  these  function- 
aries to  realize  their  political  situation;  and  in  truth,  if  the 
cabinet  should  suffer  a  change  in  views  or  there  should  occur 
a  change  of  government,  everything  would  be  lost.  And  what 
then  would  be  our  lot  ?  .  .  .  Let  it  always  be  understood  that 
I  am  already  old  and  worn  out,  and  that  I  shall  not,  accord- 
ingly, live  to  see  my  plans  put  into  effect ;  that  I  am  not  pro- 
moting the  scheme  for  selfish  motives  but  for  the  consolidation 
of  America;  that  on  this  supposition  the  most  worthy  of  the 
dukes  of  the  empire  will  succeed  me."  94 

Bolivar  was  now  ill  and  discouraged.  The  constituent  as- 
sembly which  he  had  summoned  met  in  January,  1830,  and 
attempted  to  forestall  the  rapidly  approaching  dissolution 
of  the  republic.  But  all  efforts  proved  to  be  useless.  With- 

»2  President  of  Bolivia. 

»3  O'Higgins  was  still  an  exile  in  Peru. 

»*  Lamed  to  Van  Buren,  June  24,  1830,  No.  25,  MSS.  State  Department. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS          127 

out  further  delay  Venezuela  seceded  from  the  union,  and  the 
departments  of  <the  central  and  southern  portions  of  the  re- 
public were  ready  to  establish  independent  states  as  soon  as 
Bolivar  should  relinquish  the  supreme  authority.  This  he  did 
in  March.  The  congress  made  one  more  ineffectual  effort  to 
conciliate  the  disaffected  departments  and  then  the  end  quickly 
came.  In  May,  Bolivar  left  Bogota  for  the  coast  with  the  in- 
tention of  embarking  for  Europe,  where  he  hoped  to  spend  his 
remaining  days  in  peace.  This  aim  was  unfortunately  not  to 
be  realized.  Persuaded  by  his  friends  to  await  the  outcome  of 
their  last  efforts  to  maintain  the  unity  of  the  Colombian  repub- 
lic,95 the  Liberator's  health  continued  to  decline.  In  a  procla- 
mation which  he  addressed  to  the  Colombian  people  shortly 
before  his  death,  he  declared  that  he  aspired  to  no  other  glory 
than  the  unity  of  Colombia;  and  that  if  his  death  might  con- 
tribute to  the  cessation  of  party  strife  and  to  the  consolidation 
of  the  union  he  would  descend  in  peace  to  the  grave.  On  De- 
cember 17,  1830,  he  died,  under  the  roof  of  a  Spaniard  to  whose 
villa  near  Santa  Marta  he  had  retired  a  few  days  before  in  the 
hope  that  the  air  of  the  country  would  restore  his  waning 
strength. 

Viewing  Bolivar's  political  career  as  a  whole,  taking  into 
consideration  his  public  acts  and  utterances  as  well  as  his  secret 
dealings  with  Great  Britain  and  France,  it  seems  futile  to  try 
to  determine  whether  or  not  he  was  at  heart  monarchist  or  re- 
publican. Of  his  Americanism  there  is  no  doubt.  His  great 
aim  was  to  organize  into  a  strongly  centralized  and  effective 
government  the  vast  territory  which  he  had  liberated.  He 
would  have  preferred  to  accomplish  this  under  the  Bolivian 
constitution  with  himself  as  life  president.  Failing  that  he 
would  have  accepted  possibly,  in  order  to  save  his  country  from 
ruin,  a  monarchy  under  British  protection  with  a  British  or 
French  prince  on  the  throne.  But  he  insisted  always  upon  the 
severing  absolutely  of  all  political  connections  with  Spain,  and 

»5  Gil  Fortoul,  Historic,  Constitutional  de  Venezuela,  I,  496. 


128       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

he  never,  even  in  his  moments  of  greatest  discouragement,  con- 
templated submission  to  the  Holy  Alliance.  He  believed  the 
protection  of  Great  Britain  to  be  essential  to  the  independence 
of  the  new  states  and  his  manifest  willingness  to  accept  British 
cooperation  in  the  establishment  of  stable  governments  was  con- 
sistent with  that  belief.  To  his  national  aims  and  to  his 
conception  of  the  international  situation  he  was  loyal  rather 
than  to  any  less  clearly  defined  and  less  fundamental  principle 
of  interior  governmental  organization. 

In  conclusion  a  word  must  be  said  as  to  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  toward  the  question  of  monarchy.  Although 
the  general  sentiment  of  the  country  naturally  favored  the  estab- 
lishment of  republican  institutions  throughout  the  continent, 
yet  the  government  at  Washington,  in  accordance  with  the 
national  policy  of  nonintervention  and  neutrality,  refrained 
from  all  interference.  Though  the  mission  which  was  sent  to 
Buenos  Aires  in  1818  arrived  there  at  a  time  when  monarchistic 
plotting  was  at  its  height,  the  commissioners,  however  much 
their  personal  predilections  might  have  prompted  them  to  in- 
termeddle, limited  themselves  to  the  most  formal  expressions  in 
behalf  of  the  republican  system.  Later,  when  recognition  was 
extended  to  some  of  the  new  states,  the  question  of  independence 
alone  was  considered  —  monarchies  and  republics  alike  being 
recognized.  The  minister  of  the  empire  of  Mexico  was  received 
in  1822  and  some  two  years  later  the  Brazilian  monarchy  was 
recognized.  When  recognition  of  the  latter  was  under  consid- 
eration in  the  cabinet,  some  interesting  discussion  took  place. 
Wirt  thought  that  immediate  recognition  of  Brazil  would  be 
represented  as  favoring  the  Holy  Alliance  and  monarchies  gen- 
erally ;  and  alluded  to  General  Jackson's  refusal  of  the  mission 
to  Mexico  when  Iturbide  was  emperor,  and  to  his  assigning,  as 
his  reason  for  the  refusal,  that  he  would  give  no  counsel  to  that 
usurpation.  Calhoun  maintained  that  the  established  policy 
of  the  country  in  relation  to  the  new  states  had  been  to  look  only 
to  the  question  of  independence  and  invariably  to  recognize  the 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS         129 

government  de  facto;  that  to  decline  to  recognize  the  empire  of 
Brazil  because  it  was  monarchical  would  be  a  departure  from 
the  policy  hitherto  observed  and  would  introduce  a  new  prin- 
ciple of  interference  in  the  internal  government  of  foreign  na- 
tions.96 This,  of  course,  was  the  view  that  prevailed. 

Afterward,  during  the  administration  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  it 
appears  that  the  monarchical  schemes  in  some  parts  of  Spanish 
America,  rumors  of  which  reached  Washington,  gave  the  gov- 
ernment so  much  concern  that  it  came  near  to  departing  from 
the  policy  of  non-interference.  This  was  especially  true  in  the 
case  of  the  alleged  monarchical  designs  of  Bolivar.  Secretary 
of  State  Clay,  once  his  profound  admirer,  wrote  the  Liberator 
adjuring  him  not  to  abandon  the  cause  of  liberty.  In  Novem- 
ber, 1827,  Bolivar  had  taken  advantage  of  the  departure  of 
Colonel  Watts,  charge  d'affaires  of  the  United  States  at  Bogota, 
to  send  Clay  a  polite  letter,  expressing  admiration  for  the  secre- 
tary's "  brilliant  talents  and  ardent  love  of  liberty  "  and  grati- 
tude for  the  "  incomparable  services  "  which  he  had  rendered 
the  cause  of  the  Patriots.  Nearly  a  year  later  Clay  replied  in 
a  not  too  cordial  manner.  "  I  am  persuaded,"  he  said,  "  that 
I  do  not  misinterpret  the  feelings  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  as  I  certainly  express  my  own,  in  saying  .that  the  in- 
terest which  was  inspired  in  this  country  by  the  arduous  strug- 
gles of  South  America,  arose  principally  from  the  hope  that, 
along  with  its  independence,  would  be  established  free  institu- 
tions, insuring  all  the  blessings  of  civil  liberty.  To  the  accom- 
plishment of  that  object  we  still  anxiously  look."  Continuing, 
Clay  admitted  the  difficulties  which  opposed  the  achievement 
of  this  end,  but  notwithstanding  those  difficulties  the  people 
of  the  United  States,  he  said,  cherished  the  hope  that  Providence 
would  bless  South  America,  as  he  had  her  northern  sister,  with 
the  genius  of  some  great  and  virtuous  man,  to  conduct  her  se- 
curely through  all  her  trials.  "  We  had  even  flattered  our- 
selves," he  said,  "  that  we  beheld  that  genius  in  your  Excel- 
so  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  281. 


130       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

lencj.  But  I  should  be  unworthy  of  the  consideration  with 
which  your  Excellency  honors  me  and  deviate  from  the  frank- 
ness which  I  have  ever  endeavored  to  practice,  if  I  did  not  on 
this  occasion  state  that  ambiguous  designs  have  been  attributed 
by  your  enemies  to  your  Excellency,  which  have  created  in  my 
mind  great  solicitude."  Declaring  that  he  could  not  allow 
himself  to  believe  that  Bolivar  would  abandon  the  "  bright 
and  glorious  path  "  for  the  "  bloody  road  passing  over  the 
liberties  of  the  human  race,"  Clay  continued  as  follows:  "  I 
will  not  doubt  that  your  Excellency  will,  in  due  time,  render 
a  satisfactory  explanation  to  Colombia  and  the  world  of  the 
parts  of  your  public  conduct  which  have  excited  any  distrust ; 
and  that  preferring  the  true  glory  of  our  immortal  Washington 
to  the  ignoble  fame  of  the  destroyers  of  liberty,  you  have  formed 
the  patriotic  resolution  of  ultimately  placing  the  freedom  of 
Colombia  upon  a  firm  and  sure  foundation."  97 

About  the  time  Clay's  letter  was  dispatched  to  Bolivar,  Wil- 
liam Henry  Harrison  started  on  what  proved  to  be  an  ill-fated 
mission  to  Colombia.  The  story  of  Harrison's  brief  diplomatic 
experience  in  Colombia  has  only  recently  been  fully  related,  in 
a  study  by  a  Venezuelan  writer.98  It  constitutes  an  interest- 
ing episode  in  the  foreign  relations  of  America,  involving  as  it 
does  the  Liberator  of  half  a  continent  and  a  future  President 
of  the  United  States.  Harrison's  "  thirst  for  lucrative  office," 
according  to  Adams,  was  "  absolutely  rabid."  He  had  been 
"  as  hot  in  pursuit "  of  the  office  of  vice  president,  major  gen- 
eral of  the  army,  and  minister  to  Colombia  "  as  a  hound  on  the 
scent  of  a  hare."  Adams  was  opposed  to  sending  Harrison  on 
a  diplomatic  mission  to  Colombia,  but  at  last  acquiesced,  as  all 
the  other  members  of  the  administration  favored  his  appoint- 
ment. The  next  year  the  Adams  administration  went  out  of 
office,  and  complaints  having  been  made  by  Colombia  against 
Harrison,  he  was  promptly  recalled  by  the  new  administration. 

»7  Colton,  The  Works  of  Henry  Clay,  I,  267. 

88  Rivas,  A.  C.,  Enaayoa  de  Historia  Politico,  y  Diplom&tica. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS          131 

On  the  occasion  of  a  visit  of  the  returned  minister,  Adams  re- 
corded in  his  journal  a  succinct  account  of  what  had  happened. 
After  reviewing  the  political  situation  in  Colombia  at  the  time 
Harrison  arrived  there,  Adams  declared :  "  He  soon  found 
himself  an  object  of  jealous  observation.  Inattentive  to  the 
admonitions  of  time  and  place,  he  indulged  himself  in  pane- 
gyrics upon  the  freedom  of  speech  and  action  enjoyed  in  the 
United  States.  He  was  immediately  marked  as  an  enemy  of 
the  government  of  Bolivar.  From  that  moment  every  step  he 
took  was  watched,  every  word  he  said  was  caught,  scrutinized, 
and  perverted.  He  was  made  accountable  for  the  loose  talk  of 
his  son  and  of  his  secretary  of  legation,  and  soon  signalized 
as  a  conspirator  against  the  Liberator.  He  visited  the  British 
consul,  and  they  were  both  charged  with  plotting  projects  of 
assassination.  He  dined  with  a  friend,  and  that  friend  was 
cast  into  a  dungeon.  His  own  life  was  not  safe,  and  he  was 
at  last  fortunate  in  getting  safe  out  of  the  country."  After 
he  had  taken  leave  of  the  Colombian  Government  Harrison 
wrote  a  letter  to  Bolivar  to  dissuade  him  from  making  himself 
king  or  dictator.  This  letter,  Harrison  published,  upon  his  re- 
turn in  1830  to  the  United  States,  in  a  pamphlet  which  was 
intended  to  justify  his  conduct  in  Colombia.  Moreover,  Clay's 
instructions  to  the  representatives  of  the  United  States  to  the 
congress  at  Tacubaya,  in  which  the  "  ambitious  projects  and 
views  "  of  Bolivar  were  referred  to,  were  made  public  at  the 
close  of  the  Adams  administration.  All  these  things  taken 
together  must  have  greatly  exasperated  Bolivar.  It  was  re- 
ported, indeed,  that  he  had  written  Lord  Aberdeen  complaining 
that  the  greatest  obstacle  to  the  settlement  of  affairs  in  Colombia 
was  the  government  of  the  United  States.  "  But,"  Adams  la- 
conically remarks,  "  I  doubt  this."  " 

Harrison  was  succeeded  as  minister  to  Colombia  by  Thomas 
Patrick  Moore.  In  the  summer  of  1829  he  was  instructed  by 
Van  Buren,  the  new  Secretary  of  State,  to  place  the  matter  of 

9»  Adams,  Memoirs,  VIII,  211. 


132       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  Tacubaya  instructions,  which  had  just  been  made  public, 
before  the  Colombian  Government  on  its  true  ground.     It  was 
the  undoubted  right  of  the  late  President,  said  Van  Buren, 
to  form  such  opinions  as  to  the  conduct  and  views  of  the  public 
functionaries  of  other  countries  as  he  might  deem  just,  and  to 
give  them  such  publicity  as  might  comport  with  his  views  of 
propriety;  but  the  disposition  of  the  Colombian  Government 
toward  the  United  States  "  should  not  take  its  character  from 
sentiments  which  have  been  expressed  by  those  whom  the  peo- 
ple of  these  states,  in  the  exercise  of  their  sovereign  power,  have 
divested  of  executive  authority."  10°     Continuing,  he  declared 
that   events  in   Colombia  had  undoubtedly   produced   in   the 
minds  of  the  friends  of  liberty  occasional  and  painful  appre- 
hensions as  to  the  ultimate  views  of  President  Bolivar.     In  the 
opinion  of  the  administration,  however,  "  he  ought  to  be  con- 
sidered responsible  to  the  cause  of  free  and  liberal  principles 
only  for  the  honest  and  faithful  application  of  the  means  placed 
under  his  control,  and  a  liberal  allowance  should  be  made  for 
the  difficulties  incident  to  all  attempts  to  convert  long  oppressed 
subjects  into  discreet  depositories  of  sovereign  power.     The 
application   of   a   different   rule,"    continue   the   instructions, 
"  would  be  to  make  President  Bolivar  answerable  for  the  op- 
pressions which  have  been  for  a  succession  of  years  heaped  upon 
his  countrymen,  and  to  the  removal  of  which  the  best  portion  of 
his  life  has  been  devoted."  101    These  instructions,  together  with 
Moore's  discreet  conduct,  resulted  in  restoring  the  customary 
cordiality  between  the  two  countries.     In  dispatches  to  the  De- 
partment of  State  during  the  summer  of  1829,  the  new  minis- 
ter succeeded  in  removing  much  of  the  suspicion  which  had 
arisen  as  to  Bolivar's  designs.     Toward  the  end  of  the  year, 
Van  Buren  wrote  again  to  Moore  saying  that  he  had  read  his 

100  in  1832,  Van  Buren  having  been  appointed  minister  to  England  and 
having  arrived  at  his  post,  learned  that  his  nomination  had  been  rejected 
by  the  Senate,  partly  on  the  ground  that  he  had  criticized  and  extenuated 
the  acts  of  a  previous  administration.     Moore,  Digest  Int.  Late,  VII,  787. 

101  Moore,  Digest  Int.  Law,  VII,  788. 


FAILURE  OF  MONARCHICAL  PLOTS         133 

observations  with  profound  interest  and  satisfaction.  "  It 
would  be  superfluous,"  he  said,  "  to  repeat  what  was  said  to  you 
in  general  instructions  as  to  the  policy  of  this  government  re- 
specting intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  other  countries. 
You  are  well  informed  as  to  this  point  and  as  to  the  President's 
determination  to  demand  of  our  public  agents  abroad  the  most 
scrupulous  obedience  to  those  instructions."  102 

102  Van  Buren  to  Moore,  December   12,   1829.     O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XII, 
420. 


CHAPTER  IV 

UNITED    STATES    AND    HISPANIC    AMERICAN    INDEPENDENCE 

THE  relation  of  the  United  States  to  the  Hispanic  American 
struggle  for  independence  is  often  made  a  matter  of  contro- 
versy. An  illustration  of  the  sort  of  discussion  to  which  the 
subject  gives  rise  appeared  some  years  ago  in  the  North  Amer- 
ican Review.  Matias  Romero,  then  Mexican  minister  at  Wash- 
ington, opened  the  debate  with  a  paper  in  which  he  maintained 
that  "  the  United  States  Government  did  not  render  either  ma- 
terial or  moral  assistance  to  the  cause  of  the  independence  of 
the  Spanish  American  colonies."  Among  other  things  he  ad- 
duced in  support  of  his  contention  certain  statements  in  Lymaris 
Diplomacy  of  the  United  States  affirming  that  the  patriot  cause 
did  not  awaken  any  great  general  interest  in  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States;  that  the  government  was  left  free  and  unem- 
barrassed to  pursue  its  steady  course  of  good  faith  and  exact 
neutrality  toward  Spain  and  of  justice  and  policy  toward  the 
colonies;  that  neither  the  vicinity  of  some  portions  of  their 
respective  territories,  nor  the  circumstance  of  being  members  of 
the  same  continent,  nor  the  benefit  to  be  derived  from  com- 
mercial relations,  nor  the  similarity  of  their  struggles  for  inde- 
pendence, appears  in  the  least  to  have  influenced  the  definite 
arrangements  of  the  government;  that  on  the  contrary  the  au- 
thorities at  Washington  conducted  the  business  with  the  utmost 
caution  and  circumspection,  doing  nothing  to  give  offense  to 
Spain,  or  to  awaken  in  other  nations  the  slightest  suspicion  of 
their  loyalty  to  the  system  of  neutrality.1 

In  a  subsequent  article  Senator  Money  of  Mississippi  took 
the  other  side  of  the  question.  He  declared  that  the  view  ex- 

iThe  North  American  Review,  CLXV,  70-86   (July,  1897). 

134 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      135 

pressed  in  Romero's  paper  "  leaves  a  disagreeable  impression  on 
the  mind  of  the  American  citizen,  who  has  always  gloried  in  the 
belief  that  his  government  had  cordially  sympathized  with  any 
people  anywhere  in  their  struggle  for  liberty,  and  especially 
with  those  of  this  continent."  He  maintained  that  in  permit- 
ting the  revolutionists  to  buy  in  our  cities  all  kinds  of  supplies 
not  contraband  of  war;  that  in  expressing  interest  and  sym- 
pathy for  them  in  Congress,  in  the  public  press,  and  through 
other  channels  of  publicity;  that  in  recognizing  them  before 
other  nations  had  done  so ;  and  that  in  arresting  the  movement 
designed  by  the  Holy  Alliance  to  reduce  them  again  to  subjec- 
tion to  Ferdinand,  the  government  and  people  of  the  United 
States  undoubtedly  rendered  their  cause  both  material  and 
moral  assistance.2 

The  discussion,  as  may  be  readily  perceived,  hinges  upon  the 
definition  of  the  terms  "  material  and  moral  assistance."  The 
disputants  did  not  reach  an  accord  on  this  point.  Had  "  ma- 
terial assistance  "  been  defined  as  substantial  military  and  naval 
support  such  as  that  given  by  France  to  the  Thirteen  Colonies, 
this  phase  of  the  question  would  have  been  eliminated  at  once ; 
for  the  United  States  formed  no  alliance  with  the  Spanish  pos- 
sessions against  the  mother  country.  Had  it  been  defined  as 
such  support  given  in  violation  of  professed  neutrality,  then 
the  problem  would  have  been  to  determine  its  extent  and  im- 
portance; that  is,  whether  or  not  it  were  material  in  the  sense 
of  affecting  the  outcome  of  the  struggle.  It  is  evident  that 
assistance  afforded  by  supplies,  openly  purchased  in  the  mar- 
kets of  the  United  States  and  equally  accessible  to  both  parties 
to  the  contest  need  not  be  considered.  Had  "  moral  assistance  " 
been  defined  as  encouragement  derived  from  the  example  and 
from  the  interest  and  sympathy  of  a  neighboring  people;  the 
advantages  flowing  from  the  recognition  of  belligerency  and  of 
independence ;  in  short,  as  every  aid  or  support  not  originating 
in  the  violation  of  or  departure  from  neutrality,  then  this  phase 

2 Hid.,  356-363  (September,  1897). 


136       PAN-AMEEICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

of  the  subject  would  have  been  greatly  simplified.  It  would 
have  become  a  matter  of  weighing  the  effect  of  certain  undis- 
puted facts  upon  the  fortunes  of  the  insurgent  cause. 

If  the  writers  in  the  North  American  Review  had  placed 
some  such  limitation  on  the  discussion,  they  would  have  arrived, 
doubtless,  at  substantial  agreement.  But  in  their  case  the  fail- 
ure to  agree  was  due  in  part  to  another  cause;  namely,  the 
confusion  of  government  and  people.  Romero's  proposition 
referred  to  the  government  of  the  United  States.  Money  speaks 
of  the  government  and  people,  or  of  one  or  the  other,  indiffer- 
ently. This  divergence  of  view  on  the  part  of  men  exception- 
ally well  qualified  to  analyze  the  subject  and  to  draw  just  con- 
clusions from  it  but  demonstrates  the  necessity  for  a  careful 
review  of  the  whole  matter.  Such  is  the  purpose  of  the  present 
chapter.  As  to  whether,  or  to  what  extent,  the  patriots  de- 
rived material  or  moral  assistance  from  their  relations  with  the 
United  States  the  reader  may  be  safely  left  to  draw  his  own 
conclusions. 

The  United  States  maintained  a  neutral  policy  in  the  con- 
flict between  Spain  and  her  colonies.  This  was  in  harmony 
with  an  already  well-established  tradition.  At  the  beginning 
of  its  independent  existence,  the  nation  adopted  a  distinctive 
foreign  policy,  the  first  and  foremost  principle  of  which  was 
nonintervention.  By  this  was  meant  not  only  noninterference 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  other  nations,  but  also  nonparticipation 
in  the  political  arrangements  between  other  governments  and 
especially  those  of  Europe.  The  system  of  neutrality  was  a 
logical  derivative  of  this  principle.  The  first  occasion  for  its 
application  was  the  war  which  broke  out  in  1793  between 
France  on  one  side  and  Great  Britain  and  her  European  allies 
on  the  other.  In  his  famous  proclamation,  issued  on  April  22, 
1793,  Washington  declared  that  "  the  duty  and  interest  of  the 
United  States  require  that  they  should  with  sincerity  and  good 
faith  adopt  and  pursue  a  conduct  friendly  and  impartial  toward 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      13T 

the  belligerent  powers."  Warning  the  citizens  against  "  aiding 
or  ahetting  hostilities  against  any  of  the  said  powers,"  he  made 
known  to  them  that  prosecutions  would  be  instituted  against  all 
persons  violating  the  law  of  nations  with  respect  to  the  powers 
at  war. 

At  about  the  time  this  proclamation  was  issued  the  French 
minister,  Genet,  arrived  in  the  United  States  and  began  fitting 
out  and  commissioning  privateers  and  inciting  the  people  to 
hostility  to  Great  Britain.  As  is  well  known,  this  conduct  led 
to  his  recall.  In  the  correspondence  growing  out  of  the  inci- 
dent, Jefferson,  >as  Secretary  of  State,  set  forth  with  clearness 
and  force  the  principles  of  neutrality.  Its  bases  he  found  in 
the  exclusive  sovereignty  of  the  nation  within  its  own  territory 
and  in  the  obligation  of  impartiality  toward  belligerents.3  Not 
only  did  the  administration  enunciate  principles,  but  it  adopted 
measures  to  make  them  effective.  To  assist  the  judgment  of 
officers  on  this  head,  Hamilton  prepared  a  set  of  "  Instructions 
to  the  Collectors  of  the  Customs  "  which  he  directed  to  "be 
executed  with  the  greatest  vigilance,  care,  activity,  and  impar- 
tiality." 4  And  on  June  5,  1794,  these  principles  and  rules 
were  embodied  in  the  first  neutrality  law  ever  enacted  by  any 
nation.  This  act  "  forbade  within  the  United  States  the  accept- 
ance and  exercise  of  commissions,  the  enlistment  of  men,  the 
fitting  out  and  arming  of  vessels,  and  the  setting  on  foot  of 
military  expeditions  in  the  service  of  any  prince  or  state  with 
which  the  government  was  -at  peace."  5  The  law  was  limited 
in  duration  to  two  years,  but  was  later  reenacted  with  some 
changes  and  continued  in  force  indefinitely.6  Having  brought 
the  nation  safely  through  these  first  years  of  trial,  Washington 
gave  the  policy  of  nonintervention  and  neutrality  a  sort  of 
sanctity  for  succeeding  generations  of  American  statesmen  by 
the  following  words  of  counsel  in  his  farewell  address : 

3  Moore,  The  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  45. 

*  Hamilton,  J.  C.,  Works  of  Alexander  Hamilton,  III,  576. 

s  Moore,  The  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  46. 

«  Bemis,  American  Neutrality,  52. 


138       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

"  The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard  to  foreign  na- 
tions," he  said,  "  is,  in  extending  our  commercial  relations,  to 
have  with  them  as  little  political  connection  as  possible.  .  .  . 
Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none 
or  a  very  remote  relation.  Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  fre- 
quent controversies,  the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign 
to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to 
implicate  ourselves  by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes 
of  her  politics  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of 
her  friendships  or  enmities.  Our  detached  and  distant  situa- 
tion invites  and  enables  us  to  pursue  a  different  course.  If  we 
remain  one  people,  under  an  efficient  government,  the  period 
is  not  far  distant  when  we  may  defy  material  injury  from 
external  annoyance ;  when  we  may  take  such  an  attitude  as  will 
cause  the  neutrality  we  may  at  any  time  resolve  upon  to  be 
scrupulously  respected;  when  belligerent  nations,  under  the 
impossibility  of  making  acquisitions  upon  us,  will  not  lightly 
hazard  the  giving  us  provocation;  when  we  may  choose  peace 
or  war,  as  our  interest,  guided  by  justice,  shall  counsel.  Why 
forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situation?  Why  quit 
our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign  ground  ?  Why,  by  interweaving 
our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe,  entangle  our  peace 
and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of  European  ambition,  rivalship, 
interest,  humor,  or  caprice  ?  "  7 

Under  increasingly  trying  circumstances  this  policy  was  main- 
tained by  John  Adams.  It  was  during  his  administration  that 
a  new  factor  arose  to  complicate  the  situation ;  namely,  the  re- 
volt, actual  or  threatened,  of  the  American  colonies  of  France 
and  Spain.  The  efforts  of  Miranda  to  obtain  the  support  of 
the  United  States  in  carrying  out  his  schemes  for  revolutioniz- 
ing South  America  have  been  noted  elsewhere.  Although  his 
plans  met  with  more  or  less  favor  in  the  eyes  of  Hamilton  and 
some  of  his  prominent  contemporaries,  yet  they  were  never 
countenanced  by  the  government.  In  connection  with  Santo 

f  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  I,  222. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      139 

Domingo,  however,  there  occurred  during  Adams's  adminis- 
tration an  incident  which  threatened  to  swerve  the  nation  from 
its  neutral  course. 

As  a  result  of  the  serious  difficulties  between  France  and  the 
United  States,  Congress  passed  the  Act  of  June  13,  1798,  sus- 
pending commercial  relations  with  France  and  her  dependencies. 
This  act  threatened  to  create  distress  in  the  French  part  of  the 
island  of  Santo  Domingo,  where  the  revolted  inhabitants  had 
been  receiving  many  of  their  supplies  from  the  United  States. 
Here  Toussaint  L'Ouverture  held  sway  nominally  as  comman- 
der in  chief  under  the  French,  but  in  reality  as  an  independent 
ruler.  Acting  on  the  suggestion  of  the  American  consul  he  sent 
an  agent  to  the  United  States  with  a  letter  to  the  President  con- 
taining the  assurance  that  if  commercial  intercourse  were  re- 
newed between  the  United  States  and  Santo  Domingo,  it  would 
be  protected  by  every  means  in  his  power.  In  consequence  the 
President  obtained  from  Congress  a  new  act,  approved  February 
9,  1799,  which  was  intended  to  meet  the  situation.  He  also 
sent  Dr.  Edward  Stevens,  a  friend  of  Hamilton's,  to  Santo 
Domingo  with  the  title  of  consul  general  and  with  diplomatic 
powers.  The  British  ministry  dispatched  General  Haitian d  to 
the  island  with  orders  to  go  first  to  Philadelphia  and  arrange 
with  the  government  of  the  United  States  a  general  policy  with 
regard  to  Toussaint.  Negotiations  followed,  which  resulted  on 
June  13  in  a  secret  treaty  between  Toussaint  and  Maitland,  by 
the  terms  of  which  the  former  agreed  to  abandon  all  privateering 
and  shipping,  receiving  in  return  free  access  to  those  supplies 
from  the  United  States  which  were  required  to  meet  the  de- 
mands of  his  people. 

Stevens  was  not  openly  a  party  to  this  treaty ;  but  Toussaint 
believed  him  to  be  the  real  negotiator  and  his  influence,  no 
doubt,  was  paramount.  Under  the  agreement  supplies  of  every 
kind  reached  the  island,  and  Toussaint  was  enabled  to  con- 
tinue the  struggle  for  independence.  He  began  the  siege  of 
Jacmel,  for  which  he  could  not  bring  the  necessary  supplies 


140       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

and  materials  by  land.  The  seizure  by  English  cruisers  of  a 
flotilla  which,  after  his  promise  to  abandon  shipping,  was  bring- 
ing his  munitions  of  war  along  the  coast  for  the  siege,  made 
Toussaint  fear  for  the  result  of  his  enterprise.  Writing  once 
more  to  the  President,  he  requested  him  to  send  some  frigates 
to  enforce  the  treaty  by  putting  an  end  to  all  trade  with  the 
island  except  such  as  the  treaty  permitted.  The  request  was 
granted  and  the  frigate  General  Greene  was  sent  to  cruise  off 
Jacmel  in  February  and  March,  1800.  Later,  other  vessels 
were  sent.  The  French  garrison  was  starved  out  and  Jacmel 
was  abandoned. 

When  Jefferson  became  President,  the  situation  changed. 
The  treaty  of  Morfontaine,  negotiated  in  the  latter  part  of 
Adams's  administration  and  ratified  by  the  Senate  in  the  first 
year  of  Jefferson's,  restored  relations  between  France  and  the 
United  States.  Santo  Domingo  was  henceforth  to  be  treated 
as  a  French  colony  and  the  negro  chief  to  be  left  to  his  fate.8 

The  treaty  with  Toussaint  can  be  explained  only  in  the  light 
of  the  maritime  warfare  then  existing  between  France  and  the 
United  States.  It  by  no  means  signified  an  abandonment  of 
the  policy  of  neutrality.  Hamilton,  in  spite  of  his  predilec- 
tions, wrote  Pickering  that  the  United  States  must  not  be  com- 
mitted on  the  independence  of  Santo  Domingo ;  that  it  must  give 
no  guaranty,  make  no  formal  treaty,  do  nothing  that  could  rise 
up  in  judgment.  "  It  will  be  enough,"  he  said,  "  to  let  Tous- 
saint be  assured  verbally,  but  explicitly,  that  upon  his  declara- 
tion of  independence,  a  commercial  intercourse  will  be  opened, 
and  continue  while  he  maintains  it,  and  gives  due  protection  to 
our  vessels  and  property." 9  A  few  weeks  later,  Adams, 
writing  from  Quincy  on  the  proposed  participation  of  the  United 
States  in  a  project  of  the  British  ministry  for  liberating  Santo 
Domingo,  raised  the  question  as  to  whether  it  would  not  involve 

8  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  I,  383-389. 

»  February  9,  1799,  Hamilton,  J.  C.,  The  Works  of  Alexander  Hamilton, 
VI,  395. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      141 

the  nation  in  a  more  inveterate  and  durable  hostility  with 
France,  Spain,  and  Holland,  and  subject  it  more  to  the  policy 
of  Britain  than  would  be  consistent  with  its  interest  and  honor. 
And  he  concluded  that  "  it  would  be  most  prudent  for  us  to  have 
nothing  to  do  in  the  business."  10  Sixteen  years  later  he  re- 
verted to  the  subject.  Speaking  of  Jefferson's  "  reign,"  he  said 
that  he  had  expected  it  to  be  very  nearly  what  it  had  been. 
"  I  regretted  it,"  he  said,  "  but  could  not  help  it.  At  the  same 
time  I  thought  it  would  be  better  than  following  the  fools  who 
were  intriguing  to  plunge  us  into  an  alliance  with  England,  an 
endless  war  with  all  the  rest  of  the  world  and  wild  expeditions 
to  South  America  and  Santo  Domingo."  n 

The  overthrow  of  the  Spanish  Bourbons  by  the  Emperor  Na- 
poleon in  the  spring  of  1808  aroused  anew  the  interest  of  the 
United  States  in  the  fate  of  Spain's  American  colonies.  In 
October  of  that  year,  after  news  had  reached  America  of  the 
resistance  of  the  Spanish  patriots  and  of  their  victories  over 
the  French  invaders,  the  subject  was  discussed  in  the  cabinet 
and  Jefferson  recorded  the  result  in  his  memoranda  as  follows : 
"  Unanimously  agreed  in  the  sentiments  which  should  be  un- 
authoritatively  expressed  by  our  agents  to  influential  persons 
in  Cuba  and  Mexico ;  to  wit :  *  If  you  remain  under  the  do- 
minion of  the  kingdom  and  family  of  Spain,  we  are  contented ; 
but  we  should  be  extremely  unwilling  to  see  you  pass  under  the 
dominion  or  ascendancy  of  France  or  England.  In  the  latter 
case,  should  you  choose  to  declare  independence,  we  cannot  com- 
mit ourselves  by  saying  we  would  make  common  cause  with 
you,  but  must  reserve  ourselves  to  act  according  to  the  then 
existing  circumstances;  but  in  our  proceedings  we  shall  be 
influenced  by  friendship  for  you,  by  a  firm  feeling  that  our 
interests  are  intimately  connected,  and  by  the  strongest  repug- 
nance to  see  you  under  subordination  to  either  France  or  Eng- 
land either  politically  or  commercially.'  " 

10  Adams  to  Pickering,  April  17,  1799,  Life  and  Works,  VIII,  634. 

11  Adams  to  James  Lloyd,  April  5,  1815,  Life  and  Works,  X,  155. 


142       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Writing  a  few  days  later  to  Governor  Claiborne  of  Louisiana, 
Jefferson  said :  "  The  truth  is  that  the  patriots  of  Spain  have 
no  warmer  friends  than  the  administration  of  the  United  States, 
but  it  is  our  duty  to  say  nothing  and  to  do  nothing  for  or  against 
either."  Repeating  what  he  had  written  in  his  memoranda 
about  Mexico  and  Cuba,  he  added :  "  We  consider  their  inter- 
ests and  ours  as  the  same,  and  that  the  object  of  both  must  be 
to  exclude  all  European  influence  from  this  hemisphere."  12 

It  was  not  until  two  years  afterward  that  occasion  arose  for 
a  more  definite  consideration  of  the  matter.  When  news 
reached  Washington  of  the  important  events  taking  place  at 
Caracas,  Buenos  Aires,  and  elsewhere  in  the  Spanish  colonies, 
President  Madison  hastened  to  appoint  agents  to  visit  the  prin- 
cipal centers  of  disturbance.  One  of  these  agents,  Joel  Roberts 
Poinsett,  destined  to  play  for  many  years  an  active  and  effective 
part  in  international  American  affairs,  was  appointed  to  Buenos 
Aires.  His  instructions,  dated  June  28,  1810,  contain,  it  may 
be  presumed,  an  exposition  of  the  policy  which  the  government 
proposed  to  follow  in  the  impending  struggle. 

"  As  a  crisis  is  approaching,"  ran  the  instructions,  "  which 
must  produce  great  changes  in  the  situation  of  Spanish  Amer- 
ica, and  may  dissolve  altogether  its  colonial  relations  to  Europe, 
and  as  the  geographical  position  of  the  United  States  and  other 
obvious  considerations  give  them  an  intimate  interest  in  what- 
ever may  affect  the  destiny  of  that  part  of  the  American  con- 
tinent, it  is  our  duty  to  turn  our  attention  to  this  important  sub- 
ject, and  to  take  such  steps  not  incompatible  with  the  neutral 
character  and  honest  policy  of  the  United  States  as  the  occasion 
renders  proper.  With  this  view  you  have  been  selected  to 
proceed  without  delay  to  Buenos  Aires,  and  thence,  if  con- 
venient, to  Lima  in  Peru  or  Santiago  in  Chile  or  both.  You 
will  make  it  your  object,  whenever  it  may  be  proper,  to  diffuse 
the  impression  that  the  United  States  cherish  the  sincerest 
good  will  toward  the  people  of  South  America  as  neighbors, 

12  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  340-342. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      143 

as  belonging  to  the  same  portion  of  the  globe,  and  as  having 
a  mutual  interest  in  cultivating  friendly  intercourse;  that  this 
disposition  will  exist  whatever  may  be  their  internal  system 
or  European  relations,  with  respect  to  which  no  interference 
of  any  sort  is  pretended;  and  that  in  the  event  of  a  political 
separation  from  the  parent  country  and  of  the  establishment 
of  an  independent  system  of  national  government,  it  will  co- 
incide with  the  sentiments  and  policy  of  the  United  States  to 
promote  the  most  friendly  relations  and  the  most  liberal  inter- 
course between  the  inhabitants  of  this  hemisphere,  as  having 
all  a  common  interest,  and  as  lying  under  a  common  obligation 
to  maintain  that  system  of  peace,  justice,  and  good  will  which 
is  the  source  of  happiness  for  nations. 

"  Whilst  you  inculcate  these  as  the  principles  and  disposi- 
tions of  the  United  States,  it  will  be  no  less  proper  to  ascertain 
those  on  the  other  side,  not  only  toward  the  United  States,  but 
in  reference  to  the  great  nations  of  Europe,  as  also  to  that  of 
Brazil  and  the  Spanish  branches  of  the  government  there ;  and 
to  the  commercial  and  other  connections  with  them  respectively, 
and  generally  to  inquire  into  the  state,  the  characteristics,  in- 
telligence, and  wealth  of  the  several  parties,  the  amount  of  the 
population,  the  extent  and  organization  of  the  military  force, 
and  the  pecuniary  resources  of  the  country. 

"  The  real  as  well  as  ostensible  object  of  your  mission  is  to 
explain  the  mutual  advantages  of  a  commerce  with  the  United 
States,  to  promote  liberal  and  stable  regulations,  and  to  transmit 
seasonable  information  on  the  subject."  13 

Poinsett  exceeded  his  instructions  and  became  an  enthusiastic 
collaborator  in  the  propagation  of  revolutionary  ideas.  The 
Chilean  historian,  Barros  Arana,14  describes  him  as  alert,  ener- 
getic, intelligent,  and  profoundly  democratic  and  liberal  in  his 
views.  At  Buenos  Aires  he  appointed  William  Gilchrist  as 
vice  consul  and  proceeded  to  Chile,  where  he  arrived  in  Decem- 

is  Paxson,  The  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics,  107-109. 
i*  Barros  Arana,  Historic  Jeneral  de  Chile,  VIII,  564, 


144       PAN-AMEEICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

ber,  1811.  His  arrival  in  Chile  gave  great  satisfaction  to  the 
Patriots.  He  was  received  by  the  revolutionary  junta  with 
grand  ceremony,  as  though  he  were  a  public  minister  accredited 
to  a  sovereign  nation.  The  president,  Jose  Miguel  Carrera, 
welcomed  him  in  a  speech  filled  with  the  warmest  expressions 
of  friendship  for  the  United  States.  Poinsett  spoke  briefly  in 
Spanish,  explaining  the  object  of  his  visit  and  manifesting  a 
spirit  of  international  confraternity  which  greatly  raised  the 
hopes  of  the  Chilean  revolutionists.  "  The  Americans  of  the 
North,"  said  Poinsett,  "  view  with  the  greatest  interest  the 
events  taking  place  in  these  countries  and  they  ardently  desire 
the  prosperity  and  happiness  of  their  brothers  of  the  South. 
I  shall  be  pleased  to  inform  the  government  of  the  United  States 
of  the  friendly  sentiments  of  your  Excellency  and  I  am  happy 
to  be  the  first  to  have  the  honor  of  establishing  relations  between 
two  generous  nations  which  should  be  united  as  friends  and 
natural  allies."  15  Everything  appeared  to  justify  the  high  ex- 
pectations of  the  Chileans.  Poinsett  became  an  active  propa- 
gandist. The  government  looked  to  him  for  counsel,  and  on 
every  hand  he  left  it  to  be  understood  from  his  conversations 
that  the  government  and  people  of  the  United  States  had  the 
liveliest  interest  in  the  triumph  of  the  revolution.  He  gave  the 
impression  that  military  supplies  were  to  be  easily  obtained  in 
the  United  States  and  he  gave  the  names  and  addresses  of  manu- 
facturers and  merchants  who  could  furnish  them. 

Chile  was  soon  to  be  disillusioned.  The  War  of  1812  came 
on  and  distracted  the  attention  of  the  United  States  from  the 
events  occurring  in  the  southern  continent.  Moreover,  the  revo- 
lution in  Chile  received  a  backset  as  the  result  of  civil  strife 
which  was  followed  by  the  temporary  ascendancy  of  the  Penin- 
sular authorities.  Poinsett,  desiring  to  take  part  in  the  war  in 
which  his  own  country  was  engaged,  made  his  way  back  to  the 
United  States,  but  arrived  after  peace  had  been  declared.  His 
unneutral  activities  in  Chile  apparently  passed  unnoticed  and 

d.,  566 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      145 

he  continued  to  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  administration. 

Another  of  these  early  agents  was  Robert  K.  Lowry.  He 
was  dispatched  to  Venezuela,  and,  as  he  arrived  at  his  post  ahead 
of  Poinsett,  he  hears  the  distinction  of  being  the  first  represen- 
tative of  the  United  States  in  any  of  the  revolted  colonies.  His 
conduct  was  more  discreet  than  that  of  his  colleague  in  Chile, 
though  he  maintained  friendly  relations  with  the  revolutionists, 
and,  it  appears,  gave  the  leaders  counsel  in  their  first  essays  at 
political  organization.  He  remained  in  Venezuela  throughout 
the  period  of  revolution,  was  United  States  consul  at  La  Guayra 
after  the  new  states  were  recognized,  and  later  engaged  in  busi- 
ness enterprises  in  Venezuela  until  his  death  some  years  later. 

In  his  annual  message  of  November  5,  1811,  President  Madi- 
son declared  that  it  was  impossible  to  overlook  the  scenes  "  de- 
veloping themselves  among  the  great  communities  which  occupy 
the  southern  portion  of  our  own  hemisphere  and  extend  into 
our  own  neighborhood.  An  enlarged  philanthropy  and  an  en- 
lightened forecast/'  he  added,  "  concur  in  imposing  on  the  na- 
tional councils  an  obligation  to  take  a  deep  interest  in  their 
destinies,  to  cherish  reciprocal  sentiments  of  good  will,  to  re- 
gard the  progress  of  events,  and  not  to  be  unprepared  for  what- 
ever order  of  things  may  be  ultimately  established."  16  The 
committee  to  whom  was  referred  this  part  of  the  President's 
message  reported  in  the  form  of  a  public  declaration,  a  resolu- 
tion in  which  it  was  affirmed  that  the  Senate  and  House  of 
Representatives  beheld  with  friendly  interest  the  establishment 
of  independent  sovereignties  by  the  Spanish  provinces  in  Amer- 
ica; that  as  neighbors  and  inhabitants  of  the  same  hemisphere, 
the  United  States  felt  great  solicitude  for  their  welfare;  and 
that  when  those  provinces  had  attained  the  condition  of  nations, 
by  the  just  exercise  of  their  rights,  the  Senate  and  House  would 
unite  with  the  executive  in  establishing  with  them,  as  independ- 
ent states,  amicable  relations  and  commercial  intercourse,17 

IB  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  I,  494. 
IT  American  State  Papers,  For,  Rel.,  Ill,  538. 


146       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

From  the  instructions  to  Poinsett  and  from  the  declarations 
of  the  President  and  of  Congress,  it  would  appear  that  the 
United  States  thus  early  recognized  the  revolted  colonies  as 
belligerents.  President  Monroe  declared  at  a  later  date,  in  fact, 
that  the  contest  was  regarded  from  the  first  "  not  in  the  light  of 
an  ordinary  insurrection  or  rebellion,  hut  as  a  civil  war  between 
parties  nearly  equal,  having  as  to  neutral  powers  equal 
rights.77  18  Legally,  however,  the  situation  remained  for  some 
time  without  definition.  This  was  due  mainly  to  the  following 
causes:  First,  diplomatic  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  Spain  were  suspended  during  the  early  years  of  the  revo- 
lution. Casa  Yrujo,  the  Spanish  minister  at  Washington,  was 
dismissed  in  1806  and  no  new  minister  came  to  take  his  place 
until  Luis  de  Onis  arrived  in  1809  as  the  representative  of 
the  Spanish  Patriots.  On  account  of  the  anomalous  state  of 
affairs  in  Spain,  the  United  States  declined  to  receive  the  new 
minister  until  a  general  peace  was  declared.19  The  exigencies 
of  diplomatic  intercourse  with  Spain  then  demanded  that  the 
situation  be  more  clearly  defined.  Secondly,  the  conflict  be- 
tween Spain  and  her  colonies  being  carried  on  at  first  almost 
wholly  on  land,  the  demand  for  the  formal  recognition  of  bellig- 
erency was  not  urgent.  And  finally,  the  strained  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  two  great  maritime  powers  of 
Europe,  resulting  at  last  in  war  with  one  of  them,  kept  the 
government  at  Washington  absorbed  in  matters  of  more  vital 
concern. 

Conditions  having  changed,  the  legal  status  of  the  revolted 
provinces  could  no  longer  be  left  in  doubt.  The  first  authorita- 
tive statement  on  the  subject  appears  to  have  been  contained  in 
a  letter  of  July  3,  1815,  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
to  the  collector  at  New  Orleans.  It  was  the  President's  desire, 
the  collector  was  informed,  that  intercourse  with  the  revolted 
provinces  should  strictly  conform  to  the  duties  of  the  govern- 

is  Moore,  A  Digest  of  International  Law,  I,  173. 

ie  Ibid.,  131.  See  also  Onis,  Memoir  upon  the  Negotiations  between  Spain 
and  the  United  States  of  America,  10-13. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      147 

ment  under  the  law  of  nations,  the  Act  of  Congress  and  the 
treaties  with  foreign  powers;  that  there  was  no  principle  of 
the  law  of  nations  which  required  the  United  States  to  exclude 
from  its  ports  subjects  of  a  foreign  power,  in  a  state  of  insur- 
rection against  their  own  government ;  that  any  merchant  vessel 
conforming  to  the  laws  of  the  United  States  was  entitled  to  an 
entry  to  the  customshouses  whatever  flag  she  might  bear;  that 
while  a  public  war  exists  between  two  foreign  nations,  or  when 
a  civil  war  exists  in  any  particular  nation,  the  provisions  of  the 
Act  of  June  5,  1794,  must  be  strictly  enforced.  A  few  weeks 
later  the  President  issued  under  this  Act  a  proclamation  for- 
bidding the  setting  on  foot  in  the  United  States  of  military 
expeditions  or  enterprises  against  the  dominion  of  Spain.20 
Thus  the  belligerency  of  the  insurgents  was  at  last  definitively 
recognized. 

Against  the  admission  of  vessels  under  the  insurrectionary 
flags,  Onis  protested  on  the  ground  that  it  was  subversive  of 
the  most  solemn  stipulations  in  the  treaties  between  Spain  and 
the  United  States.  He  maintained,  moreover,  that  it  was  op- 
posed to  the  general  principles  of  public  security  and  good 
faith  and  to  the  law  of  nations ;  and  that  as  the  independence 
of  none  of  these  provinces  had  been  acknowledged,  it  was  an 
offense  against  the  dignity  of  the  Spanish  monarchy  and  against 
the  sovereignty  of  the  king.  He  protested  also  against  the  activ- 
ities of  a  "  factious  band  of  insurgents  and  incendiaries  "  who 
were  raising  and  arming  troops  in  Louisiana  "  to  light  the  flame 
of  revolution  in  the  kingdom  of  New  Spain."  Continuing,  he 
declared  that  all  Louisiana  had  witnessed  those  activities  and 
that  other  expeditions  under  the  ring-leaders,  Jose  Alvarez  de 
Toledo  and  Jose  Manuel  de  Herrera,  the  latter  of  whom  had 
just  arrived  as  representative  of  the  Mexican  Congress,  were 
on  foot  to  invade  the  dominions  of  his  Catholic  Majesty.21  This 

20  American  State  Papers,  Fed.  ReL,  TV,  1. 

21  Onis  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  December  3.0,   1815,     American  State 
Papers.     For.  ReL,  IV,  422. 


148       PAIST-AMERICAKLSM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

was  the  beginning  of  a  voluminous  correspondence  which  Onis 
carried  on  during  the  next  five  or  six  years  with  the  State  De- 
partment. 

The  Spanish  minister  without  doubt  had  grounds  for  com- 
plaint. But  he  was  not  without  prejudice.  He  viewed  every 
move  with  suspicion.  Soon  after  his  arrival  he  declared  that 
there  was  no  hope  of  obtaining  anything  favorable  from  the 
United  States  except  "  by  energy,  by  force,  and  by  chastise- 
ment." 22  And  in  1812  he  informed  the  viceroy  of  Mexico 
that  the  United  States  contemplated  extending  its  southwestern 
boundary  to  the  Eio  Bravo ;  that  East  Florida  and  Cuba  would 
be  seized  as  West  Florida  had  been;  that  emissaries  of  the 
United  States  had  been  sent  throughout  the  Spanish  possessions 
to  foment  revolution;  that  great  assistance  in  arms  had  been 
given  to  Caracas  and  to  Buenos  Aires ;  that  an  agent  had  been 
appointed  to  treat  with  the  insurgents  in  Mexico  and  to  offer 
them  aid  in  money,  arms,  and  officers ;  that  in  order  to  remain 
on  good  terms  with  Spain  the  United  States  affected  to  give  the 
greatest  attention  to  the  repeated  remonstrances  which  had  been 
made  against  the  arming  of  privateers  in  its  ports,  and  had  in 
fact  given  strict  orders  to  prevent  violations  of  the  laws;  but 
that  in  spite  of  this,  the  government  was  then  raising  seventy- 
five  thousand  troops,  on  the  pretext  of  taking  Canada,  but  really 
for  the  purpose  of  robbing  Spain  of  her  colonies.23 

Alvarez  Toledo,  whom  Onis  mentioned  as  one  of  the  "  ring- 
leaders," was  a  Cuban  by  birth.  He  represented  Santo  Do- 
mingo in  the  Cortes  at  Cadiz,  where  his  radical  opinions  made 
him  obnoxious  to  the  peninsular  authorities.  Fleeing  to  the 
United  States  he  arrived  at  Philadelphia  in  September,  1811. 
He  soon  entered  into  informal  relations  with  Secretary  Monroe, 
to  whom,  it  appears,  he  gave  information  of  an  alleged  design 

22  Onis  to  the  Captain  General  of  Caracas,  February  2,  1810.     American 
State  Papers.     For.  Rel.,  Ill,  404. 

23  Onis  to  the  Viceroy  of  Mexico,  Philadelphia,  April  1,  1912.     Alamfln, 
Historia  de  Mexico,  III,  app.  46. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      149 

of  Great  Britain,  acquiesced  in  by  the  Cortes,  to  take  posses- 
sion of  Cuba,  Santo  Domingo,  and  Porto  Rico.  Claiming  to 
represent  his  Spanish  American  associates  in  the  Cortes,  he 
sought  the  aid  of  the  United  States  in  forming  these  islands 
into  an  independent  confederation. 

Shortly  before  these  informal  relations  began,  a  Mexican, 
Jose  Bernardo  Gutierrez  de  Lara;,  appeared  at  Washington  as 
the  diplomatic  representative  of  Hidalgo's  government,  seeking 
assistance  for  his  countrymen  in  men,  money,  and  arms.  The 
two  agents  became  acquainted,  and  after  further  conferences 
with  representatives  of  the  State  Department  revealed  the  fact 
that  the  government  would  not  give  the  desired  assistance,  they 
turned  their  attention  to  the  organization  of  an  expedition  to 
invade  Texas  from  the  Louisiana  border.24  With  a  force  com- 
posed of  some  four  hundred  and  fifty  Mexican  refugees  and 
American  adventurers,  the  invasion  began  in  August,  18 12.25 
Gutierrez  de  Lara  was  nominally  head  of  the  expedition,  but 
was  later  superseded  by  Toledo.  The  real  commanding  officer, 
however,  was  Colonel  Augustus  W.  Magee,  who  resigned  a 
commission  as  lieutenant  in  the  United  States  Army  to  assume 
command.  Hence  the  expedition  is  known  to  history  as  the 
"  Gutierrez-Magee  raid."  Welcomed  by  the  Creole  population 
and  opposed  but  ineffectively  by  the  weak  Royalist  garrisons, 
the  invaders,  styling  themselves  the  "  Republican  Army  of  the 
North/7  marched  through  the  province  to  the  capital,  San  An- 
tonio de  Bejar,  where  they  established  themselves  and  set  about 
organizing  a  civil  government.  Here  they  remained  until  Au- 
gust, 1813,  when  a  superior  force  of  Royalists  engaged  them 
in  a  bloody  battle  and  cut  them  to  pieces.  A  few  of  the  sur- 
vivors, among  them  Toledo  and  Colonel  Perry,  an  able  Amer- 
ican officer,  escaped  to  Louisiana,  where  they  joined  with  the 

2*  Cox,  Monroe  and  the  Early  Mexican  Revolutionary  Agents.  Am.  Hist. 
Assn.  Rep.,  I,  199-208. 

25  Alamfin,  Historia  de  Mexico,  III,  481,  McCaleb,  The  First  Period  of 
the  Gutierrez- Magee  Expedition  in  Texas  Hist.  Assn.  Quar.,  IV,  229. 


150       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Mexican  refugees  and  the  adventurers  of  different  nationalities, 
who,  undiscouraged,  were  planning  new  undertakings.26 

It  was  against  such  enterprises,  fomented  for  the  most  part 
by  this  polyglot  group  in  Louisiana,  that  the  Spanish  minister 
urged  the  government  to  act.  Before  the  correspondence  of 
Onis  with  the  State  Department  began,  however,  measures  had 
been  taken  to  frustrate  the  designs  of  the  plotters.  Arms  sup- 
posed to  be  intended  for  an  expedition  which,  according  to  ru- 
mor, was  being  organized  by  Colonel  Perry  were  seized.  It 
was  later  ascertained  that  Perry  and  a  number  of  his  follow- 
ers, crossed  the  border  separately  and  embarking  from  some 
point  below  the  mouth  of  the  Sabine  for  the  coast  of  Mexico, 
were  wrecked  and  dispersed.  Toledo  and  a  number  of  his 
associates  were  indicted  in  the  United  States  District  Court  of 
Louisiana,  and  this  had  a  tendency  to  check  their  activities.27 
Toledo  himself  shortly  afterward  deserted  the  Patriot  cause, 
and,  proceeding  to  Spain,  was  received  with  open  arms  and 
sent  as  ambassador  to  Naples.28 

As  to  Herrera,  whom  Onis  evidently  regarded  as  particu- 
larly dangerous  to  Spanish  interests,  it  appears  that  he  never 
proceeded  further  than  New  Orleans,  established  no  connections 
with  the  government  at  Washington,  and  accomplished  nothing 
beyond  dispatching  small  quantities  of  arms  and  ammunition 
to  the  insurgents.  Associated  with  him  was  a  Mexican,  An- 
tonio Francisco  Peredo  by  name,  who  was  furnished  with  a 
limited  amount  of  funds  and  authorized  to  procure  merchant 
vessels  and  privateers  to  sail  under  the  flag  of  the  new  repub- 
lic.29 Exactly  what  Peredo  accomplished  is  not  clear;  but  as 
from  this  time  a  number  of  vessels  were  added  to  the  Mexican 
fleet,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  he  effected,  with  the  concurrence 
of  Herrera,  some  arrangement  by  which  the  acquisitions  could 

28  Alamftn,  Historia  de  Mexico,  III,  48O-492.  Yoakum,  History  of  Texas, 
I,  75-85. 

27  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  IV,  431. 
zs  AlamAn,  Historia  de  Mexico,  IV,  395. 
2»  Ibid.,  186,  395. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      151 

be  made.  The  authority  to  commission  the  vessels  was  dele- 
gated to  Luis  Aury,30  formerly  in  the  naval  service  of  New 
Granada,  and  at  this  time,  according  to  Yoakum,  "  Commo- 
dore of  the  fleet  of  the  republics  of  Mexico,  Venezuela,  La  Plata, 
and  New  Granada."  31  By  what  authority  this  office  of  "  Com- 
modore "  of  the  combined  fleet  was  established,  Yoakum  does 
not  explain;  nor  do  other  historians  throw  any  light  on  the 
point.  The  title  was  of  doubtful  validity.  But  it  is  with 
Aury  as  an  officer  of  the  republic  of  Mexico  that  we  are  at 
present  interested. 

In  September,  1816,  Herrera  went  with  Aury  and  his  fleet 
to  Galveston  Island,  where  a  government  for  the  province  of 
Texas  was  organized  under  the  Mexican  republic.  Aury  was 
chosen  civil  and  military  governor.  From  Galveston  as  a  base, 
the  vessels  of  the  fleet  were  sent  out  to  cruise  against  Spanish 
commerce.  Prizes  were  brought  in  and  adjudicated  in  a  Court 
of  Admiralty  in  which  Aury  himself  sat  as  a  judge.32  The 
men  whom  Aury  gathered  about  him  were  not  all  of  spotless 
character.  Many  of  them  had  been  followers  of  the  pirate, 
Jean  Lafitte,  at  Barataria,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi, 
until  that  establishment,  harboring  more  than  a  thousand  men, 
was  broken  up  in  1814.  It  will  be  recalled  that  this  band  of 
freebooters  under  Lafitte  had  been  pardoned  by  the  President 
as  a  reward  for  the  valiant  part  they  played  in  the  battle  of 
New  Orleans.  They  were  now  gradually  returning  to  their 
old  occupation  of  piracy  and  smuggling  along  the  coast.  It 
is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  among  Aury's  sea  rovers,  some 
should  have  failed  to  distinguish  between  friend  and  foe,  espe- 
cially when  specie  or  other  valuable  article  formed  part  of  the 
cargo ;  that  they  should  have  found  a  way,  as  they  did,  to  bring 
the  slaves  taken  from  Spanish  slavers  into  the  hands  of  Louisi- 
ana planters;  that  they  should  have  disposed  of  the  articles 

so  Robinson,  W.  D.,  Memoirs  of  the  Mexican  Revolution,  61. 
si  Yoakum,  History  of  Texas,  I,  88. 
32  lUd.,  I,  89. 


152       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

of  merchandise,  with  which  their  numerous  prizes  were  laden, 
to  smugglers  engaged  in  an  illicit  trade  along  the  bays  and 
bayous  of  the  Louisiana  coast.33 

Though  Galveston  was  the  base  of  this  fleet,  the  vessels  came 
with  great  frequency  to  New  Orleans.  At  least  on  one  occa- 
sion reported  by  the  collector,  there  were  six  privateers  in  the 
port,  commissioned  by  Aury.  It  was  reported  and  generally 
believed  that  many  of  the  vessels  of  Aury's  fleet  were  owned 
by  persons  resident  in  New  Orleans  and  enjoying  the  privileges 
of  American  citizens.  In  admitting  these  vessels,  the  collector 
averred,  great  care  was  taken  not  to  permit  any  violation  of 
the  Neutrality  Act;  but  in  defiance  of  every  precaution,  they 
violated  the  law,  not  while  in  port,  but  before  they  left  Amer- 
ican waters.  Nothing  was  easier,  said  the  collector,  when  a 
privateer  was  ready  for  sea,  than  to  send  both  men  and  guns 
to  Barataria,  or  any  other  convenient  place  where  the  vessel 
could  sail,  and  take  them  on  board.  At  the  end  of  the  cruise 
the  same  farce  would  be  played  over  again.  Thus  it  might 
be  said  that  each  cruise  began  and  ended  at  New  Orleans.  At- 
tempts had  been  made  to  secure  convictions,  but  without  suc- 
cess; for  witnesses  were  difficult  to  obtain.34 

It  was  by  no  means  with  the  Southwest  alone  that  the  govern- 
ment had  to  deal  in  maintaining  neutrality.  Along  the  Atlantic 
seaboard,  numerous  unneutral  activities  mainly  connected  with 
privateering  had  to  be  watched  for  and,  if  possible,  frustrated. 
Of  this  character  was  the  Mina  expedition,  which  sailed  un- 
hindered from  the  port  of  Baltimore.  Xavier  Mina  was  born 
in  Navarre,  Spain,  in  1789.  In  the  war  against  the  French 
invaders,  he  distinguished  himself.  He  was  captured  in  1811 
and  held  a  prisoner  in  France  until  peace  was  declared.  As 
soon  as  he  was  at  liberty,  he  returned  to  Spain  and,  with  his 
uncle,  Espoz,  raised  the  standard  of  revolt  against  the  reaction- 

83  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  IV,  134.     Yoakum,  History  of  Texas, 
1,92. 

34  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  IV,  136. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      153 

ary  Ferdinand.  The  conspiracy  having  failed,  he  fled  to  Eng- 
land, where  he  was  well  received.  It  is  said  he  was  granted 
a  pension  by  the  British  Government.  Desiring  to  continue 
his  revolutionary  activities  in  Mexico,  he  obtained  a  ship,  arms, 
and  military  stores  from  some  "  English  gentlemen  attached 
to  the  cause  of  freedom,"  and,  setting  sail,  accompanied  by  fif- 
teen Spanish,  Italian,  and  British  officers,  arrived  at  Balti- 
more in  the  summer  of  1816.  On  the  way  over,  four  of  the 
Spanish  officers  became  disaffected,  and,  upon  arriving  in  the 
United  States,  deserted  the  enterprise  and  gave  such  informa- 
tion of  it  as  they  possessed  to  the  Spanish  minister  at  Wash- 
ington, who  immediately  called  upon  the  government  to  sup- 
press the  threatened  undertaking.  But  the  complaints  of  the 
minister  were  not  sustained  by  any  positive  data  and  the  execu- 
tive did  not  think  proper  to  interfere  as  long  as  Mina  and  his 
agents  moved  within  the  sphere  of  the  laws  of  the  republic. 

Quantities  of  military  stores  were  put  aboard  the  ship  as 
cargo  and,  late  in  August,  some  two  hundred  "  passengers  " 
under  the  direction  of  Colonel  the  Count  de  Euuth,  having  em- 
barked, the  vessel  put  to  sea  with  a  clearance  for  Saint  Thomas. 
She  was  accompanied  by  a  Spanish  schooner  which  had  been 
hired  by  Mina,  and  on  board  of  which  was  Lieutenant  Colonel 
Myers  with  a  company  of  artillery.  Mina  and  his  staff  sailed 
four  weeks  later  aboard  a  fast  sailing  brig  pierced  for  guns, 
joining  the  rest  of  the  expedition  at  Port-au-Prince  early  in 
October.35  Here  Mina  met  Bolivar  who  had  been  driven  a 
second  time  from  his  native  shores.36  From  Petion,  the  negro 
president  of  the  republic  of  Haiti,  he  received  generous  assist- 
ance, as  had  Bolivar  a  few  months  before.  On  October  24  the 

35  Robinson,  W.  D.,  Memoirs  of  the  Mexican  Revolution,  43-55.  The 
author  of  this  memoir  was  an  American  who  had  spent  some  years  in 
Venezuela  and  Mexico.  He  accompanied  the  Mina  expedition  to  Mexico, 
was  captured,  and  sent  a  prisoner  to  Spain.  Escaping  and  returning  to  the 
United  States,  he  published  his  memoir  at  Philadelphia  in  1820.  This  is 
the  account,  with  minor  corrections,  which  Alamfin  follows  in  his  Historic* 
de  Mexico. 

se  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVII  (Narracidn  I),  356. 


154       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

expedition,  consisting  of  the  brig,  ship,  and  schooner,  made 
sail  for  Galveston  Island.  Arriving  safely  the  troops  were  dis- 
embarked and  the  work  of  organization  and  training  was  begun. 
Mina  made  a  trip  to  New  Orleans  where  he  purchased  a  trans- 
port to  replace  the  ship  with  which  he  left  England,  and,  hav- 
ing arranged  the  purchase  of  another  smaller  vessel,  he  re- 
turned with  a  few  American  and  European  officers  to  Galveston. 
Among  the  recruits  who  joined  Mina  at  Galveston  Island  was 
a  small  band  of  Americans  under  Colonel  Perry.  These,  to- 
gether with  a  number  of  Aury's  men  and  a  few  additions  from 
miscellaneous  sources,  gave  him  about  three  hundred  fighting 
men.  On  April  5,  1817,  the  expedition,  accompanied  by  the 
whole  Galveston  Island  naval  establishment,  sailed  southward 
and,  bearing  down  the  coast,  reached  Soto  la  Marina,  where  a 
successful  landing  was  made.  Successes  and  reverses  followed 
alternately  during  the  next  four  or  five  months  until  finally 
Mina  was  captured.  On  November  11,  1817,  he  paid  the  pen- 
alty. He  met  death  at  the  hands  of  a  firing  squad.37 

In  discussing  Mina's  failure,  Robinson,  the  historian  of  the 
expedition,  declares  that  the  first  great  obstacle  which  Mina 
had  to  contend  against  was  the  want  of  proper  support  from 
the  mercantile  world.  The  giving  of  such  support,  he  main- 
tained, did  not  constitute  either  in  the  United  States  or  Great 
Britain  a  breach  of  neutrality.  "  We  have  heard  much,"  he 
said,  "  of  the  assistance  which  the  Mexican  Patriots  have  re- 
ceived from  individuals  in  the  United  States;  and  indeed  if 
we  were  to  believe  one  tenth  part  of  what  the  Chevalier  Onis 
has  stated  on  this  subject,  we  might  suppose  that  the  American 
merchants  had  been  liberal  in  the  extreme  in  the  supplies  af- 
forded to  the  Mexican  people ;  but  the  real  fact  is,  that  a  single 
house  in  London  has  supplied  a  larger  amount  of  arms  and 
clothing  to  Venezuela  than  has  been  afforded  by  all  the  mer- 
chants of  the  United  States  to  Mexico;  at  the  same  time  that 

37  Robinson,  Memoirs,  58-62,  78-80,  259. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      155 

the  royal  armies  [of  Spain]  were  fed  and  furnished  with 
ammunition,  ships,  and  every  species  of  supply  from  our  prin- 
cipal seaports."  Continuing,  he  declared  that  the  resources 
which  Mina  obtained  at  Baltimore  were  small,  though  in  the 
eyes  of  the  Spanish  minister  they  were  greatly  magnified,  the 
expedition  becoming  in  his  terrified  imagination  a  formidable 
army.  "  It  was  in  vain,"  says  Robinson,  "  that  Mina  endeav- 
ored to  convince  some  merchants  of  the  United  States  of  the 
advantages  they  would  derive  from  the  political  and  commercial 
emancipation  of  Mexico.  It  was  in  vain  that  he  offered  the 
most  flattering  terms  for  ample  supplies;  while  the  influence 
of  the  Spanish  agents,  through  the  contracts  which  they  were 
enabled  to  bestow,  produced  such  an  influence  on  the  monied 
men,  and  the  monied  institutions  of  some  of  our  principal  cities, 
as  to  interfere  materially  with  the  necessities  of  Mina  and  the 
emancipation  of  Mexico."  38 

But  in  Mina's  case  as  in  numerous  other  cases  the  neutrality 
laws  of  the  United  States  were,  doubtless,  violated.  The  fail- 
ure to  prevent  these  violations  was  due  to  certain  defects  in 
the  laws.  The  Act  as  it  stood  did  not  give  the  executive,  in 
cases  where  there  might  be  reason  to  suspect  an  intention  to 
commit  the  offense,  authority  to  demand  security  or  to  adopt 
any  other  preventive  measure.  Thus  it  frequently  happened 
that  vessels  belonging  to  citizens  of  the  United  States  or  to 
foreigners  would  arm  and  equip  in  the  ports  of  the  United 
States,  and  clearing  as  merchant  ships,  cruise  as  privateers 
under  one  or  another  of  the  belligerent  flags,  either  immediately 
after  getting  to  sea  or  after  touching  at  other  ports.  In  other 
instances,  foreign  vessels  would  abuse  the  privileges  allowed  in 
the  ports,  augment  their  armaments,  as  Mina  did,  and  take  on 
board  citizens  of  the  United  States,  who  later  assumed  a  mili- 
tary character.  Accordingly,  President  Madison,  in  a  special 
message  to  Congress  of  December  26,  1816,  recommended  the 

38  Robinson,  Memoirs,  262-263. 


156       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

adoption  of  such  additional  legislation  as  the  situation  might 
require.39 

On  January  14,  1817,  a  bill  was  introduced  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  and  on  March  3,  following,  after  a  long  debate, 
in  which  Henry  Clay  led  the  opposition,  it  was  enacted  into 
law.  This  Act  contained  two  provisions  intended  to  remedy 
the  defects  in  the  old  law.  The  first  of  these  was  a  provision 
requiring  the  American  owners,  or  part  owners,  of  armed  ships 
to  give  bond  that  such  ships  would  not  be  used  in  hostilities 
against  any  "  prince  or  state,  colony,  district,  or  people  "  with 
whom  the  United  States  was  at  peace.  The  second  authorized 
the  collectors  of  the  customs  to  detain  any  vessel  manifestly 
built  for  warlike  purposes,  when  the  arms  and  number  of  men 
shipped  aboard,  or  other  circumstances,  rendered  it  probable 
that  such  vessel  was  intended  to  be  used  in  violation  of  the 
law.40  The  law  contained  one  other  new  feature.  The  statute 
of  1794  contemplated  wars  between  "  princes  or  states."  This 
was  disclosed  as  a  defect  in  the  case  of  Gelston  v.  Hoyt,  where 
the  fitting  out  of  the  ship  American  Eagle  for  one  of  the  Haitian 
combatants,  Petion,  to  be  used  against  another  Haitian  com- 
batant, Christophe,  was  held  to  be  no  offense,  for  the  reason 
that  neither  of  the  chieftains  had  been  recognized  as  a  "  foreign 
prince  or  state  "  under  the  statute  of  1794.  Hence  the  law  of 
1817  contemplates  belligerents,  princes,  states,  colonies,  dis- 
tricts, or  peoples.41  This  Act  was  superseded  by  the  compre- 
hensive law  of  April  20,  1818,  the  provisions  of  which  are  now 
embodied  in  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States.42 

The  Act  of  1817  was  passed  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
by  a  vote  of  83  to  62.  The  opposition  did  not  spring  from  any 
widespread  desire  to  intervene  in  the  contest.  It  was  at- 
tributable in  part  to  party  spirit,  and  in  so  far  as  it  had  any 

39  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  IV,  102-103. 
«  Annals  of  Congress,  Uth  Cong.,  2d  8ess.,  477,  740,  1308. 
*i  Moore,  A  Digest  of  International  Law,  VII,   1076.     Bemis,  American 
Neutrality,  35. 

42  Moore,  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  49. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      157 

solid  basis,  it  rested  on  the  ground  that  the  Act  would  increase 
the  already  existing  inequality  of  condition  as  between  the  two 
contending  parties.  One  of  them,  said  Clay,  had  an  accredited 
minister  to  watch  over  its  interests,  while  the  other  had  no 
organ  through  which  to  communicate  its  grievances.  The  na- 
tion being  in  a  state  of  neutrality  respecting  the  con-test,  and 
bound  to  maintain  it,  the  question,  according  to  Clay,  was 
whether  the  provisions  of  the  bill  were  necessary  to  the  per- 
formance of  that  duty.  "  We  ought  to  perform  our  neutral 
duties,"  he  declared,  "  whilst  we  are  neutral,  without  regard 
to  the  unredressed  injuries  inflicted  upon  us  by  Old  Spain  on 
the  one  hand,  or  to  the  glorious  objects  of  the  struggle  of  the 
South  American  Patriots  on  -the  other.  We  ought  to  render 
strict  justice  and  no  more."  But,  as  the  bill  was  not  limited 
to  that  object,  he  could  not  give  it  his  assent.43 

On  the  day  following  the  enactment  of  this  new  legislation 
James  Monroe  was  inaugurated  President.  He  appointed  as 
Secretary  of  State  John  Quincy  Adams,  then  serving  as  min- 
ister to  Great  Britain.  Adams  was  an  unwavering  advocate  of 
the  system  of  neutrality.  When  but  twenty-six  years  of  age, 
he  wrote,  under  the  signature  of  "  Marcellus,"  several  articles 
in  which  he  contributed  greatly,  at  the  critical  moment  of 
Genet's  arrival  in  America,  to  the  formation  of  a  sound  public 
opinion  on  the  subject.  These  writings  commended  him  to  the 
favor  of  Washington  and  won  for  him  the  appointment  in  1794- 
as  minister  to  the  Netherlands.44  Sent  as  minister  to  Prussia 
in  1797,  elected  United  States  Senator  in  1803,  returned  to 
Europe  as  minister  to  Russia  in  1809,  named  one  of  the  com- 
missioners to  negotiate  a  peace  with  Great  Britain  in  1813, 
appointed  minister  to  the  court  of  St.  James  in  1815,  Adams 
had  enjoyed  an  unparalleled  opportunity  for  acquiring  a  knowl- 
edge and  grasp  of  the  international  situation  commensurate 
with  the  high  office  to  which  he  was  called.  Moreover,  his  long 

43  Annals  of  Congress,  l^th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  740-743. 

44  Adams,  J,  Q.,  Writings,  I,  135,  148. 


158       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

residence  in  Europe  had  not  left  him  unacquainted  with  the 
special  set  of  relations  which  had  developed  between  the  United 
States  and  the  belligerent  communities  in  the  southern  part  of 
the  continent.  Not  only  did  he  see  those  relations  clearly  but 
he  saw  more  clearly,  perhaps,  than  any  of  his  contemporaries 
their  wide-spreading  European  connections.  Long  before  his 
return  to  the  United  States  he  had  begun  to  point  out  the  com- 
plications to  which  an  abandonment  of  the  traditional  policy 
might  give  rise.  In  1816  he  told  Del  Real,  a  representative 
of  New  Granada,  who  called  upon  him  in  London,  that  the 
policy  of  the  government  of  the  United  States,  a  policy  dic- 
tated equally  by  duty  to  its  own  country,  by  amity  with  Spain, 
and  by  good  will  to  the  South  Americans,  was  a  strict  and  im- 
partial neutrality  between  them  and  Spain.  And  he  explained 
that  he  meant  by  saying  that  the  policy  was  dictated  by  good 
will  to  the  South  Americans,  that  the  neutrality  of  the  United 
States  was  more  advantageous  to  them,  by  securing  the  neutral- 
ity of  Great  Britain,  than  any  support  which  the  United  States 
could  give  them  by  declaring  in  their  favor  and  making  com- 
mon cause  with  them,  the  effect  of  which  would  probably  have 
been  to  make  Great  Britain  declare  against  both.45  A  few 
months  later,  commenting  on  news  from  the  United  States,  he 
wrote :  "  There  seemed  to  me  too  much  of  the  warlike  humor 
in  the  debates  of  Congress  —  propositions  even  to  take  up  the 
cause  of  the  South  Americans.  ...  A  quarrel  with  Spain  for 
any  cause  can  scarcely  fail  of  breeding  a  quarrel  with  Great 
Britain."  46 

But  it  was  not  merely  with  British  hostility  that  the  United 
States  had  to  contend.  "  All  the  restored  governments  of  Eu- 
rope," declared  Adams,  "  are  deeply  hostile  to  us.  The  Royal- 
ists everywhere  detest  and  despise  us  as  Republicans.  All  the 
victims  and  final  vanquishers  of  the  French  Revolution  abhor 
us  as  aiders  and  abettors  of  the  French  during  their  career  of 

*5  Adams  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  March  30,  1816,  Writings,  V,  551. 
««  Adams  to  George  William  Erving,  June  10,  1816,  Writings,  VI,  45. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  USTDEPENDENCE      159 

triumph.  Wherever  British  influence  extends  it  is  busy  to 
blacken  us  in  every  possible  manner.  In  Spain  the  popular 
feeling  is  almost  as  keen  against  us  as  in  England.  Emperors, 
kings,  princes,  priests,  all  the  privileged  orders,  all  the  estab- 
lishments, all  the  votaries  of  legitimacy  eye  us  with  the  most 
rancorous  hatred.  Among  the  crowned  heads  the  only  friend 
we  had  was  the  Emperor  Alexander,  and  his  friendship  has, 
I  am  afraid,  been  more  than  cooled."  47  Adams's  view  was  not 
a  passing  fancy.  About  six  months  later  he  returned  to  the 
subject,  expressing  more  emphatically  than  ever  his  belief  in 
European  hostility  to  the  United  States.  "  There  is  already," 
he  said,  "  in  all  the  governments  of  Europe  a  strong  prejudice 
against  us  as  Republicans,  and  as  the  primary  causes  of  the 
propagation  of  those  political  principles  which  still  made  the 
throne  of  every  European  monarch  rock  under  him  as  with  the 
throes  of  an  earthquake.  .  .  .  We  are  considered  not  merely  as 
an  active  and  enterprising,  but  as  a  grasping  and  ambitious 
people.  We  are  supposed  to  have  inherited  all  the  bad  quali- 
ties of  the  British  character,  without  some  of  those  of  which 
other  nations  in  their  dealings  with  the  British  have  made 
their  advantage.  They  ascribe  to  us  all  the  British  rapacity, 
without  allowing  us  the  credit  of  the  British  profusion.  The 
universal  feeling  of  Europe  in  witnessing  the  gigantic  growth 
of  our  population  and  power  is  that  we  shall,  if  united,  become 
a  very  dangerous  member  of  the  society  of  nations.  They 
therefore  hope  what  they  confidently  expect,  that  we  shall  not 
long  remain  united.  That  before  we  shall  have  attained  the 
strength  of  national  manhood  our  Union  will  be  dissolved,  and 
that  we  shall  break  up  into  two  or  more  nations  in  opposition 
against  one  another."  48 

Thus,  conscious  of  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  the  interna- 
tional situation,  Adams  returned  to  America  to  take  up  at 
Washington  the  duties  of  Secretary  of  State.  He  found  upon 

47  Adams  to  John  Adams,  August  1,  1816,  Writings,  VI,  61. 

48  Adams  to  William  Plumer,  January  17,  1817,  Writings,  VI,  143. 


160       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

his  arrival  a  growing  demand  for  the  early  recognition  of  the 
new  states.  This  was  due  to  the  more  hopeful  aspect  which 
their  affairs  were  assuming.  The  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de 
la  Plata  had  declared  and  were  maintaining  their  independence ; 
San  Martin  had  crossed  the  Andes  and  won  the  great  victory 
of  Chacabuco;  Bolivar  and  his  exiled  followers  had  returned 
to  Venezuela,  where  they  were  gradually  gaining  ground ;  and 
finally,  the  Mina  expedition  had  entered  Mexico  and  friends 
of  the  Patriots  in  the  United  States  entertained  hopes  of  suc- 
cess in  that  quarter.  The  President,  however,  did  not  trust 
wholly  in  the  correctness  and  comprehensiveness  of  the  infor- 
mation which  was  reaching  him.  Accordingly  he  determined 
to  seek  the  truth  through  agencies  of  his  own  choosing.  He 
turned  first  to  Poinsett,  writing  him  a  personal  note  on  April 
25,  1817,  and  asking  him  to  undertake  a  mission  to  Buenos 
Aires.  But  having  entered  the  legislature  of  South  Carolina, 
Poinsett  declined  the  appointment.  Then  the  President  settled 
upon  a  commission  which  was  partly  constituted  at  once  by  the 
appointment  of  Caesar  A.  Rodney  and  John  Graham.  The  in- 
structions were  prepared  during  the  summer  by  Richard  Rush, 
who,  until  Adams's  arrival  in  September,  filled  the  office  of 
Secretary  of  State.  On  December  4,  Rodney  and  Graham, 
with  Theodorick  Bland  as  the  third  member  and  Henry  M. 
Brackenridge  as  secretary,  sailed  from  Hampton  Roads  aboard 
the  frigate  Congress.  At  about  the  same  time  John  B.  Prevost 
was  sent  on  a  similar  mission  to  Peru  and  Chile.49 

Two  of  the  commissioners,  Rodney  and  Graham,  returned  to 
the  United  States  in  July,  1818.  Bland,  who  proceeded  from 
Buenos  Aires  to  Chile,  returned  in  October.  The  work  of  the 
commission  was  not  harmonious.  Bland  and  Brackenridge 
quarreled  and  no  two  agreed.  Each  'commissioner  made  a  sep- 
arate report,  those  of  Rodney  and  Graham  being  communicated 
to  Congress  in  November  and  that  of  Bland  in  December.60 

*»  Paxson,  The  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics,  119-121. 
*o  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  IV.,  217-348.     Niles'  Weekly  Reg- 
later,  XIV,  356. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      161 

These  reports  were  voluminous  and  in  addition  to  them  Brack- 
enridge  published  in  two  volumes,  a  few  months  later,  an  ex- 
tended account  of  the  voyage  and  of  the  mission.  Neither  in 
the  reports  nor  in  Brackenridge's  account  was  any  important 
information  given  in  addition  to  that  already  known.  Accord- 
ing to  Adams,  Brackenridge  was  a  mere  enthusiast  and  so  de- 
voted to  South  America  that  he  wished  to  unite  all  America 
in  conflict  against  all  Europe.  Eodney,  who  was  suspected  of 
being  under  his  influence,  traced  the  South  American  to  the 
North  American  revolution,  identifying  them  together  in  a 
manner  which  the  President  thought  would  be  offensive  to  the 
European  allies.  His  report,  as  did  his  personal  efforts,  tended 
to  strengthen  the  party  favoring  immediate  recognition.  Gra- 
ham was  less  enthusiastic,  and  Bland  held  views  which  were 
not  at  all  favorable  to  the  Patriots.51 

But  recognition  became  a  pressing  question  before  the  com- 
missioners had  even  left  the  United  States.  In  September, 
1817,  the  subject  was  discussed  in  the  Eichmond  Inquirer;  and 
a  few  weeks  before  the  opening  of  Congress  the  editor  of  the 
Intelligencer  announced  that,  if  the  President  failed  to  treat 
the  subject  adequately  in  his  message,  it  would  be  taken  up  in 
the  House  of  Representatives,  where  it  would  form  a  good 
theme  for  the  display  of  oratorical  abilities.52  Monroe  was  im- 
pressed and  presented  the  question  to  his  cabinet  for  advice. 
The  Secretary  of  State,  finding  that  his  colleagues  were  back- 
ward in  giving  their  opinions,  explicitly  avowed  his  as  opposed 
to  the  expediency  of  recognition.53  That  opinion  prevailed,  and 
in  his  annual  message  of  December  2,  1817,  the  President  lim- 
ited himself  to  expressions  of  sympathy  and  good  will  for  the 
Patriots,  and  to  a  reiteration  of  the  policy  of  neutrality.54 

The  display  of  oratorical  abilities  began  without  delay.  As 
soon  as  the  President's  message  was  received,  a  series  of  resolu- 

51  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV.,  156,  159;  V.,  57. 

52  Paxson,  The  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics,  126. 

53  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV.,  15. 

s*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  13. 


162       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

tions  embracing  references  of  parts  of  it  to  appropriate  com- 
mittees was  introduced  in  the  House  of  Eepresentatives.  To 
the  first,  relating  to  foreign  affairs,  Clay  proposed  an  amend- 
ment instructing  the  committee  to  inquire  what  provisions  of 
law  were  necessary  to  insure  the  American  colonies  of  Spain 
their  rights  as  belligerents.  He  was  moved  to  this  course  in 
consequence  of  certain  cases  which  had  been  tried  under  the 
neutrality  laws,  resulting  in  decisions  unfavorable  to  the  Pa- 
triot cause.  He  cited  a  case  in  point,  Nine  or  ten  British, 
disbanded  officers  desiring  to  join  the  Patriots,  had  sailed  from 
Europe,  and  in  their  transit  to  South  America  had  touched  at 
Philadelphia.  During  their  stay  there  they  wore  the  arms  and 
habiliments  of  military  men,  making  no  disguise  of  their  inten- 
tion to  participate  in  the  struggle.  They  took  passage  in  some 
vessel  bound  to  a  port  in  South  America.  A  knowledge  of  this 
fact  having  come  to  the  ears  of  the  public  authorities,  a  prose- 
cution was  commenced  against  them,  and,  from  their  inability 
to  procure  bail,  they  were  confined  in  prison.  Clay  felt,  he 
declared,  perfectly  sustained  in  saying  that,  if  such  proceed- 
ing were  warranted  by  the  existing  law,  it  was  the  imperious 
duty  of  Congress  to  alter  the  law.  For  the  essence  of  neutral 
obligation,  as  he  conceived  it,  was  that  the  belligerent  means 
of  the  neutral  should  not  be  employed  in  favor  of  either  of  the 
parties.  It  certainly  did  not  require  one  nation  to  restrain 
the  belligerent  means  of  other  nations.  To  further  illustrate 
the  point  he  referred  to  the  application  of  the  law  to  privateers. 
"  We  admit  the  flag  of  those  colonies  into  our  ports,"  he  said ; 
"  we  profess  to  be  neutral ;  but  if  our  laws  pronounce  that  the 
moment  the  property  and  persons  under  the  flag  enter  our  ports 
they  shall  be  seized,  the  one  claimed  by  the  Spanish  minister 
or  consul  as  <the  property  of  Spain,  and  the  other  prosecuted 
as  pirates,  that  law  ought  to  be  altered  if  we  mean  to  perform 
our  neutral  professions."  Continuing,  he  declared  that  what- 
ever had  been  our  intentions,  our  acts  had  been  on  one  side; 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      163 

they  all  bore  against  the  Patriot  cause.  We  had  had  one  great 
and  magnanimous  ally  to  recognize  us;  but  no  nation  had 
stepped  forward  to  acknowledge  any  of  these  provinces.  The 
disparity  between  the  contestants,  said  Clay,  demanded  a  just 
attention  to  the  party  which  was  unrepresented ;  and  if  the  facts 
which  he  had  mentioned  and  others  which  had  come  to  his 
knowledge  were  correct,  they  loudly  demanded  the  interposition 
of  Congress. 

The  amendment  moved  by  Clay  was  agreed  to  without  oppo- 
sition ;  but  it  had  no  importance  beyond  offering  an  opportunity 
for  expressions  of  sympathy  for  the  Patriots  and  furnishing 
an  occasion  for  an  opening  onslaught  on  the  administration.55 

On  one  pretext  or  another,  similar  discussions  were  con- 
stantly recurring  in  the  House  until  late  in  the  spring,  when 
the  session  adjourned.  Early  in  December  a  resolution  re- 
questing the  President  for  information  relative  to  the  inde- 
pendence and  political  condition  of  the  belligerent  provinces 
led  to  discussion,  which  was  renewed,  a  few  days  later,  on  a 
resolution  calling  for  information  respecting  the  Amelia  Island 
affair.  In  January  a  bill  for  the  general  revision  of  the  neu- 
trality laws  was  introduced  and  in  March  it  was  debated  at 
some  length  and  passed.  That  disposed  of,  discussion  arose 
over  a  clause  in  the  appropriation  bill  voting  compensation  for 
the  commissioners  to  South  America.  Then  followed  an  ex- 
tended debate  occasioned  by  an  amendment  offered  by  Clay  to 
appropriate  a  sum  of  money  for  the  outfit  and  salary  of  a 
minister  to  Buenos  Aires.  It  was  on  this  occasion  that  Clay 
spoke  in  advocacy  of  the  "  system  of  the  New  World/'  to  which 
reference  has  been  made  elsewhere.  This  measure  having  been 
disposed  of  by  an  adverse  vote,  the  discussions  for  this  session 
came  to  a  close.56  On  no  occasion  did  the  forces  marshaled  by 
Clay,  though  showing  a  strength  which  gave  the  administration 

ss  Annals  of  Congress,  15th  Cong.,  1st  8 ess.,  401-404. 
se  Ibid.,  406,  408,  1406,  1655. 


164       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

concern,  accomplish  their  ends.  Unhampered  by  Congress  the 
executive  continued  to  pursue  the  policy  of  neutrality.  Recog- 
nition, however,  as  an  issue  was  not  dead. 

In  August,  1818,  Adams  set  forth  very  clearly  in  a  letter  to 
the  President  the  principles  upon  which  the  act  of  recognition 
should  be  based.  "  There  is  a  stage  in  such  contests,"  he  said, 
"  when  the  party  struggling  for  independence  have,  as  I  con- 
ceive, a  right  to  demand  its  acknowledgment  by  neutral  par- 
ties, and  when  the  acknowledgment  may  be  granted  without 
departure  from  the  obligations  of  neutrality.  It  is  the  stage 
when  the  independence  is  established  as  a  matter  of  fact,  so  as 
to  leave  the  chance  of  the  opposite  party  to  recover  their  do- 
minion utterly  desperate.  The  neutral  nation  must,  of  course, 
judge  for  itself  when  this  period  has  arrived,  and  as  the  bellig- 
erent nation  has  the  same  right  to  judge  for  itself,  it  is  very 
likely  to  judge  differently  from  the  neutral  and  to  make  it  a 
cause  or  a  pretext  for  war,  as  Great  Britain  did  expressly 
against  France  in  our  Revolution,  and  substantially  against 
Holland.  If  war  thus  result  in  point  of  fact  from  the  measure 
of  recognizing  a  contested  independence,  the  moral  right  or 
wrong  of  the  war  depends  upon  the  justice  and  sincerity  and 
prudence  with  which  the  recognizing  nation  took  the  step.  I 
am  satisfied  that  the  cause  of  the  South  Americans,  so  far  as 
it  consists  in  the  assertion  of  independence  against  Spain,  is 
just.  But  the  justice  of  a  cause,  however  it  may  enlist  indi- 
vidual feelings  in  its  favor,  is  not  sufficient  to  justify  third 
parties  in  siding  with  it.  The  fact  and  the  right  combined  can 
alone  authorize  a  neutral  to  acknowledge  a  new  and  disputed 
sovereignty.  The  neutral  may  indeed  infer  the  right  from  the 
fact,  but  not  the  fact  from  the  right."  67 

The  subject  of  recognition  again  came  under  consideration 
in  the  early  part  of  the  following  November.  The  President, 
who  was  drafting  his  second  annual  message,  appeared  to  have 
some  hesitation  what  to  say,  and  requested  Adams  to  sketch  a 

67  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Writings,  VI,  442. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      165 

paragraph  on  the  subject.58  The  secretary  complied,  with  the 
result  that,  when  the  message  was  sent  to  Congress  a  few  days 
later,  it  embodied  his  views.  They  were  briefly  that  there 
should  be  no  departure  from  the  neutral  policy  hitherto  pur- 
sued. This  he  based  upon  two  grounds :  First,  that  the  inde- 
pendence of  none  of  the  regions  aspiring  to  statehood  was  estab- 
lished as  a  matter  of  fact;  and  secondly,  that  the  European 
allies  had  undertaken  to  mediate  between  Spain  and  her  col- 
onies. It  was  understood  that  the  powers  would  confine  their 
interposition  to  the  expression  of  their  sentiments,  abstaining 
from  the  application  of  force.59  And  it  was  known  that  the 
mediation  must  fail,  because  there  could  be  no  resubjugation 
without  the  use  of  force.  It  was  thought  best,  therefore,  to 
let  the  experiment  have  its  full  effect,  and  after  it  had  failed, 
as  fail  it  must,  the  United  States  would  then  be  at  liberty  to 
recognize  any  of  the  governments  without  collision  with  the 
allies.60  Congress  did  not  venture  to  dissent  and  thus  for  a 
time  the  matter  rested. 

The  President's  third  annual  message,  sent  to  Congress  on 
December  7,  1819,  contained,  contrary  to  Adams's  advice,61 
passages  from  which  the  Patriots  might  well  draw  encourage- 
ment. The  progress  of  the  war,  said  the  President,  had  oper- 
ated manifestly  in  favor  of  the  colonies.  Their  distance  from 
the  parent  country  and  the  great  extent  of  their  population  and 
resources  gave  them  advantages  which,  he  believed,  would  be 
difficult  for  Spain  to  surmount.  "  The  steadiness,  consistency, 
and  success/*'  he  declared,  "  with  which  they  have  pursued  their 
objects,  as  evidenced  more  particularly  by  the  undisturbed 
sovereignty  which  Buenos  Aires  has  so  long  enjoyed,  evidently 
give  them  a  strong  claim  to  the  favorable  consideration  of  other 
nations.'7  But,  he  maintained,  "  it  is  of  the  highest  importance 

58  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  164. 

59  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  44. 
eo  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  166. 

ei  Ibid.,  IV,  460-461. 


166       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

to  our  national  character  and  indispensable  to  the  morality  of 
our  citizens  that  all  violations  of  our  neutrality  should  be  pre- 
vented." 62 

The  President  did  not  succeed,  however,  as  he  had  hoped  to 
do,  in  forestalling  discussion  in  Congress.  Clay  again  intro- 
duced a  resolution  upon  which  he  spoke  on  May  10,  1820,  pro- 
viding for  the  outfit  and  salary  of  such  ministers  as  the  Presi- 
dent might  deem  it  expedient  to  send  to  the  new  states.  For- 
getting for  the  moment  the  principles  of  neutrality,  to  which 
he  had  always  professed  the  strongest  attachment,  he  declared 
that  two  years  before  would  have  been  the  proper  time  for 
recognizing  the  independence  of  the  South ;  for  then  the  strug- 
gle was  somewhat  doubtful,  and  a  kind  office  on  the  part  of  the 
government  would  have  had  a  salutary  effect.  Since  then 
nothing  had  occurred  to  make  recognition  less  expedient.  The 
independence  of  several  of  the  provinces  was,  in  fact,  estab- 
lished; and  as  to  their  capacity  for  self-government  every  evi- 
dence was  in  their  favor.  The  delay,  Clay  believed,  was  due 
to  the  excessive  deference  on  the  part  of  the  administration  for 
the  powers  of  Europe.  We  had  gone  about,  he  said,  among 
foreign  powers,  seeking  aid  in  recognizing  the  independence  of 
these  states.  Was  it  possible,  he  scornfully  inquired,  we  could 
be  content  to  remain  looking  anxiously  to  Europe,  watching 
the  eyes  of  Lord  Castlereagh  and  getting  scraps  of  letters, 
doubtfully  indicative  of  his  wishes;  and  sending  to  the  Czar 
of  Russia  and  getting  another  scrap  from  Count  Nesselrode? 
"  Why  not,"  he  asked,  "  proceed  to  act  on  our  own  responsi- 
bility, and  recognize  these  governments  as  independent,  instead 
of  taking  the  lead  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in  a  course  which 
jeopardizes  the  happiness  of  unborn  millions  ?  .  .  .  Our  insti- 
tutions now  make  us  free;  but  how  long  shall  we  continue  so, 
if  we  mold  our  opinions  on  those  of  Europe?  Let  us  break 
these  commercial  and  political  fetters;  let  us  no  longer  watch 
the  nod  of  any  European  politician;  let  us  become  real  and 
«2  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  69. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      167 

true  Americans,  and  place  ourselves  at  the  head  of  the  American 
system."  63 

Though  Clay's  resolution  now  passed  the  House,  yet  no  action 
was  taken  by  the  executive.  Accordingly,  at  the  next  session, 
the  attack  was  renewed.  After  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  revive 
his  old  resolution,  Clay  introduced  on  May  10,  1821,  a  new  one 
to  the  effect  that  the  House  joined  with  the  people  of  the  United 
States  in  their  sympathy  with  the  South  Americans;  and  that 
it  was  ready  to  support  the  President  whenever  he  should  think 
it  expedient  to  recognize  their  governments.  The  question  was 
divided  and  the  first  part  was  carried  hy  the  vote  of  134  to  12 ; 
and  the  second  by  86  to  68. 64  The  executive,  however,  was  still 
unmoved.  Recognition  was  not  yet  to  be  accorded. 

The  "  deference  "  of  the  administration  for  the  powers  of 
Europe,  which  Clay  treated  with  such  scorn,  demands  a  word 
of  explanation.  It  will  be  recalled  that  Adams  returned  to 
America  in  the  summer  of  1817  firmly  convinced  that  the  na- 
tions of  Europe  were  moved  by  a  strong  feeling  of  hostility  to- 
ward the  United  States.  Moreover  he  had  observed  that  in  all 
their  councils  they  showed  a  perpetual  tendency  to  interference 
against  the  American  insurgents,  upon  the  principle  of  legiti- 
macy.65 Nothing  would  have  been  easier,  he  believed,  and 
with  reason,  than  to  precipitate  a  general  conflict  with  mon- 
archist Europe  arrayed  against  republican  America.  Such  a 
conflict  he  desired  by  every  means  in  his  power  to  avoid. 
Hence  the  caution  which  Clay  professed  to  believe  was  born 
of  weakness. 

Monroe,  though  at  times  vacillating,  shared  his  secretary's 
views.  In  a  "  sketch  of  instructions "  66  prepared  early  in 
1819,  in  which  he  reviewed  at  length  the  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment in  the  contest  between  Spain  and  her  colonies,  the  Presi- 
dent explained  the  attitude  assumed  with  respect  to  the  Euro- 

63  Annals  of  Congress,  16th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  2223-2230. 

e*  Paxson,  The  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics,  142. 

es  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Writings,  VI,  176. 

ee  Monroe,  Writings,  VI,  92-102. 


168       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

pean  powers.  The  best  service  we  could  render  the  Patriots, 
he  thought,  was  to  keep  our  ports  open  and  to  extend  to  them  all 
the  advantages  enjoyed  by  Spain,  at  the  same  time  promoting 
by  communications  with  other  powers  a  like  neutrality  on  their 
part,  so  as  to  leave  the  future  of  the  war  to  be  decided  by  the 
parties  themselves.  If  this  were  done  the  result  could  not  be 
doubted.  On  the  other  hand,  had  we  recognized  them,  there 
was  much  reason  to  believe  that  we  should  have  given  offense 
to  every  other  power,  and  excited  in  them  a  disposition  to  coun- 
teract its  probable  effect.  The  least  injury  which  could  have 
attended  such  a  measure,  said  the  President,  would  have  been 
to  increase  the  indisposition  of  other  powers  to  recognize  the 
new  states ;  and  it  might  have  resulted  in  war  with  Spain,  the 
allies  being  drawn  into  it  equally  against  the  United  States  and 
the  colonies.  By  the  course  pursued,  therefore,  the  United 
States  had  given  the  belligerent  provinces  all  the  advantages 
of  recognition  without  any  of  its  evils.  Declaring  that  our 
relations  with  the  allies  were  of  the  most  friendly  character, 
he  continued  as  follows :  "  We  have  been  long  in  free  com- 
munication with  them  in  favor  of  the  colonies,  pushing  their 
cause  to  the  utmost  extent  that  circumstances  would  permit. 
Our  object  is  to  promote  a  recognition  of  their  independence 
by  the  allies  at  the  earliest  day  at  which  it  may  be  obtained, 
and  we  are  satisfied  that  the  best  mode  of  accomplishing  it  is 
by  moving  in  concert  with  the  allies,  postponing  the  recognition 
on  our  part  until  it  can  be  obtained  from  them,  or  until  it  shall 
be  manifest  that  it  will  at  least  do  no  harm." 

In  the  course  of  time  it  became  evident  that  nothing  could 
be  accomplished  by  concerted  action  with  other  powers.  Eng- 
land, though  gradually  withdrawing  from  the  European  alli- 
ance and  assuming  an  intermediate  political  position  with  re- 
spect to  the  Old  and  the  New  World,  was  not  yet  inclined  to 
cooperate  with  the  United  States  in  the  recognition  of  the  new 
states.  She  had  from  the  first,  Lord  Castlereagh  declared  in 
February,  1819,  anxiously  desired  to  see  the  controversy  be- 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      169 

tween  Spain  and  her  colonies  at  an  end,  and  had  done  her  best 
to  effect  this  result;  but  always  upon  the  basis  of  the  restora- 
tion of  the  supremacy  of  Spain.  The  intervention  of  force  as  a 
means  of  its  accomplishment,  however,  she  had  ever  repudiated. 
When  some  months  later  Lord  Castlereagh  assured  the  American 
minister  that,  in  the  event  of  a  rupture  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States,  Great  Britain  would  not  -take  the  part  of  the 
former,  the  danger  of  a  general  conflict  with  all  Europe  against 
America  had  vanished.67  Whether  or  not  the  United  States 
should  recognize  the  new  states  was  therefore  reduced  from  a 
proposition  based  largely  upon  expediency  to  one  based  wholly 
upon  the  fact  of  independence.  In  a  previous  chapter  it  has 
been  shown  that  that  fact  became  clearly  established  in  1821. 

On  March  8,  1822,  the  President  transmitted  to  the  House 
of  Representatives  certain  documents  called  for  by  that  body 
relating  to  the  independence  of  the  Spanish  American  prov- 
inces. In  complying  with  the  request,  the  President  briefly 
reviewed  the  history  of  the  struggle  which  had  so  long  held  the 
attention  of  the  world.  He  declared  that  in  Buenos  Aires, 
Chile,  Colombia,  and  Mexico  it  had  been  attended  with  com- 
plete success,  and  that  these  provinces  "  which  had  declared 
their  independence  and  were  in  the  enjoyment  of  it  ought  to  be 
recognized."  In  proposing  this  measure,  the  President  added, 
it  was  not  contemplated  to  change  our  friendly  relations  with 
either  of  the  parties,  but  to  observe  as  theretofore  the  most  per- 
fect neutrality  between  them.68  Congress  concurring,  made, 
some  weeks  later,  the  necessary  appropriations. 

67  Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  III,  154. 

The  British  attitude  was  known  in  the  belligerent  colonies.  Referring  to 
the  revolt  of  troops  which  occurred  in  Spain  in  1820,  Bolivar  made  the 
following  estimate  of  the  situation :  — "  She  [England]  fears  revolution 
in  Europe  and  desires  it  in  America;  there  it  gives  her  infinite  concern, 
and  here  furnishes  her  inexhaustible  resources.  North  America,  pursuing 
its  arithmetical  course  of  business,  will  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity 
to  acquire  the  Floridas,  our  friendship,  and  a  dominion  of  trade.  It  is  truly 
a  conspiracy  of  Spain,  of  Europe,  and  of  America  against  Ferdinand." 
Bolivar  to  Guillermo  White,  May  1,  1820.  (XLeary,  Memoriae,  XXX,  159, 

PS  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  117. 


170       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

On  June  19,  1822,  Manuel  Torres  was  received  as  charge 
d'affaires  from  the  republic  of  Colombia.  Relative  to  this  in- 
cident, which  was  the  first  formal  recognition  of  a  Latin  Amer- 
ican state  by  the  United  States,  Adams  makes  the  following 
interesting  remarks  in  his  Memoirs:  "  Torres,  who  has  scarcely 
life  in  him  to  walk  alone,  was  deeply  affected  by  it.  He  spoke 
of  the  great  importance  to  the  republic  of  Colombia  of  this 
recognition,  and  of  his  assurance  that  it  would  give  extraordi- 
nary gratification  to  Bolivar.  The  President  invited  him  to  be 
seated,  sat  down  by  him,  and  spoke  to  him  with  kindness  which 
moved  him  even  to  tears.  The  President  assured  him  of  the 
great  interest  taken  by  the  United  States  in  the  welfare  and 
success  of  his  country,  and  of  the  particular  satisfaction  with 
which  he  received  him  as  its  first  representative."  69  Mexico 
was  recognized  on  December  12,  1822,  by  the  reception  of 
Manuel  Zozaya  as  minister  plenipotentiary.70  Buenos  Aires 
and  Chile  were  recognized  on  January  27,  1823,  by  the  ap- 
pointment of  Csesar  Rodney  and  Heman  Allen,  respectively,  as 
ministers  plenipotentiary  to  those  governments.  Brazil  was 
formally  recognized  by  the  reception  of  Senhor  Rebel! o  as 
charge  d'affaires  on  May  26,  1824 ;  the  Central  American  states 
by  the  reception  of  Antonio  Jose  Canas,  August  4,  1824 ;  and 
Peru  by  the  appointment  of  James  Cooley  as  charge  d'affaires 
to  that  government  on  May  2, 1826.71 

News  of  recognition  by  the  United  States  was  in  due  time 
disseminated  throughout  Latin  America.  It  was  treated  in  the 
public  press  as  an  event  of  transcendent  importance.  A  single 
example  may  be  cited.  In  the  Gaceta  de  Colombia  of  June  2, 
1822,  a  leading  article  commenting  upon  President  Monroe's 
message  of  March  8,  and  upon  the  report  of  the  Committee 
on  Foreign  Relations  to  which  the  message  had  been  referred, 
declared  that  these  two  documents  "  honor  the  United  States 

fe»  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  VI,  23. 

TO  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the.  United  States  and 
Mearico,  12. 

71  Moore,  A  Digest  of  International  Lav?,  I,  90-92, 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  INDEPENDENCE      171 

as  greatly  as  does  the  declaration  of  independence  written  by 
the  pen  of  the  immortal  Jefferson."  Continuing,  the  writer 
said,  among  other  things :  "  Palpable  are  the  inconveniences 
to  which  undefined  relations  give  rise.  The  increase  of  our 
commerce  and  of  our  industry  since  we  became  masters  of  our 
extensive  coast  lines  should  convince  Europe  and  America  of 
the  necessity  of  entering  into  friendly  arrangements  with  us 
upon  matters  of  such  high  importance.  A  magistrate  like  Mr. 
Monroe,  whose  private  opinions,  it  appears,  have  been  con- 
stantly in  opposition  to  the  duties  which  his  public  character 
imposed,  has  been  able  with  most  propriety  to  take  the  initia- 
tive and  to  enlighten  the  whole  world  respecting  the  true  state 
of  a  country  which  is  to-day  the  object  of  the  animadversions 
of  our  enemies  and  of  the  praises  of  our  friends.  The  United 
States  has  always  given  careful  attention  to  the  origin  and 
progress  of  the  war  in  which  its  neighbors  are  engaged  and  in 
Which  its  foreign  policy  has  been  and  is  to  some  extent  compro- 
mised. Its  government  never  acted  upon  impressions  of  the 
moment.  The  deliberateness  of  its  procedure,  which  is  a  mat- 
ter of  comment  in  Europe,  is  an  additional  proof  of  the  recti- 
tude with  which  it  has  acted  on  this  occasion.  There  is  noth- 
ing, therefore,  which  we  can  present  so  effectively  to  Spain  and 
to  the  rest  of  Europe,  to  demonstrate  the  justice  of  our  preten- 
sions, as  the  impartial  judgment  of  a  foreign  nation  which, 
established  in  our  continent,  has  had  frequent  opportunity  to 
observe  our  conduct  and  to  give  to  our  actions  the  merit  which 
they  deserve." 


CHAPTER  V 

INTERNATIONAL    COMPLICATIONS 

THE  execution  of  the  neutrality  laws  was  a  source  of  many 
difficulties  to  the  government  at  Washington  and  required  its 
constant  watchfulness.  The  legislation  of  1817  and  1818  was 
not  sufficient  in  itself  to  prevent  such  violations  as  were  prac- 
ticed with  impunity  under  the  old  laws.  There  were  still 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  perfect  observance  of  neutral  duty, 
the  chief  of  which  was  the  sympathy  felt  on  all  sides  for  the 
cause  of  the  Patriots.  Adams,  who  was  less  subject  to  its  in- 
fluence than  any  of  his  distinguished  contemporaries,  repeat- 
edly testified  in  his  writings  to  its  existence.  In  1812  he  told 
Count  Romanzoff,  Chancellor  of  the  Russian  Empire,  that  the 
government  of  the  United  States  regarded  with  favorable  senti- 
ments the  change  that  was  taking  place  in  the  Spanish  prov- 
inces, believing  it  would  be  generally  advantageous  to  the  inter- 
ests of  mankind.1  In  1816  he  said  to  the  agent  of  New  Granada 
in  London,  Del  Real,  that  the  general  sentiment  in  the  United 
States  was  certainly  in  their  favor.2  In  1817,  commenting  on 
one  of  Abbe  de  Pradt's  pamphlets,  Les  trois  demiers  mois  de 
I'Amerique  Meridionale,  he  declared  that  "  the  republican  spirit 
of  our  country  not  only  sympathizes  with  people  struggling  in 
a  cause  so  nearly,  if  not  precisely,  the  same  which  was  once  our 
own,  but  it  is  working  into  indignation  against  the  relapse  of 
Europe  into  the  opposite  principle  of  monkery  and  despot- 
ism."  8  In  1818  he  remarked  to  Onis  that  if  Spain  had  taken 
more  pains  to  adjust  her  differences  with  the  United  States, 
there  would  probably  have  been  less  ardor  in  the  country  against 

1  Adams  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  February  29,  1812.     Writings,  IV,  300. 

2  Adams  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  March  30,  1816.     Writings,  V,  551. 
s  Adams  to  John  Adams,  December  21,  18*17,  Writings,  VI,  276. 

172 


ISTTEKSTATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          173 

Spain  and  consequently  less  in  favor  of  the  South  Americans.4 
If  the  testimony  of  such  a  witness  were  not  sufficient,  abundant 
corroboration  might  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Jefferson,  Madi- 
son, Monroe,  and  others.  Moreover  the  debates  preserved  in 
the  annals  of  Congress  show  that  the  nation's  legislators  with- 
out exception  desired  to  see  the  Patriots  succeed;  and  similar 
views  were  generally  reflected  in  the  public  press.  The  inde- 
pendence of  the  Spanish  colonies  was,  indeed,  according  to  a 
foreign  observer,  Hyde  de  Neuville,  "  the  only  cause  popular 
here."  5 

The  Spanish  Americans  themselves  were  convinced  of  the 
sympathy  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  if  not  of  that  of 
the  government.  "  Here  as  well  as  in  Spain  and  in  every  other 
nation,"  said  Juan  German  Roscio  in  1819,  "  it  is  well  not  to 
compare  the  operations  of  the  government  with  the  sentiment 
of  the  people  and  of  individuals,  in  order  not  to  impute  to  them 
the  intrigues  and  vices  of  their  rulers,  or  of  their  system  of  ad- 
ministration. The  great  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  are  decidedly  for  our  cause."  And  he  goes  on  to  men- 
tion the  fact  that  in  the  invasion  of  Texas  in  1813  and  of  Mex- 
ico in  1817  a  large  number  of  Americans  took  part;  that  a 
great  part  of  the  privateers  sailing  under  the  Patriot  flags  were 
fitted  out  and  manned  in  the  ports  of  the  United  States;  that 
the  juries  never  conformed  to  the  "  unneutral "  Act  of  1817, 
and  that  the  state  of  Kentucky  had  made  a  declaration  in  favor 
of  their  cause.6 

It  is  readily  to  be  understood  what  an  obstacle  this  propen- 
sity to  sympathize  with  the  cause  of  the  Patriots  constituted 
for  the  government  in  the  execution  of  the  neutrality  laws. 
Through  its  influence  citizens  who  were  otherwise  law-abiding 
embarked  shamelessly  upon  illegal  enterprises  in  aid  of  the  in- 
surgents; Federal  judges  failed  to  render  strict  justice  under 

*  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  200. 

s  Hyde  de  Neuville,  Memoirs  et  Souvenirs,  II,  203,  205. 
e  Urrutia.     Pdginas   de  Historia   Diplomdtica,    207.     For   the  Kentucky 
resolutions,  see  Niles'  Weekly  Register,  XIII,  371. 


174      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  law;  and  executive  officers  of  the  government  not  only 
winked  at  violations  but  actively  aided  and  abetted  them.  Pri- 
vateering after  1815  was  the  chief  source  of  annoyance.  Un- 
fortunately it  came  to  be  disgraced  by  a  buccaneering  and  pi- 
ratical spirit  for  which  citizens  of  the  United  States  were  largely 
responsible.  The  vessels  were  "  for  the  most  part  fitted  out 
and  officered  in  our  ports  and  manned  from  the  sweepings  of 
our  streets."  7  The  center  of  illicit  enterprises  shifted  from 
New  Orleans  and  the  Southwestern  border  to  the  Atlantic  sea- 
board and  more  particularly  to  the  port  of  Baltimore.  In  the 
course  of  time  Baltimore  became  so  notorious  in  its  failure  to 
suppress  the  illegal  acts  of  the  privateers  that  the  matter  was 
made  the  subject  of  a  memorial  by  the  government  of  Portugal 
to  the  Congress  of  Sovereigns  at  Aix-la-Chapelle.  A  declaration 
of  displeasure  concerning  these  practices  was  entered  upon 
the  protocols  of  the  conferences  and  it  was  agreed  that  amicable 
expostulations  concerning  it  should  be  made  to  the  United 
States.8 

When  Hyde  de  Neuville  told  Adams  of  the  action  of  the  Con- 
gress of  Sovereigns,  the  secretary  vented  his  wrath  in  a  long 
entry  in  his  journal.  "  The  misfortune,"  he  wrote,  "  is  not 
only  that  this  abomination  has  spread  over  a  large  portion  of 
the  merchants  and  of  the  population  of  Baltimore,  but  that  it 
has  infected  almost  every  officer  of  the  United  States  in  the 
place.  They  are  all  fanatics  of  the  South  American  cause. 
Skinner,  the  postmaster,  has  been  indicted  for  being  concerned 
in  the  piratical  privateers.  McCulloh,  the  collector,  Crawford 
says,  is  a  very  honest  man,  but  only  an  enthusiast  for  the  South 
Americans  and  easily  duped  by  knaves,  because  he  thinks  all 
other  men  as  honest  as  himself.  .  .  .  The  district  judge,  Hous- 
ton, and  the  circuit  judge,  Duval,  are  both  feeble,  inefficient 
men,  over  whom  William  Pinkney,  employed  by  all  the  pirates 
as  their  counsel,  domineers  like  a  slave  driver  over  his  negroes. 

T  Adams  to  A.  H.  Everett,  December  29,  1817.     Writings,  VI,  282. 
s  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  317. 


INTEKNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          175 

After  the  pirates  were  indicted  last  September,  and  before  they 
were  tried,  a  piece  was  published  in  the  National  Intelligencer, 
threatening  that  any  judge  who  should  condemn  them  could 
not  be  expected  to  live  long,  either  as  a  judge  or  as  a  man. 
The  paper  containing  this  piece  was  sent  under  a  blank  cover 
to  Judge  Houston  just  before  he  opened  court.  He  read  the 
paragraph  in  open  court,  blustered  about  his  independence  and 
how  impossible  it  was  to  intimidate  him,  and  then  (as  well  as 
Judge  Duval),  Wirt  says,  was  perfectly  subservient  to  what- 
ever Pinkney  chose  to  dictate.  Middleton  told  me  that  he  had 
seen  that  threatening  piece  in  the  handwriting  of  Skinner,  the 
postmaster,  one  of  the  parties  indicted.  When  the  trials  came 
on,  Glenn  [district  attorney]  wrote  to  me  asking  to  be  assisted 
in  the  management  of  the  causes.  I  prevailed  upon  the  Presi- 
dent to  direct  the  Attorney-General,  Wirt,  to  assist  him;  but 
Wirt  considered  it  as  extra  official,  and  made  the  public  pay  him 
fifteen  hundred  dollars  for  losing  the  causes.  The  grand  jury 
indicted  many,  and  the  petit  jury  convicted  one  man,  but 
every  one  of  the  causes  fell  through  upon  flaws  in  Glenn's  bills 
of  indictment.  The  conduct  of  the  juries  proves  the  real  sound- 
ness of  the  public  mind.  The  soldiers  are  good  men  and  true. 
But  the  officers !  the  commanders !  what  with  want  of  honesty 
in  some  and  want  of  energy  in  others,  the  political  condition  of 
Baltimore  is  as  rotten  as  corruption  can  make  it.  Now  that 
it  has  brought  the  whole  body  of  European  allies  upon  us  in 
the  form  of  remonstrances,  the  President  is  somewhat  concerned 
about  it,  but  he  had  nothing  but  directions  altogether  general 
to  give  me  concerning  it.  I  must  take  the  brunt  of  the  battle 
upon  myself,  and  rely  upon  the  justice  of  the  cause."  9 

Some  time  after  this  Adams  received  information  from 
Brackenridge  which  put  a  still  worse  light  on  the  whole  affair. 
It  appears  that  Theodorick  Bland  and  the  Baltimore  postmaster, 
Skinner,  who  was  his  son-in-law,  together  with  others  associated 
with  them,  had  entered  into  relations  with  the  Carreras,  exiles 

»  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV,  318. 


176       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

from  Chile  and  Buenos  Aires  and  conspirators  against  the  exist- 
ing governments  there.  They  had  lent  these  political  refugees 
large  sums  of  money  and  had  obtained  from  them  stipulations 
for  exclusive  privileges  of  commerce  for  a  period  of  years. 
This  private  speculation,  Adams  believed,  was  the  source  of  all 
the  excitement  stirred  up  in  the  newspapers  during  the  autumn 
of  1817  over  the  question  of  recognition.  The  articles  were 
written  by  Skinner  aided  by  some  others.  The  same  cabal 
obtained  the  appointment  of  Bland  as  one  of  the  commission- 
ers and  made  him  their  private  agent  to  recover  from  the  gov- 
ernments of  Buenos  Aires  and  of  Chile  the  moneys  lent  to  the 
Carreras.  These  connections  of  Bland,  with  their  links  of 
attachment  to  the  Baltimore  privateering  piracies,  influenced 
and  pervaded  his  conduct  as  a  commissioner  and  were  the  cause 
of  his  quarrel  with  Brackenridge.10 

"  It  is,  in  theory,"  said  Adams,  "  one  of  the  duties  of  a 
President  of  the  United  States  to  superintend  in  some  degree 
the  moral  character  of  the  public  officers  who  hold  their  places 
at  his  pleasure.  But  the  difficulty  of  carrying  it  into  practice 
is  great,  and  the  number  of  instances  in  which  I  see  corrup- 
tion of  the  deepest  dye,  without  being  able  to  punish  or  even  to 
displace  it,  is  among  the  most  painful  appendages  to  my  situa- 
tion." n  Adams  evidently  felt  that,  if  the  President  had  used 
his  authority  to  remove  certain  Federal  officers  who  were  guilty 
of  corrupt  practices,  the  neutrality  laws  would  have  been  more 
strictly  observed.  This  doubtless  was  true.  In  certain  cases 
the  President  was  lenient.  There  was,  however,  no  disposi- 
tion on  his  part  toward  a  general  tolerance  of  these  irregulari- 
ties. On  the  whole,  the  administration  adopted  effective  means 
to  enforce  neutrality.  The  legislative  branch  of  the  government 
lent  its  cooperation  by  passing  early  in  1819  "An  act  to  pro- 
tect the  commerce  of  the  United  States  and  punish  the  crime  of 
piracy."  This  law  empowered  the  President  to  instruct  the 

10  Adams,  Memoirs,  V,  158. 
.,  V,  159. 


INTEKNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          177 

naval  commanders  of  the  United  States  to  capture  any  vessel 
committing  piratical  aggressions  upon  ships  of  the  United 
States  or  of  any  other  nationality ;  and  it  authorized  merchant 
vessels  owned  by  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  resist  aggres- 
sions by  all  vessels  except  the  public  armed  ships  of  the  nations 
in  amity  with  the  United  States.  Finally,  a  section  of  the  law 
prescribed  the  death  penalty  for  persons  convicted  of  piracy 
as  defined  by  the  law  of  nations.12 

A  few  months  after  the  passage  of  this  act  an  expedition  was 
sent  out  under  Commodore  Perry  to  carry  it  into  execution,  to 
communicate  the  terms  to  the  governments  of  Venezuela  and 
Buenos  Aires,  and  at  the  same  time  to  make  representations 
to  those  governments  against  the  privateering  piracies  carried 
on  in  their  names  and  under  their  commissions.13  A  number 
of  piratical  vessels  were  captured  and  within  the  next  year 
some  ten  or  twelve  of  the  pirates  were  executed,  executions 
taking  place  at  Boston,  Baltimore,  Charleston,  Savannah,  and 
New  Orleans.  A  number  of  others  of  the  culprits,  after  trial 
and  conviction,  were  pardoned.14  Although  the  executions 
produced  a  salutary  effect,  yet  piracy  continued  for  several 
years  longer  to  thrive,  especially  around  the  island  of  Cuba. 
In  the  course  of  time  the  incipient  South  American  navies  be- 
coming better  organized,  the  line  between  legitimate  privateer- 
ing and  piracy  was  more  clearly  distinguishable.  Thus  the 
task  of  suppressing  the  pirates  became  less  complex  and  less 
likely  to  cause  international  friction. 

In  the  meantime,  however,  numerous  cases  of  friction  did 
occur,  involving  not  only  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with 
the  European  powers,  but  with  the  new  states  and  Brazil  as 
well.  With  the  latter  the  situation  became  tense.  Brazil,  it 
will  be  remembered,  was  raised  in  1815  to  the  dignity  of  a 
kingdom  coordinate  with  the  mother  country.  As  long  as  the 

12  Annals  of  Congress,  15th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  2523. 

is  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  389. 

u  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Writings,  VII,  45;  Memoirs,  V,  147. 


178       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

court  resided  at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Brazil  was  in  effect  the  Portu- 
guese power.  The  memorial  on  privateering  presented  to  the 
Congress  of  Sovereigns  may  be  regarded,  therefore,  as  having 
been  presented  by  Brazil.  And  Brazil  had  cause  to  protest. 
It  will  be  recalled  that  the  territory  now  constituting  the  re- 
public of  Uruguay,  the  Banda  Oriental,  was  occupied  in  1816 
by  the  Portuguese  who,  after  driving  out  the  forces  of  Buenos 
Aires  and  of  the  independent  leader,  Artigas,  occupied  Monte- 
video. Retiring  northward,  Artigas  continued  the  struggle 
to  recover  Montevideo.  Though  he  had  no  port,  he  managed 
to  enlist  a  number  of  privateers  in  his  service.  The  Portu- 
guese minister,  the  Abbe  Correa,  made  frequent  complaints  to 
the  State  Department  at  Washington  of  the  depredations  of 
these  privateers,  which  he  declared  were  fitted  out  and  officered 
and  manned  in  the  ports  of  the  United  States.  Adams  be- 
lieved that  the  situation  was  so  serious  that  if  the  United  States 
had  been  the  injured  party  it  would  have  declared  war  without 
hesitation.15 

The  Abbe  Correa  resided  for  many  years  in  the  United 
States,  first  as  a  fugitive  from  the  Inquisition  and  afterward 
as  minister  plenipotentiary.  In  1820  he  returned  to  Brazil. 
At  that  time  he  was  seventy  years  of  age,  though,  as  Adams 
described  him,  full  of  spirit,  vivacity,  and  wit.  "  He  is  among 
the  men  I  have  known,"  said  Adams,  "  one  of  the  most  enter- 
taining conversation."  Just  before  returning  to  Brazil,  he 
went  upon  a  visit  to  Jefferson,  to  whom  he  talked  much  about 
an  American  system,  in  which  his  government  and  that  of  the 
United  States  should  be  united,  and,  by  concert  with  the  Eu- 
ropean powers,  should  agree  to  keep  the  coasts  of  this  hemi- 
sphere clear  of  pirates,  on  condition  that  they  should  clear  the 
seas  of  the  Eastern  Hemisphere  of  the  Barbary  pirates.  Jeffer- 
son was  disposed  to  favor  the  project  and  thought  that  it  might 
be  carried  into  effect  so  that  the  United  States  vessels  might  be 
withdrawn  from  the  Mediterranean.  But  Monroe  believed,  and 

is  Adams,  Memoirs,  V,  177. 


INTEBNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          179 

Adams  was  of  the  same  opinion,  that  an  American  system  upon 
that  plan  would  be  an  alliance  between  the  United  States  and 
Portugal  against  the  South  American  independents,  which  was 
hardly  reconcilable  with  any  just  view  of  our  policy.16 

Insisting  that  it  was  impossible  for  Portuguese  subjects  to 
obtain  justice  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  Correa  pro- 
posed the  appointment  of  special  commissioners  to  investigate 
their  complaints.  Told  by  Adams  that  such  an  arrangement 
was  impossible,  the  Portuguese  minister  painted  the  situation 
in  the  darkest  colors.  Adams  reported  to  the  President,  in 
part  as  follows :  "  These  things  had  produced  such  a  temper 
both  in  Portugal  and  in  Brazil  against  the  people  and  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  that  he  was  unwilling  to  tell  me  the 
proposal  which  had  been  formally  made  in  the  King's  Council 
concerning  them.  That  five  or  six  years  ago  the  people  of  the 
United  States  were  the  nation  of  the  earth  for  whom  the  Portu- 
guese felt  the  most  cordial  regard  and  friendship.  They  were 
now  those  whom  they  most  hated,  and  if  the  government  had 
considered  the  peace  as  at  an  end,  they  would  have  been  sup- 
ported in  the  declaration  by  the  hearty  concurrence  of  the  peo- 
ple. .  .  .  The  desire  of  the  king  was  to  be  on  good  terms  with 
the  United  States,  but  the  property  of  his  subjects  was  robbed 
upon  the  high  seas  by  pirates  sallying  from  the  ports  of  the 
United  States,  without  the  trouble  to  assume  a  disguise.  This 
practice  was  continued  year  after  year  in  the  midst  of  profes- 
sions of  friendship  from  the  American  Government.  It  was 
impossible  that  he  should  put  up  with  it."  17 

Events  over  which  the  United  States  had  no  control  had 
already  solved  this  difficulty  with  Brazil.  Unknown  to  the 
Portuguese  minister,  the  power  of  Artigas  had  been  completely 
broken  some  months  before  and  he  was  already  a  prisoner  in 
Paraguay.  Other  events  which  soon  followed  —  the  return  of 
the  king  and  his  court  to  Portugal  in  1821  and  the  declaration 

ie  Adams,  Memoirs,  172,  176. 

IT  Adams  to  Monroe,  August  30,  1820,  Writings,  VII,  70, 


180       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

of  independence  by  Brazil  in  1822  —  marked  the  beginning  of 
a  new  era  in  the  relations  between  these  two  great  American 
states. 

Other  incidents  caused  friction  between  the  United  States 
and  the  new  governments.  The  privateering  enterprises  of 
Thomas  Lloyd  Halsey,  the  United  States  agent  at  Buenos  Aires, 
resulted  in  his  dismissal.  Another  representative  at  Buenos 
Aires,  W.  G.  D.  Worthington,  though  not  violating  neutrality, 
did  swell  upon  his  agency,  as  Adams  expressed  it,  until  he 
broke  out  into  a  self-accredited  plenipotentiary,18  causing  his 
dismissal  also.  The  government  of  Buenos  Aires  was  no  less 
unfortunate  in  its  early  representatives  to  the  United  States. 
The  first,  Martin  Thompson,  sent  to  Washington  in  1816,  was 
dismissed  by  his  government  for  having  transcended  his  author- 
ity in  granting  commissions.19  Manuel  H.  de  Aguirre,  who 
succeeded  him  the  next  year,  suffered  persecution,  personal 
humiliation,  and  imprisonment.  He  was  commissioned  by  his 
government  to  obtain  the  recognition  of  Argentine  independ- 
ence and  to  induce  the  United  States  to  favor  the  interests  of 
the  new  states.20  And  as  a  private  agent  of  Chile,  in  addition 
to  his  public  representation  of  Buenos  Aires,  he  was  authorized 
to  build  and  dispatch  six  sloops  of  war  to  aid  in  the  expedition 
against  Peru  which  was  then  being  organized.21 

Arriving  in  the  United  States  during  the  summer  of  1817, 
Aguirre  had  an  interview  with  the  President  and  with  the  Sec- 
retary of  State,  Rush,  the  latter  of  whom  informed  him  that 
nothing  in  the  law  prevented  the  building  and  sending  away 
the  vessels  as  a  commercial  speculation.22  Not  until  October 
29,  did  he  communicate  with  the  government  on  the  subject  of 
recognition.  Receiving  no  reply,  he  wrote  again  on  December 

is  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  158 ;  V,  93. 

is  Palomeque,  Origenes  de  la  Diplomacia  Argentina,  I,  28.     Adams,  J.  Q., 
Memoirs,  IV,  46. 

20  Mitre,  Historia  de  Belgrano,  III,  309. 

21  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  123. 
•^  /bid.,  IV,  124. 


INTEKNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          181 

16.  "  My  government/7  he  said,  "  considering  that  of  the 
United  States  as  one  of  the  first  of  whom  it  ought  to  solicit 
this  acknowledgment,  believed  that  the  identity  of  political  prin- 
ciples, the  consideration  of  their  inhabiting  the  same  hemi- 
sphere, and  the  sympathy  so  natural  to  those  who  have  expe- 
rienced similar  evils,  would  be  so  many  additional  reasons  in 
support  of  its  anxiety.  .  .  .  The  recollection  that  it  was  these 
states  which  first  pointed  out  to  us  the  path  of  glory,  and  the 
evidence  that  they  are  enjoying  most  fully  the  blessed  effects  of 
liberty,  inspire  me  with  the  conviction  that  it  is  for  them  also 
to  show  that  they  know  how  to  appreciate  our  efforts."  23 

Failing  in  his  effort  to  obtain  recognition,  Aguirre  went  to 
New  York,  where  he  had  two  sloops  of  war  constructed,  his 
funds  not  being  sufficient  for  more.  It  was  in  this  transaction 
that  his  troubles  arose.  At  the  instigation  of  the  Spanish  con- 
sul, he  was  once  arrested  in  the  streets,  and  at  another  time  he 
was  taken  out  of  bed  at  midnight.  For  some  weeks,  his  house 
became  "  a  mere  house  of  marshals  and  sheriffs  and  officers  of 
the  law."  24  When  the  vessels  were  ready  for  sea  they  were 
attached  for  personal  debts  of  the  captains  in  whose  names  they 
were  registered.  His  officers  and  crews  had  been  bribed;  his 
funds  were  exhausted;  and  the  two  sloops  were  lying  at  New 
York  at  an  expense  of  a  thousand  dollars  a  day.  Aguirre's 
only  resource  was  to  sell  them.  But,  being  built  as  vessels  of 
war,  they  were  not  salable  for  purposes  of  commerce.  Hence, 
he  turned  to  the  government,  complaining  bitterly  of  his  treat- 
ment and  inquiring  if  it  would  purchase  the  vessels. 

At  the  President's  request,  Adams  wrote  to  Aguirre  inform- 
ing him  that  the  executive  was  not  authorized  to  make  the  pur- 
chase. Explaining  that  the  interpretation  and  exposition  of 
the  laws,  under  the  free  institutions  of  the  United  States,  be- 
longed peculiarly  to  the  judiciary,  and  reminding  Aguirre  as 
a  stranger,  unacquainted  with  the  legal  provisions  of  the  United 

23  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  IV,  180. 

24  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  123. 


182       PAST- AMERICANISM :  ITS 

States,  lie  might  have  recurred  to  professional  men  of  eminence 
for  advice,  Adams  continued  as  follows :  "  You  have,  therefore, 
constantly  been  aware  of  the  necessity  of  proceeding  in  such  a 
manner,  in  executing  the  orders  of  your  government,  as  to  avoid 
violating  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  although  it  has  not 
been  possible  to  extend  to  you  the  privilege  of  exemption  from 
arrest  (an  exemption  not  enjoyed  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States  himself,  in  his  individual  capacity),  yet  you  have  had 
all  the  benefit  of  those  laws  which  are  the  protection  of  the 
rights  and  personal  liberties  of  our  citizens.  Although  you  had 
built  and  equipped,  and  fitted  for  sea,  and  manned,  two  vessels 
suitable  for  purposes  of  war,  yet  as  no  proof  was  adduced  that 
you  had  armed  them,  you  were  immediately  liberated  and  dis- 
charged by  the  decision  of  the  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court,  be- 
fore whom  the  case  was  brought.  It  is  yet  impossible  for  me 
to  say  that  the  execution  of  the  orders  of  your  government  is 
impracticable ;  but  the  government  of  the  United  States  can  no 
more  countenance  or  participate  in  any  expedient  to  evade  the 
intention  of  the  laws  than  it  can  dispense  with  their  oper- 
ation." 26  Shortly  afterward  Aguirre  made  the  financial  ar- 
rangements necessary  to  enable  him  to  take  the  vessels  away. 
As  they  sailed  unarmed,  their  departure  was  not  hindered  by 
the  government.26 

Three  questions  connected  with  the  acquisition  of  Florida 
affected  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  with  the  belligerent  provinces.  The  first  of  these  was 
the  occupation  of  West  Florida.  The  strip  of  territory  lying 
south  of  the  thirty-first  parallel,  between  the  Perdido  River  on 
the  east  and  the  Mississippi  on  the  west,  and  known  as  West 

25  Adams  to  Monroe,  August  27,  1818,  Writings,  VI,  450. 

26  The  vessels  reached  Buenos  Aires  in  November,  1818.     One  of  them 
later  joined  the  Chilean  Navy.     The  other  was  taken  away  by  her  captain 
to  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  sold  to  the  Portuguese  Government,  the  failure  of  the 
Buenos  Aires  Government  to  pay  the  crew  and  to  reimburse  the  captain  for 
funds  advanced  by  him  being  alleged  as  the  reason.     Barros  Arana,  Historia 
Jeneral  de  Chile,  XII,  280. 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          183 

Florida,  was  claimed  by  the  United  States  as  a  part  of  the 
Louisiana  purchase.  It  had  never  been  delivered  to  the  French, 
however,  and  it  continued  under  Spanish  rule  until  1810,  when 
the  inhabitants,  as  elsewhere  in  Spanish  America,  rose  in  revolt 
Representatives  of  the  several  districts  convened  at  Baton  Rouge 
and  on  September  26,  1810,  declared  the  territory  to  be  a  free 
and  independent  state.  The  convention  then  requested  the 
government  at  Washington  to  take  the  infant  state  under  its 
"  immediate  and  special  protection,  as  an  integral  and  inalien- 
able portion  of  the  United  States.7'  The  President  deemed  it 
"  right  and  requisite  "  that  possession  should  be  taken  of  the 
territory,  but  on  the  ground  of  the  claim  to  it  under  the  treaty 
of  cession.  Accordingly,  ignoring  the  independent  government 
established  there,  he  ordered  Governor  Claiborne  to  occupy  the 
territory  and  administer  it  as  a  part  of  the  Orleans  Territory.27 
This  transaction  appears  to  have  aroused  at  the  time  no  re- 
sentment on  the  part  of  the  Patriots  in  Mexico  or  in  South 
America. 

The  next  incident,  however,  did  affect  to  some  extent  the 
relations  of  the  United  States  with  certain  of  the  new  states. 
This  was  the  suppression  of  an  insurgent  establishment  on  what 
is  known  as  Amelia  Island  at  the  mouth  of  St.  Mary's  River, 
near  the  boundary  of  the  state  of  Georgia.  The  facts  of  the 
case  are  stated  by  the  President  in  divers  messages  to  Congress.28 
In  the  summer  of  1817",  Amelia  Island  was  taken  possession  of 
by  persons  claiming  to  act  under  the  authority  of  some  of  the 
revolutionary  governments.  As  the  island  lay  within  territory 
which  had  long  been  the  subject  of  negotiation  with  Spain,  its 
occupation  excited  surprise.  The  unfolding  of  the  undertaking, 
however,  in  the  opinion  of  the  President,  marked  it  as  a 
mere  private,  unauthorized  adventure.  "  Projected  and  com- 
menced," he  declared,  "  with  an  incompetent  force,  reliance 

2T  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  III,  395-397.  For  a  full  history  see 
The  West  Florida  Controversy  by  Isaac  Joslin  Cox. 

28  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  II,  13,  23,  32,  40,  51.  December  2, 
1817;  January  13,  1818;  November  16,  1818;  January  30,  1819. 


184       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

seems  to  have  been  placed  on  what  might  be  drawn,  in  defiance 
of  our  laws,  from  within  our  limits;  and  of  late,  as  their  re- 
sources have  failed,  it  has  assumed  a  more  marked  character  of 
unfriendliness  to  us,  the  island  made  a  channel  for  the  illicit 
introduction  of  slaves  from  Africa  into  the  United  States, 
an  asylum  for  fugitive  slaves  from  the  neighboring  states, 
and  a  port  for  smuggling  of  every  kind." 29  Moreover, 
like  Galveston  Island,  the  place  was  made  the  rendez- 
vous for  privateers  illegally  fitted  out  in  the  ports 
of  the  United  States.  Under  the  secret  Act  of  January 
15,  1811,  the  President  was  empowered  to  occupy  any  part  of 
East  Florida  in  the  event  of  an  attempted  occupation  by  any 
foreign  government  or  power.30  The  Spanish  authorities  hav- 
ing made  a  feeble  and  ineffectual  attempt  to  dislodge  the  in- 
vaders, the  executive  dispatched  the  United  States  ship  John 
Adams,  Captain  Henley  commanding,  to  the  island  with  in- 
structions to  break  up  the  establishment.  This  was  accom- 
plished with  the  cooperation  of  land  forces  in  the  latter  part  of 
December,  1817.31  Subsequently  the  United  States  held  the 
place,  subject  to  negotiations  pending  with  Spain. 

The  President  expressed  full  confidence  that  the  revolutionary 
governments  would  disclaim  any  connection  with  the  enterprise, 
and  the  several  agents  who  were  being  dispatched  toward  the 
end  of  1817  to  South  America  were  instructed  to  bring  the  sub- 
ject to  the  attention  of  the  governments  which  they  might  visit. 
Aguirre,  the  Argentine  agent,  declared  to  Rodney  and  Bland 
before  they  set  out  for  Buenos  Aires,  that  the  adventurers  never 
had  any  authority  from  his  government  whatever;  that  in  his 
judgment  the  United  States  was  fully  justified  in  breaking  up 
the  establishment ;  and  that  he  was  assured  it  would  be  consid- 
ered in  the  same  light  by  his  government.82.  O'Higgins,  the 
Director  of  Chile,  declared  to  Bland  that  he  had  never  heard 

29  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  II,  14. 
ao  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  IV,  132. 

81  Niles'  Weekly  Register,  XIII,  347. 

82  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  46. 


COMPLICATIONS          185 

of  such  a  place  as  Amelia  Island.33  And  Bolivar  assured  Ir- 
vine, an  agent  sent  to  Venezuela,  that  his  government  had  no 
knowledge  of  or  part  in  the  enterprise.34  Mexico  and  New 
Granada,  the  other  governments  supposedly  connected  with  the 
scheme,  appear  to  have  made  no  formal  disavowal.  The  former 
possessed  no  responsible  revolutionary  government  at  the  time, 
and  as  the  latter  was  on  the  point  of  union  with  Venezuela,  its 
(failure  to  disavow,  if  indeed  it  did  fail  to  do  so,  need  not  be 
regarded  as  a  serious  omission. 

Inasmuch  as  certain  recent  Spanish  American  writers  at- 
tribute to  Bolivar  the  design  of  erecting  a  barrier  in  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  against  the  expansion  of  the  United  States  toward  the 
south,  it  will  be  of  interest  to  inquire  further  into  the  insurgent 
occupation  of  Amelia  Island  with  a  view  to  determining  whether 
or  not  it  constituted  a  part  of  any  such  plan.  Although  there 
is  much  about  the  affair  that  remains  obscure,  yet  certain  facts, 
relating  especially  to  the  chief  actors,  throw  light  upon  it. 

Sir  Gregor  McGregor  was  the  leader  of  the  expedition  which 
took  possession  of  the  island.  Sir  Gregor  had  then  been  in 
America  for  several  years,  having  gone  first  to  Venezuela  in 
1811.  There  he  served  under  Miranda,  rising  to  the  rank  of 
brigadier  general.  After  Miranda's  downfall,  he  joined  Bolivar 
in  the  renewed  struggle,  and  on  a  number  of  occasions  distin- 
guished himself.  For  a  short  time  in  1816,  during  Bolivar's 
absence,  he  was  in  chief  command  of  the  forces  in  northern 
Venezuela.  Later  he  surrendered  the  command  to  General  Piar 
and  abandoned  the  country.  Had  he  already  been  designated 
as  the  leader  of  the  Amelia  Island  expedition  ?  Such  evidence 
as  is  available  proves  the  contrary.  Early  in  1817  news  of  his 
being  at  Saint  Thomas  was  published  in  the  United  States. 
The  reasons  assigned  for  his  quitting  Venezuela  were  "  the 
futility  of  his  endeavors  to  establish  concert,  discipline,  and  a 
regular  government."  35  That  he  abandoned  the  Venezuelan 

S3  American  State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  IV,  292. 

s*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  42, 

85  files'  Weekly  Register,  XI,  380, 


186       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

cause  in  disgust  is  confirmed  by  Larrazabal,  by  Baralt,  and  by 
the  anonymous  author  of  a  Voyage  to  the  Spanish  Main.™  It 
is  further  confirmed  by  circumstances  and  by  the  character  of 
the  man.  After  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  foreign 
officers  flocked  to  the  standards  of  the  revolutionists  in  great 
numbers.  These  officers,  among  whom  many  were  unfit  for  the 
positions  which  they  received,  were  inclined  to  despise  the  na- 
tive officers  under  whose  orders  they  had  to  serve.  Hostility 
of  the  natives  to  the  foreigners  naturally  arose,  leading  many  of 
the  latter  to  quit  the  service.  Sir  Gregor  was  an  exceedingly 
vain  man  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  the  surrender  of  the  com- 
mand, the  exercise  of  which  for  a  short  time  must  have  given 
him  great  satisfaction,  to  a  native  officer  whom  doubtless  he 
regarded  as  his  inferior,  was  more  than  his  pride  could  bear. 

McGregor  now  had  no  other  aim,  apparently,  than  to  seek 
some  new  field  of  adventure  in  which  he  could  himself  be  the 
chief  figure.  His  exploits  were  heralded  to  the  world.  It  was 
reported  that  he  was  proceeding  to  Mexico ;  that  upon  arriving 
at  Saint  Thomas  he  had  immediately  recruited  one  hundred  and 
fifty  "  choice  spirits  of  various  nations  and  complexions  "  ;  that 
with  these  he  had  embarked  for  Port-au-Prince,  expecting  to 
raise  there  enough  men  to  get  a  footing  in  Mexico,  where  he  sup- 
posed the  natives  would  flock  to  his  standard.  He  is  next  heard 
of  at  Baltimore,  but  without  followers.37  On  March  31,  1817, 
he  was  commissioned  at  Philadelphia  by  certain  "  deputies  of 
Free  America  "  to  take  possession,  either  wholly  or  in  part,  of 
East  and  West  Florida.38  With  a  small  expedition  organized 
in  the  United  States,  he  proceeded  to  Amelia  Island,  which  he 
took  without  a  struggle.  His  plans  were  next  to  attack  St. 
Augustine.  But  almost  immediately  dissensions  arose,  and  in 
September  he  resigned.  Louis  Aury,  who  put  into  the  harbor 

8«  Vida  de  Bolivar,  I,  444 ;  Resumen  de  la  Historia  de  Venezuela,  I,  285. 
Narrative  of  a  voyage  to  the  Spanish  Main  in  the  ship  Two  Friends,  The 
occupation  of  Amelia  Island  by  McGregor,  etc. 

»T  Niles'  Weekly,  XI,  380. 

-8  Executive  Document,  15th  Cong.,  1st  Sesa.,  No.  175,  33. 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          187 

about  the  time  McGregor  resigned,  assumed  command.  Sir 
Gregor,  it  was  reported,  sailed  away  for  England  in  his  priva- 
teer, The  General  McGregor,  to  arrange  his  personal  affairs. 
In  1819  he  made  a  descent  on  Porto  Bello,  which  he  captured. 
Although  this  place  lay  within  the  territory  claimed  by  the  new 
republic  of  Colombia,  Sir  Gregor  acted  independently.39  Sur- 
prised by  Spanish  forces  and  compelled  to  flee,  he  next  estab- 
lished himself  on  the  Mosquite  shore,  where  he  adopted  the  title 
of  his  Highness  Gregor,  Cacique  of  Poyais.  In  this  enterprise 
he  failed  also.  In  1839,  he  was  naturalized  by  the  Venezuelan 
Government  and  restored  to  his  former  military  rank.  His 
death  occurred,  it  is  said,  at  Caracas  a  few  years  later.40 

It  is  even  more  clear  that  Aury  as  the  head  of  the  Amelia 
Island  enterprise  was  not  an  agent  of  Bolivar.  The  privateer- 
ing activities  of  this  buccaneer,  pirate,  or  patriot,41  as  he  is  vari- 
ously called,  have  already  been  adverted  to.  He  was  originally 
a  French  sailmaker,  becoming  afterward  a  sailor.  He  lived  in 
Santo  Domingo  until  1813.  He  then  offered  his  services  to  the 
Patriots  of  New  Granada,  who  gave  him  a  commission  as  lieu- 
tenant in  their  navy,  and  promoted  him  afterward  to  the  rank 
of  commandant  general  of  their  naval  forces.42  In  1816,  when 
the  exiled  leaders  of  Venezuela  and  New  Granada  met  at  Aux 
Cayes,  in  the  republic  of  Haiti,  to  adopt  measures  for  renewing 
the  war,  Aury  alone  opposed  the  election  of  Bolivar  as  supreme 
chief  with  full  military  and  civil  authority.  But  he  was  joined 
by  Montilla,  Bermudez,  and  a  few  others  who  were  also  discon- 
tented with  Bolivar's  leadership.  This  small  group  attempted 
to  break  up  the  Venezuelan  expedition  by  offering  extraordinary 
rewards  to  those  who  would  enroll  in  the  service  of  Mexico. 

39  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XVI,  390. 

40  Lee,  Dictionary  of  National  Biography,  XXXV,  95. 

41  It  is  of  especial  interest  to  note  that  Alaman    ( Historic  de  Mexico, 
IV,   553)    calls  him  "the  chief  of  the  pirates."     See  also   Adams,  J.   Q., 
Memoirs,  IV,  58.     Parton   (Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  II,  423)   says  that  he 
seems  to  have  been  a  man  of  honor,  sincerely  devoted  to  the  cause. 

*"  Adams,  <J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  75;  Executive  Document  115,  15th  Cong., 
1st  Sess.,  36. 


188       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Failing  to  interfere  materially  with  Bolivar's  plans,  Aury,  with 
his  band,  proceeded  to  join  the  Mexicans.43  His  establishment 
at  Galveston,  his  appointment  as  civil  and  military  governor  of 
Texas,  and  his  connection  with  the  Mina  expedition  have  been 
noted.  After  having  convoyed  Mina's  vessels  down  the  coast 
of  Mexico,  he  established  his  headquarters  for  a  while  at  Mata- 
gorda  Bay.  Thence  he  proceeded  late  in  the  summer  of  1817 
to  Amelia  Island  to  join  McGregor.  Assuming  command  un- 
der the  doubtful  authority  of  the  commission  issued  to  him  by 
the  Mexican,  Herrera,  he  hoisted  the  Mexican  flag.44  After 
his  departure  from  Amelia  Island  he  was  employed  in  the  serv- 
ice of  Colombia.45 

It  appears,  then,  that  Bolivar  had  no  connection  with  either 
of  these  agents.  But  what  of  his  relation  to  the  principals  ? 
McGregor's  commission  was  signed  by  Lino  de  Clemente  as 
Deputy  of  Venezuela;  by  Pedro  Gual  as  deputy  for  New 
Granada,  and  as  proxy  for  F.  Zarate,  the  Mexican  deputy ;  and 
by  Martin  Thompson  as  deputy  for  Buenos  Aires.46  Of  these, 
Lino  de  Clemente  and  Gual  alone  need  be  considered;  for 
Thompson  was  without  standing  in  Buenos  Aires  and,  more- 
over, he  was  dismissed  for  exceeding  his  authority.  The  Mexi- 
can representative  appears  to  have  had  no  part  in  the  undertak- 
ing. Clemente  was  most  active  in  promoting  the  enterprise. 
He  was  Bolivar's  brother-in-law,  having  married  Maria  Antonia 
de  Bolivar.  He  was  sent  as  an  agent  to  the  United  States  early 
in  1817.  Nothing  in  the  published  documents  and  correspon- 
dence shows  that  in  the  Amelia  Island  affair  he  acted  on  any 
but  his  own  responsibility;  though  there  is  some  evidence  that 
Bolivar  did  not  strongly  condemn  the  conduct  of  his  agent. 
Writing  to  Clemente  after  the  conference  with  Irvine,  Bolivar 
said  that  his  reply  had  reduced  itself  to  a  declaration  that  the 

43  Larrazabal,  Vida  de  Bolivar,  I,  417. 

4*  Executive  Document  175,  15th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  16.  Adams,  J.  Q., 
Writings,  VI,  284. 

45  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  VIII,  510. 

46  Executive  Document  175,  15th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  34. 


INTEKNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          189 

government  of  Venezuela  was  ignorant  of  what  was  going  on  at 
Amelia  Island  and  that  it  did  not  recognize  either  McGregor  or 
Aury  as  legitimate  parties  to  the  contest  against  Spain  unless 
they  had  received  authority  from  some  independent  government. 
"  Mr.  Irvine/'  he  added,  "  expressed  the  greatest  satisfaction  at 
this  reply,  although  it  was  nothing  more  than  a  private  opinion 
confidentially  expressed."  47  Moreover  Bolivar  now  dispatched 
to  Clemente  an  appointment  as  envoy  extraordinary  and  minis- 
ter plenipotentiary  near  the  government  of  the  United  States.48 
This  appointment  proved  to  be  offensive  to  the  government  at 
Washington.  But  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  it  was  so 
intended.  Irvine,  another  of  the  "  mere  enthusiasts/'  in  all 
probability,  had  not  given  Bolivar  any  reason  to  suppose  that 
Clemente's  actions  in  the  United  States  were  regarded  there  as 
reprehensible.  The  administration,  however,  took  a  decidedly 
different  view  of  them,  and  when  Clemente,  after  receiving  his 
commission,  presented  himself  at  Washington  and  requested  a 
conference,  the  Secretary  of  State,  by  direction  of  the  President, 
replied  in  the  severest  terms.  "  I  have  to  inform  you,"  he 
wrote,  "  that  your  name  having  been  avowedly  affixed  to  a  paper, 
drawn  up  within  the  United  States,  purporting  to  be  a  commis- 
sion to  a  foreign  officer  for  undertaking  and  executing  an  ex- 
pedition in  violation  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  also 
to  another  paper  avowing  that  act,  and  otherwise  insulting  to 
this  government,  ...  I  am  not  authorized  to  confer  with  you, 
and  that  no  further  communication  will  be  received  from  you 
at  this  department."  49  When  Clemente  shortly  afterward  re- 
turned to  Venezuela,  he  not  only  manifested  great  resentment 
toward  the  United  States,  but  insisted  that  the  Venezuelan 
Government  approve  his  conduct  in  the  Amelia  Island  affair. 
Bolivar  being  absent  from  the  seat  of  government,  it  fell  to 

47  Bolivar  to  Lino  de  Clemente,  July  24,  1818.  Urrutia,  Pdginas  de  His- 
toria  Diplomdtica,  120.  , 

48/&td,  116. 

49  Adams  to  Lino  de  Clemente,  December  16,  1818,  Am.  State  Papers,  For. 
ReL,  IV,  414. 


190       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  vice  president,  Zea,  to  pass  upon  the  matter.  Zea  denied 
Clemente's  request,  and  in  writing  to  Bolivar  on  the  subject 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  United  States  was  well  disposed 
toward  the  cause  of  the  Patriots  and  that  the  impolitic  con- 
duct of  Clemente  had  alone  prevented  a  positive  declaration  in 
their  favor.50 

Of  GuaPs  connection  with  Amelia  Island  less  in  known.  He 
resided  there  for  a  time  and  took  part  in  the  management  of 
the  establishment.  Adams,  who  regarded  him  as  the  most  re- 
spectable of  all  the  men  connected  with  the  enterprise,  leaves 
it  to  be  inferred  from  an  entry  in  his  journal  that  Gual's  con- 
duct may  have  been  influenced  by  his  desperate  circumstances 
and  by  the  lack  of  means  of  subsistence.  The  President,  how- 
ever, regarded  the  project  as  peculiarly  Gual's  own,  and  at- 
tributed to  him  a  feeling  of  acrimonious  resentment  for  its 
failure.51 

The  names  of  Xavier  Mina  and  Alvarez  de  Toledo  were  also 
connected  with  the  enterprise.  When  the  establishment  was  sup- 
pressed, Aury  designated  one  of  the  adventurers,  Vicente  Pazos, 
to  inform  the  United  States  of  the  grounds  on  which  "  this  part 
of  East  Florida  was  dismembered  from  the  dominions  of  the 
King  of  Spain."  In  his  exposition,  Pazos  declared  that  the  en- 
terprise was  decided  upon  in  consequence  of  the  arrival,  in  the 
summer  of  1816,  of  Mina  from  England  and  of  Toledo  from 
New  Orleans;  and  in  consequence  of  the  interception  of  a  dis- 
patch indicating  the  probable  transfer  of  the  Floridas  to  the 
United  States.  The  plan  was  to  launch  two  simultaneous  at- 
tacks from  Port-au-Prince  under  Mina  and  Toledo.  But  the 
damage  sustained  by  Mina's  fleet  in  a  storm  and  the  desertion  of 
Toledo,  says  Pazos,  frustrated  the  plan.52 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  Mina  and  Bolivar  met  at 
Port-au-Prince.  The  two  leaders  discussed  their  respective 

BO  Zea  to  Bolivar,  June  8,  1819.    O'Leary,  Memorial,  XVI,  398. 

si  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  775;  VI,  146. 

cz  Executive  Document  175,  15th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  23. 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          191 

plans,  Mina  having  already  proposed  by  letter  the  union  of 
their  forces  in  the  liberation  first  of  Mexico  and  then  of  Vene- 
zuela. This  combination  Bolivar  did  not  approve.53  Nor  does 
it  appear. that  either  Bolivar  or  Mina  designed  measures  for 
the  wresting  of  Florida  from  Spain.  Robinson,  the  historian 
of  the  Mina  expedition,  mentions  in  this  relation  only  an  over- 
ture made  to  Mina  by  certain  persons  at  New  Orleans  for  an 
attack  upon  Pensacola.  This  overture  Mina  rejected  because 
it  appeared  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  mercantile  speculation. 
"  As  a  soldier  and  as  a  patriot/'  says  Robinson,  "  he  disliked  to 
war  for  mercenary  considerations  and  he  was  most  decidedly 
hostile  to  all  predatory  projects."  54 

But  the  occupation  of  Florida  may  have  formed  at  one  time 
a  part  of  Mina's  plans.  These  plans,  it  will  be  recalled,  were 
laid  in  England,  and  there,  if  anywhere,  the  plot  to  keep  the 
United  States  out  of  Florida  was  hatched.  During  the  War  of 
1812  the  British  used  Florida  as  a  base  of  operations  against 
the  United  States,  and  after  the  war  a  certain  Colonel  Nicholls 
and  other  British  subjects,  among  whom  were  Arbuthnot  and 
Ambrister,  remained  there  to  perpetuate  British  influence.55 
During  1815  the  English  papers  frequently  discussed  the  sub- 
ject of  Florida,  in  a  tone  hostile  to  the  United  States.  Rumors 
of  the  cession  of  the  province  by  Spain  to  Great  Britain  were 
constantly  circulated.56  It  was  even  reported  that  there  was  in 
preparation  an  expedition  of  ten  thousand  men,  to  be  sent  out 
from  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  to  take  possession  of  it.  The 
intimations  of  these  things  reaching  Washington  were  so  strong 
and  confident  that  Adams  was  finally  instructed  to  bring  the 
matter  to  the  attention  of  the  British  Government.57  In  Feb- 
ruary, 1816,  he  obtained  from  Castlereagh  the  assurance  that 
there  was  not  and  never  had  been  any  foundation  for  the  re- 

53  Larrazabal,  Vida  de  Bolivar,  I,  442. 

5*  Robinson,  Memoirs  of  the  Mexican  Revolution,  69,  76,  261. 

55  Bassett,  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  253. 

56  Mies'  Weekly  Register,  IX,  197,  200,  215,  252. 

57  Monroe  to  Adams,  December  10,  1815.     Monroe,  Writings,  V,  380. 


192       PAK-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGIKKTINGS 

ports.  "  Military  positions,"  he  said,  "  may  have  been  taken  by 
us  during  the  war  of  places  which  you  had  previously  taken  from 
Spain,  but  we  never  intended  to  keep  them.  Do  you  only  ob- 
serve the  same  moderation.  If  we  shall  find  you  hereafter 
pursuing  a  system  of  encroachment  upon  your  neighbors,  what 
we  might  do  defensively  is  another  consideration."  58  Later, 
when  the  expedition  against  Amelia  Island  was  being  organized 
in  the  United  States,  McGregor  went  to  Bagot,  the  British  min- 
ister at  Washington  and,  unfolding  the  plans  for  taking  Florida, 
asked  him  what  the  opinion  of  the  British  Government  upon  it 
would  be.  Bagot  replied  that  he  could  give  no  answer  to  that 
question  and  could  say  nothing  about  it.  In  the  Seminole 
War  the  British  subjects,  Nicholls,  Arbuthnot,  Ambrister,  and 
others,  incited  the  Indians  to  hostilities  against  the  United 
States,  and  the  fact  that  they  acted  in  concert  with  McGregor 
was  established.  The  British  Government,  however,  disavowed 
the  acts  of  its  subjects.59 

Hyde  de  Neuville,  who  kept  his  government  informed  of  the 
Amelia  Island  affair,  was  convinced  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment was  back  of  it.  In  June,  1817,  he  expressed  his  views 
in  the  following  terms :  "  The  eclat  of  this  expedition,  the  funds 
which  have  been  put  into  it,  the  affectation  on  the  part  of  the 
leaders  of  encouragement  by  the  Federal  Government,  the  origin 
of  McGregor,  his  secret  relations  with  English  agents,  his  con- 
fidences to  some  of  the  members  of  his  party,  all  concur  to  con- 
vince me  of  what  I  have  sought  to  make  sure  of ;  that  is,  that  it 
is  chiefly  English  influence  which  is  at  work  in  the  ports  of  the 
United  States  and  that  McGregor  is  nothing  more  than  a  British 
agent.  The  English  wish  to  compromise  the  Americans;  they 
wish  to  create  for  themselves  a  pretext  and  to  mask  their  own 
ambition,  from  the  necessity  of  putting  a  check  on  that  of  the 
Federal  Government.  If  Florida  is  attacked  by  the  insurgents, 
the  adventurers  of  the  Union  will  flock  to  them  from  all  sides. 

M  Adams  to  Monroe,  February  8,  1816.     Adams,  Writings,  V,  602. 
«•  Adams,  J.  Q.,  Memoirs,  IV,  50,  179. 


COMPLICATIONS          193 

The  English  would  then  have  to  choose  whether  to  come  to  the 
aid  of  Spain  against  the  Americans,  or  to  support  openly  the 
insurgents,  in  either  case  under  the  pretext  of  the  conduct  of 
the  government  and  people  of  the  United  States."  Three 
months  later,  Hyde  de  Neuville,  though  still  believing  that  Mc- 
Gregor was  a  British  agent  and  that  his  mission  was  to  make 
trouble  and  to  compromise  the  Americans,  thought  that  he  had 
indirectly  served  the  Americans,  as  the  attack  on  Amelia  would 
result  in  forcing  Spain  to  the  cession  of  the  Floridas.  A  year 
later  he  again  declared :  "  McGregor  is  certainly  an  agent  of  the 
English  Government."  60 

In  maintaining  that  the  British  Government  directly  sup- 
ported the  Amelia  Island  enterprise,  Hyde  de  Neuville  was  in 
error,  if  the  declarations  of  that  government  are  to  be  credited. 
But  the  complicity  of  certain  British  subjects  does  not  admit  of 
question.  What  part  they  may  have  had  in  conceiving  the  plan 
is  not  known  and,  indeed,  the  final  word  on  the  subject  cannot 
be  spoken  until  the  facts  relative  to  its  origin  are  revealed.  Of 
all  the  explanations  of  the  undertaking,  however,  the  most  im- 
probable is  that  which  attributes  it  to  distrust  of  the  United 
States  on  the  part  of  Bolivar  or  of  other  influential  Spanish 
Americans.  That  sentiment  was  the  conjecture  of  a  later  day. 
The  South  American  promoters  of  the  scheme  for  seizing  the 
Floridas,  whatever  hidden  motives  may  have  instigated  their 
backers,  professed  to  act  in  no  unfriendly  spirit  toward  the 
United  States.  They  maintained  that  the  occupation  of  Florida 
by  the  Patriots  would  in  every  way  be  beneficial  to  the  United 
States,  especially  since  Spain  had  manifested  a  willingness  to 
transfer  it  to  some  European  power.  It  is  true  that  the  United 
States  had  declared  more  than  once  that  it  would  not  consent 
to  such  a  transfer  and  for  obvious  reasons;  but  it  was  no  less 
obvious,  they  insisted,  that  those  reasons  did  not  apply  to  the 
other  American  states.  The  French  or  the  English  in  Florida 
would  be  commercial  and  political  rivals,  whereas  the  Patriots 
*o  Memoirs  et  Souvenirs,  II,  271,  324,  369. 


194       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

would  be  friends  politically  and  commercially.  With  the  inde- 
pendence of  Florida  established,  they  said,  it  would  be  recog- 
nized as  a  part  of  the  confederation  of  South  America ;  but  this 
they  did  not  wish  to  have  interpreted  as  denying  to  the  people  of 
Florida  the  right  to  become  a  part  of  the  United  States  if  they 
and  the  people  of  the  United  States  so  desired.61 

The  suppression  of  the  Amelia  Island  establishment  appears 
to  have  aroused  no  great  resentment  except  on  the  part  of  the 
insurgent  agents  in  the  United  States.  A  long  article,  it  is 
true,  was  published  in  the  Correo  del  Orinoco?2  the  semi-official 
organ  of  the  Venezuelan  Government,  in  which  the  action  of  the 
United  States  was  severely  criticized.  But  this  article  has 
every  evidence  of  having  originated  with  Lino  de  Clemente,  and 
it  is  to  be  doubted  whether  it  reflected  any  widespread  feeling 
among  the  leaders  of  Venezuela.  That  Bolivar  knew  nothing 
about  the  inception  of  the  undertaking  and  that  he  did  not  ob- 
ject to  the  acquisition  of  the  Floridas  by  the  United  States  is 
singularly  confirmed  by  two  of  his  letters.  Writing  to  Piar  on 
June  14,  1817,  about  the  time  the  Amelia  Island  expedition 
was  ready  to  set  out,  Bolivar  said :  "  Brion  writes  me  of  the 
early  arrival  of  McGregor  from  Baltimore  with  seven  large  ves- 
sels loaded  with  arms  and  munitions.  They  are  coming  to  join 
Brion  and  us."  63  A  little  more  than  a  year  later,  writing  to 
Briceno,  and  referring  in  a  spirit  of  exultation  to  the  victory  of 
San  Martin  in  Chile,  and  to  the  campaigns  in  Venezuela  and 
New  Granada,  he  declared :  "  The  day  of  America  has  arrived, 
and  everything  appears  to  announce  the  end  of  our  glorious  and 
terrible  struggle.  The  war  of  the  United  States  leaves  now  no 
doubt.  The  American  general,  Jackson,  has  taken  by  assault 

«i  Urrutia,  Pdginaa  de  Historia  Diplomdtica,  108. 

62  Blanco- Azpurfia,  Documentos,  VI,  565-570.  It  is  to  be  noted  also  that 
Roscio,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Angostura,  and  one  of  the  editors 
of  the  Correo  del  Orinoco,  was  in  the  United  States  early  in  1818  just  after 
the  suppression  of  the  Amelia  Island  establishment.  He  returned  later  in 
the  year  to  Venezuela.  Blanco-Azpurtia,  Documentos,  VI,  360. 

630'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIX,  111. 


INTEKNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          195 

the  fort  of  Pensacola,  and  the  Floridas,  East  and  West,  are  in 
the  possession  of  the  Americans."  64 

The  third  of  the  Florida  incidents  which,  it  is  sometimes  said, 
affected  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  the  revolutionary 
governments,  was  the  negotiation  and  final  ratification  of  the 
treaty  of  cession.  The  United  States  had  long  desired  to  ac- 
quire the  Floridas  and  efforts  were  repeatedly  made  during 
Jefferson's  presidency  to  bring  Spain  to  agree  to  the  transfer. 
The  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries in  1806  put  an  end  to  the  discussions  and  the  matter  re- 
mained in  abeyance  until  relations  were  restored  in  the  early 
part  of  Monroe's  first  administration.  Negotiations  were  then 
renewed  and,  under  the  able  direction  of  John  Quincy  Adams, 
brought  to  a  successful  conclusion  on  February  22,  1819,  when 
the  treaty  of  cession  was  signed.  The  United  States  Senate  im- 
mediately ratified  the  treaty,  but  Spain  delayed ;  and  the  final 
act  giving  full  force  to  the  instrument,  the  exchange  of  ratifica- 
tions, was  not  consummated  until  exactly  two  years  after  the 
date  of  signature.65 

It  has  been  charged  that  in  these  negotiations  with  Spain 
the  United  States  pursued  a  purely  selfish  policy;  that  its  one 
great  desire  being  to  acquire  the  Floridas,  everything  else  was 
subordinated  to  that  end ;  specifically,  that  the  neutrality  law  of 
181 7  and  the  long-deferred  recognition  of  the  new  states  were 
a  part  of  the  price  which  the  government  at  Washington  had  to 
pay  for  the  cession  of  the  Floridas.66  The  charge  is,  of  course, 
without  foundation.  The  system  of  neutrality,  already  a  tra- 
ditional policy  of  the  nation,  had  the  preponderant  support  of 
public  opinion  and  of  all  branches  of  the  government.  The 
executive,  being  responsible  for  recognition,  withheld  it  not  in 
order  to  facilitate  the  negotiations  with  Spain,  but  on  solid 
grounds  of  fact.  The  Spanish  Government  attempted,  it  is 

64  Cartas  de  Bolivar  (Sociedad  de  Ediciones) ,  236. 

es  Davis,  Treaties  and  Conventions  concluded  between  the  United  States 
and  other  Powers,  785. 
06  Calvo,  Recueil  des  Traites,  V,  174,  178. 


196       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

true,  to  exact  a  promise  as  a  condition  of  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty  that  the  United  States  should  abandon  the  right  to  recog- 
nize the  revolutionists  or  to  form  relations  with  them ; 67  and, 
though  the  promise  was  not  given,  the  Spanish  Government,  it 
seems,  regarded  the  United  States  as  morally  hound.  Such  at 
least  is  the  inference  from  the  protest  which  the  Spanish  minis- 
ter at  Washington  made  to  the  Secretary  of  State  upon  learning 
of  the  President's  message  of  March  8,  1822,  proposing  the 
recognition  of  the  new  states.  "  How  great  my  surprise  was," 
he  wrote,  "  may  he  easily  judged  by  any  one  who  is  acquainted 
with  the  conduct  of  Spain  toward  this  republic,  and  who  knows 
the  immense  sacrifices  which  she  has  made  to  preserve  her 
friendship.  In  fact  who  could  think  that,  in  return  for  the 
cession  of  her  most  important  provinces  of  this  hemisphere ;  for 
the  forgetting  of  the  plunder  of  her  commerce  by  American  citi- 
zens ;  for  the  privileges  granted  to  their  navy ;  and  for  as  great 
proofs  of  friendship  as  one  nation  can  give  another,  this  execu- 
tive would  propose  that  the  insurrection  of  the  ultramarine  pos- 
sessions of  Spain  should  be  recognized  ?  "  68 

It  is  to  British  rather  than  to  Spanish  sources,  however,  that 
the  aspersions  on  the  motives  of  the  United  States  in  the  Florida 
negotiations  are  to  be  traced.  In  this,  much  more  than  in  the 
Amelia  Island  affair,  the  British  manifested  a  spirit  of  jealous 
resentment  and  of  suspicion,  and  their  attitude  was  reflected, 
as  they  desired  it  should  be,  in  the  minds  of  some  of  the  Spanish 
American  leaders.  As  soon  as  it  became  known  in  England 
that  the  Treaty  of  Cession  had  been  concluded,  certain  British 
agencies,  if  not  the  government  itself,  began  to  take  measures 
to  counteract  the  supposed  advantage  which  the  United  States 
had  obtained  by  the  peaceable  transfer  of  the  Floridas,  and 
which,  it  was  feared,  would  now  be  greatly  increased  by  an 
early  recognition  of  the  new  states.  A  leading  article  published 
in  the  London  Times  of  April  19,  1819,  is  typical  of  the  means 

«*  Davis,  Notes  upon  the  Treaties  of  the  United  States,  163. 
es  American  State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  IV,  845. 


INTEKNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          197 

employed.  Declaring  that  Great  Britain  and  every  Christian 
nation  had  an  interest  in  seeing  the  war  between  Spain  and  her 
colonies  terminated,  the  writer  continued  as  follows :  "  It  cannot 
be  said  that  America  [the  United  States]  has  not  an  interest  in 
the  conclusion  of  these  fatal  troubles;  at  least  she  has  shown 
that  she  has  been  able  to  sack  no  small  advantage  from  their 
continuance  and  that  to  our  great  and  lasting  detriment.  Old 
Spain  having  rejected  arbitration  may  carry  on  the  contest  more 
feebly  and  more  feebly  still,  till  at  last  she  may  concede  all  her 
trans-Atlantic  possessions  to  America,  one  after  another,  simply 
because  she  herself  is  unable  to  reduce  them,  and  because  Amer- 
ica finds  their  occupation  necessary  for  the  tranquillity  of  her 
contiguous  provinces." 

Having  raised  before  the  eyes  of  the  Spanish  American  as- 
pirants for  statehood  the  specter  of  absorption  by  the  United 
States,  the  writer  reassures  them  by  suggesting  the  means  of 
their  salvation.  "  Are  we  to  stand  by,"  he  inquires,  "  and 
suffer  a  procedure  which  in  its  sinister  effect  upon  us  will  have 
all  the  consequences  of  collusion  between  Old  Spain  and  the 
United  States?  Are  we  to  refrain  from  intercourse  with  the 
insurgent  provinces  of  South  America  (simply  because  the 
Spanish  Government  at  home  calls  itself  at  war  with  them) 
till  they  drop  at  last  exhausted  into  the  hands  of  our  great  com- 
mercial rival  ?  The  court  of  Madrid  will  be  pleased  to  observe 
that  America  has  been  paid  for  her  forbearance.  If  she  has 
hitherto  abstained  from  acknowledging  the  trans- Atlantic  states, 
she  has  had  her  price  for  it,  in  the  cession  by  Old  Spain  of  cer- 
tain wealthy  provinces.  Far  indeed  from  Great  Britain  be 
such  conduct  as  this !  Far  removed  from  us  be  the  baseness  of 
extorting  a  bribe  from  the  impotence  of  the  old  government  in 
order  to  induce  us  to  disown  the  rising  liberties  of  the  new  ones ! 
No;  let  us  remember  that  we  are  England  still;  that  we  have 
an  established  name  for  honor  and  integrity,  as  well  as  for 
valor  and  enterprise,  among  the  nations  of  the  world ;  and  that, 
if  we  have  hitherto  abstained  from  interfering  in  the  sanguinary 


198       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

troubles  which  desolate  the  fields  and  towns  of  New  Spain,  it 
has  been  from  dignity  and  moderation,  not  from  the  sordid  hope 
of  gain.  We  have  not  hovered  like  the  vulture  over  the  contend- 
ing armies  till  we  could  seize  a  breathless  carcass  for  our  prey." 
Continuing,  the  writer  becomes  more  specific  and  reveals  the 
secret  of  his  choler.  It  was  not  the  fear  that  the  United  States 
might  become  sovereign  throughout  the  continent,  but  the  fear 
that  it  might  gain  in  the  American  family  of  nations  a  moral 
predominance  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain. 
"  We  believe  it  is  some  time,"  he  says,  "  since  America  proposed 
to  us  to  acknowledge  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires.  This 
is  an  important  fact;  and  so  far  the  conduct  of  America  ap- 
peared to  be  candid  and  friendly  to  England.  We  know  not 
whether  her  secret  objects  might  not  be  to  quicken  Spain  in  her 
bargain  about  the  Floridas.  However,  the  result  is  such  as 
we  have  seen.  America  has  not  acknowledged  any  of  the  in- 
surrectionary states  as  she  proposed  to  us ;  and  she  has  accepted 
a  valuable  cession  from  the  court  of  Madrid.  Hence,  therefore, 
commences  a  fresh  epoch  in  the  war.  Shall  we  suffer  this  or 
any  similar  traffic  to  succeed  ?  We  do  not  use  the  language  of 
menace;  there  is  no  occasion  to  go  to  war;  but  shall  we  allow 
America  to  reap  first  the  advantage  of  many  valuable  posses- 
sions from  Old  Spain  as  the  price  of  withholding  her  acknowl- 
edgment of  the  Patriot  governments;  and  then  shall  we  suffer 
her  to  insure  the  gratitude  of  those  Patriot  governments  by 
being  still  the  first  to  treat  with  them  as  independent  ?  Amer- 
ica cannot  deny  this  fact  —  she  is  at  present  leagued  with  Old 
Spain  against  the  colonies.  She  has  accepted  the  Floridas  as 
the  price  of  that  union;  for  we  know  that  she  did  propose  to 
us  to  acknowledge  the  new  states ;  that  she  has  not  so  acknowl- 
edged them ;  and  that  she  has,  without  the  slightest  pretext  of 
justice,  accepted  the  Floridas  from  Old  Spain.  She  has,  in 
familiar  language,  been,  for  a  while  at  least,  bought  off.  Our 
course  is  now,  therefore,  not  one  of  our  own  choosing,  it  is  im- 
posed on  us  by  the  necessity  of  things;  we  cannot,  without 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          199 

madness,  desist  from  acknowledging  the  independence  of  Buenos 
Aires  and  the  other  Spanish  provinces.  The  court  of  Madrid 
must  have  looked  to  this  as  a  result,  when  it  gained  the  forbear- 
ance of  the  United  States  by  consigning  to  them  the  Floridas 
in  our  detriment;  and  we  should  be  sunk  into  a  very  abject  con- 
dition, indeed,  if  we  allowed  Spain  to  think  it  of  more  impor- 
tance, even  to  purchase  the  neutrality  of  America  than  to  retain 
ours  as  a  boon,  or  as  the  natural  consequence  of  our  disinter- 
estedness." 

Articles  published  in  foreign  newspapers,  and  especially  in 
those  of  Great  Britain,  relating  to  the  struggle  between  Spain 
and  her  colonies  were  widely  copied  in  papers  which  had  sprung 
up  in  those  parts  of  Spanish  America  controlled  by  the  revolu- 
tionists. The  "  leader  "  of  the  London  Times  was  no  excep- 
tion. In  the  latter  part  of  August,  1819,  a  translation  of  it 
appeared  in  the  Correo  del  Orinoco  and  it  may  have  been  in- 
serted in  other  South  American  papers.  A  curious  evidence  of 
its  effect  is  found  in  the  instructions  of  September  1,  1819,69  to 
Manuel  Torres,  who  had  been  appointed  to  succeed  Lino  de 
Clemente  as  agent  of  the  Venezuelan  Government  in  the  United 
States.  In  the  instructions  to  Torres,  Juan  German  E-oscio, 
the  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  declared  that  in  the  light 
of  the  Times  article  of  April  19,  the  conduct  of  the  United 
States  had  acquired  a  new  meaning.  It  is  now  revealed,  says 
Roscio  in  substance,  that  the  eyes  of  the  United  States  have  been 
upon  the  Floridas  from  the  beginning,  and  though  there  may 
have  been  some  other  motive  for  the  Neutrality  Act  of  1817, 
the  obvious  one  was  the  acquisition  of  the  Floridas.  But,  having 
come  into  possession  of  the  coveted  territory,  the  United  States 
will  be  more  likely  to  give  its  support  to  the  Patriots.  Unlike 
the  British  writer,  Eoscio  drew  comfort  from  the  probability 
of  such  an  outcome. 

In  instructions  of  July  7,  1819,  to  Penalver  and  Vergara, 
agents  of  Venezuela  to  Great  Britain,  the  question  of  Florida 

69  Urrutia,  Pdginaa  de  Historia  Diplomdtica,  138-140. 


200       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

is  considered  more  at  length.70  Eoscio  here  says  that  there  are 
two  things  to  note  relative  to  the  Neutrality  Act  of  1817 :  First, 
that  the  United  States,  being  desirous  of  acquiring  the  Floridas, 
sacrificed  its  neutrality,  convinced  that  any  act  of  hostility  to- 
ward the  Patriots  would  contribute  to  the  attainment  of  the  de- 
sired end ;  and  secondly,  that  the  British  minister  at  Washing- 
ton was  most  active  in  promoting  the  passage  of  the  Act.  With- 
out reflecting,  one  might  judge  from  this,  said  Roscio,  that 
Great  Britain  did  not  desire  the  emancipation  of  Spanish  Amer- 
ica ;  but,  viewing  the  matter  in  its  true  light,  the  English  Gov- 
ernment appeared  to  be  striving  to  deprive  the  United  States  of 
the  advantages  which  it  might  obtain  from  an  independent 
South  America,  indebted  to  the  elder  republic  for  generous  as- 
sistance. The  object  of  the  maneuver  was  to  bring  the  United 
States  into  bad  odor  with  the  Patriots,  so  that  in  commercial 
and  other  relations  it  would  receive  but  little  consideration, 
whereas  Great  Britain  would  gain  favor  with  the  Patriots  by 
giving  them  commercial  and  military  aid.  Returning  again 
specifically  to  the  subject  of  Florida,  Roscio  ventured  the 
opinion  that  the  English  Government  would  not  be  pleased  at 
the  transfer  of  that  territory  to  the  United  States,  increasing 
thus  the  political  importance  of  the  American  Confederation. 
And  finally,  he  said  that  if  it  were  true  that  Spain  had  money  to 
send  another  expedition  to  America,  it  must  have  come  from  the 
sale  of  the  Floridas.71 

To  what  extent  views  such  as  those  expressed  by  Roscio  pre- 
vailed it  is  impossible  to  say,  but  there  is  reason  to  believe  that 
they  were  not  generally  held.  The  great  mass  of  the  Spanish 
American  population  knew  nothing  about  the  Floridas,  and  the 
great  majority  of  the  leaders,  it  appears,  were  either  indifferent 
to  their  fate,  or  regarded  their  acquisition  by  the  United  States 
as  a  natural  outcome  of  the  break  up  of  the  Spanish  Empire. 

TO  Urrutia,  Pdginas  de  Historia  Diplomdtica,  202-204. 

7i  By  the  terms  of  the  treaty  the  United  States  undertook  to  make  satis- 
faction for  the  claims  of  American  citizens  against  Spain  to  an  amount  not 
exceeding  $5,000,000.  No  money  was  paid  directly  to  Spain. 


INTEKNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          201 

The  latter  was  the  point  of  view  of  the  author  of  an  article  pub- 
lished in  the  Correo  del  Orinoco,  while  the  ratification  by  Spain 
of  the  treaty  of  1819  was  pending.  During  the  Peninsular 
War,  according  to  this  writer,  there  was  neither  Spanish  nation 
nor  true  sovereign,  and  the  United  States  would  have  been 
justified  in  taking  out  of  the  ruin  of  the  empire  in  payment  of 
its  claims,  a  part  of  what  was  being  saved.  But,  added  the 
writer,  it  should  be  said  to  the  honor  of  the  American  republic, 
whether  it  was  due  to  respect  for  that  part  of  the  people  who 
were  struggling  for  independence  or  to  confidence  in  the  justice 
and  in  the  sincerity  of  him  who  then  aspired  to  the  throne,  or 
whether  it  was  due  to  the  belief  that  the  opportune  moment  had 
not  arrived,  it  abstained  from  taking  advantage  of  the  weakness 
of  its  opponent.  The  occupation  of  the  Floridas  in  1818  and 
the  failure  of  the  other  nations,  from  whom  Spain  expected 
support,  to  protest,  demonstrated  that  the  United  States  could, 
whenever  it  desired,  obtain  justice.  It  was  then,  therefore, 
that  the  treaty  was  concluded.  After  discussing  the  causes 
which  were  delaying  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  the  writer 
concluded  that,  if  a  new  war  should  be  the  result  of  the  refusal 
of  Spain  to  comply  with  its  obligation,  the  Americans  would 
seize  the  two  Floridas  without  difficulty  and  would  advance  into 
New  Spain,  where  the  people  were  awaiting  and  would  welcome 
their  coming.  The  Floridas  would  then  be  held  by  right  of 
conquest.  Mexico  would  be  avenged,  the  debts  of  Spain  would 
remain  unpaid,  and  the  rest  of  America  would  have  acquired 
indirectly  a  powerful  ally.72 

The  reference  to  Mexico  serves  to  raise  the  question  as  to  what 
was  really  the  attitude  of  that  country  to  the  transfer  of  the 
Floridas  to  the  United  States.  As  has  already  been  intimated, 
the  revolution  in  Mexico  during  these  years  had  reached  such  a 
low  ebb  that  it  seems  futile  to  attempt  to  discover  its  official  at- 
titude toward  any  important  question.  In  consequence  of  the 
precarious  situation,  newspapers  did  not  spring  up  until  later, 

72  Blanco-Azpurtia,  Documentos,  VI,  371. 


202       PAN-AMEBICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

and  contemporary  documents,  such  as  those  which  have  been 
cited  in  the  case  of  Venezuela,  are  not  available.  The  contem- 
porary historians,  Alaman,  Bustamente,  and  others,  wrote  their 
works  some  years  afterward,  when  relations  between  Mexico 
and  the  United  States  had  become  embittered  by  numerous  con- 
flicting interests  and  finally  by  war.  Even  so,  the  question 
of  the  Floridas  received  but  little  consideration  at  their  hands. 
There  was  published,  however,  in  1821,  at  Philadelphia,  a  little 
volume  under  the  title  of  Memoria  Politico-Instructiva,  which 
contains  some  indication  of  the  Mexican  point  of  view.  It  was 
distributed  to  the  independent  leaders  in  Mexico,  and  it  was  re- 
printed there  in  1822.  This  book,  published  anonymously,  has 
been  attributed  to  Vicente  Eocafuerte,  a  citizen  of  Ecuador, 
then,  and  for  several  years  afterward,  in  the  service  of  Mexico ; 
but  every  evidence  points  to  Father  Mier  as  author  of  the 
work.73  Mier  was,  as  has  been  pointed  out  in  a  previous  chap- 
ter, one  of  the  ablest  and  most  influential  Mexicans  of  his  time. 
It  will  be  of  interest,  therefore,  to  note  his  views  on  the  cession 
of  the  Floridas.  He,  as  did  many  others,  regarded  the  neu- 
trality of  the  United  States  as  purchased  by  Spain,  the  Floridas 
being  ceded  as  a  part  of  the  consideration.  "  All  the  cessions," 
he  declared,  "  are  injuries  to  us,  not  only  by  virtue  of  the  rights 
acquired  from  our  mothers,  all  of  whom  were  Indians,  but  by 
virtue  of  the  pacts  of  our  fathers,  the  conquistadores  (who  won 
all  on  their  own  account  and  at  their  own  risk)  with  the  Kings 
of  Spain,  who,  according  to  the  laws  of  the  Indies,  cannot  under 
any  condition  whatever  alienate  the  least  part  of  America. 
And  if  they  do,  their  act  has  no  binding  force."  74 

And  yet  Mier  was  by  no  means  unfriendly  to  the  United 
States.  He  was  an  ardent  republican  and  thought  that  the 
predictions  often  heard  that  the  government  of  the  United 

78  The  internal  evidence  points  unmistakably  to  Padre  Mier.  See  pp. 
74-105,  127.  Bustamente  (Historia  del  Emperador  Iturbide,  201)  con- 
firms the  authorship  of  Mier. 

7*  Memoria  PoUtico-Instructiva,  15. 


INTEKNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          203 

States  would  not  survive  were  a  sad  consolation  to  royalists 
and  had  no  basis  in  fact.  "  Why  should  we  be  compared,"  he 
inquired,  "with  the  corrupt  peoples  of  Europe,  unacquainted 
with  the  virtues  of  republicanism,  rather  than  with  our  com- 
patriots of  the  United  States,  among  whom  the  republican  form 
of  government  has  had  excellent  results  ?  "  The  interests  of 
Europe  and  America,  he  declared,  were  diverse.  The  counsels 
of  the  crowned  heads  of  Europe  should  not  be  heeded,  and  es- 
pecially should  England  be  distrusted.  The  philanthropy  of 
British  nationals  should  not  be  confused  with  the  Machiavellian 
practices  of  the  British  ministry.  Hiding  her  ambition  under 
the  veil  of  measures  necessary  to  check  the  power  of  Napoleon, 
Great  Britain,  declared  Mier,  had  proceeded  with  her  system 
of  seizing  the  strategic  points  in  the  waters  of  Europe,  and  she 
intended  to  follow  the  same  practice  in  America.  She  was 
deeply  wounded  by  the  cession  of  the  Floridas,  which  gave  to 
the  United  States,  the  only  power  able  to  dispute  her  maritime 
supremacy,  control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  writer  goes  on 
to  point  out  the  places  held  in  American  waters  by  Great  Britain 
—  the  Bermudas,  the  Bahamas,  Jamaica,  Trinidad,  and  other 
places  which  she  had  her  eye  upon.  In  the  Guianas,  she  had  a 
foothold  on  the  continent  of  South  America ;  and  she  was  show- 
ing a  disposition  to  occupy  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  so  that  she 
might  raise  her  trident  in  both  seas.  Moreover,  in  the  southern 
continent,  Brazil  was,  he  said,  little  more  than  a  British  colony, 
and  in  that  quarter  Great  Britain  had  acquired  or  was  attempt- 
ing to  acquire  other  points  of  vantage.  In  the  northern  con- 
tinent not  only  did  she  possess  the  Canadas,  but  she  held  the 
coast  of  Honduras,  in  New  Spain,  and  she  was  going  on  extend- 
ing her  dominion  toward  Yucatan.  The  British  were  so  rooted 
in  the  country,  said  Mier,  that  the  kings  of  the  Mosquito  nation 
received  their  authority  at  the  hands  of  the  governors  of  Ja- 
maica. It  was  not,  therefore,  Spain,  their  open  enemy,  with 
whom  they  had  mainly  to  contend  in  order  to  be  truly  inde- 


204       PAN-AMEEICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

pendent;  but  another,  more  formidable,  because  hidden  —  the 
British  ministry.'75 

Not  only  did  the  author  of  this  Memoria  regard  the  tendency 
of  Great  Britain  to  add  to  her  possessions  in  America  as  of 
much  greater  consequence  to  the  continent  than  any  similar 
tendency  manifested  by  the  United  States,  but  he  was  so  far 
from  being  intolerant  of  the  cession  of  the  Floridas  to  the 
United  States  that  he  included  in  the  appendix  of  his  book  an 
extract  from  the  Letter  of  a  Patriot  76  in  which  that  transac- 
tion was  decidedly  approved.  The  minister  of  his  Catholic 
Majesty,  said  the  writer  of  the  letter,  upon  offering  to  the 
United  States  the  Floridas  —  which  were,  and  with  reason,  the 
object  of  their  most  ardent  desires  —  demanded  nothing  less 
than  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  against  the  insurgents 
of  South  America  and  Mexico;  that  is,  he  demanded  that  the 
government  at  Washington  obligate  itself  to  guarantee  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Spanish  dominions  in  America.  Did  the  Spanish 
minister  know,  inquired  the  writer,  that  in  putting  forward 
this  illegal,  inhumane,  scandalous  proposition,  he  was  placing 
the  sword  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  ?  The  Americans,  feeling 
aggrieved,  presented  the  dilemma,  either  Spain  would  deliver 
the  Floridas  in  payment  of  the  just  claims  against  her,  or  the 
United  States  would  occupy  them  by  force  and  recognize  the 
new  governments.  Spain  could  make  but  one  choice.  The 
Americans  waited  patiently  and  confidently  and  at  the  end  of 
twenty  months  obtained  the  ratification  of  the  treaty.  Thus  had 
the  Floridas  attained  liberty.  To-day  they  formed  a  part  of 
the  United  States,  and  though  sold,  they  escaped  from  the  hu- 
miliating servitude  and  from  the  state  of  languor  in  which  the 
mother  country  had  held  them  for  centuries. 

There  occurred  in  the  southern  part  of  the  continent  also  a 
number  of  incidents  affecting  the  relations  of  the  United  States 

7B  Memoria  PoUtico-Instructiva,  81,  90,  95. 

7«  Memoria  Politioo-lnttructiva,  140.  The  letter  was  published  in  full  in 
the  Correo  del  Orinoco  early  in  1820  and  reprinted  in  Blanco- Azpurua, 
VII,  446-449. 


INTEKNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          205 

with  the  belligerent  colonies.  One  of  these,  involving  in  a 
singular  manner  the  principle  of  neutrality,  is  briefly  related  by 
Barros  Arana.77  In  1813,  during  the  war  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  the  famous  American  frigate, 
Essex,  under  the  command  of  Captain  David  Porter,  made  a 
number  of  prizes  in  the  southern  Pacific,  and  arming  and  equip- 
ping one  of  them  —  at  first  the  Georgiana,  later  the  Atlan- 
tic f  rechristened  the  Essex  Junior  —  sent  it  out  to  cruise  under 
Lieutenant  Downes.  No  less  fortunate  than  his  chief,  Lieu- 
tenant Downes  captured  a  number  of  enemy  vessels,  which  he 
was  ordered  to  take  to  Valparaiso  and  dispose  of  to  the  best 
advantage.  The  government  of  Chile,  believing  that  the  United 
States  was  resolved  to  aid  the  Spanish  colonies  to  achieve  their 
independence,  placed  no  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  disposal 
of  the  prizes.  The  Viceroy  of  Peru  and  the  Spanish  officials 
generally  had  attempted  to  convince  the  insurgents  that  the 
alliance  between  Spain  and  England  against  Napoleon  extended 
to  America  and  that  England  would  help  to  reduce  the  rebellious 
colonies  to  obedience.  It  was  not  strange  that  this  propaganda 
should  have  had  effect  in  a  country  which,  like  Chile,  was  lo- 
cated at  such  a  great  distance  from  the  sources  of  information. 
Poinsett's  activities,  referred  to  in  the  preceding  chapter,  doubt- 
less contributed  also  to  the  erroneous  impression  that  assistance 
might  be  expected  from  the  United  States.  Not  only  was  Lieu- 
tenant Downes  permitted,  therefore,  to  dispose  of  the  prizes, 
but  the  government  itself  manifested  a  disposition  to  acquire 
some  of  the  vessels  for  the  purpose  of  arming  and  equipping 
them  as  the  beginning  of  the  Chilean  navy.  This  conduct  of 
the  government  of  Chile  elicited  from  the  junta  at  Buenos  Aires 
a  remonstrance,  but  expressed,  says  Barros  Arana,  in  the  most 
moderate  and  discreet  terms  it  was  possible  to  employ.  The 
admission  into  the  port  of  Valparaiso  of  an  American  war  vessel 
with  British  prizes  which  had  been  permitted  to  be  disposed  of 
and  sold  in  the  country,  declared  the  Buenos  Aires  junta,  in- 

77  Barros  Arana,  Historic  Jeneral  de  Chile,  IX,  220. 


206       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGHSHSFINGS 

fringed  the  strict  neutrality  which  should  be  maintained  in  the 
conflict  between  the  two  belligerents,  England  and  the  United 
States.  In  order  that  embarrassing  consequences  might  be 
avoided,  the  junta  suggested  that  reparation  be  made  "  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  British  commanders  in  these  seas."  Al- 
though it  was  thought  in  Chile  that  the  commercial  interests  of 
the  Buenos  Aires  Government  might  have  prompted  its  action, 
most  of  the  Chilean  trade  having  been  effected  hitherto  through 
Buenos  Aires,  yet  the  junta  at  Santiago,  perceiving  the  danger 
of  international  complications,  thereafter  treated  the  Americans 
with  greater  reserve,  maintaining  as  between  them  and  the 
British  strict  neutrality. 

The  friendly  attitude  of  the  Chilean  Patriots  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  Spanish  authorities  on  the  other, 
toward  the  United  States  is  reflected  in  the  pages  of  Captain 
Porter's  Journal.  When  he  first  entered  the  port  of  Valparaiso 
in  the  spring  of  1813,  he  believed  the  Spanish  to  be  in  control; 
and  from  the  stand  the  United  States  had  taken  against  British 
aggressions  and  from  its  conduct  with  respect  to  the  Floridas 
he  had  no  reason  to  expect  a  friendly  reception.  Before  he 
cast  his  anchor,  however,  the  captain  of  the  port,  accompanied 
by  another  officer,  came  on  board  with  an  offer  of  every  civility, 
assistance,  and  accommodation  that  Valparaiso  could  afford. 
To  his  astonishment,  Porter  was  informed  that  the  country  had 
shaken  off  its  allegiance  to  Spain ;  that  the  ports  of  Chile  were 
open  to  all  nations;  that  they  looked  up  to  the  United  States 
for  example  and  protection;  and  that  the  arrival  of  the  Amer- 
ican vessels  would  be  regarded  as  most  advantageous  to  their 
commerce,  which  had  been  much  harassed  by  Royalist  corsairs 
from  Peru.  On  shore,  Captain  Porter  was  given  a  very  cordial 
reception  by  the  governor.  He  found  that  he  had  happily  got 
among  stanch  republicans,  men  filled  with  revolutionary  princi- 
ples and  apparently  desirous  of  a  form  of  government  founded 
on  liberty.  As  soon  as  his  arrival  was  announced  at  Santiago, 
bells  were  rung  the  whole  day  and  illuminations  took  place  in 


INTEKNATIOSTAL  COMPLICATIONS          207 

the  evening.  It  was  generally  believed  that  the  appearance  of 
an  American  frigate  in  the  Pacific  signified  nothing  less  than  the 
offer  of  a  friendly  alliance  and  assistance  in  the  struggle  for  in- 
dependence. The  captain  and  his  officers  were  invited  to 
visit  Santiago.  He  was  told  that  the  president  with  a  large 
military  escort  would  meet  them  on  the  road  and  accompany 
them  to  the  city ;  and  he  was  assured  that,  from  a  political  point 
of  view,  their  coming  was  a  most  happy  event.78 

But,  said  Captain  Porter,  time  was  too  precious  to  be  spent 
in  amusements.  Preparations  for  continuing  the  cruise  went 
busily  forward.  And  not  until  the  vessel  was  ready  for  sea 
did  the  captain  determine  to  devote  a  few  hours  to  relaxation. 
He  then  invited  the  ladies  and  gentlemen  of  Valparaiso  on 
board  the  Essex.  As  they  were  on  the  point  of  embarking, 
however,  a  strange  vessel  appeared  in  the  offing.  The  guests 
were  left  on  shore,  and  the  officers  returned  on  board,  where 
everything  was  found  prepared  for  getting  under  way.  The 
cables  were  cut,  and  in  an  instant,  as  Captain  Porter  expresses 
it,  the  frigate  was  under  a  cloud  of  canvas.  On  board  were 
Pbinsett  and  Luis  Carrera,  together  with  other  Americans  and 
Chileans  who  had  come  down  from  Santiago  to  visit  the  ship. 
As  there  was  every  expectation  of  an  engagement,  they  requested 
the  privilege  of  sharing  the  dangers.  Luis  Carrera  was  the 
brother  of  the  Chilean  president,  Jose  Miguel  Carrera.  He  was 
a  spirited  youth,  says  Captain  Porter,  and  evidently  anxious 
to  take  part  in  an  engagement.  His  constant  request  was  to 
board  the  stranger  and  his  disappointment  was  great  when  she 
was  discovered  to  be  a  Portuguese  frigate.  "  We  could  per- 
ceive the  hills,"  records  Captain  Porter  in  his  Journal, 
"  crowded  with  men,  women,  and  children,  all  equally  and  per- 
haps more  anxious  than  Don  Luis  to  see  the  fight.  Among 
them,  as  it  afterward  proved,  were  our  fair  guests,  who  did  not 
hesitate  to  declare  their  disappointment;  and  frankly  acknowl- 
edged that  a  sight  of  a  sea  engagement  would  have  had  more 

78  Journal  of  a  Cruise  to  the  Pacific,  I,  94,  97, 


208       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

charms  for  them  than  all  the  entertainments  we  could  afford 
them  on  board  the  ship."  Returning  to  port  the  American 
officers  were  given  a  dinner  by  order  of,  and  at  the  expense  of, 
the  supreme  government  of  Chile.  There  were  present  the 
officers  of  the  Portuguese  ship  and  some  English  merchants; 
"  but/'  says  Captain  Porter,  "  when  the  wine  began  to  circu- 
late and  the  Chilean  officers  to  feel  the  ardor  of  their  patriotism, 
such  flaming  toasts  were  given  as  to  make  them  think  it  prudent 
to  retire."  79 

Cruising  along  the  coast  of  Peru,  the  Essex  fell  in  with  the 
Nereyda,,  a  Spanish  privateer  out  of  Callao,  and  took  possession 
of  her,  Captain  Porter  having  discovered  that  she  had  been 
cruising  for,  and  had  captured,  some  American  vessels.  Her 
captain  stated  that  as  Spain  and  Great  Britain  were  allies,  he 
always  respected  the  British  flag;  and  that  his  sole  object  was 
the  capture  of  American  vessels.  Captain  Porter  disarmed  the 
privateer  and,  removing  the  American  prisoners  whom  she  had 
on  board,  sent  her  into  the  port  of  Callao  with  a  letter  to  the 
viceroy,  requesting  that  her  captain  be  punished.  At  Tumbez, 
where  the  Essex  touched  a  little  later,  Captain  Porter  found 
that  the  Royalist  authorities  there  also  were  uncertain  whether 
the  war  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  did  not 
extend  to  the  former's  allies,  the  Spaniards.80  In  time,  how- 
ever, the  relationship  of  the  several  belligerents  to  each  other 
was  better  understood.  Captain  Porter  continued  his  cruise, 
temporarily  breaking  up  British  navigation  in  the  Pacific.  At 
last,  in  March,  1814,  a  superior  British  squadron  under  Com- 
modore Hilly ar,  composed  of  the  frigate  Phcebe  and  the  sloop 
of  war  Cherub,  appeared  off  the  port  of  Valparaiso,  where  the 
Essex  and  the  armed  prize,  Essex  Junior,  lay  at  anchor.  Com- 
ing in  and  taking  on  provisions,  the  British  vessels  then  cruised 
off  the  port  for  nearly  six  weeks,  blockading  the  American  ves- 
sels. Finally,  the  Essex  attempted  to  escape,  but  becoming  dis- 

f»  Journal  of  a  Cruise  to  the  Pacific,  I,  100-102. 
so  Ibid,,  I,  193. 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          209 

abled  in  a  gale,  put  back  into  port  and  cast  anchor  in  a  small 
bay  on  the  east  side  of  the  harbor,  for  the  purpose  of  repairing 
damages.  The  enemy  approached  and  here,  in  the  territorial 
waters  of  Chile,  the  fierce  battle,  so  well  known  to  naval  his- 
tory, was  fought.  The  American  vessels  were  compelled  to 
surrender.81  No  claim  for  reparation  was  ever  made  nor  does 
it  appear  to  have  been  alleged  that  there  was  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  territorial  sovereign  in  not  preventing  the  attack.82 
As  a  result  of  the  surrender  of  the  Essex,  the  prestige  of  the 
Americans  on  the  Pacific  coast  of  South  America  suffered  a 
decline.  British  influence  was  henceforth  in  the  ascendant. 
Commodore  Hillyar  offered  his  services  as  mediator  between  the 
Royalist  authorities  at  Lima  and  the  revolutionary  government 
of  Chile.  The  Royalists  accepted  at  once,  and  the  Patriots, 
having  suffered  reverses,  accepted  somewhat  later.  The  outlook 
for  the  revolution  was  dark  not  only  in  Chile  but  throughout  the 
revolted  provinces.  As  a  result  of  Commodore  Hillyar's  media- 
tion, the  Treaty  of  Lircay  was  concluded  on  May  3,  1814.  By 
the  terms  of  this  treaty  the  Chileans  recognized  their  dependence 
on  the  metropolis,  but  demanded  and  were  promised  an  autono- 
mous national  government.83  Of  the  subsequent  disapproval  of 
the  treaty  by  the  viceroy  at  Lima,  of  the  renewal  of  the  war 
and  of  the  complete  reconquest  of  Chile,  it  does  not  concern 
us  here  to  speak.  Captain  Porter  and  the  survivors  of  his 
crew  were  sent  under  parole  to  the  United  States  aboard  the 
Essex  Junior,  which  was  disarmed  and  used  as  a  cartel.  For 
the  next  four  or  five  years  relative  quiet  reigned  on  the  Pacific 
coast.  [With  the  renewal  of  the  war,  however,  and  the  prepa- 
ration in  1819  of  the  expedition  against  Peru,  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  again  became  involved,  through  the  opera- 
tion, as  on  so  many  other  occasions,  of  the  principle  of  neu- 
trality. 

si  Journal  of  a  Cruise  to  the  Pacific,  II,  161-168. 

82  Moore,  A  Digest  of  International  Law,  VII,  1092. 

ss  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  IX,  416  et  seq. 


210       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Late  in  1818,  Lord  Cochrane,  it  will  be  recalled,  arrived  in 
Chile  to  assume  command  of  the  naval  forces  of  that  republic. 
His  presence  there,  as  may  well  be  inferred  from  his  imperious 
character  and  from  the  fact  that  the  feeling  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  was  still  bitter,  was  not  calculated 
to  contribute  to  cordial  relations  between  the  Patriots  and  the 
Americans,  who  for  one  reason  or  another  happened  to  visit  that 
quarter.  He  had  no  sooner  entered  upon  his  duties  than  an 
acrid  correspondence  between  him  and  Captain  Biddle  of  the 
American  sloop  of  war  Ontario  arose  over  the  question  of  sa- 
lutes.84 

On  March  1,  1819,  acting  under  the  authority  of  the  Chilean 
Government,  Cochrane  issued  a  proclamation  declaring  the 
whole  coast  of  Peru  to  be  in  a  state  of  formal  blockade.85  His 
forces  being  insufficient  to  maintain  an  effective  blockade  of 
such  a  great  stretch  of  coast,  the  United  States  held  that  it  was 
illegal  throughout  its  whole  extent ;  for  otherwise,  every  capture 
under  a  notified  blockade  would  be  legal,  because  the  capture 
itself  would  be  proof  of  the  blockading  force.  Lord  Cochrane 
disavowed  all  claim  of  forfeiture  as  to  any  place  where  no  ac- 
tual force  was  employed;  but  this  disavowal  was  not  wholly 
satisfactory86  and  numerous  disagreeable  incidents  involving 
American  ships  and  merchants  occurred  and  continued  to  occur 
until  the  Royalists  were  finally  driven  out  of  Peru. 

A  brief  reference  to  the  case  of  the  Macedonian,  an  Ameri- 
can brig,  taken  by  her  captain,  Eliphalet  Smith,  to  trade  on 
the  Pacific  coast  in  1818,  will  illustrate  the  friction  which  arose. 
On  September  23,  1818,  the  Supreme  Director  of  Chile,  in 
order  to  keep  secret  certain  measures  of  a  naval  and  military 
character,  issued  a  decree  declaring  an  embargo  for  one  month 
upon  all  ships  in  the  ports  of  the  country.  The  Macedonian  had 
been  lying  in  the  harbor  of  Valparaiso,  but  a  few  days  before 

84  Niles'  "Weekly  Register,  XVI,  204. 

SB  The  proclamation  was  published  in  Niles'  Weekly  Register  for  July  3, 
1819,  XVI,  318. 
8«  American  State  Papers,  ffaval  Affairs,  II,  567. 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          211 

the  decree  was  issued  put  to  sea  and  made  for  the  port  of  Callao, 
arriving  there  early  in  October.  Captain  Smith,  according  to 
Barros  Arana,  was  an  unscrupulous  adventurer  who  saw  in 
the  countries  struggling  for  their  independence  nothing  more 
than  a  field  for  his  speculations.  He  gave  the  viceroy  all  the 
information  which  he  had  been  able  to  obtain  in  Chile,  and 
offered  to  sail  out  to  meet  the  Spanish  squadron,  which  was 
expected  in  the  Pacific,  to  warn  it  of  the  naval  preparations 
which  were  going  on  in  the  ports  of  Chile.  This  offer  was  not 
accepted  by  the  viceroy.  Smith  continued  to  traffic  along  the 
coast,  serving  the  interests  of  the  Koyalists,  says  Barros  Arana, 
and  giving  rise  to  diplomatic  complications  which  were  not  set- 
tled for  many  years  afterward.87  When  Lord  Cochrane  ap- 
peared before  Callao,  the  Macedonian  proceeded  to  Huarmey, 
a  little  port  some  twenty  or  thirty  miles  to  the  north.  Near 
that  place  Cochrane' s  forces  captured  the  sum  of  $80,000  which 
was  being  transported  overland  by  Captain  Smith  under  a 
small  Royalist  guard  to  be  taken  aboard  the  Macedonian.  This 
sum,  together  with  $60,000  taken  by  Cochrane  from  a  French 
vessel  and  claimed  by  Captain  Smith,  as  the  proceeds  of  the 
sale  of  his  cargo,  was  confiscated  as  enemy  property,  which 
it  was  alleged,  Smith  was  attempting  to  smuggle  out  of  the 
country.  These  two  seizures  were  the  subject  of  a  negotiation 
between  the  United  States  and  Chile  in  1820,  the  Chilean  gov- 
ernment agreeing  to  pay  the  sum  of  $104,000  with  interest  in 
full  settlement  of  the  claims.  Two  years  later  another  large 
sum  of  money  which  Captain  Smith  claimed  as  the  proceeds  of 
a  cargo  brought  by  the  Macedonian  from  China  and  sold  to 
Royalist  merchants  at  Arica  was  seized  by  Chilean  forces,  de- 
livered to  Lord  Cochrane,  and  distributed  by  him  among  his 
squadron.  This  seizure  became  the  subject  of  a  separate  claim 
which  the  two  governments  agreed,  in  1858,  to  submit  to  the 
King  of  Belgium  for  arbitration.  By  the  award,  which  was 
not  rendered  until  1863,  three-fifths  of  the  claim,  $42,400,  that 

87  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XI,  634. 


212       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

proportion  being  owned  by  Smith  and  his  American  associates, 
was  allowed. 

The  Macedonian  was  the  cause  of  still  another  claim  against 
Peru.  After  the  Patriots  came  into  control  of  the  government 
at  Lima,  Captain  Smith  took  his  vessel  to  Callao  to  dispose  of 
the  residue  of  the  cargo  brought  from  China.  The  brig  was 
now  seized  and  condemned  as  the  property  of  Spanish  refugees. 
By  the  terms  of  a  convention  entered  into  in  1841  between  the 
United  States  and  Peru  the  latter  agreed  to  pay  the  United 
States  the  sum  of  $300,000  in  full  satisfaction  of  all  its  claims ; 
and  of  this  sum  nearly  one-third  was  apportioned  on  account  of 
the  Macedonian.88 

It  would  appear  from  the  settlement  of  the  various  claims 
growing  out  of  the  trading  of  the  Macedonian  in  Peru,  that  Cap- 
tain Smith,  in  so  far  as  these  particular  incidents  were  con- 
cerned, was  guilty  of  no  offense  under  international  law.  Apart 
from  his  trading  activities,  however,  the  Patriots  believed  him 
to  be  in  sympathy  with  the  Royalists,  and  actively  engaged  in 
promoting  their  interests.  This  charge  was  never  the  subject 
of  judicial  investigation,  as  were  the  claims.  But,  whatever 
may  have  been  the  truth  of  the  matter,  the  conduct  of  Captain 
Smith,  supported  in  so  far  as  it  was  legal,  by  the  government 
at  Washington,  contributed,  together  with  other  incidents  of  a 
similar  sort,  not  a  little  to  the  dimming  of  the  earlier  impression 
of  the  Patriots  that  the  United  States  would  be,  in  the  struggle, 
their  friend  and  ally. 

The  Macedonian  was  only  one  of  a  number  of  American  ves- 
sels trading  with  the  Royalists  in  defiance  of  the  so-called  block- 
ade. After  Lord  Cochrane  returned  to  Chile  in  1822,  the 
Peruvian  navy  was  organized  and  for  the  next  two  or  three 
years  thereafter  attempted  to  prevent  intercourse  with  the 
enemy.  The  United  States  maintained  a  squadron  in  Peruvian 
waters  during  this  period  and  its  commander,  in  looking  out  for 

88  Moore,  History  and  Digest  of  International  Arbitrations,  II,  1451 
etseq.;  V,  4602. 


INTEKNATIOSTAL  COMPLICATIONS          213 

the  interests  of  American  shipping,  incurred  the  ill  will  of  the 
Patriot  government.  The  Peruvian  historian,  Paz  Soldan,  de- 
clares that  "  the  decided  and  vituperable  partiality  "  of  Captain 
Stewart  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Franklin  aided  the  viceroy  in  keeping 
informed  of  the  movements  of  the  Patriots ;  that  under  the  guns 
of  the  Franklin  arms  and  ammunition  were  debarked  at  Arica 
for  the  Royalists ;  that  the  government  of  Peru  asked  in  vain  to 
have  Captain  Stewart  relieved ;  that  during  the  South  American 
struggle  for  independence  the  United  States  gave  more  than 
one  proof  of  its  protection  to  Spain  and  of  its  lack  of  interest  in 
the  political  fortunes  of  the  former  Spanish  colonies ;  and  that 
Great  Britain  pursued  a  wholly  different  course.89 

The  contrast,  suggested  by  Paz  Soldan,  between  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States  and  that  of  Great  Britain  toward  the  strug- 
gle of  the  Spanish  American  colonies  to  achieve  independence 
demands  a  word  of  consideration.  Both  governments  professed 
a  policy  of  strict  neutrality.  The  United  States,  as  has  been 
pointed  out,  in  order  better  to  comply  with  its  neutral  duty, 
passed  the  Act  of  March  3,  18 IT,  This  law  was  declared  by 
Clay  and  his  partisans  to  be  "  anti-neutral  "  and  this  character- 
ization was  widely  copied  throughout  Spanish  America,  often 
with  the  implication  that  British  legislation  was  more  favorable 
to  the  insurgents.  But  the  Foreign  Enlistment  Act,  passed  by 

89  Historia  del  Peru  Independiente,  II,  115. 

Captain  Stewart  was  recalled  and  tried  by  court-martial  in  1824.  In  a 
letter  to  him  dated  November  16,  1824,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  said: 
"  You  have  been  already  apprised  that  the  government  of  Peru  has  made 
complaints  against  a  part  of  your  official  conduct,  while  in  command  of  the 
squadron  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  and  that  these  complaints  have  been  seconded 
by  public  rumor,  and  confirmed  by  the  agent  of  our  government  in  that 
country.  I  have,  also,  to  inform  you  that  other  complaints  have  been 
made,  though  in  a  less  imposing  form."  Captain  Stewart  was  tried  under 
the  following  charges :  Unofficerlike  conduct,  disobedience  of  orders,  neglect 
of  duty,  and  oppression  and  cruelty.  Under  the  first  charge  there  were 
twenty-nine  separate  specifications,  most  of  which  set  forth  alleged  un- 
neutral  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  accused.  By  the  judgment  of  the  court- 
martial,  Captain  Stewart  was  acquitted  most  honorably  of  all  the  charges 
which  had  been  made  against  him.  The  record  of  the  trial  is  found  in 
American  State  Papers,  Naval  Affairs,  II,  487-597. 


214       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Parliament  in  1819,  was  avowedly  based  on  the  American  Act 
of  1817  as  amended  in  1818.  Prior  to  the  enactment  of  this 
law,  Great  Britain  had  attempted  to  enforce  neutrality  under 
the  provisions  of  international  law.  But  violations  were  fre- 
quent. In  1818  alone  six  expeditions  are  said  to  have  been 
dispatched  by  Lopez  Mendez  to  Venezuela.  One  of  these,  a 
brigade  under  Colonel  English,  consisted  of  some  two  thousand 
men.  Even  subsequent  to  the  passage  of  the  Foreign  Enlistment 
Act,  General  D'Evereux,  after  an  elaborate  public  banquet  in 
Dublin,  took  out  another  expedition  to  South  America.90 

Out  of  these  illicit  expeditions  grew  the  British  Legion  which 
served  under  Bolivar  and  which,  in  conjunction  with  the  native 
troops,  played  a  decisive  part  in  the  liberation  of  the  northern 
part  of  South  America.91  For  this  assistance,  however,  and 
for  the  invaluable  aid  rendered  in  the  south  by  Cochrane, 
Miller,  and  others,  whose  services  were  enlisted  in  England,  no 
credit  can  be  given  to  the  British  Government  without  con- 
victing it  of  a  shameless  disregard  for  its  own  laws  and 
of  duplicity  toward  one  of  the  parties  to  the  contest.  It  was 
a  question  of  individual  enterprise.  That  citizens  of  the  United 
States  played  no  such  part  was  due  not  at  all  to  lack  of  sym- 
pathy with  the  cause,  but  to  a  stricter  enforcement  of  the  Amer- 
ican neutrality  laws  and  to  the  circumstance  that  the  relatively 
small  number  of  adventurous  spirits  who  might  have  been  drawn 
into  the  contest  found  agreeable  occupation  at  home.  The 
country  was  new.  Savage  tribes  on  the  frontiers  had  to  be 
subdued.  Vast  tracts  of  unoccupied  territory  called  for  settlers. 
Industry  and  commerce  flourished.  In  Great  Britain  the  situ- 
ation was  altogether  different.  The  conclusion  of  the  Euro- 
pean wars  turned  many  thousands  back  to  peaceful  pursuits. 
A  period  of  industrial  distress  and  of  unemployment  followed. 
Emigration  set  out  for  foreign  shores.  The  countries  of  Cen- 
tral and  South  America,  struggling  to  be  free,  offered  promis- 

eopaxson,  The  Independence  of  the  South  American  Republics,  120. 
•iCTLeary,  Memoriae,  XVII,  571;  XVIII,  80. 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          215 

ing  rewards  to  those  bred  to  arms.  To  these  causes  and 
not  to  governmental  policy  was  due  the  relatively  large  con- 
tribution of  British  subjects  to  the  emancipation  of  Spanish 
America. 

Although  the  British  Government  and  that  of  the  United 
States  were  in  substantial  accord  on  the  subject  of  neutrality, 
yet,  as  to  the  question  of  the  independence  of  the  colonies,  they 
differed  widely.  The  United  States,  while  maintaining  neu- 
trality, did  not  hesitate  to  express  its  sympathy  with  the  cause 
of  independence,  and  was  never  in  the  least  inclined  to  con- 
tribute to  any  arrangement  for  reestablishing  the  authority  of 
the  mother  country.  Great  Britain,  on  the  contrary,  made 
several  attempts  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  between  the  in- 
surgents and  the  Peninsular  authorities  on  the  basis  of  the 
supremacy  of  the  latter,  and  not  until  the  United  States  had 
formally  recognized  the  new  states  did  the  British  Government 
finally  give  up  hope  of  accomplishing  such  a  result.  The  first 
of  these  attempts  was  made  in  1810  at  the  solicitation  of  a 
Venezuelan  delegation  headed  by  Bolivar.  In  a  memorandum 
on  the  subject,  Marquess  Wellesley  concluded  that  by  a  skillful 
use  of  Ferdinand's  title  as  sovereign  —  the  insurgents  still  pro- 
fessed loyalty  to  him  —  it  would  be  possible  for  England  to  pre- 
vent a  sudden  and  complete  emancipation  of  the  Spanish  col- 
onies and  yet  compel  Spain  to  modify  her  colonial  system ;  but 
that  it  was  chimerical  to  suppose  that  the  mother  country  could 
preserve  her  colonies  otherwise  than  as  allied  states  under  a 
common  sovereign.  The  regency  at  Cadiz,  however,  declined  to 
enter  into  negotiations  upon  such  a  basis  and  no  further  effort 
was  made  for  the  time  to  bring  about  the  desired  reconcili- 
ation.92 

In  May,  1811,  the  British  diplomatic  representative  at  Cadiz 
was  instructed  to  renew  and  urge  the  offer  of  mediation  of  Great 
Britain  for  the  purpose  of  checking  the  progress  of  the  unfor- 
tunate civil  war  and  of  effecting  at  least  such  a  temporary  ad- 
92  Satow,  Diplomatic  Practice,  II,  335-337. 


216       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

justment  as  might  prevent,  during  the  contest  with  France, 
so  ruinous  a  waste  of  the  general  strength  of  the  Spanish  Em- 
pire. "  Heads  of  Articles  of  Adjustment "  were  drawn  up  as 
a  basis  for  the  proposed  mediation.  The  provisions  were  in 
substance  for  a  cessation  of  hostilities;  a  general  amnesty; 
representation  of  the  colonies  in  the  Cortes;  free  trade  with 
preference  for  Old  Spain  and  her  colonies;  native  Americans 
to  be  viceroys  or  governors ;  native  representation  in  the  cabildos 
and  no  appeals  to  Spain;  and  cooperation  in  the  war  against 
France.  The  articles  were  to  be  guaranteed  by  Great  Britain. 
But  it  was  understood  that  the  British  Government  would  not  be 
induced  to  commit  acts  of  hostility  against  the  colonies  on  the 
ground  of  a  refusal  to  recognize  the  constituted  authorities 
in  the  Peninsula,  because  such  a  course  would  merely  drive 
them  into  the  arms  of  the  enemy.  The  mediation  was  not  pro- 
posed by  Great  Britain  for  her  own  benefit,  it  was  declared,  but 
in  order  to  reconcile  the  colonies  with  the  mother  country  and 
maintain  the  integrity  of  the  Spanish  monarchy.  This  attempt 
having  failed  because  of  Spain's  insistence  on  the  help  of  Great 
Britain  to  resub jugate  the  colonies  in  case  the  mediation  failed, 
negotiations  were  once  more  renewed,  in  1812,  on  the  occasion 
of  the  election  of  a  new  regency.  But  Spain  remained  obdurate 
and  no  agreement  was  reached.  The  reestablishment  of  Spanish 
authority  in  Chile  in  1814  through  the  mediation  of  Commo- 
dore Hillyar  has  been  referred  to  above.  And  in  a  previous 
chapter  attention  has  been  called  to  the  treaty  of  July  5,  1814, 
between  Great  Britain  and  Spain,  in  which  his  Britannic  Ma- 
jesty, being  anxious  that  the  insurgents  "  should  return  to  their 
obedience  to  their  lawful  sovereign,"  engaged  to  prevent  his 
subjects  from  furnishing  them  "  arms,  ammunition,  or  any 
other  warlike  article."  In  1815  Spain  asked  for  the  mediation 
of  Great  Britain,  but  refused  to  state  the  terms  to  which  she 
was  willing  to  agree.  In  1818,  at  Aix-la-Chapelle,  the  question 
of  an  arrangement  between  Spain  and  her  colonies  was  discussed 
by  the  five  great  powers.  The  British  attitude  continued  to 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          217 

be  that  they  could  only  mediate  and  facilitate  and  not  compel  or 
menace.  But  not  even  an  approximation  of  opinion  was 
reached.93 

As  Great  Britain  consistently  refused  to  intervene  by  force 
to  resubjugate  the  Spanish  colonies,  and  as  revolutionary  prin- 
ciples showed  a  constant  tendency  to  spread  in  Europe  as  well 
as  in  America,  the  allied  sovereigns  of  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria, 
and  France  resolved  to  take  the  matter  in  hand.  At  the  Con- 
gress of  Verona,  in  1822,  they  agreed  to  restore,  through  the 
arms  of  France,  the  absolute  power  of  Ferdinand  VII,  of  which 
he  had  been  deprived  by  a  movement  setting  up  a  liberal  gov- 
ernment under  the  Spanish  Constitution  of  1820.  This  stand 
of  their  allies  brought  the  British  cabinet  to  a  realization  of  the 
hopelessness  of  further  attempts  to  mediate  between  the  parties 
to  the  conflict  in  America,  on  the  basis  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
mother  country.  Moreover  the  government  at  Washington  had 
just  recognized  the  independence  of  the  new  states.  The  line 
of  cleavage  between  liberal  America  and  absolutist  Europe  was 
now  clearly  drawn.  It  was  necessary  for  Great  Britain  to  take 
her  position  definitively  on  one  side  or  the  other.  At  the  Con- 
gress of  Verona  the  British  representatives  had  opposed  the 
hostile  intentions  of  the  allies,  and  on  April  14,  1822,  Canning, 
who  had  succeeded  Castlereagh  as  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
made  a  declaration  on  the  subject  in  the  House  of  Commons.94 
With  regard  to  the  Spanish  possessions  in  America,  he  said, 
there  was  no  choice.  As  long  as  peace  continued  and  Spain 
had  no  enemies  in  Europe,  Great  Britain  was  free  to  determine 
how  far  she  could  intervene  in  the  contest  in  America.  The 
situation,  however,  had  changed.  Spain  had  acquired  a  power- 
ful and  active  enemy  in  Europe  and  it  had  become  necessary 
for  England  to  declare  her  views  on  the  struggle  of  the  colonies 


340-350. 

94  The  papers  relating  to  the  subject  were  given  to  the  press.  On  July 
20,  1823,  the  Qaceta  de  Colombia  published  an  article  based  on  an  account 
in  the  Jamaica  Courant,  containing  the  substance  of  Canning's  declaration. 


218       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

for  independence.  As  France  might  send  fleets  and  armies  to 
conquer  and  take  possession  of  them,  and  as  at  the  termination 
of  the  war  a  settlement  might  be  made  transferring  some  of 
them  to  France,  Great  Britain  felt  obliged  to  declare  that  she 
considered  the  separation  of  the  Spanish  colonies  had  reached 
such  a  point  that  she  could  not  tolerate  the  cession  of  them  to 
any  other  power. 

In  spite  of  the  British  attitude,  the  Holy  'Alliance  persisted 
in  its  plans.  The  French  army,  which  early  in  1823  invaded 
Spain,  soon  accomplished  its  mission.  Apprehensions  were 
aroused  in  both  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  It  was 
stated  and  generally  believed  that  the  plan  was  the  reestablish- 
ment  of  Spanish  authority  over  all  the  American  possessions, 
except  Mexico  and  California,  which  were  to  be  ceded  to  France 
and  Russia,  respectively,  in  consideration  of  the  military  aid  to 
be  rendered  to  Spain  by  these  two  powers  in  the  work  of  res- 
toration.95 Toward  the  latter  part  of  August,  1823,  Canning 
sounded  Rush,  the  United  States  minister  at  London,  as  to 
whether  the  two  governments  might  not  come  to  an  understand- 
ing on  the  subject  of  the  Spanish  American  colonies,  and  as 
to  whether  it  would  not  be  expedient  for  themselves  and  bene- 
ficial for  the  world  that  its  principles  should  be  clearly  settled 
and  plainly  avowed.  The  British  Government,  he  added,  con- 
sidered the  recovery  of  the  colonies  by  Spain  to  be  hopeless,  and 
the  question  of  recognizing  their  independence  to  be  one  of 
time  and  circumstances,  but  were  not  disposed  to  put  any  im- 
pediment in  the  way  of  a  settlement  by  amicable  negotiation. 
Disclaiming  any  selfish  aim  on  the  part  of  his  government,  he 
declared,  finally,  that  Great  Britain  could  not  see  with  indiffer- 
ence the  transfer  of  any  portion  of  them  to  any  other  power. 
Rush,  not  being  authorized  to  enter  into  such  an  agreement, 
communicated  the  substance  of  the  conversation  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  at  Washington.90  The  circumstances  which  fol- 

»s  Burgees,  The  Middle  Period,  124.     Gaceta  de  Colombia,  July  13,  1823. 
e«  Satow,  Diplomatic  Practice,  II,  353. 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          219 

lowed  and  which  led  up  to  the  famous  declaration  contained  in 
Monroe's  message  of  December  2,  1823,  are  well  known. 

Without  waiting  for  the  decision  of  the  United  States,  Can- 
ning declared  in  an  interview  with  Prince  de  Polignac,  on  Oc- 
tober 9,  that  in  the  conflict  between  Spain  and  her  colonies 
Great  Britain  would  remain  neutral;  but  that,  if  any  foreign 
power  joined  with  Spain  against  the  colonies,  an  entirely  new 
question  would  be  created  upon  which  Great  Britain  must  take 
such  decision  as  her  interests  might  require.97  In  January 
following,  Canning  declared  that,  in  the  opinion  of  the  British 
Government,  it  was  vain  to  hope  that  any  mediation  not  founded 
on  the  basis  of  independence  could  be  successful,  but  if  the 
court  of  Madrid  desired  it,  they  would  willingly  afford  their 
countenance  and  aid  to  a  negotiation  commenced  on  the  only 
basis  which  then  appeared  to  be  practicable,  and  would  see  with- 
out reluctance,  the  conclusion,  through  a  negotiation  on  that 
basis,  of  an  arrangement  by  which  the  mother  country  should  be 
secured  in  the  enjoyment  of  commercial  advantages  superior  to 
those  conceded  to  other  nations.98  A  year  later  Great  Britain 
recognized  the  independence  of  the  new  states,  but  she  continued 
her  efforts,  as  will  be  seen  in  a  subsequent  chapter  on  the  Pan- 
ama Congress,  to  mediate  in  favor  of  a  settlement  of  the  con- 
flict on  the  basis  of  certain  pecuniary  advantages  to  the  mother 
country. 

It  is  not  proposed  to  give  a  resume  of  the  history  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Numerous  histories  of  it  have  been  written 
and  many  able  minds  have  been  devoted  to  the  analysis  of  its 
provisions.  Relatively  little,  however,  has  been  published  in 
English  on  the  subject  from  the  standpoint  of  Hispanic  Amer- 
ica. Accordingly,  in  the  next  chapter,  an  effort  will  be  made  to 
determine  from  contemporaneous  sources  the  attitude  which  the 
new  states  assumed  toward  the  declaration  at  the  time  of  its 
promulgation.  For  reference  the  paragraphs  of  Monroe's  mes- 

97  Moore,  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  243. 
»s  Satow,  Diplomatic  Practice,  II,  353. 


220       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

sage  commonly  accepted  as  constituting  the  basis  of  the  doc- 
trine are  given  below.  They  cannot  be  too  often  read. 

In  the  first  part  of  the  message,  referring  to  an  attempt 
which  was  being  made  to  arrange  by  amicable  negotiation  with 
the  Russian  Government  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  two  na- 
tions on  the  northwest  coast,  President  Monroe  said : 

"  In  the  discussions  to  which  this  interest  has  given  rise  and 
in  the  arrangement  by  which  they  may  terminate  the  occasion 
has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting,  as  a  principle  in  which 
the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are  involved,  that 
the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and  independent  condition 
which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to 
be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any 
European  powers." 

Toward  the  end  of  the  message,  Monroe  refers  to  events  in 
Spain  and  Portugal  and  continues  as  follows : 

"  Of  events  in  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  with  which  we  have 
so  much  intercourse  and  from  which  we  derive  our  origin,  we 
have  always  been  anxious  and  interested  spectators.  The  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  cherish  sentiments  the  most  friendly 
in  favor  of  the  liberty  and  happiness  of  their  fellow  men  on  that 
side  of  the  Atlantic.  In  the  wars  of  the  European  powers  in 
matters  relating  to  themselves  we  have  never  taken  any  part, 
nor  does  it  comport  with  our  policy  so  to  do.  It  is  only  when 
our  rights  are  invaded  or  seriously  menaced  that  we  resent  in- 
juries or  make  preparation  for  our  defense.  With  the  move- 
ments in  this  hemisphere  we  are  of  necessity  more  immediately 
connected,  and  by  causes  which  must  be  obvious  to  all  enlight- 
ened and  impartial  observers.  The  political  system  of  the 
allied  powers  is  essentially  different  in  this  respect  from  that 
of  America.  This  difference  proceeds  from  that  which  exists  in 
their  respective  governments;  and  to  the  defense  of  our  own, 
which  has  been  achieved  by  the  loss  of  so  much  blood  and  treas- 
ure, and  matured  by  the  wisdom  of  their  most  enlightened  citi- 
zens, and  under  which  we  have  enjoyed  unexampled  felicity, 


INTERNATIONAL  COMPLICATIONS          221 

this  whole  nation  is  devoted.  We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor 
and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United  States 
and  those  powers  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt 
on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemi- 
sphere as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  exist- 
ing colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  power  we 
have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the 
governments  who  have  declared  their  independence  and  main- 
tained it,  and  whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  con- 
sideration and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not 
view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or 
controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any  Euro- 
pean power  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of  an 
unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United  States.  In  the  war 
between  those  new  governments  and  Spain  we  declared  our  neu- 
trality at  the  time  of  their  recognition,  and  to  this  we  have 
adhered,  and  shall  continue  to  adhere,  provided  no  change  shall 
occur  which,  in  the  judgment  of  the  competent  authorities  of 
this  government,  shall  make  a  corresponding  change  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  indispensable  to  their  security. 

"  The  late  events  in  Spain  and  Portugal  show  that  Europe 
is  still  unsettled.  Of  this  important  fact  no  stronger  proof  can 
be  adduced  than  that  the  allied  powers  should  have  thought  it 
proper,  on  any  principle  satisfactory  to  themselves,  to  have 
interposed  by  force  in  the  internal  concerns  of  Spain.  To 
what  extent  such  interposition  may  be  carried,  on  the  same 
principle,  is  a  question  in  which  all  independent  powers  whose 
governments  differ  from  theirs  are  interested,  even  those  most 
remote,  and  surely  none  more  so  than  the  United  States.  Our 
policy  in  regard  to  Europe,  which  was  adopted  at  an  early  stage 
of  the  wars  which  have  so  long  agitated  that  quarter  of  the 
globe,  nevertheless  remains  the  same,  which  is,  not  to  interfere 
in  the  internal  concerns  of  any  of  its  powers;  to  consider  the 
government  de  facto  as  the  legitimate  government  for  us;  to 
cultivate  friendly  relations  with  it  and  to  preserve  those  rela- 


222       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

tions  by  a  frank,  firm,  and  manly  policy,  meeting  in  all  in- 
stances the  just  claims  of  every  power,  submitting  to  injuries 
from  none.  But  in  regard  to  these  continents  circumstances 
are  eminently  and  conspicuously  different.  It  is  impossible 
that  the  allied  powers  should  extend  their  political  system  to 
any  portion  of  either  continent  without  endangering  our  peace 
and  happiness;  nor  can  any  one  believe  that  our  southern 
brethren,  if  left  to  themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their  own  ac- 
cord. It  is  equally  impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should  behold 
such  interposition  in  any  form  with  indifference.  If  we  look 
to  the  comparative  strength  and  resources  of  Spain  and  those 
new  governments  and  their  distance  from  each  other,  it  must 
be  obvious  that  she  can  never  subdue  them.  It  is  still  the  true 
policy  of  the  United  States  to  leave  the  parties  to  themselves, 
in  the  hope  that  other  powers  will  pursue  the  same  course."  " 

99  Monroe,  Writings,  VI,  339. 


CHAPTEE  VI 

HISPANIC    AMERICA    AND    THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE; 

IT  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  former  col- 
onies of  Spain,  and  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  Brazil  also,  dur- 
ing their  struggle  for  independence  and  for  some  years  after- 
ward had  their  gaze  constantly  fixed  on  Europe.  From  that 
source  would  come,  they  feared,  the  forces  which  might  succeed 
in  subjecting  them  again  to  the  hated  authority  of  the  mother 
country;  and  from  that  source  also  they  hoped  to  receive  the 
succor  which  would  complete  their  independence  and  protect 
them  in  the  continuous  enjoyment  of  it.  Mexico  and  Central 
America,  after  their  disastrous  experience  as  an  empire,  frankly 
accepted  the  republican  system ;  but  not  for  this  reason  did  they 
cease  to  rely  upon  European  and  especially  upon  British  assist- 
ance to  fix  their  independence.  Argentina,  and  to  a  less  de- 
gree Chile,  continued  throughout  the  revolutionary  period  to 
look  to  Europe  for  a  solution  of  their  political  problems.  The 
Bolivarian  republics  —  that  is,  Great  Colombia,  Peru,  and  Bo- 
livia—  although  they  achieved  their  emancipation  mainly 
through  their  own  efforts  under  the  leadership  of  the  Liberator, 
yet  had  received  material  aid  from  Great  Britain  and  expected 
from  her  protection  against  reconquest  by  the  allied  powers  of 
Europe.  Brazil,  likewise,  owing  to  the  peculiar  relation  exist- 
ing between  Portugal  and  Great  Britain,  was  indebted  to  Brit- 
ish influence  in  great  part  for  the  relative  ease  with  which  her 
independence  was  effected,  and  for  the  prospect  of  being  able 
to  live  in  undisturbed  exercise  of  sovereignty  over  her  vast 
territory. 

Great  Britain,  in  fact,  had  become  strongly  intrenched  in  the 
affections  of  the  new  American  states.  She,  more  than  any 

223 


224:       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

other  foreign  power,  had  contributed  to  their  independence. 
From  her  shores,  regardless  of  treaty  obligations,  and  the  obli- 
gations of  international  law,  armed  expeditions  had  sailed  to 
aid  the  revolted  colonists ;  in  her  ports  ships  had  been  fitted  out 
to  form  units  in  the  insurgent  navies  or  to  operate  as  privateers 
against  Spanish  commerce;  from  her  citizens  loans  had  been 
obtained  and  by  them  military  supplies  had  been  furnished; 
and  on  British  soil  thousands  of  men  had  been  enlisted  to  serve 
in  the  revolutionary  ranks.  Moreover  the  prestige  which  Great 
Britain  had  acquired  through  the  part  she  had  played  in  the 
overthrow  of  Napoleon,  together  with  her  gradual  withdrawal 
from  the  trammels  of  the  allied  powers  of  Europe,  and  finally 
her  stand  against  the  intervention  of  those  powers  in  American 
affairs,  tended  very  much  to  enhance  friendly  relations  be- 
tween her  and  the  American  beneficiaries  of  her  policy,  and  to 
cause  them  to  rely  more  strongly  upon  British  protection.1 
The  United  States  on  the  other  hand  enforced  its  neutrality 
laws  with  relative  strictness  and  thus  contributed  much  less 
in  a  material  way  to  the  outcome  of  the  revolution  than  did 
Great  Britain.  And,  as  the  military  and  naval  strength  of 
the  United  States  was  considerably  inferior  to  that  of  Great 
Britain,  it  is  not  surprising  that  of  the  two  nations  that  stood 
between  the  Hispanic  American  states  and  the  Holy  Alliance, 

i  During  the  greater  part  of  the  period  of  revolution  in  Hispanic  Amer- 
ica the  interests  of  Great  Britain  were  looked  after  by  British  naval  offi- 
cers, but  special  agents  were  later  sent  out  and  to  their  activities,  no 
doubt,  the  good  disposition  toward  England  can  in  large  measure  be 
attributed.  The  following  from  a  letter  of  Naval  Lieutenant  Samouel,  an 
agent  whom  France  sent  to  Mexico  early  in  1824  to  effect  a  reconciliation 
between  that  republic  and  Spain  is  significant.  Writing  to  the  Minister 
of  Marine  and  Colonies  from  Habana  under  date  of  August  14,  1824,  he 
says :  "  I  made  strong  efforts  to  destroy  the  lack  of  confidence  with  respect 
to  the  intentions  of  France,  who  is  thought  to  be  supporting  King 
Ferdinand,  and  on  all  sides  I  noted  great  animosity  toward  the  Spaniards, 
who  are  quite  numerous  in  that  province.  Spain  is  considered  as  incapable 
of  carrying  out  any  undertaking  unless  she  is  aided  by  some  power  of  the 
Continent,  and  the  English  have  given  out  the  information  that  if  this 
should  occur  they  would  give  Mexico  strong  support." — Villanueva,  La 
Santa  Alianza,  38,  283. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  225 

Great  Britain  should  have  occupied  by  far  the  more  prominent 
place  in  the  opinion  of  those  states.  Striking  illustrations  of 
this  fact  are  to  be  found  in  the  manner  in  which  the  new  states 
received  the  Monroe  declaration. 

News  of  President  Monroe's  message  of  December  2,  1823, 
apparently  did  not  arrive  in  the  City  of  Mexico  until  near  the 
middle  of  the  following  February.  The  first  direct  reference 
to  the  message  in  the  press  of  the  Mexican  capital  occurs  in  the 
A  guild  Mexicana  2  of  February  12,  1824,  when  the  following 
brief  notice  appeared :  "  A  person  who  left  New  Orleans  on 
the  fifteenth  of  last  month  says  that  the  message  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States  of  North  America  containing  a  declara- 
tion with  regard  to  maintaining  the  independence  of  Mexico 
and  South  America  was  received  with  the  greatest  approval 
and  satisfaction ;  and  that  though  the  President  insinuates  that 
no  intervention  would  be  called  for  in  case  Spain  alone  under- 
took the  reconquest  of  her  colonies,  nevertheless  it  is  said  the 
states  of  the  West  are  determined  to  oppose  reconquest  under 
whatever  circumstances  and  to  assist  in  any  way  they  may  be 
able  to  defend  the  United  Mexican  states."  3 

Several  days  later  the  Aguila  Mexicana  received  a  letter  and 
newspapers  from  a  correspondent  writing  from  Habana  under 
date  of  January  15.  This  correspondent  discussed  the  interna- 
tional situation  in  such  a  way  as  to  indicate  that  he  had  read 
the  Monroe  declaration,  though  he  made  no  direct  reference  to 
it.  He  expressed  the  opinion  that  England  and  the  United 
States  would  oppose  foreign  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the 
American  states,  but  he  believed  that  their  action  would  be 
limited  to  opposition  to  what  he  called  ostensible  intervention, 
which  would  not  prevent  aid  being  given  Spain  through  loans. 
He  was  of  the  opinion,  therefore,  that  it  was  best  for  the  Amer- 

2  This  paper,  the  first  daily  to  be  published  in  Mexico,  was  the  organ  of 
the  Federalist  group  of  the  Republican  party.     The  Centralists  depended 
upon  El  Sol  to  defend  their  interests.     The  Federalists  were  in  power  at 
this  time. —  Zavala,  Ensayo  Histdrico,  I,  256. 

3  Aguila  Mexicana,  February  12,  1824. 


226       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINISTHSTOS 

ican  states  to  trust  to  their  own  resources  and  not  to  rely  too 
much  on  foreign  protection.4 

Among  the  papers  received  from  the  Habana  correspondent 
there  must  have  been  one  or  more  which  contained  either  ex- 
tracts from  Monroe's  message  or  possibly  the  message  in  full ; 
for  in  the  same  issue  of  the  Aguila  Mexicana  in  which  this 
correspondent's  letter  was  inserted  there  was  published  a  lead- 
ing article  entitled  "  Politica,"  which  embodied  a  short  extract 
from  that  famous  document.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  on  this 
occasion,  when  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe  might  have 
been  expected  to  arouse  the  liveliest  interest,  another  question 
which  in  the  mind  of  the  editor  was  of  much  greater  impor- 
tance; namely,  the  recognition  of  Mexican  independence  by 
Great  Britain  and  the  establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries,  received  the  paper's  chief  attention, 
while  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe  was  treated  as  purely 
incidental  to  that  question.  The  author  of  the  article,  declar- 
ing that  the  British  cabinet  was  in  favor  of  the  independence 
of  Mexico,  expressed  the  opinion  that  with  England  on  their 
side  the  goal  was  already  practically  attained;  for  Spain  in 
her  weakness  would  be  obliged  to  heed  the  least  intimation  of 
that  great  power.  A  favorable  circumstance,  he  added,  was  the 
fact  that  the  United  States,  naturally  the  friend  of  Mexico, 
had  come  to  its  aid  in  accord  with  the  only  nation  capable  of 
commanding  respect  in  case  opposition  of  interests  should  arise. 
Then  to  make  clear  the  position  of  the  United  States  an  extract 
from  that  part  of  Monroe's  message  referring  to  the  noninter- 
vention of  Europe  in  the  affairs  of  the  American  states  was 
given;  but  this  was  followed  by  no  comment.5 

In  the  course  of  a  review  of  the  year  1824,  El  Sol,  another 
daily  of  Mexico  City,  though  not  referring  to  Monroe's  mes- 
sage, makes  the  following  significant  observations :  "  The 
termination  of  the  war  in  Spain  we  believe  turned  the  attention 

«  Ibid.,  February  26,  1824. 


THE  MOSTKOE  DOCTKINE  227 

of  the  powers  of  Europe  to  independent  America.  The  despot 
Ferdinand  as  soon  as  he  saw  himself  reestablished  in  what  he 
calls  his  rights,  solicited  the  aid  of  his  allies  for  the  purpose 
of  restoring  his  authority  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic.  To  this 
end  he  proposed  the  convocation  of  a  congress  in  the  expecta- 
tion that  one  of  those  reunions  in  which  the  sovereigns  of  Eu- 
rope conspire  against  the  liberties  of  the  people  would  resolve 
upon  the  oppression  of  the  Americas.  In  this  he  was  disap- 
pointed, for  the  firm,  constant,  liberal  conduct  of  the  British 
Government  prevented  such  a  congress  from  meeting,  and  the 
positive  declarations  of  that  government  closed  the  door  to  the 
idea  of  aggression  by  other  arms  than  those  of  Spain.  More- 
over the  power  of  a  nation  in  a  state  of  dissolution  and  anarchy, 
such  as  that  in  which  Spain  finds  herself,  is  to  be  but  little 
feared.  Thus  it  is  that  though  our  independence  has  not  been 
recognized  it  has  been  respected."  6 

The  foregoing  expressions,  unofficial  though  they  are,  never- 
theless undoubtedly  make  manifest  in  a  fairly  exact  way  the 
relative  importance  which  was  attached  in  Mexico  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  at  the  time  of  its  proclamation.  Fortunately,  how- 
ever, a  more  authoritative  statement  is  at  hand.  In  a  report 
which  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  Don  Lucas  Alaman,7 

6  El  Sol,  January  2,  1825. 

7  Lucas  Alaman  was  born  in  Guanajuato,  Mexico,  in  1792.     He  received 
his  early  education  in  the  city  of  his  birth,  and  afterward  continued  his 
studies  in  Mexico  City  and  in  Europe,  where  he  remained  from   1814  to 
1820.     During   these  years   he   traveled   over   the  greater   part   of   Great 
Britain  and  the  Continent,  perfecting  himself  in  moden  languages  and  pur- 
suing studies  in  the  natural  sciences.    On  his  return  to  Mexico  he  was 
elected  deputy  to  the  Spanish  Cortes  for  the  province  of  Guanajuato  and 
thenceforth  he  occupied  a  prominent  place  in  Mexican  history.     Returning 
once  more   to   Mexico   in   March,    1823,   he   was   shortly   afterward   made 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  with  the  exception  of  short  intervals  served 
in  that  office  until  the  end  of  1825,  after  which  he  retired  to  private  life. 
At  various  times  subsequently,  however,  he  held  high  office  in  the  republic 
and  at  the  time  of  his  death  in  1853  he  was  once  more  occupying  the  post  of 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Alamfin's  Historia  de  Mexico  (5  vols.)  is  perhaps  the  most  reliable  and 
satisfactory  history  that  has  yet  been  written  of  the  Republic  of  Mexico. 
This  work  was  preceded  by  his  Disertaciones  sobre  la  historic  de  la 


228       PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

made  to  the  Mexican  Congress  on  January  11,  1825,  he  men- 
tions, in  discussing  the  state  of  affairs  in  Europe,  the  message 
of  President  Monroe.  This  he  does  in  such  a  connection  as  to 
leave  little  doubt  as  to  his  estimate  of  its  relative  importance. 
Speaking  of  the  invasion  of  Spain  by  France  and  of  the  desire 
of  Ferdinand  to  secure  the  intervention  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
in  his  favor,  Alaman  says :  "  This  conduct  of  the  Spanish 
Government  has  given  an  entirely  new  direction  to  European 
policy.  England  refused  Ferdinand's  invitation  to  join  in  the 
proposed  congress,  and  the  papers  presented  by  the  English 
minister  to  Parliament,  which  were  published,  set  forth  with 
admirable  frankness  the  liberal  principles  which  were  to  guide 
her  conduct.  While  not  opposing  the  recognition  of  our  inde- 
pendence England  desired  that  Spain  should  be  the  first  of  the 
European  powers  to  take  this  important  step,  though  she  has 
indicated  that  the  circumstances  are  such  that  she  will  not  wait 
very  long  for  the  results  of  Spain's  tortuous  procedure,  and 
she  has  openly  declared  that  she  will  not  permit  any  power  or 
league  of  powers  to  undertake  armed  intervention  in  favor 
of  Spain  in  the  pending  questions  with  her  former  colonies. 
Very  similar  also  was  the  resolution  announced  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  the  North  as  set  forth  in  his  mes- 
sage presented  to  a  former  Congress.  And  as  the  French  Gov- 
ernment at  about  the  same  time  manifested  friendly  intentions 
toward  us  there  are  very  strong  reasons  for  believing  that  the 
moment  for  the  recognition  of  our  independence  by  other  Eu- 
ropean nations  is  at  hand."  8 

Republica  Mexicana  desde  la  Conquista  hasta  la  Independence,  forming  in 
effect  an  introduction  to  the  former.  Alaman  possessed  ability  of  a  high 
order,  and  he  cultivated  it  with  industry.  He  spoke  English,  French,  and 
Italian  fluently.  He  not  infrequently  displayed  leanings  toward  monarchy, 
though  he  himself  declared  that  his  experience  in  Europe  had  converted  him 
to  republican  principles. —  Bancroft,  History  of  Mexico,  IV,  823 ;  Bocanegra, 
Hist,  de  Mex.,  241,  557,  574;  Apuntes  para  la  Biografla  del  Exmo.  8r.  D. 
Lucas  Alamdn. 

s  Memoria  presentada  a  las  dos  Cdmaras  del  Congreso  General  de  la 
Federaci6n  al  abrirse  las  Sesiones  del  Ano  de  1825,  4.  See  also  British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII,  983. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  229 

As  it  is  desired  at  this  point  merely  to  determine  the  imme- 
diate effect  produced  throughout  Latin  America  by  the  message 
of  President  Monroe,  but  little  importance  will  be  attached  to 
views  expressed  long  posterior  to  that  event.  It  is  worth  not- 
ing, however,  that  Alaman  in  his  Historia  de  Mexico,  published 
about  a  quarter  of  a  century  later,  found  no  reason  to  give  a 
more  important  place  in  Mexican  history  to  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine than  he  had  ascribed  to  it  in  the  report  referred  to  above. 
Indeed  the  pages  of  his  work  may  be  searched  in  vain  for  any 
reference  whatever  to  the  Monroe  declaration,  whereas  along 
with  a  brief  notice  of  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of 
Mexico  by  the  United  States,  the  author  gives  a  relatively  full 
account  of  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain  respecting  recognition 
and  the  opposition  of  that  power  to  the  interference  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  in  American  affairs.9 

Other  Mexican  historians,  contemporaries  of  Alaman,  in  like 
manner  attached  relatively  less  importance  to  the  policy  of 
Monroe  than  to  that  of  Canning.  Tornel,10  in  his  Breve  Resena 
Historic^  affirms  that  if  the  United  States  had  been  content 
with  exercising  the  supremacy  to  which  every  circumstance 
called  her,  or  if  she  had  been  satisfied  with  laying  the  founda- 
tions for  an  American  continental  system,  she  would  have  met 
the  expectations  of  the  world  and  she  would  not  have  been  re- 
proached with  having  proceeded  with  selfish  motives,  rather 
than  with  the  noble  purpose  of  leading,  counseling,  and  de- 
fending the  American  nations  in  their  tempestuous  infancy. 
Reviewing  in  detail  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain  in  her  rela- 
tions to  the  continental  system  and  to  the  Western  Hemisphere, 
the  author  concludes  by  saying  that  the  words  of  Canning  to 
the  effect  that  he  had  called  a  new  world  into  existence,  were 

9  Alaman,  Hist,  de  Mex.,  V,  815-818. 

1°  General  Jose  Marfa  Tornel  was  a  firm  supporter  of  Santa  Anna.  He 
was  twice  appointed  as  Minister  of  War  and  on  one  occasion  represented 
Mexico  at  Washington.  He  died  in  1853,  leaving  his  Resena  Histdrica 
incomplete.  Bancroft,  Hist,  of  Mexico,  V,  254;  Bocanegra,  Hist,  de  Mex., 
II,  577. 


230       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

in  the  nature  of  a  boast  for  which  he  could  be  excused  out  of 
gratitude  for  the  immense  benefit  conferred  upon  the  American 
states  by  England  in  disconcerting  the  designs  of  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance. In  this  respect  they  had  been  favored  also,  he  admits, 
by  the  United  States,  who  opposed  with  energy  and  firmness 
the  interposition  of  the  powers  of  Europe  in  the  affairs  of  the 
New  World.11 

Bocanegra,  in  his  Memorias  para  la  Historia  de  Mexico  Irtr 
dependiente,  referring  to  the  arrival  at  Vera  Cruz  in  December, 
1823,  of  a  commission  which  the  British  Government  had  sent 
to  Mexico  to  report  on  its  political  condition,  says  that  this 
event  was  made  much  of  on  account  of  the  prevailing  conviction 
that  recognition  by  Great  Britain  was  essential  to  the  conserva- 
tion of  the  independence  of  the  republic.12  In  May,  1824, 
news  reached  Mexico  of  certain  conferences  which  Canning  had 
held  with  the  French  ambassador  at  London,  and  in  which 
Canning  had  declared  in  substance  that  he  believed  it  to  be 
useless  for  Spain  to  try  longer  to  recover  her  colonies,  and 
that  if  she  insisted  on  making  the  effort  England  would  not 
permit  any  other  power  to  aid  in  the  reconquest.  In  virtue 
of  this  stand,  the  fame  of  Canning,  Bocanegra  declares,  spread 
throughout  America,  and  in  Mexico  he  was  looked  upon  as  the 
great  champion  of  natural  rights  and  of  the  independence  of 
the  Mexican  nation.18  From  this  writer  President  Monroe 
received  no  such  praise  as  was  given  the  "  immortal  Canning." 
Indeed  the  only  reference  to  Monroe  or  to  his  doctrine  to  be 
found  in  Bocanegra's  history  is  contained  in  a  short  discourse 
spoken  by  the  minister  of  the  United  States,  Poinsett,  upon 
his  reception  by  President  Victoria  on  June  2,  1825.  Vic- 

11  Breve  Resena  Histdrica  de   los  Acontecimientos  m&s  notables  de  la 
Jfacidn  Meancana,  31-32. 

12  Jose"  Maria  Bocanegra  was  for  a  short  time  provisional  president  of  the 
republic.     In  1829,  1837,  and  1841-1844  he  served  as  Minister  of  Foreign 
Relations.     He  died  in  1862  without  having  published  his  Memorias.     They 
were  not  published  until  1892,  when  an  official  edition  appeared  under  the 
direction  of  J.  M.  Vigil. 

is  II,  288. 


THE  MONKOE  DOCTKINE  231 

toria,  however,  in  his  reply  made  no  reciprocal  reference  to  the 
Monroe  declaration.14 

To  cite  opinions  formed  after  the  annexation  of  Texas  and 
after  the  War  of  1847  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States 
had  embittered  the  relations  between  the  two  countries,  would 
not  contribute  to  the  aims  of  this  chapter.  Although  the  works 
of  Alaman,  Tornel,  and  Bocanegra  were  not  published  until 
toward  the  middle  of  the  century  or  later,  yet  they  appear  to 
reflect  faithfully  the  early  attitude.  This  is  confirmed  by  an- 
other Mexican  author,  Lorenzo  Zavala,15  whose  sympathies 
were  decidedly  favorable  to  the  people  and  to  the  institutions 
of  the  United  States  and  whose  work  was  published  in  1831, 
at  which  time  no  serious  friction  had  yet  arisen  between  Mex- 
ico and  the  United  States. 

"  It  is  evident,"  says  Zavala,  "  that  if  it  had  not  been  for 
the  forceful  declarations  of  the  governments  of  England  and 
of  the  United  States  to  the  effect  that  they  would  not  permit 
Spain  to  receive  aid  from  any  of  the  powers  in  her  attempts 
to  recover  her  colonies,  France  would  have  done  in  America, 
or  at  least  would  have  attempted  to  do,  what  she  had  just  ac- 
complished in  the  Peninsula.  At  that  time  the  propaganda 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  was  altogether  in  Spain's  favor.  The 
undertakings  in  Naples,  in  the  Piedmont,  and  in  Spain  ap- 

i*  II,  381-382. 

is  Lorenzo  de  Zavala  was  born  in  Merida,  Yucatan,  in  1781.  In  1820  he 
was  elected  deputy  to  the  Spanish  Cortes  and  later  served  as  deputy  and 
then  senator  in  the  Mexican  Congress.  From  1827-1830  he  was  governor  of 
the  State  of  Mexico.  Upon  the  downfall  of  Guerrero  in  December,  1829, 
Zavala  left  Mexico  and  traveled  in  the  United  States  and  Europe.  Return- 
ing in  1833  he  was  again  elected  to  Congress,  serving  also  as  governor  of 
Mexico.  In  the  following  year  he  was  appointed  minister  to  France  but 
resigned  upon  perceiving  the  direction  toward  centralism  of  the  party  in 
power  in  Mexico,  and  cast  his  lot  with  the  Texans.  He  was  a  member  of 
the  convention  which  declared  the  independence  of  Texas,  March  2,  1836, 
and  was  elected  vice-president  of  that  republic.  He  died  in  November  of 
the  same  year.  His  Ensayo  Hist6rico  de  las  Revoluciones  de  Mexico 
(2  vols.)  was  first  published  at  Paris  in  1831.  There  he  also  published  in 
1834  his  Viaje  a  los  Estados  Unidos  del  Norte  de  America.  Bancroft, 
Hist,  of  Mex.,  V,  87;  North  Mexican,  States  and  Texas,  II,  218.  Wooten, 
A  Comprehensive  History  of  Texas,  I,  238.  Alaman,  Hist,  de  Mex.,  V,  576. 


232       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

peared  to  encourage  the  Holy  Alliance  in  its  crusade  against  the 
Americans,  who,  according  to  the  phrase  employed,  were  rebels 
against  their  legitimate  sovereign.  If  it  had  not  been  for  Eng- 
land and  the  United  States  the  seas  would  have  been  covered 
with  embarkations  bearing  new  conquistadores  to  America. 
The  language  of  Canning,  though  somewhat  pompous  and  in- 
flated, had  nevertheless  the  positive  effect  of  prohibiting  the 
intervention  of  any  other  power  in  transatlantic  affairs."  1G 
Then,  referring  to  the  famous  speech  of  Canning,  made  in  the 
House  of  Commons  on  December  12,  1826,  on  which  occasion 
he  boasted  that  he  had  called  a  new  world  into  existence, 
Zavala  declares  that  the  language  was  poetic  and  exaggerated; 
but  that  it  could  not  be  doubted  that  though  Canning  did  not 
give  existence  to  the  new  states  —  for  they  existed  without 
British  recognition,  Mexico  first  of  all  —  he  consolidated  their 
independence  and  placed  Spain  in  a  position  of  isolation  in  her 
efforts  to  resub jugate  them.17 

President  Victoria,18  in  a  manifesto  dated  October  5,  1824, 
on  the  eve  of  the  conversion  of  the  provisional  government  into 
a  constitutional  one,  reviewed  the  international  relations  of  the 
republic  but  did  not  mention  Monroe's  message  of  December  2, 
1823.  In  a  similar  document  issued  five  days  later  he  recom- 
mended to  his  countrymen,  among  other  things,  the  advice  of 
Washington  on  the  importance  of  leaving  to  Congress  the  exer- 

10  Ensayo  Histdrico  de  las  Revolucidnes  de  Mexico,  I,  325. 

"  The  exact  quotation  to  which  Zavala  refers  is  as  follows :  "  If  France 
occupied  Spain,  was  it  necessary,  in  order  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  that 
occupation,  that  we  should  blockade  Cadiz  ?  No.  I  looked  another  way  — 
I  sought  materials  of  compensation  in  another  hemisphere.  Contemplating 
Spain,  such  as  our  ancestors  had  known  her,  I  resolved  that  if  France  had 
Spain,  it  should  not  be  Spain  with  the  Indies.  I  called  the  New  World 
into  existence,  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  Old."  Speeches  of  the  Right 
Honorable  George  Canning.  (Third  edition)  VI,  111. 

IB  The  real  name  of  Victoria  was  Juan  F6lix  Fernandez,  but  during  the 
war  he  changed  his  first  name  to  that  of  Guadalupe,  in  honor  of  the  Virgin 
patroness  of  Mexico,  and  his  surname  to  that  of  Victoria  to  commemorate 
a  victory  over  the  Spaniards.  He  retired  from  office  in  1829,  never  to 
appear  again  in  public  life  except  in  an  inferior  role.  He  died  in  1843. 
Bancroft,  Hist,  of  Meas.,  V,  28,  44,  45. 


THE  MONKOE  DOCTKIKE  233 

cise  of  the  functions  which  the  Constitution  undoubtedly  con- 
ferred upon  it  and  to  the  executive  the  general  direction  of  the 
government  in  the  interests  of  the  federation.  "  My  feeble 
voice,"  said  Victoria,  "  will  be  listened  to  when  it  mentions 
with  profound  respect  the  Hero  of  the  North  and  I  do  not 
fear  to  be  censured  when  covered  by  his  august  shade."  In  a 
speech  on  the  opening  of  the  first  Constitutional  Congress,  Jan- 
uary 1,  1825,  the  Mexican  president  again  referred  to  Wash- 
ington and  eulogized  the  United  States  as  the  land  of  liberty. 
But  on  neither  of  these  occasions  did  he  refer  to  Monroe.19 

In  his  message  on  the  opening  of  Congress,  January  1,  1826, 
Victoria  made  some  pertinent  remarks  which  it  will  be  of  in- 
terest to  transcribe.  Speaking  of  the  relations  of  the  republic 
of  Mexico  with  the  powers  of  Europe,  and  first  of  all  with 
England,  he  said: 

"  The  month  of  January  of  last  year  is  deserving  of  eternal 
record,  as  the  government  of  his  Britannick  Majesty  then 
evinced  a  disposition,  to  the  Diplomatic  Agents  in  London,  to 
enter  into  friendly  relations  with,  and  to  recognize  the  inde- 
pendence of,  the  New  American  States.  This  proceeding  of 
the  wise  British  Cabinet  has  strengthened  our  interests,  and 
at  the  same  time  disconcerted  the  plans  of  external  Enemies, 
surprising  the  Cabinets  of  the  Allied  Powers.  The  latter  have 
disclaimed  all  interference  with  the  affairs  of  the  Americans, 
and  have  thus  discovered  the  ulterior  plans  which  lay  latent  in 
their  bosoms:  they  wished  to  waft  across  the  ocean  the  absurd 
principles  of  Legitimacy,  and  to  smother  liberal  ideas  in  the 
New  World.  All  their  intercourse  with  the  court  of  Madrid 
indicated  a  wish  again  to  subjugate  the  ancient  Colonies  of 
Spain  by  Foreign  Forces.  The  invasion  of  the  Peninsula,  in 
1823,  had  for  its  object  to  enable  Ferdinand  VII  to  undertake 
the  reconquest  of  his  former  Colonies.  The  French  Generalis- 
simo proclaimed  this  to  be  tKe  object  of  his  august  uncle.  Eng- 
land has  the  credit  of  flying  to  the  assistance  of  reason,  justice 

19  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII,  875,  884,  963. 


234      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

and  liberty,  and  of  rescuing  America  from  the  disasters  of  war, 
by  the  interposition  of  her  Trident.20  This  eventful  circum- 
stance has  opened  the  means  of  communication  between  the 
two  worlds ;  and  Mexico,  blessed  by  the  inexhaustible  resources 
of  its  soil,  occupies  a  high  station  in  the  new  order  of  things."  21 
After  rapidly  reviewing  the  relations  of  the  United  Mexican 
states  with  the  other  powers  of  Europe,  President  Victoria 
passed  to  a  consideration  of  the  relations  with,  the  nations  of 
this  hemisphere.  "  Justice  and  gratitude,"  he  said,  "  compel 
us  to  mention,  before  all  others,  the  most  ancient  State  of  Amer- 
ica, and  the  first  of  the  Civilized  World  which  solemnly  pro- 
claimed our  rights,  after  having  preceded  us  in  the  heroick 
resolution  of  shaking  off  a  dependence  on  the  Mother  Country. 
The  United  States  of  the  North,  models  of  political  virtue  and 

20  Victoria's  evident  partiality  for  Great  Britain  did  not  pass  unnoticed 
in  the  United  States.     William  Cabell  Rives  of  Virginia,  speaking  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  April   6,   1826,   on   a  resolution  which  he  had 
introduced   respecting  the  proposed  mission   to   Panama   adverted   to   the 
partiality    of    President    Victoria    for    Great    Britain.     "  I    have    already 
briefly  alluded,"  he  said,  "  to  the  various  offices  of  kindness,  and  manifesta- 
tions of  friendship,  which  we  have  exhibited  towards  these  people.     With 
what    return    have   they    ever    met?     Let    any   gentleman    read    the    late 
message   of   the   President   of   Mexico   to   his   congress,   and   then    let   his 
feelings  of  mortified  and  indignant  pride  give  the  answer.     Sir,  we  have 
vainly  imagined  that  by  the  acts  of  disinterested  friendship,  and  the  solid 
and   useful    services   we   have   rendered   our    southern    neighbors,    we   had 
won  their  gratitude  and  confidence;   that  they  looked  up  to  us  as  their 
patron   and   guide,    and   regarded   us   with    filial   reverence  —  to   use   the 
language  of  a  gentleman  from  Kentucky   (Mr.  Metcalfe),  as  the  mother  of 
Republics.     But,  sir,  this  fine  delusion  is  dissipated.     The  message  of  the 
Mexican  president  begins  with  celebrating,   in  the  most  fulsome  strains, 
the  power,  the  wisdom,  the  magnanimity  of  Great  Britain,  in  her  trans- 
actions with  the  Spanish   American  states,   and   distinctly  attributes   the 
disconcertion  of  the  schemes  of  their  enemies  to  the  interposition  of  the 
British   trident  —  which   trident  was  never   interposed  in   any  other  way 
than  by  forming  commercial  relations  with  them,  for  her  oven  benefit,  and 
even  this  was  not  done  until  three  or  four  years  after  we  had  made  a 
formal  and  explicit  acknowledgment  of  their  independence.     But  we  recog- 
nize no  traces  of  that  ardent  devotion,  that  fervent  gratitude,  that  affec- 
tionate confidence,  which  we  have  been  taught  to  believe  were  cherished  in 
all  Spanish  American  hearts  toward  us,  and  of  which  there  are  such  ample 
end  gratuitous  displays  toward  Great  Britain."     Register  of  Debates  in 
Congress  (1825-26)  Vol.  II,  Part  II,  2085. 

21  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  1068. 


THE  MONKOE  DOCTBINE  235 

moral  rectitude,  have  advanced  under  the  system  of  a  Federa- 
tive Republick,  which,  having  been  adopted  amongst  us,  by 
the  most  spontaneous  act  on  record,  exalts  us  to  the  level  with 
the  Country  of  Washington  and  establishes  the  most  intimate 
union  between  the  neighboring  countries."  22 

The  Central  American  provinces,  during  the  greater  part  of 
the  period  of  the  wars  of  emancipation,  constituted  a  sort  of 
eddy  in  which  the  general  movement  of  revolution  produced 
but  few  of  the  destructive  effects  suffered  by  other  sections. 
Their  independence  was  achieved  with  relatively  little  sacri- 
fice.23 Their  contact  with  foreign  powers  had  been  limited, 
and  though  the  government  took  measures,  upon  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Federation  in  1824,  to  encourage  immigration  and 
to  promote  intercourse  with  the  nations  of  Europe  and  Amer- 
ica,24 progress  in  this  direction  was  effectively  checked  by  civil 
strife  which  soon  began,  and  which  in  some  parts  of  Central 
America  has  scarcely  abated  to  this  day.  Under  the  circum- 
stances it  would  not  be  surprising  to  find  that  public  opinion 
with  regard  to  international  affairs  was  less  definite  there  than 
in  other  quarters.  Such  indeed  was  the  case. 

An  examination  of  the  pages  of  the  Gaceta  del  Gobierno  Su- 
premo de  Guatemala  from  its  first  issue  on  March  1,  1824,  in 
an  unbroken  series  to  November  of  the  same  year,  reveals  the 
fact  that  practically  all  that  was  printed  in  that  paper,  during 
the  period  mentioned,  with  reference  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  taken  from  a  foreign  source.  For  example,  on  March  26 
there  appeared  an  article  entitled  "  Reflections  on  the  message 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States,"  which  was  copied  from 
El  Sol  of  Mexico.25  An  article  which  appeared  in  the  number 
for  July  30,  1824,  and  which  declared  that  the  independence 
of  the  Hispanic  American  states,  protected  as  it  was  by  the 

22  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  1069. 

23  Gaceta  del  Gobierno  Swpremo  de  Guatemala,  March  1,  1824. 

24  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII,  979. 

25  The  article  was  originally  copied  by  El  Sol  from  the  National  Gazette 
of  Philadelphia  for  December  9,  1823. 


236       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

nations  that  possessed  the  institutions  and  spoke  the  language 
of  liberty  —  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  —  was  no 
longer  in  danger,  is  credited  to  the  Gaceta  de  Cartagena,  Co- 
lombia. In  the  issue  for  August  30,  1824,  there  was  inserted 
a  letter,  written  from  London  early  in  the  preceding  January, 
which  contained  interesting  observations  on  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine and  on  the  policy  of  Great  Britain  with  regard  to  the 
intervention  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in  the  affairs  of  the  new 
states  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  But  this  communication 
also  was  first  published  in  one  of  the  gazettes  of  Colombia. 

The  Central  American  state  papers  also  lacked  positive  ex- 
pressions of  opinion  on  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe  or 
on  the  situation  which  that  declaration  was  intended  to  meet. 
The  message  of  the  executive  upon  the  opening  of  the  congress 
at  Guatemala  on  March  1,  1826,  reviews  the  foreign  relations 
of  the  republic,  and  in  referring  to  the  United  States  says 
merely  that  they  "  have  acknowledged  our  independence  with 
the  greatest  good  will,  and  have  given  us  testimony  of  great 
friendship  and  good  understanding."  26  The  executive,  how- 
ever, on  a  previous  occasion  was  somewhat  more  definite.  In 
a  circular  which  he  addressed  to  the  provincial  governors  he 
declared  that  "  England  protects  our  just  cause.  She  has  dis- 
patched consuls  to  the  American  nations.  She  cooperates  in 
the  development  of  our  resources.  She  promotes  our  progress 
and  she  has  decided  to  recognize  our  independence.  The  United 
States  has  a  well-defined  interest  in  the  southern  republics. 
That  nation  has  recognized  our  independence  and  has  sent  us 
consuls.  Moreover  the  message  of  the  President  on  the  open- 
ing of  the  Congress,  December  2,  1823,  declares  in  unmistak- 
able terms  that  the  government  would  resist  an  attack  on  our 
rights  by  the  allied  powers  of  Europe.27 

Before  passing  to  the  continent  of  South  America  a  brief 
reference  may  be  made  to  the  republic  of  Haiti.  It  will  be  re- 

ze  British  and  Foreign  Rtate  Papers,  XIII,  1020. 

2T  Oaceta  del  Oobierno  Supremo  de  Guatemala,  September  13,  1824. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  237 

called  that  the  independence  of  that  republic  had  been  declared 
as  early  as  1804 ;  that  France  was  never  able  thereafter  to  re- 
establish her  authority  over  the  colony;  that  the  unification  of 
the  conflicting  factions  into  a  single  government  effective 
throughout  the  island  had  been  accomplished  by  the  time  the 
United  States  resolved  in  1822  to  recognize  the  governments 
set  up  by  certain  of  the  former  Hispanic  American  colonies. 
Haiti,  however,  was  not  included  among  the  number  to  be  recog- 
nized, and  apparently  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe  of 
December  2,  1823,  did  not  embrace  that  republic.  In  a  com- 
munication to  the  Senate  on  the  political  condition  of  Santo 
Domingo,  Monroe  stated  on  February  26,  1823,  that  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  island  had  not  been  molested  in  the  exercise  of 
its  sovereignty  by  any  European  power  and  that  no  invasion 
of  it  had  been  attempted  by  any  power.  He  added,  however, 
that  it  was  understood  that  the  relations  between  the  republic 
and  the  government  of  France  had  not  been  adjusted. 

The  President  had  been  requested  to  communicate  to  the  Sen- 
ate not  only  such  information  as  he  might  possess  as  to  the 
political  condition  of  Haiti  and  as  to  whether  sovereignty  over 
it  were  claimed  by  any  European  nation,  but  also  as  to  whether 
any  further  commercial  relations  with  it  would  be  consistent 
with  the  interests  and  safety  of  the  United  States.  In  com- 
plying with  this  request  Monroe  called  attention  to  the  provi- 
sions of  the  Haitian  constitution  which  prohibited  the  employ- 
ment of  all  white  persons  who  had  immigrated  there  since  1816, 
and  which  prohibited  also  the  acquisition  by  such  persons  of 
the  right  of  citizenship  or  of  the  right  to  own  real  estate  in  the 
island.  The  establishment  of  a  government  on  such  princi- 
ples, he  thought,  evinced  distinctly  the  idea  of  a  separate  inter- 
est and  of  a  distrust  of  other  nations.  To  what  extent  that 
spirit  might  be  indulged  or  to  what  purposes  applied,  experience, 
he  declared,  had  been  up  to  that  time  too  limited  to  make  pos- 
sible a  just  estimate.  Commercial  intercourse  existed,  he  added, 
and  it  would  be  the  object  of  the  government  to  promote  it. 


238       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

But  in  this  connection  he  assured  the  Senate  that  every  cir- 
cumstance which  might  by  any  possibility  affect  the  tranquillity 
of  any  part  of  the  Union  would  be  guarded  against  by  suitable 
precautions.28 

It  was  evident,  therefore,  that  Haiti  was  not  placed  by  the 
United  States  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  governments  which 
had  been  set  up  on  the  mainland.  In  this  attitude  toward 
Haiti  the  United  States  was  not  alone.  England  and  France 
for  obvious  reasons  looked  with  disfavor  upon  the  establish- 
ment of  a  black  republic  in  the  West  Indies.29  And  even 
Bolivar,  who  had  received  aid  from  President  Petion  in  1816 
and  who  professed  great  friendship  for  the  Haitian  people,  re- 
frained from  inviting  the  government  of  that  island  to  partici- 
pate in  the  congress  of  Panama.30 

The  omission  of  any  allusion  to  Haiti  in  the  message  of  De- 
cember 2,  1823,  met  with  protest  on  the  island.  A  Haitian 
newspaper,  Le  Propagateur,  commenting  upon  the  declaration 
of  President  Monroe  and  applauding  the  procedure  of  the 
United  States  in  extending  the  hand  of  friendship  to  the  rising 
nations  of  South  America,  remonstrated  against  the  treatment 
of  Haiti  as  follows : 

"  But  why  has  not  the  name  of  Haiti  been  mentioned  in  this 
message?  Does  our  course  differ  from  that  of  the  southern 
nations?  Have  we  shown  less  courage,  less  idolatry,  in  the 
cause  of  liberty?  Are  we  less  advanced  in  civilization,  or  is 
our  government  weaker  and  less  stable?  To  all  these  we  an- 
swer in  the  negative.  If  we  morally  compare  our  population 
with  that  of  Mexico  or  Peru,  the  result  will  be  entirely  to  our 

28  Am.  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  V,  240. 

2»  LSger,  La  Politique  Exterieure  d'Haiti,  6. 

soLeger,  Haiti,  Her  History  and  her  Detractors,  171.  Haiti  sent  an 
agent  to  propose  a  defensive  alliance  with  Colombia,  but  not  wishing  to 
antagonize  France  and  resenting  the  absorption  by  Haiti  of  the  Spanish 
portion  of  the  island,  which  had  resolved  upon  annexation  to  Colombia, 
this  republic  declined  the  proposal.  See  the  message  of  the  vice-president 
to  the  Congress  of  Colombia,  January  2,  1825.  British  and  Foreign  Papers, 
XII,  822. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  239 

advantage.  We  have  proved  our  strength  by  long  and  terrible 
conflicts,  and  the  troops  that  we  have  vanquished  were  neither 
small  in  number  nor  of  ordinary  bravery.  They  were  the  vic- 
tors of  the  pyramids  of  Abouker  and  Marengo,  whose  remains 
now  sleep  on  our  plains."  31 

Continuing,  the  writer  sets  forth  in  greater  detail  the  claims 
of  Haiti  upon  the  United  States  for  recognition  and  for  its 
good  offices.  The  Americans,  he  averred,  especially  those  of 
the  north,  were  the  natural  friends  of  Haiti ;  and  an  extensive 
commerce  already  existed  between  the  two  countries.  America 
could  supply  the  articles  which  Haiti  received  from  Europe, 
but  Europe  could  never  supply  those  furnished  by  America. 
Time  would  bring  about  closer  relations  which  no  future  diffi- 
culties could  interrupt.  The  people  of  the  United  States  might 
possess  the  commerce  of  both  Indies  and  the  Haitians  would 
not  envy  them  the  enjoyment  of  it.  They  were  content  to  live 
on  the  soil  where  Providence  had  placed  them.  They  would  not 
emigrate.  Haiti  was  justified,  therefore,  in  desiring  the  good 
offices  of  the  United  States.  It  had  been  intimated,  the  writer 
added,  that  the  question  of  color  embarrassed  the  cabinet  at 
Washington.  He  thought  that  if  such  pitiful  considerations 
existed  they  would  gradually  lose  their  force.  The  red  chil- 
dren of  the  American  forests  were  admitted  into  the  halls  of 
Washington  —  why  was  that  favor  denied  to  the  citizens  of 
Haiti  ?  They  should  not  despair  of  obtaining  it,  for  that  era 
in  America  was  so  splendid,  so  magnificent  in  promises  that  it 
forcibly  recalled  to  the  writer's  mind  the  prediction  of  a  mon- 
arch of  the  preceding  century :  "  L'Europe  finit,  FAmerique 
commence."  82 

Turning  now  to  the  continent  of  South  America,  the  state  of 
opinion  in  the  Bolivarian  republics  may  first  be  considered. 
And  in  order  that  that  opinion  may  be  justly  appreciated  it 

siNiles'  Weekly  Register,  XXV,  413;   The  Examiner   (London),  October 
24,  1824. 

32  files'  Weekly  Register,  XXV,  413. 


240       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

will  be  indispensable  to  view  it  in  its  proper  historical  perspec- 
tive, for  which  the  preceding  chapters  have  in  general  furnished 
the  guiding  lines.  There  is,  however,  one  important  detail, 
barely  referred  to  in  the  preceding  pages,  which  must  now  re- 
ceive fuller  treatment:  the  opposition  of  the  vice  president  of 
Colombia,  Santander,  to  the  policies  of  the  Liberator. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Bolivar  believed  that  the  people 
of  the  former  Spanish  colonies  were  not  prepared  to  conduct 
highly  democratic  governments.  He  believed,  on  the  contrary, 
that  the  aristocratic  principle  was  essential  to  good  government, 
especially  where,  as  was  the  case  throughout  Spanish  America, 
ignorance  and  political  inexperience  prevailed  among  the  great 
mass  of  the  people.  He  believed  that  the  executive  should  be 
elected  for  life,  should  exercise  his  authority  without  responsi- 
bility, should  name  his  successor;  should,  in  fact,  be  king  in 
everything  except  name.  His  dream  was  of  a  great  federation 
of  Hispanic  American  states  of  which  his  own  Great  Colom- 
bia should  be  the  head.  In  this  he  undoubtedly  had  the 
good  will  of  Great  Britain,  who  viewed  with  jealousy  the  in- 
evitable expansion  of  the  United  States  toward  the  south  and 
west.33 

Francisco  de  Paula  Santander,  elected  as  vice  president  of 
the  republic  of  Colombia  in  1821,  exercised  the  chief  magistracy 
during  the  five  years  of  Bolivar's  absence  in  the  south.  He  had 
been  one  of  Bolivar's  generals  and,  though  still  under  thirty 
years  of  age  and  untried  in  statecraft  when  he  was  called  to  the 
presidential  chair,  he  apparently  enjoyed  the  fullest  confidence 
of  his  chief  and  of  the  people  as  a  whole*  The  origin  and  cul- 
mination of  the  break  in  friendly  relations  between  the  two 
men  constitutes  a  long  chapter  in  the  history  of  Colombia.  It 
is  essential  to  the  present  purpose,  however,  to  know  merely 
the  main  issue.  It  is  likely  that  the  quarrel  had  an  earlier 
origin  than  appears  on  the  surface.  Possibly,  the  beginning 

«« For  the  British  attitude  §ee  Adams,  E.  D.,  British  Interests  and 
Activities  in  Texas,  15. 


THE  MOKROE  DOCTRINE  241 

of  the  trouble  goes  back  to  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  it- 
self. The  Liberator,  displeased  that  so  democratic  and  as  he 
believed  impractical  an  instrument  as  was  the  constitution  of 
Cucuta  should  have  been  accepted,  finally  countenanced,  if  he 
did  not  foment,  its  overthrow  to  make  way  for  his  Bolivian 
constitution.  Santander  on  the  other  hand  became  the  cham- 
pion of  the  constitution  of  1821,  whether  sincerely  and  patri- 
otically as  his  partisans  declare  or  whether  as  a  demagogue,  in- 
tent on  selfish  ends  as  his  detractors  maintain,  is  a  matter  of 
controversy  with  which  this  study  has  no  concern. 

The  essential  fact  is  that  in  the  republic  of  Colombia  there 
were,  at  the  time  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  proclaimed,  in  proc- 
ess of  formation  two  main  currents  of  opinion  which  were  to 
become  clearly  defined  two  or  three  years  later ;  one  favorable  to 
Bolivar  and  to  the  promotion  of  his  political  designs  and  an- 
other to  Santander  and  to  his  conception  of  a  democratic  re- 
public.34 The  former  group  inclined  toward  Great  Britain  and 
the  latter  toward  the  United  States.  In  the  light  of  these  re- 
marks, attention  may  now  be  directed  to  some  of  the  comments 
evoked  in  Colombia  by  the  message  of  December  2,  1823. 

The  following  article  appearing  in  La  Gaceta  de  Colombia, 
a  newspaper  published  at  Bogota,  if  not  written  by  Santander 
himself  must  have  been  inspired  by  him.35 

"  The  United  States  has  now  begun  to  play  among  civilized 
nations  of  the  world  that  powerful  and  majestic  role  which 
befits  the  oldest  and  most  powerful  nation  of  our  hemisphere. 
We  deeply  regret  our  inability  to  publish  all  of  the  message 
of  the  President  to  Congress  of  December  2,  for  it  is  one  of  the 
most  interesting  documents  which  has  emanated  from  the  Amer- 
ican Government  up  to  this  time.  It  abounds  in  those  sug- 

s*  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  Villanueva,  El  Imperio  de  los  Andes, 
62-80  and  passim.  Ibid.,  Bolivar  y  el  General  San  Martin,  270-277. 

35  La  Gaceta  de  Colombia,  though  not  an  official  government  organ,  was 
at  least  friendly  to  the  administration  and  responded  to  the  desires  of  Vice 
President  Santander.  He  often  spoke  of  it  as  "  our  gazette  "  and  according 
to  his  own  statements  frequently  wrote  articles  for  publication  in  its 
columns.  O'Leary,  Memorias,  III,  105,  111,  124,  137,  353,  390. 


242       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

gestions  and  details  which  every  free  government  ought  to  fur- 
nish its  citizens  in  order  that  they  may  judge  in  regard  to  the 
interests  of  the  nation  with  the  proper  exactness  and  discern- 
ment. How  different  is  this  frank  and  loyal  mode  of  procedure 
from  that  horrid  system  which  finds  its  stability  in  the  secrets 
of  the  cabinet  and  in  ministerial  maneuvers.  The  enemies  of 
liberty  may  take  pleasure  in  the  triumphs  of  that  system  on  the 
European  side  of  the  Atlantic,  where  its  favorite  principle  of 
legitimacy  has  numerous  partisans.  In  this  favored  continent 
there  are  no  classes  interested  in  perpetuating  the  ignorance 
of  the  people  that  they  may  thrive  upon  prejudice  and  stupid- 
ity. In  America  man  is  only  the  slave  of  the  law,  while  in  a 
large  part  of  the  Old  World  people  still  believe  and  obstinately 
maintain  that  kings  are  an  emanation  of  divinity. 

"  The  partisans  of  this  impious  doctrine  defend  it  rather  be- 
cause of  self-interest  than  because  of  conviction.  But,  as  they 
find  some  credulous  persons  and  some  persons  who  are  victims 
of  their  own  voluntary  errors,  they  find  support  in  them  for 
their  system  of  pretended  legitimacy.  Well  and  good,  let  the 
supporters  of  legitimacy  extend  their  senseless  system  over  that 
continent  which,  because  of  its  enlightenment,  is  worthy  of  a 
better  fate.  If  they  wish,  let  them  reduce  to  ashes  the  Swiss 
cantons,  which  rebelled  against  the  august  house  of  Hapsburg 
and  established  their  independence  by  their  own  efforts.  Let 
them  take  the  throne  of  the  Low  Countries  away  from  the  house 
of  Orange  which  to-day  enjoys  the  fruit  of  its  religious  and 
practical  rebellion  against  the  Catholic  kings.  Let  them  punish, 
if  they  are  able,  the  thousandth  generation  in  their  and  other 
countries  of  Europe  for  the  sins  of  their  ancestors  against  legiti- 
macy. Their  rage  will  ever  be  impotent  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic.  America  is  separated  from  those  less  fortunate  re- 
gions by  a  vast  ocean  in  which  there  will  be  drowned  forever  the 
hopes  of  those  who  imagine  that  we  have  not  yet  emerged  from 
the  darkness  of  the  fifteenth  century. 

"  The  perusal  of  the  message  which  we  have  before  us  has 


THE  MOKROE  DOCTKIKE  243 

consequently  furnished  us  with  much  pleasure,  for  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  has  profited  by  the  opportunity 
afforded  by  the  differences  pending  with  Russia  to  assert  that 
the  American  continent  is  now  so  free  and  independent  that 
henceforth  it  cannot  be  made  the  theatre  of  colonization  by 
any  European  power.  Indeed  the  Americans  of  the  North  and 
of  the  South  of  this  continent  shall  not  behold  again  in  their 
lands  those  hordes  of  foreigners,  who,  with  the  cross  in  one 
hand  and  a  dagger  in  the  other,  would  disturb  the  happiness 
and  the  peace  which  they  to-day  enjoy."  38 

On  April  6,  1824,  Vice  President  Santander  sent  a  message 
to  the  Colombian  congress  in  which  he  referred  to  the  Monroe 
declaration  as  follows : 

"  The  President  of  the  United  States  has  lately  signalized 
his  Administration  by  an  Act  eminently  just  and  worthy  of 
the  classic  land  of  liberty:  in  his  last  Message  to  the  Con- 
gress he  has  declared  that  he  will  regard  every  interference  of 
any  European  Power  directed  to  oppress  or  violate  the  destinies 
of  the  Independent  Governments  of  America  as  a  manifestation 
of  hostile  dispositions  toward  the  United  States.  That  Govern- 
ment considers  every  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Allied  Powers 
to  extend  their  System  to  any  portion  of  the  American  Hemi- 
sphere as  perilous  to  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  United  States. 
This  policy,  consolatory  to  human  nature,  would  secure  to 
Colombia  a  powerful  Ally  should  its  Independence  and  Liberty 
be  menaced  by  the  Allied  Powers.  As  the  Executive  cannot 
regard  with  indifference  the  march  which  the  Policy  of  the 
United  States  has  taken  it  is  sedulously  occupied  in  reducing 
the  question  to  decisive  and  conclusive  points."  37 

The  foregoing  expressions  are  of  still  greater  force  when  they 

se  La  Gaceta  de  Colombia,  February  1,  1824.  The  translation  employed 
by  W.  S.  Robertson  in  his  article  on  South  America  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly  for  March,  1915,  Vol.  XXX, 
is  followed. 

37  O'Leary,  Memorias,  492.  A  translation  of  the  message  is  found  in 
British  and  For,  State  Papers,  XI,  808,  from  which  the  above  extract  ig 
taken. 


244       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

are  taken  in  connection  with  the  brief  remarks  in  the  same  mes- 
sage respecting  Great  Britain.  The  relations  of  the  republic 
with  Europe  had  been  limited,  the  vice  president  declared,  to 
Great  Britain,  whose  policies  were  favorable  to  the  American 
cause  and  whose  commercial  intercourse  had  been  most  ex- 
tensive and  active  in  Colombia.  The  sympathy  of  the  public 
in  England  and  the  justice  of  the  British  Government  in- 
spired in  the  executive  the  most  encouraging  prospects ;  but  he 
was  sorry  that  he  could  not  say  what  had  been  the  final  reso- 
lution of  the  government  of  his  Britannic  Majesty  with  respect 
to  the  republic.  He  concluded  by  referring  to  the  presence  in 
Bogota  of  a  British  commission,  which  he  considered  a  satis- 
factory sign  of  the  interest  that  Colombia  had  inspired  in  the 
people  of  Great  Britain.38 

The  friendly  attitude  of  the  Santander  administration  toward 
the  United  States  is  succinctly  set  forth  in  a  dispatch  of  Richard 
C.  Anderson,  the  American  minister  at  Bogota.  Writing  under 
date  of  February  17,  1824,  he  said: 

"  Much  of  that  solicitude,  to  which  I  have  recently  referred 
in  my  letters  to  you,  in  relation  to  the  public  affairs  of  this 
country  as  connected  with  the  designs  of  certain  European 
powers,  is  still  felt  by  the  persons  in  authority  here  and  indeed 
by  others;  but  great  and  I  believe  unaffected  joy  was  expressed 
on  the  arrival  of  the  President's  message,  at  the  views  therein 
communicated  to  Congress,  regarding  the  feelings  and  policy 
of  the  United  States  in  the  event  of  European  interference  in 
the  political  affairs  of  this  continent.  Some  declared  that  it 
would  have  the  salutary  effect  of  repressing  the  designs  and 
averting  the  calamity  so  much  deprecated,  while  others,  less 
sanguine  in  their  opinion  of  its  preventive  tendencies,  seemed  to 
derive  their  joy  from  the  contemplation  of  the  actual  aid  which 
the  course  indicated  might  give  in  the  expected  contingency; 
but  all  declared  that  the  views  assume  the  true  American 
ground.  From  the  conversations,  which  I  have  hitherto  de- 

38  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  III,  495. 


THE  MONKOE  DOCTKINE  245 

tailed  to  you,  between  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  and 
myself,  you  will  readily  believe  that  the  language  and  senti- 
ments of  the  message  were  very  acceptable  to  him,  and  he  took 
occasion  in  a  recent  conversation  to  tell  me  that  they  were  pe- 
culiarly grateful  to  the  vice  president.''  39 

The  article  of  the  Gaceta  de  Colombia  quoted  above  and  the 
message  of  Vice  President  Santander  credit  the  United  States 
with  taking  a  high  and  independent  stand  with  regard  to  the 
affairs  of  the  New  World.  The  contemporary  discussions  in 
Mexico,  as  has  been  shown,  invariably  placed  Great  Britain  in 
first  place  as  a  champion  of  the  rights  of  the  new  governments, 
leaving  the  United  States  in  a  secondary  if  not  in  a  dependent 
position  with  respect  to  England.  And  indeed  such  was  usually 
the  case  in  Colombia  also,40  the  attitude  of  Santander  and  per- 
haps of  a  few  others  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  Curi- 
ously enough,  Santander  himself  in  his  correspondence  with 
the  Liberator,  reflecting,  no  doubt,  the  common  opinion  and 
that  of  the  strong,  overpowering  personality  of  the  great  leader 
whose  influence  was  ever  present  to  him,  gave  expression  to 
views  much  more  favorable  to  Great  Britain  and  correspond- 
ingly less  so  to  the  United  States. 

Writing  to  Bolivar  five  days  after  the  article  on  Monroe's 
message  appeared  in  the  Gaceta  de  Colombia,,  Santander  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  England  would  prevent  other  powers 
from  intervening  in  the  war  in  America.  He  had  received 
from  the  message  of  President  Monroe,  he  said,  a  similar  im- 
pression respecting  the  United  States.41  A  month  later,  re- 
ferring to  the  congress  of  the  powers  which  it  was  proposed  to 
convene  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  American  affairs,  San- 
tander informed  Bolivar  that  it  had  become  clear  that  the 

39  Robertson,   South   America  and  the  Monroe   Doctrine  in   Polit.   8ci. 
Quar.,  XXX,  84. 

40  See  La  Gaceta  de  Colombia  for  March  21,  1824,  April  4,   1824,  and 
August  29,   1824;   El  Venezolano,  for  January  17,   1824;   El  Patriota  de 
Guayaquil  for   May   1,    1824,   and   August  28,    1824;    O'Leary,   Memorias, 
VIII,  29. 

41  O'Leary,  Memorias,  III,  137. 


246       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

United  States  and  Great  Britain  would  not  intervene  as  long 
as  Spain  alone  and  with  her  own  resources  continued  the  war. 
Moreover  the  British  commissioners  who  had  recently  arrived 
at  Bogota  gave  assurance  that  England  would  not  permit  Co- 
lombia to  be  subjugated.42  In  a  letter  dated  March  15  he  gave 
an  account  of  the  formal  reception  of  the  British  agents,  trust- 
ing that  the  news  would  cause  in  the  Liberator  an  agreeable  im- 
pression and  inspire  in  him  hopes  of  great  consideration. 
Whatever  proposals  these  commissioners  had  to  make  it  seemed 
clear  that  England  would  take  the  part  of  Colombia  against  the 
Holy  Alliance.  And  referring  again  to  the  message  of  Presi- 
dent Monroe  he  said  it  had  made  a  strong  impression  in  Eu- 
rope, causing  the  Holy  Alliance  to  be  extremely  incensed,  not 
merely  because  the  President  spoke  in  a  threatening  tone  but 
because  the  Powers  suspected  that  Great  Britain  had  a 
hand  in  the  declaration.  King  Ferdinand  had  solicited  the 
mediation  of  the  Powers,  he  said  finally,  but  England  per- 
sistently refused  to  take  part  in  a  congress  to  discuss  American 
affairs.43 

By  the  middle  of  the  next  year  the  importance  of  the  United 
States  as  a  factor  in  the  international  situation  had,  in  the 
opinion  of  Santander,  greatly  diminished,  while  that  of  Eng- 
land had  correspondingly  increased.  Meanwhile  a  most  sig- 
nificant event  for  Colombia  had  occurred  —  the  recognition  of 
its  independence  by  Great  Britain.  Spain,  protesting  against 
this  procedure  of  the  British  Government,  obstinately  continued 
the  war.  France  still  occupied  the  Peninsula  and,  though  pro- 
fessing neutrality  in  the  war  in  America,  sent  a  squadron  to 
Martinique.  On  the  pretext  of  illegal  seizure  of  her  merchant 
vessels  by  Colombian  privateers,  she  also  maintained  men  of 
war  in  front  of  Puerto  Cabello  while  the  claims  were  being 
adjusted.  Moreover  it  was  believed  that  French  troops  were 
being  sent  to  Porto  Rico  and  Cuba  to  relieve  the  regular  garri- 

420'Leary,  Memoriaa,  III,  139. 
« Ibid.,  Ill,  141. 


THE  MOXKOE  DOCTKIKE  247 

sons  for  service  against  some  one  of  the  Central  or  South  Amer- 
ican states.  These  circumstances,  together  with  the  fact  that 
the  general  disposition  in  Europe  toward  the  new  states  had 
apparently  not  improved,  convinced  Santander  that  there  still 
existed  a  propensity  on  the  part  of  the  Powers  to  intervene. 
Such  at  least  seemed  to  be  the  situation  as  he  saw  and  described 
it  in  letters  to  Bolivar  in  the  first  half  of  the  year  1825.  And 
it  is  significant  that  in  view  of  the  danger  which  he  believed  to 
exist  he  declared  that  the  United  States  would  do  nothing ;  for 
the  country  was  completely  permeated  with  the  idea  of  peace 
and  President  Adams  was,  as  he  was  painted,  a  man  of  peaceful 
disposition  and  of  but  little  force  of  character.44  As  to  Eng- 
land he  seemed  to  be  more  confident.  Parliament  had  aug- 
mented the  military  forces  of  the  nation,  and  Canning  in  recent 
negotiations  with  Spain  had  declared  that  Great  Britain  would 
not  take  a  backward  step  in  her  American  policy.45 

During  the  early  part  of  1824,  Bolivar  was  in  northern  Peru 
engaged  in  organizing  his  final  campaign  against  the  Eoyalists. 
It  does  not  appear  at  what  moment  he  first  received  intelligence 
of  President  Monroe's  message.  On  March  21  he  apparently 
had  not  yet  heard  of  it;  for,  writing  to  Sucre  on  that  date, 
he  said :  "I  do  not  believe  at  all  in  the  league  between  France 

4*  Los  Estados  Unidos  Amalgamados  con  su  estado  de  paz,  que  s6  yo  que 
hardn:  el  Presidente  Adams  es  hombre  muy  pacifico  y  de  poca  energia 
segun  lo  pintan. —  Santander  to  Bolivar,  June  21,  1825;  O'Leary,  Memorias 
III,  184.  On  a  previous  occasion  Santander  writing  to  Bolivar  (May  6, 
1825),  had  expressed  a  more  favorable  opinion.  He  said:  "Mr.  Adams, 
who  was  Secetary  of  State,  is  now  President  and  Clay,  our  ardent  friend, 
is  Secretary  of  State.  Rush,  who  was  Minister  to  England,  and  was  there 
of  great  service  to  Revenga,  is  Secretary  of  Treasury.  I  do  not  believe  we 
could  have  an  administration  more  friendly  and  decided  for  American 
interests  and  especially  those  of  Colombia." —  O'Leary,  Memorias,  III,  175. 
On  January  21,  1826,  Santander  wrote  Bolivar  that  "  If  the  Holy  Alliance 
has  not  taken  action  against  us  actively  and  specifically  I  attribute  it  to 
two  principles:  First,  to  the  policy  of  England,  who  fortunately  was 
obliged  by  her  own  interests  to  take  the  part  of  the  American  states; 
second,  to  our  not  having  given  the  sovereigns  cause  for  provocation,  for 
on  the  one  hand  our  protests  of  respect  and  on  the  other  our  great  suffer- 
ings have  calmed  the  anger  of  the  European  cabinets."  Ibid.,  Ill,  239. 

45  O'Leary,  Memorias,  III,  164,  172,  175,  179,  183. 


248       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

and  Spain.  We  have  documents  which  prove  the  contrary. 
But  I  do  believe  that  the  English  are  resolved  to  protect  us."  46 
Between  this  date  and  April  9  following  he  must  have  received 
news  from  the  northern  coast  of  Colombia,  probably  by  way 
of  Panama,  including  information  respecting  the  Monroe 
declaration,  if  not  a  copy  of  the  message,  for  he  then  wrote 
to  Sucre  as  follows :  "  The  English  commissioners  who  have 
arrived  at  Santa  Marta  have  assured  us  that  their  government 
will  soon  recognize  us  and,  if  we  should  break  with  Erance, 
give  us  aid  against  that  power.  Spain  can  do  nothing  because 
she  has  no  navy,  no  army,  nor  money ;  and  whatever  she  should 
attempt  would  be  attributed  to  Erance,  and  therefore  opposed 
as  a  foreign  usurpation  directed  against  England  and  her  lib- 
erty. Any  move  that  the  Holy  Alliance  might  make  would 
be  checkmated  by  England  and  the  United  States."  47  Writ- 
ing again  to  Sucre,  five  days  later,  Bolivar  returns  to  the  as- 
surances made  by  the  British  commissioners,  expressing  the 
belief  that  England  would  protect  Colombia  not  only  against 
the  Holy  Alliance  but  against  Spain  as  well,  for  Spain  had  come 
to  be  looked  upon  as  one  of  the  allies.  He  expressed  also  the 
conviction  that  recognition  might  be  expected  from  Great 
Britain  at  any  moment.  If  in  the  former  letter  he  had  really 
had  in  mind  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe  he  did  not 
on  this  occasion  again  refer  to  it.48 

In  none  of  his  published  writings  does  Bolivar  mention  spe- 
cifically the  Monroe  declaration.  A  letter  which  he  wrote  to 
Admiral  Guise  of  the  Peruvian  Navy,  however,  on  April  28, 
1824,  contains  what  is  undoubtedly  a  reference  to  it.  On  this 
occasion  he  made  a  brief  summary  of  what  he  considered  to  be 
the  international  situation.  He  had  received  gazettes  up  to 
March  15  from  Jamaica.  They  contained,  said  Bolivar,  many 
extracts  from  the  columns  of  a  London  paper  which  assured 
in  the  most  positive  manner : 

4« Ibid.,  XXX,  459. 

4TO'Ix>ary,  Memorial,  XXX,  465. 

48  ibid.,  XXX,  473. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  249 

"  1.  That  Spain  has  neither  the  means  nor  the  credit  to  fit 
out  a  single  man-of-war.  In  England  therefore  they  regard  her 
proposed  expeditions  as  quixotic. 

"  2.  That  France  and  Austria,  in  reply  to  England's  official 
inquiry  as  to  what  will  be  their  attitude  relative  to  Spain  and 
her  former  colonies,  have  replied:  France,  that  she  will  not 
intervene  or  take  any  other  part;  and  Austria,  that  she  will 
not  go  heyond  mediation  or  the  tender  of  good  offices. 

"  3.  That  England  has  definitely  decided  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  the  republics  of  South  America  and  to  con- 
sider as  an  unfriendly  act  any  intervention  on  the  part  of  any 
European  power  in  the  affairs  of  America. 

"  4.  That  the  United  States  has  solemnly  declared  that  it 
will  consider  as  an  unfriendly  act  any  measure  that  the  powers 
of  Europe  should  take  against  America  and  in  favor  of 
Spain."  49 

Admiral  Guise  had  become  dissatisfied  in  the  service  of  Peru 
and  had  threatened  to  return  to  Chile,  whence  he  had  come 
with  Lord  Cochrane  in  1821.  Bolivar  wrote  with  the  evident 
intention  of  conciliating  him  and  of  preventing  his  departure  by 
presenting  to  him  the  prospect  of  victory  and  an  early  return 
to  the  pursuits  of  peace.  He  therefore  brought  forward  all 
the  factors  that  seemed  to  favor  the  cause.  It  is  a  remarkable 
fact  that  the  only  subsequent  reference  that  the  Liberator  ap- 
pears to  have  made  to  the  declaration  of  Monroe  had  for  its 
object  to  induce  the  Spanish  general,  Olaneta,  to  join  the  Pa- 
triot cause.  "  England  and  the  United  States,"  Bolivar  wrote 
him  on  May  21,  1824,  "  protect  us,  and  you  must  know  that 
these  two  nations  are  the  only  maritime  powers  and  that  no  aid 
can  come  to  the  Royalists  except  by  sea."  50 

Whether  Bolivar  had  by  this  time  received  the  Bogota 
gazettes  and  the  letters  of  Santander,  referred  to  above,  his 
writings  do  not  show;  nor  does  he  subsequently  make  any  ref- 

*eO'Leary,  Memorias,  XXX,  486-488. 
50  Hid.,  XXX,  496. 


250       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

erence  to  them.  This  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
information  therein  contained  had  ceased  to  be  news,  or  by 
the  fact  that  other  matters  of  more  immediate  importance  oc- 
cupied his  attention.  Leaving  the  coast  early  in  April,  Bolivar 
established  his  headquarters  in  the  mountains  and  began  an 
active  prosecution  of  the  campaign  against  the  Royalists.  Dur- 
ing the  next  seven  or  eight  months  he  appears  to  have  been  com- 
pletely absorbed  in  the  attainment  of  a  final  victory  over  the 
enemy.  His  letters,  usually  abounding  in  references  to  inter- 
national affairs,  were  during  this  period  confined  almost  ex- 
clusively to  military  matters.51  Not  until  success  was  prac- 
tically assured  did  he  again  turn  his  attention  to  the  broader 
realm  of  international  politics.  It  was  on  the  eve  of  the 
battle  of  Ayacucho  that  he  sent  out  his  circular  inviting  the 
Spanish  American  states  to  the  Congress  of  Panama.  Hence- 
forward his  heart  was  set  upon  the  building  up  of  a  great  Hi- 
spanic American  state  or  confederation  under  the  powerful  in- 
fluence of  Great  Britain.  In  a  word  he  did  not  greatly  rely 
upon  any  protection  that  the  United  States  might  afford  nor 
accept  the  leadership  in  this  hemisphere  which  was  implied  in 
President  Monroe's  declaration.52 

Brazil  at  the  beginning  of  1824  occupied  with  respect  to 
Portugal  a  position  analogous  to  that  which  the  former  Spanish 
colonies  occupied  with  regard  to  Spain.  Independence,  which 
had  been  achieved  in  the  one  and  the  other  case,  had  not  been 
recognized  by  the  mother  country,  and  Brazil,  like  the  Spanish 
speaking  states,  stood  in  more  or  less  danger  of  subjugation  in 
the  event  that  the  Holy  Alliance  should  attempt  to  carry  out  its 
designs.  If,  however,  the  hopes  of  the  Legitimists  of  Europe 
were  illusory  in  so  far  as  the  recovery  of  the  colonies  of  Spain 
was  concerned,  they  were  much  more  so  with  respect  to  Por- 
tugal and  her  American  possessions ;  for  this  little  kingdom  was 

oiOTeary,  Memoriae,  XXX,  465  et  seq. 

52  For  a  fuller  treatment  of  Bolivar's  international  policies  see  the  pre- 
ceding chapter  on  monarchy  in  America  and  those  on  the  Congress  of 
Panama. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  251 

even  less  able  than  Spain  to  provide  the  military  forces  required 
to  reduce  and  to  hold  in  subjection  its  vast  expanse  of  American 
territory.  Moreover  the  relation  which  had  subsisted  for  more 
than  a  century  between  Portugal  and  Great  Britain  —  at  this 
time  in  reality  almost  one  of  suzerain  and  subject  —  made  any 
interference  of  the  continental  powers  in  Portuguese  affairs,  in- 
ternal or  external,  practically  impossible  without  provoking  war 
with  the  virtual  sovereign.  But  in  spite  of  this  relation,  the 
British  Government,  far  from  attempting  on  its  own  part  to 
establish  the  authority  of  the  mother  country  over  her  American 
colony,  favored  the  separation.  It  was  in  fact  through  a  British 
diplomat,  Sir  Charles  Stuart,  that  the  negotiations  were  begun 
in  March,  1824,  which  resulted  a  year  and  a  half  later  in  the 
signing  of  a  treaty  in  which  Portugal  recognized  the  inde- 
pendence of  Brazil.53 

Thus,  in  its  actual  and  prospective  relations  with  Europe, 
Brazil  stood  in  a  fairly  satisfactory  position.  With  regard  to 
its  South  American  neighbors,  however,  conditions  were  less 
favorable.  The  seizure  of  the  Banda  Oriental  and  later  its  in- 
corporation into  the  empire  was  now  a  source  of  friction  and  of 
possible  war  with  Buenos  Aires.  It  was  at  this  time  that  the 
train  of  circumstances  was  set  in  motion  which  led  to  the  out- 
break, in  1825,  of  hostilities  between  the  two  states.54  And  to 
add  to  Brazil's  difficulties  the  sympathies  of  the  Spanish  speak- 
ing states  ran  strongly  against  the  empire.  Bolivar,  for  exam- 
ple, after  his  victory  over  the  Royalists  in  Peru,  actually  had 
under  consideration  a  plan  for  joining  forces  with  the  United 
Provinces  and  leading  an  expedition  against  Brazil  for  the  pur- 
pose of  effecting  the  overthrow  of  the  monarchy.  And  it  was 
rumored  that  the  Congress  of  Panama  would  support  such  a 
design.55  Isolated,  then,  in  the  southern  continent,  Brazil  un- 

ss  Cambridge,  Modern  History,  X,  319,  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers, 
XIII,  933,  Constancio,  Historia  do  Brasil,  II,  378. 

s*  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  748-774. 

55Q'Leary,  Memorias,  III,  215-216,  235,  Villanueva,  El  Imperio  de  los 
Andes,  328-334.  Senator  Berrien  of  Georgia  in  a  speech  on  the  Panama 


252       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

doubtedly  welcomed  the  policy  of  President  Monroe  not  merely 
as  constituting  a  barrier  against  the  Holy  Alliance,  but  as 
offering  the  hope  of  a  friendly  interest  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States  which  might  redound  to  the  benefit  of 
the  empire  in  its  threatened  conflict  with  the  neighboring 
republic.56 

Brazil  had  not  yet  been  recognized  by  the  United  States.  Its 
status  with  respect  to  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe  was 
therefore  not  so  clear  as  was  that  of  those  governments  who  had 
"  declared  their  independence  and  maintained  it,"  and  whose 
independence  the  United  States  had,  "  on  great  consideration 
and  just  principles,"  acknowledged.  Desiring  to  terminate  this 
undefined  state  of  affairs  the  government  of  Brazil  appointed 
Jose  Silvestre  Rebello  as  charge  d'affaires  to  the  United 
States.  His  instructions,  dated  January  31,  1824,  referred  to 
the  message  of  President  Monroe  as  being  applicable  to  all  the 
states  of  the  continent,  since  it  recognized  the  necessity  of  com- 
bining and  standing  shoulder  to  shoulder  for  the  defense  of 
American  rights  and  for  the  integrity  of  American  territory. 
Rebello  was  accordingly  instructed  first  to  urge  the  recognition 

mission  delivered  in  the  United  States  Senate  in  March,  1826,  said: 
"  Brazil  yet  bows  beneath  the  imperial  sway.  The  glitter  of  diadem  is 
offensive  to  the  Spanish  American  republics.  The  Liberator  pants  to 
finish  the  great  work  to  which  he  thinks  he  is  called  —  the  emancipation 
of  a  continent.  Ere  long  the  arms  of  the  confederacy  will  press  upon 
Brazil."  Register  of  Debates  in  Congress,  1825-1826,  II,  part  I,  p.  280. 

56  In  Cartas  Politicas  by  "  Americus,"  published  in  London  in  1825, 
from  letters  first  appearing  in  the  Brazilian  newspaper,  0  Padre  Amaro, 
frequent  references  are  found  indicating  that  in  Brazil  as  in  other  sections 
of  Latin  America  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  were  associated 
together  in  interposing  a  common  barrier  to  the  designs  of  the  Holy 
Alliance.  Such  expressions  as  the  following  appear :  "  Fortunately  the 
policies  and  interests  of  the  two  powerful  nations,  England  and  the  United 
States,  are  opposed  to  the  project  of  reconquest"  (I,  25)  .  .  .  "  It  will  be 
impossible  for  any  European  power  or  all  of  them  together  to  subjugate 
Brazil,  principally  because  of  the  aid  which  is  offered  by  the  maritime 
power  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States"  (I,  26)  ...  "England 
and  the  United  States  oppose  all  cooperation  of  this  sort"  .  .  .  (Coalition 
for  the  subjugation  of  the  new  American  states)  (I,  50).  These  letters 
have  been  attributed  to  the  Brazilian  statesman,  J.  Severiano  Maciel  da 
Costa. 


THE  MONKOE  DOCTRINE  253 

of  the  independence  of  Brazil,  and  secondly  to  sound  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  as  to  its  attitude  toward  an  offen- 
sive and  defensive  alliance  to  be  based  not  on  mutual  conces- 
sions but  on  the  general  principle  of  mutual  benefits.  E-ebello 
was  received  and  thus  the  empire  of  Brazil  was  recognized  on 
May  26,  1824.  On  this  occasion  the  Brazilian  spoke  of  a  "  con- 
cert of  American  powers  to  sustain  the  general  system  of  Ameri- 
can independence."  To  this  the  President  did  not  particularly 
allude  in  his  reply,  confining  himself  rather  to  general  expres- 
sions of  friendly  interest.  The  idea  of  forming  an  alliance  with 
the  United  States  was  kept  alive  however,  by  the  Brazilian  rep- 
resentative for  nearly  a  year  afterward  until  finally,  a  definite 
proposal  having  been  made  in  writing,  Clay,  then  Secretary  of 
State,  disposed  of  the  matter  by  declining  to  enter  into  any 
such  agreement  on  the  ground  that  it  was  contrary  to  the  policy 
of  the  United  States.57 

The  efforts  of  Brazil  were  thus  directed  from  the  beginning 
toward  securing  a  definition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  on  the 
basis  of  what  was  called  the  principle  of  mutual  benefits ;  that 
is,  its  transformation  from  a  unilateral  to  a  bilateral  policy. 
As  has  been  suggested  above,  the  empire  doubtless  wished  to 
strengthen  its  position  among  its  neighbors  by  forming  an  al- 
liance with  the  United  States.  This  is  not,  however,  the  whole 
explanation.  It  was  felt  that  the  acceptance  of  the  protection 
offered  by  the  United  States  without  giving  anything  in  return 
placed  Brazil  in  a  position  of  inferiority.  Accordingly  Eebello 
in  his  written  proposal,  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  if  the 
government  of  the  United  States  should  be  obliged  to  put  into 
practice  the  principles  enunciated  in  President  Monroe's  mes- 
sage, thus  giving  proof  of  generosity  and  consistency,  it  would 
do  so  only  at  the  sacrifice  of  men  and  treasure,  and  that  it  was 

57  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  484.  Moore,  Digest  of  Int.  Law,  VI,  437. 
Adams  speaking  in  his  diary  of  the  proposed  treaty  of  alliance  between 
Brazil  and  the  United  States  says  that  Rebello  agreed  that  "  on  certain 
contingencies  the  republican  governments  of  South  America  should  also 
be  parties." —  Memoirs,  VI,  475. 


254:       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

not  in  accordance  with  reason,  justice,  and  right  that  the  gov- 
ernment of  Brazil  should  receive  such  services  gratuitously.  It 
was  for  this  reason  therefore  that  the  convention  had  been 
proposed.58 

In  Argentina  the  first  public  notice  of  President  Monroe's 
declaration  appeared  on  February  9,  1824,  when  extracts  from 
the  message  of  December  2  were  published  in  La  Gaceta  Mer- 
cantil  of  Buenos  Aires.  A  few  days  later  El  Argos  of  the  same 
city  printed  passages  from  the  message  and  called  attention  es- 
pecially to  the  noncolonization  and  the  nonintervention  clauses. 
On  February  10  the  American  minister,  Rodney,  wrote  Presi- 
dent Monroe  that  his  message  had  been  received  two  days  before, 
that  it  had  inspired  them  all  there  and  that  it  would  have 
the  "  happiest  effect  throughout  the  whole  Spanish  provinces." 
On  May  22  he  wrote  Secretary  Adams  that  the  frank  and  firm 
message  of  the  President  had  been  productive  of  happy  effects ; 
but  that  he  looked  not  so  much  to  its  temporary  influence  as  to 
its  permanent  operation.  "  We  had  it  immediately  translated," 
he  wrote,  "  into  the  Spanish  language,  printed  and  generally 
distributed  in  this  quarter,  Peru  and  Chile."  59 

In  a  message  of  the  provincial  executive  authority  of  Buenos 
Aires  to  the  legislative  assembly  on  the  occasion  of  its  opening 
on  May  3,  1824,  the  following  reference  was  made  to  the  declar- 
ation of  President  Monroe : 

"  Peace  has  been  maintained  with  the  nations  of  the  con- 
tinent ;  and  every  true  American  heart  has  been  filled  with  satis- 
faction at  the  reception  in  our  city  of  the  first  minister  pleni- 
potentiary of  the  republic  of  the  United  States ;  an  honor  which 
has  been  returned  by  the  appointment  of  a  minister  of  corre- 
sponding rank,  who  has  already  departed  for  Washington.  He 
has  been  instructed  to  suggest  to  the  government  of  that  republic 
how  desirable  it  would  be  if,  in  addition  to  those  two  great 

ss  Robertson,  South  America  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  Polit.  8ci.  Quar., 
XXX,  95. 
B»  Ibid.,  98. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  255. 

principles;  namely,  that  of  the  abolition  of  piratical  warfare, 
and  that  of  the  non-European  colonization  of  American  terri- 
tory, it  could  also  be  declared  that  none  of  the  new  governments 
of  this  continent  shall  alter  by  force  their  respective  boundaries 
as  recognized  at  the  time  of  their  emancipation.  Thus  may  be 
destroyed  the  germ  of  future  dissensions  which,  springing  up 
amongst  new  states,  might  have  a  fatal  influence  upon  their 
civilization  and  manners.  .  .  .  The  analogy  of  feelings  and 
principles  manifested  by  the  cabinets  of  London  and  Washing- 
ton will  convince  Spain  that  she  must  contend  singly  with  the 
free  nations  of  the  New  World.  This  conviction  will  perhaps 
introduce  into  her  councils  that  wisdom  and  moderation  which 
are  of  so  much  importance  to  her  existence."  60 

On  December  16,  1824,  the  congress  of  the  United  Provinces 
of  Rio  de  la  Plata  opened  its  sessions  at  Buenos  Aires.  In  a 
message  of  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires,  laid  before  that 
body  on  the  same  date,  the  American  policy  of  the  United 
States  was  referred  to  in  the  following  terms : 

"  We  have  fulfilled  a  great  national  duty  toward  the  republic 
of  the  United  States  of  North  America.  That  republic,  which, 
from  its  origin,  presides  over  the  civilization  of  the  New  World, 
has  solemnly  acknowledged  our  independence.  It  has  at  the 
same  time  made  an  appeal  to  our  national  honor  by  supposing  us 
capable  of  contending  single-handed  with  Spain ;  but  it  has  con- 
stituted itself  the  guardian  of  the  field  of  battle  in  order  to  pre- 
vent any  foreign  assistance  from  being  introduced  to  the  aid 
of  our  rival."  61 

A  just  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  foregoing  expressions  re- 
quires that  they  be  regarded  in  their  proper  historical  setting. 
As  for  the  views  of  Rodney,  his  arrival  in  Buenos  Aires  in 
November,  1823,  allowed  him  but  little  time  to  become  ac- 

eo  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XI,  803,  805. 

6i  A  translation  of  this  message  is  found  in  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  XII,  858.  For  the  original  in  Spanish  see  El  National  (Buenos 
Aires)  for  December  23,  1824. 


256       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

quainted  with  the  political  opinions  of  the  leaders  of  the  coun- 
try to  which  he  was  accredited.62  He  was  moreover  already 
suffering  from  the  illness  of  which  he  died  the  following  June.63 
Under  the  circumstances  therefore  his  impressions  are  of  little 
value.  He  merely  served  as  a  means  for  transmitting  the 
formal  expressions  of  diplomatic  intercourse.  And  as  for  the 
official  utterances  of  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires,  they  must 
be  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  policies  of  the  responsible  leaders 
of  the  administration. 

Elsewhere  an  account  has  been  given  of  the  efforts  made  by 
the  United  Provinces  to  solve  the  problems  growing  out 
of  their  revolt  by  establishing  some  sort  of  relation,  dynastic  or 
other,  with  some  power  of  Europe,  preferably  Great  Britain  or 
France.  Those  efforts  failed,  and,  the  government  responsible 
for  the  negotiations  being  driven  from  office,  a  new  era  domi- 
nated by  republican  aspirations  began.  An  excessive  spirit  of 
localism,  however,  made  impossible  all  progress  toward  the  es- 
tablishment of  an  effective  national  government.  The  constitu- 
tion of  1819,  promulgated  with  high  hopes,  being  soon  aban- 
doned, the  term  "  United  Provinces  "  continued  to  be,  as  it 
had  always  been,  more  or  less  a  fiction  as  the  expression  of  or- 
ganized nationality.64  Such  national  functions  as  were  exer- 
cised at  all  were  exercised  by  the  provincial  authorities  of 
Buenos  Aires,  whose  leadership  within  certain  limits  was  tacitly 
recognized.  The  governor  of  the  province,  General  Martin 
Rodriguez,  brought  into  his  cabinet  two  of  Argentina's  ablest 
statesmen,  Bernadino  Rivadavia  and  Manuel  Jose  Garcia,  both 
of  whom  had  played  important  roles  during  the  preceding  five 
or  six  years  in  the  negotiations  looking  to  the  establishment  of 
a  monarchical  form  of  government.  Rivadavia,  who  was  ap- 
pointed Minister  of  Interior,  conducted  the  foreign  affairs  of 

«2  Registro  Oficial  de  la  RepAblica  Argentina,  II,  46.  For  an  account  of 
Rodney's  reception  by  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires  see  Palomeque, 
Origines  de  la  Diplomaoia  Argentina,  I,  114. 

68  Monroe,  Writings,  VI,  430.     Regiatro  Oficial,  II,  61. 

««Vedia,  Constitucidn  Argentina,  13. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  257 

Buenos  Aires  and  of  the  other  provinces  as  far  as  they  had  any 
intercourse  with  the  exterior.  He  had  been  greatly  influenced 
by  the  reaction  toward  absolutism  in  Europe  and  though  he  had 
given  up  the  idea  of  seeing  a  throne  erected  at  Buenos  Aires, 
he  looked  with  little  favor  upon  the  attempts  to  introduce  too 
strong  a  democratic  element  into  the  government.65  Moreover, 
his  sympathies  were  decidedly  European  and  he  advocated  meas- 
ures calculated  to  bring  Europe  and  America  into  more  inti- 
mate relations  rather  than  to  divide  them  into  hostile  camps.66 
Eor  nearly  a  year  past  negotiations  had,  in  fact,  been  going 
on  with  agents  of  the  Spanish  Government  who  had  arrived  in 
Buenos  Aires  in  May,  1823,  with  instructions  to  effect  a  recon- 
ciliation with  the  American  states.  Rivadavia  was  appointed 
to  represent  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires  in  the  negotiations 
and  by  a  resolution  of  the  Provincial  Assembly,  passed  on  July 
19,  he  was  authorized  to  treat  with  the  Spanish  commissioners 
on  the  basis  of  the  cessation  of  hostilities  against  all  the  new 
states  of  the  continent  and  the  recognition  by  Spain  of  their 
independence.  A  preliminary  treaty  was  signed  on  July  4, 
providing  for  an  armistice  of  eighteen  months  within  which 
period  it  was  agreed  that  there  should  be  negotiated  a  "  definitive 
treaty  of  peace  and  amity  between  his  Catholic  Majesty  and 
the  states  of  the  American  continent."  It  was  also  provided 
by  a  separate  agreement  that  the  governments  of  the  states 

65  Lopez,  Historia  de  la  Reptiblica  Argentina,  IX,  79. 

66  The  Argentina  publicist,  Alberdi,  referring  to  the  Panama  Congress, 
among  whose  aims  he  believed  to  have  been:     First,  the  formation  of  a 
permanent  league  against  Spain  or  any  other  power  that  should  attempt  to 
dominate  America;  and  secondly,  the  prevention  of  all  European  coloniza- 
tion on  this  continent  and  of  all  foreign  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the 
New  World,  says :     "  To  the  honor  of  Rivadavia  and  of  Buenos  Aires  be  it 
remembered  that  he  was  opposed  to  the  congress  of  Panama  and  to  its 
principles,  because  he  comprehended  that  if  he  favored  it  he  would  destroy 
all  his  hopes  of  European  immigration  and  of  establishing  closer  relations 
between  this  continent  and  the  Old  World,  which  had  always  been  and 
would    continue    to    be    the    source    of    our    civilization    and    progress." 
Organizacidn  de  la  Confederacidn  Argentina,  I,  34.     See  Registro  Oficial, 
II,   46,    47.     The   late    president,   Roque   Saenz   Pena,    entertained    similar 
ideas.     See  an  article  by  him  in  Ateneo  (Madrid),  III,  368-394. 


258       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

which  should  be  recognized  as  independent  under  the  proposed 
treaty  should  pay  to  Spain  the  sum  of  twenty  million  pesos 
through  a  loan  to  be  raised  in  England.  The  government  of 
Buenos  Aires  engaged  to  obtain  the  accession  of  Chile,  Peru, 
and  Colombia,  and  with  that  end  in  view  immediately  dis- 
patched an  agent  to  those  countries.  Other  agents  were  ap- 
pointed to  treat  with  the  provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata,  Paraguay, 
and  Upper  Peru.  Chile  promptly  declined  to  become  a  party 
to  the  convention,  and  Peru  and  Colombia  after  consideration 
likewise  declined  to  accede  to  it.  But  this  was  not  known  in 
Buenos  Aires  until  some  time  after  the  news  of  President 
Monroe's  message  arrived  there  early  in  February,  1824.  By 
this  time,  however,  there  was  probably  no  longer  any  hope  of 
attaining  the  object  of  the  negotiations.67 

Though  these  negotiations  came  to  nothing  they  are  worthy 
of  note  not  merely  as  the  mark  of  a  conciliatory  attitude  toward 
the  mother  country,  but  as  the  concrete  expression  of  the  desire 
on  the  part  of  Buenos  Aires  to  revive  and  tr  extend  the  in- 
fluence which  it  had  formerly  exercised  in  Chile  and  Peru  es- 
pecially, and  to  a  less  extent  throughout  the  continent.68 
Buenos  Aires,  in  short,  disputed  the  leadership  of  Colombia. 
A  "  circular  to  the  American  states/'  signed  by  Rivadavia  and 
dated  February  5,  1824,  singularly  enough  just  three  days  be- 
fore the  news  of  the  message  of  President  Monroe  reached 
Buenos  Aires,  furnishes  evidence  of  this  aspiration.  Rivadavia 
declared  that  his  government,  being  under  the  obligation  to  de- 
fend the  independence  which  the  united  sister  republics  of  the 
American  continent  had  proclaimed,  addressed  their  respective 
governments  for  the  purpose  of  informing  them  of  the  steps 
being  taken  in  Europe  to  prolong  the  war  in  Peru  (the  only 
part  not  yet  freed),  and  to  prevent  the  full  enjoyment  of  the 

«T  Registro  Oficial,  II,  38,  41,  42,.  L6pez,  Historia  de  la  Republica  Ar- 
gentina, IX,  180,  189.  Villanueva,  Fernando  VII  y  los  Nuevoa  Eatodoa, 
272-287. 

«s  See  a  chapter  entitled  Hegemonia  de  la  Republica  Argentina  in 
Guastavino's  San  Martin  j/  8im6n  BoUvar. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  259 

emancipation  for  which  that  country  was  struggling.  Discuss- 
ing the  propensity  of  the  European  powers  to  intervene  in 
American  affairs  and  the  form  that  such  intervention  might 
take,  the  author  of  the  circular  assured  the  several  governments 
that  Buenos  Aires  was  resolved  to  lend  its  active  cooperation  to 
whatever  plan  the  necessities  of  the  case  might  demand,  and 
that  it  would  work  with  energy  and  zeal  to  hring  about  a  general 
peace  based  on  independence  and  liberty.69 

It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  enthusiasm  over  the  declaration 
of  President  Monroe  was  not  as  great  as  certain  expressions  of 
the  American  minister  and  of  the  Buenos  Aires  Government 
would  seem  to  indicate.  The  message  of  May  3,  cited  above, 
was  signed  by  Rivadavia  and  Garcia  and  not  by  the  governor 
of  the  province.70  The  references  in  that  document  to  the 
United  States  are  very  friendly;  but  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
President  Monroe  was  credited  with  having  enunciated  two 
great  principles;  namely,  the  abolition  of  piratical  warfare 
and  the  proscription  of  colonization  of  American  territory  by 
European  powers.  Why  should  no  mention  have  been  made 
of  the  nonintervention  clause?  It  would  not,  perhaps,  be  far 
from  the  truth  to  say  that  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires  was 
not  inclined  to  accept  that  part  of  the  Monroe  declaration. 
Not  that  the  nonintervention  of  Europe  in  American  affairs  was 
unacceptable  in  principle,  but  because  it  was  not  desired  that 
any  limitation  should  be  placed  by  the  United  States  upon 
the  possibility  of  the  adjustment  of  the  difficulties  between  the 
new  states  and  the  mother  country  through  the  interposition  of 
European  powers.  Significant  also  is  the  statement  in  the  mes- 
sage of  December  16,  1824,  to  the  effect  that  the  United  States 
had  constituted  itself  the  guardian  of  the  field  of  battle  to 
prevent  any  foreign  assistance  from  being  given  to  the  adversary 
of  the  American  states.  Thus  far  not  even  the  full  significance 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  been  recognized. 

69  Guastavino,  San  Martin  y  Sim6n  Bolivar,  429-437. 

70  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XI?  808, 


260       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

In  May,  1824,  General  Las  Heras  succeeded  Rodriguez  as 
governor  of  Buenos  Aires  and  Garcia  was  appointed  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  Rivadavia  having  retired  upon  the  change 
of  administration.71  On  August  28,  1825,  Las  Heras,  on  the 
occasion  of  the  reception  of  John  M.  Forbes,  who  had  been  ap- 
pointed to  succeed  Rodney  as  American  minister,  declared  un- 
equivocally at  last  that  the  government  of  the  United  Provinces 
knew  the  importance  of  the  two  great  principles  laid  down  in 
President  Monroe's  message,  and  being  convinced  of  the  utility 
of  their  adoption  by  all  the  states  of  the  continent,  would  con- 
sider it  an  honorable  duty  to  avail  itself  of  every  opportunity 
to  second  them.  These  remarks  were  elicited  by  a  speech  of 
Forbes  in  which  he  restated  the  principles  proclaimed  by  Mon- 
roe and  announced  that  the  views  of  President  Adams  entirely 
coincided  with  them.72 

Of  all  the  Hispanic  American  states,  Chile,  perhaps,  gave  the 
most  genuine  response  to  President  Monroe's  message;  that  is 
to  say,  a  response  the  cordiality  of  which  was  least  affected  by 
such  extraneous  motives  as  those  which  complicated  the  attitude 
of  Mexico,  Colombia,  Brazil,  and  the  United  Provinces.  The 
possibility  of  territorial  disputes  such  as  were  to  embitter  the 
relations  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico  were  absent; 
ideas  of  leadership  such  as  prevailed  in  Colombia  and  the 
United  Provinces  were  not  entertained  by  the  Chilean  leaders, 
and  no  impending  conflict  with  a  neighboring  state  suggested 
such  an  amplification  of  the  doctrine  as  that  proposed  by  Brazil. 

It  was  not  until  April,  1824,  that  the  papers  of  Santiago  pub- 
lished the  message  of  President  Monroe.  They  seemed  to  dis- 
cover in  the  document  a  frank  and  explicit  promise  of  effective 
protection  for  the  Spanish  American  republics  against  the 
political  combinations  and  military  projects  of  European  mon- 

71  Las  Heraa  was  elected  on  April  2,   1824.     Absent  at  the  time  on  a 
mission  to  Upper  Peru,  he  took  office  immediately  upon  his  return,  May  9, 
following.     L6pez,  Historia  de  la  Reptiblica  Argentina,  IX,  238-240. 

72  Robertson,    Kouth   America  and   the   Monroe  Doctrine   in   Polit.   flei, 
Quarterly,  XXX,  101. 


THE  MONBOE  DOCTHHSTE  261 

archs.  It  was  believed  also  that  the  government  of  Great 
Britain,  opposed  as  it  was  to  the  intervention  of  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance in  the  political  affairs  of  Spain,  was  resolved  to  take  a 
more  decided  stand  to  prevent  the  allied  powers  from  carrying 
out  any  act  of  aggression  against  the  new  states  of  America. 
The  arrival  at  this  time  of  Heman  Allen,  accredited  as  United 
States  minister  to  Chile,  was  considered  as  an  event  of  great 
significance.  He  was  received  publicly  and  with  great  cere- 
mony on  April  22.  In  addition  to  the  expressions  of  courtesy 
and  good  will  customarily  employed  on  such  occasions,  Allen 
assured  Chile  that  pursuing  an  honorable  and  just  course  to- 
ward others  she  need  not  fear  alliances  or  coalitions  which 
might  threaten  her  tranquillity  and  independence.  The  dele- 
gate of  the  chief  executive  who  replied  to  Allen's  speech  ex- 
pressed the  gratitude  of  his  government  for  the  recognition  of 
the  independence  of  the  new  states,  and  for  the  recent  declar- 
ation of  President  Monroe  which  placed  them  beyond  the  reach 
of  the  coalitions  of  European  monarchs.73 

Briefly  summarizing  the  foregoing  discussion,  we  may  say 
that  the  Monroe  declaration  was  welcomed  throughout  the 
newly  erected  states  of  America  with  no  more  than  moderate 
enthusiasm;  for  the  opinion  generally  prevailed  that  Great 
Britain  constituted  the  real  and  most  effective  barrier  to  the 
aggressions  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  In  contemporary  discussions 
the  declaration  of  Monroe  was  seldom  referred  to  without  a 
corresponding  reference  to  the  policy  of  Canning ;  and  although 
the  interests  of  the  two  nations  were  thought  to  be  identical 
respecting  the  nonintervention  of  the  powers  of  Europe  in 
American  affairs,  yet  it  was  desired,  at  least  in  some  quarters, 
that  the  influence  of  England  should  intervene  to  prevent  the 
preponderance  of  the  United  States  among  the  nations  of  this 
hemisphere.  This  appears  to  be  the  explanation  of  the  attitude 
of  Mexico,  and  it  seems  clear  that  Bolivar  hoped  by  British  pro- 
tection to  obtain  superiority  for  a  confederation  of  Hispanic 

73  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XIV,  367-8. 


262       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

American  states  of  which  Colombia,  united  with  Peru  and 
Bolivia,  should  be  the  head.  Central  America  received  the 
declaration  with  mild  satisfaction.  Haiti  complained  of  not 
being  included  in  its  benefits.  Brazil  wished  to  give  it  bilateral 
force.  The  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata  were  inclined 
to  regard  it  at  first  as  not  altogether  in  harmony  with  their 
national  policies.  And  finally,  Chile  received  it  with  unmixed 
if  not  extreme  satisfaction.  Such  in  brief  was  the  reception 
which  the  Hispanic  American  states  accorded  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 


CHAPTEK  VII 

EARLY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION 

THE  idea  of  continental  solidarity  was  not  a  sudden  develop- 
ment. On  the  contrary  it  was  of  slow  growth  and  its  roots 
reach  far  back  into  the  colonial  history  of  the  continent.  As 
early  as  1741  a  vast  conspiracy  against  Spain  was  formed  in 
Peru  with  centers  in  New  Granada,  Venezuela,  Chile,  and 
Buenos  Aires.  Though  this  revolt  aimed  to  reestablish  the  Inca 
dynasty,  the  movement  was  not  a  mere  Indian  rebellion ;  for  it 
was  supported  by  both  Creoles  and  Spaniards  and  enjoyed  the 
protection  of  the  Jesuits.  At  about  the  same  time,  Mexico, 
probably  in  accord  with  the  southern  colonies,  was  also  planning 
to  strike  for  its  independence.  Mexican  commissioners  were 
sent  to  the  colony  of  Georgia,  Spain  and  Great  Britain  then  be- 
ing at  war,  to  confer  with  General  Oglethorpe  and  to  ask  the 
aid  of  the  British  in  the  accomplishment  of  their  purpose.  It 
was  the  intention  of  the  conspirators  to  establish  in  Mexico  an 
independent  kingdom  with  a  prince  of  the  house  of  Austria  on 
the  throne.  In  return  for  her  help  England  was  to  be  given 
a  monopoly  of  the  foreign  trade  of  the  kingdom.  An  agent 
whom  Oglethorpe  sent  to  Mexico  to  investigate  the  matter 
brought  back  a  favorable  report  and  Oglethorpe  thereupon  com- 
municated the  proposal  to  the  home  government.  The  scheme 
was  looked  upon  with  favor  and  some  steps  were  taken  to  carry 
it  into  effect;  but  before  anything  was  accomplished  the  project 
was  abandoned.1 

1  Villanueva,  Resumen  de  la  Historia  de  America,  190, 

It  was  in  1741  that  Admiral  Vernon's  expedition  againgt  Cartagena  was 

undertaken.     See   in   this  connection    a   memorial    (Amer.   Hist.   Rev.,   IV, 

325-328)    to  the  British  Government,   dated  June  6,   1741,  recommending 

that  Great  Britain  aid  the   Spanish   colonies  in  America  to  obtain  their 

263 


264       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

During  the  remainder  of  the  eighteenth  century  several  revo- 
lutionary movements  of  more  or  less  importance  were  set  on 
foot  in  different  parts  of  Spanish  and  Portuguese  America, 
These  movements  often  had  ramifications  which  extended  widely 
throughout  the  continent.  They  were  usually  undertaken  in 
the  expectation  of  receiving  the  support  of  Great  Britain,  and 
after  1783,  of  the  United  States  also.  Knowledge  of  a  con- 
spiracy formed  in  1787  by  a  number  of  Brazilian  students  for 
the  purpose  of  effecting  the  independence  of  Brazil  was  com- 
municated in  a  letter  by  one  of  the  conspirators,  Maia  by  name, 
to  Thomas  Jefferson,  who  was  at  that  time  minister  of  the 
United  States  to  France.2  It  was  necessary,  Maia  wrote,  that 
the  colony  should  obtain  assistance  from  some  power  and  the 
United  States  alone  could  be  looked  to  with  propriety,  "be- 
cause nature  in  making  us  inhabitants  of  the  same  continent 
has  in  some  sort  united  us  in  the  bonds  of  a  common  patriot- 
ism." 3  By  appointment,  the  Brazilian  met  Jefferson  shortly 
afterward  and  gave  him  further  information.  Jefferson  dis- 
creetly avoided  committing  himself,  but  appeared  not  to  disap- 
prove of  the  scheme  and  assured  Maia  that  a  successful  revolu- 
tion in  Brazil  could  not  be  uninteresting  to  the  United  States. 

Some  time  before  this  occurrence  Jefferson  had  a  conversation 
with  a  native  of  Mexico  about  the  possibility  of  revolution  in 
that  colony.  Though  convinced  by  the  information  which  he 
received,  that  Mexico  was  not  so  well  prepared  for  a  move  for 
independence  as  was  Brazil,  he  wrote  Jay,  nevertheless,  that 
"  however  distant  we  may  be,  both  in  condition  and  dispositions, 
from  taking  an  active  part  in  any  commotions  in  that  country, 
nature  has  placed  it  too  near  us  to  make  its  movements  alto- 
gether indifferent  to  our  interests,  or  to  our  curiosity."  4 

independence  rather  than  attempt  to  take  them  and  hold  them  by  right  of 
conquest;  and  that  an  alliance  be  then  formed  with  them  as  with  a  free 
people. 

2  Varnhagen,  Historia  Oeral  do  Brasil,  II,  1013-1017. 

a  Jefferson,  Writings,  VI,  115.  For  Maia's  letter  to  Jefferson,  see  Oliveira 
Lima,  Formation  Historique  de  la  Nationality  Brtsilienne,  115-116. 

*  Jefferson,  Writings,  VI,  122. 


EAKLY  PKOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION   265 

At  this  time  the  revolutionary  activities  of  the  Precursor, 
Francisco  de  Miranda,  had  already  begun.  Certain  features  of 
his  general  plan  may  be  adverted  to.  It  was  in  1797  that  he 
received  from  a  revolutionary  junta  in  Paris,  composed  of 
Spanish  Americans  who  had  gathered  there,  powers  and  instruc- 
tions for  directing  a  general  movement  for  the  liberation  of 
Spanish  America.  Crossing  over  to  London  he  entered  into 
negotiations  with  the  British  Government.  He  approached  at 
the  same  time  Rufus  King,  the  American  minister  to  England, 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  through  him  the  cooperation  of 
the  United  States.  According  to  the  plan  which  Miranda  had 
been  charged  to  carry  out,  an  alliance  was  to  be  formed  between 
Great  Britain,  the  United  States,  and  the  governments  which 
it  was  proposed  to  set  up.  The  two  powers  thus  cooperating  in 
the  liberation  of  the  colonies  were  to  receive  certain  trade  ad- 
vantages in  compensation  for  their  assistance.  Deputies  rep- 
resenting the  different  parts  of  Spanish  America  were  to  meet, 
after  independence  had  been  achieved,  to  make  general  regula- 
tions regarding  commercial  relations  among  themselves.5 

The  British  Cabinet  took  under  consideration  Miranda's  plan 
for  revolutionizing  Spanish  America,  and  after  some  months 
of  deliberation  decided  not  to  lend  it  support.  In  the  mean- 
time Miranda  had  frequent  conferences  with  King,  who,  being 
enthusiastic  in  his  support  of  the  project,  wrote  in  advocacy  of 
it  to  Pinckney,  Marshall,  and  Gerry,  then  in  France  on  their 
famous  mission  to  the  Directory.  He  wrote  also  to  Alexander 
Hamilton  and  Secretary  Pickering  in  the  United  States.  Mi- 
randa himself  wrote  to  President  Adams  and  to  Hamilton,  with 
the  latter  of  whom  he  had  maintained  friendly  relations  for 
some  years  past.  Hamilton  declared  that  he  wished  the  enter- 
prise to  be  undertaken  and  that  he  wished  the  principal  agency 
in  carrying  it  out  to  be  in  the  United  States.  He  would  em- 

s  Robertson,  Francisco  de  Miranda  and  the  Revolutionizing  of  Spanish 
America,  319-23;  Baralt  y  Diaz,  Resumen  de  la  Historia  de  Venezuela,  I, 
22,  See  also  C.  J.  Ingersoll,  Recollections,  218. 


266       PAN-AMEKECANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

bark  upon  the  scheme,  however,  only  on  condition  of  its  being 
officially  sanctioned  by  his  government.  Adams  did  not  reply 
to  Miranda,  but  referred  the  matter  to  Pickering,  remarking 
that  the  United  States  was  at  peace  with  Spain  and  inquiring 
whether  the  project  would  be  useful  in  the  event  that  that  con- 
dition should  change.  Pickering  made  no  response  to  Miranda's 
appeal  and  thus  the  matter  rested.6 

Upon  the  failure  of  the  United  States  to  give  assistance  to 
this  project  of  Miranda's,  was  grounded  in  part  the  refusal  of 
Great  Britain  to  provide  the  aid  which  was  sought  of  her.  If 
the  strained  relations  which  then  existed  between  the  United 
States  and  France  had  resulted  in  war,  the  alliance  which 
Miranda  hoped  to  bring  about  would,  in  all  probability,  have 
become  effective;  for  war  with  France  would  have  meant  war 
with  Spain  also,  those  two  powers  having  entered  into  an  al- 
liance after  the  Peace  of  Basel.  That  war  did  not  occur  was 
due  in  part  to  the  firm  resolve  of  Adams  to  prevent  it,  in  spite 
of  the  strong  provocation  which  France  gave  the  United  States, 
and  in  part  to  the  aversion  of  public  opinion  to  a  British  al- 
liance.7 Whatever  might  have  otherwise  been  the  outcome  of 
the  project,  the  fact  remains  that  its  aim  was  not  merely  to 

6  Robertson,  Francisco  de  Miranda  and  the  Revolutionizing  of  Spanish 
America,  328-32. 

7  Ibid.,  336. 

Schouler,  History  of  the  United  States  of  America,  I,  362,  395. 

The  idea  of  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain  to  combat  the  designs  of 
Napoleon  in  America  was  later  suggested  by  Jefferson  in  a  letter  which 
he  wrote  on  April  18,  1802,  to  Robert  Livingston,  United  States  minister 
to  France.  He  said :  "  The  day  that  France  takes  possession  of  New 
Orleans  fixes  the  sentence  which  is  to  restrain  her  forever  within  her  low- 
water  mark.  It  seals  the  union  of  two  nations,  who,  in  conjunction,  can 
maintain  exclusive  possession  of  the  ocean.  From  that  moment  we  must 
marry  ourselves  to  the  British  fleet  and  nation.  We  must  turn  all  our 
attention  to  a  maritime  force,  for  which  our  resources  place  us  on  very 
high  ground;  and  having  formed  and  connected  together  a  power  which 
may  render  reinforcement  of  her  settlements  here  impossible  to  France, 
make  the  first  cannon  which  shall  be  fired  in  Europe  the  signal  for  the 
tearing  up  any  settlement  she  may  have  made,  and  for  holding  the  two 
continents  of  America  in  sequestration  for  the  common  purposes  of  the 
united  British  and  American  nations."  Writings,  X,  313. 


EARLY  PROJECTS  OF  COSTTIKElSrTAL  UKION      267 

achieve  the  independence  of  the  American  colonies  but  to  effect 
as  well  some  such  continental  unity  as  that  which  Bolivar  strove 
ineffectually  to  achieve  two  or  three  decades  later. 

Miranda  remained  in  England  until  near  the  close  of  1805 
when,  having  given  up  hope  of  securing  assistance  from  the 
British  Government,  he  set  sail  for  the  United  States.  Arriv- 
ing at  New  York  and  beginning  active  preparations  for  an 
expedition  to  South  America  he  went  shortly  afterward  to  Wash- 
ington, where  he  met  Jefferson  and  where  he  had  more  than  one 
conference  with  Madison,  the  Secretary  of  State.  From  Madi- 
son, it  appears,  he  received  the  impression  that  the  project  had 
"  the  tacit  approbation  and  good  wishes  "  of  the  government 
and  that  there  were  no  difficulties  in  the  way  of  private  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  promoting  the  enterprise  provided 
"  the  public  laws  be  not  openly  violated."  Madison  later  de- 
clared that  he  warned  Miranda  that  the  government  would  not 
countenance  or  embark  insidiously  in  any  enterprise  of  a  secret 
nature.  But  whatever  may  have  been  the  attitude  of  the  ad- 
ministration, Miranda  succeeded  in  organizing  without  inter- 
ference from  the  United  States  authorities  an  expedition  con- 
sisting of  two  hundred  men  and  three  ships  with  an  abundance 
of  arms  and  supplies.  Two  of  the  ships  having  sailed  some 
time  before,  Miranda  with  his  recruits  put  to  sea  in  the  remain- 
ing vessel  early  in  1806.8 

A  few  days  before  setting  sail  from  ~New  York  Miranda 
wrote  Jefferson  a  note  in  which  the  following  interesting  state- 
ment is  found :  "  If  the  happy  prediction  which  you  pronounced 
on  the  future  destiny  of  our  dear  Colombia  is  to  be  accom- 
plished in  our  day,  may  Providence  grant  that  it  may  be  under 
your  auspices  and  by  the  generous  efforts  of  her  own  children."9 
What  Jefferson's  happy  prediction  may  have  been  does  not  ap- 
pear, but  in  view  of  his  well-known  ideas  respecting  the  destiny 

s  Robertson,  Francisco  de  Miranda  and  the  Revolutionizing  of  Spanish 
America,  361-369. 

»  King,  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus  King,  IV,  584. 


268       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

of  the  Western  Hemisphere  it  may  be  inferred  that  inde- 
pendence and  some  degree  of  continental  solidarity  were  im- 
plied. Miranda's  plans,  indeed,  seem  to  have  been  continental 
in  scope  and  to  have  enjoyed  the  tolerance  and  the  good  will 
of  the  government  of  Great  Britain  as  well  as  that  of  the  United 
States ;  for  upon  his  arrival  in  the  West  Indies  he  received  ma- 
terial aid  from  the  British  navy  and  from  the  civil  authorities 
of  the  islands;  and  there  are  good  reasons  for  believing  that 
his  expedition  proceeded  in  accordance  with  a  secret  under- 
standing with  Sir  Home  Popham,  who  was  carrying  out  simul- 
taneously an  enterprise  against  Buenos  Aires.10 

Failing  in  this  undertaking,  Miranda  continued  his  revolu- 
tionary activities  until  he  was  at  last  captured  in  1812  by  the 
Spanish  forces  in  Venezuela  and  taken  away  to  die  in  prison  in 
Spain.  His  later  plans  were  magnificent  in  scope,  as  had  been 
his  earlier  ones.  In  a  frame  of  government  for  Spanish  Amer- 
ica which  he  prepared  about  the  year  1808  provision  was  made 
for  establishing  the  capital  of  this  new  empire  at  the  most  cen- 
tral point,  perhaps,  it  was  stated,  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
It  is  to  be  inferred  from  this  that  his  scheme  embraced  all  the 
American  colonies  of  Spain.  The  extension  of  the  projected 

10  "A  symbolic  design  on  a  handkerchief  of  English  manufacture  found 
in  the  colonies  near  Miranda's  point  of  attack  in  the  spring  of  1807  illus- 
trates some  contemporary  sentiment  on  the  English  attitude  toward 
Spanish  America  so  well  that  it  is  worth  a  brief  description.  On  this  hand- 
kerchief were  portraits  of  Sir  Home  Popham,  General  Beresford,  Washing- 
ton, and  Miranda,  associated,  as  it  were,  to  obtain  the  same  end,  or  because 
of  the  similarity  of  their  undertakings,  with  many  sketches  of  naval 
battles  and  bordered  with  these  four  inscriptions:  It  is  not  commerce  but 
union;  Let  arts,  industry,  and  commerce  flourish;  Religion  and  its  holy 
ministers  be  protected;  Persons,  conscience,  and  commerce  be  at  liberty. 
The  apotheosis  of  Christopher  Columbus  filled  the  center  and  English  colors 
adorned  the  sides.  England  was  depicted  as  goddess  of  the  seas,  the  lion 
of  Spain  at  her  feet.  A  youth  was  pictured  rolling  up  the  French  colors, 
and  poking  the  lion  with  the  hilt  of  his  sword.  On  the  handkerchief  was 
the  inscription:  The  dawn  of  day  in  South  America.  The  captain  general 
of  Caracas  declared,  in  referring  to  this  handkerchief,  that  the  rebel 
Miranda  worked  in  connivance  and  with  the  support  of  the  English  as  the 
result  of  a  comprehensive  plan  of  Spanish  American  conquest  formed  by 
that  government."  Robertson,  Francisco  de  Miranda  and  the  Revolutionis- 
ing of  Spanish  America,  397. 


EAELY  PKOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION   269 

state  was  more  definitely  indicated  in  a  plan  which  he  presented 
for  the  consideration  of  the  British  prime  minister  in  1790. 
His  proposal  then  was  that  its  boundaries  should  be:  on  the 
east,  Brazil,  Guiana,  the  coast  line,  and  the  Mississippi  River; 
on  the  north,  a  straight  line,  the  parallel  of  45°  north  latitude, 
from  the  source  of  the  Mississippi  to  the  Pacific  Ocean;  and 
on  the  west,  the  Pacific  coast  line  to  the  uttermost  point  of 
Cape  Horn.11 

Many  examples  might  be  given  to  show  that  the  ideal  of 
American  unity  appealed  to  men  of  vision  in  both  North  and 
South  America  during  the  first  decade  or  two  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  Two  years  after  the  Miranda  expedition  sailed  from 
New  York,  President  Jefferson,  feeling  that  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  were  intimately  connected  with  those  of  the 
Spanish  colonies,  particularly  of  Mexico  and  Cuba,  and  unwill- 
ing to  see  them  fall  into  the  hands  of  England  or  France,  either 
politically  or  commercially,  appointed  General  James  Wilkin- 
son as  an  envoy  to  bear  them  a  message  of  friendliness.  De- 
siring to  strengthen  the  position  of  the  United  States  in  the 
region  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  Jefferson  was  doubtless  influenced 
by  motives  of  national  expansion.  His  agent,  who  had  unfor- 
tunately been  discredited  by  the  relations  which  he  had  main- 
tained with  the  Spanish  authorities  in  the  Southwest  and  later 
by  his  connections  with  Aaron  Burr,  may  not  have  been  wholly 
free  from  motives  of  a  baser  sort.12 

But  motives  apart,  the  history  of  these  negotiations  reveals 
the  fact  that  America  was  being  thought  of  as  a  whole.  How- 
ever corrupt  Wilkinson  may  have  been,  his  long  experience  on 
the  western  border  had  given  him  a  comprehensive  view  of  the 
possibilities  of  continental  union.  In  a  letter  to  Jefferson  dated 
March  12,  1807,  he  declared  that  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  should  combine  to  preserve  the  Western  World  from 

11  Robertson,  Francisco  de  Miranda  and  the  Revolutionizing  of  Spanish 
America,  272,  417,  471,  486,  525. 

12  Cox,  The  Pan-American  Policy  of  Jefferson  and  Wilkinson.      (Reprint 
from  the  Miss,  Valley  Hist.  Rev.,  Sept.,  1914)   212-214. 


270       PAX-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Napoleon  and  his  unwilling  ally,  the  King  of  Spain ;  and  later 
in  the  same  month  he  suggested  that  Mexico,  Peru,  and  Cuba  if 
allied  as  independent  states  might,  with  the  aid  of  the  United 
States,  bid  defiance  to  the  Old  World.  Writing  a  little  more 
than  a  year  later,  but  still  before  he  had  started  on  his  mission, 
he  expressed  the  hope  of  seeing  Mexico  and  South  America 
speedily  emancipated.  Advocating  the  termination  of  all  trans- 
atlantic connections,  he  made  the  following  extravagant  declar- 
ation :  "  Our  acquaintance  with  the  European  world  would 
gradually  subside,  fleets  and  armies  would  insensibly  become 
useless  to  a  people  of  self-government ;  and  a  persevering  respect 
for  ancient  habits,  and  a  fine  adherence  to  principle,  would  per- 
petuate the  freedom  and  happiness  of  the  people  of  United 
America,  to  endless  time."  And  in  a  letter  to  Governor  Folch 
of  West  Florida  he  declared  that  should  Spain  fall  into  the 
power  of  Napoleon,  Spanish  America,  united,  organized,  and 
in  alliance  with  the  United  States,  might  bid  defiance  to  all 
the  warring  nations  of  Europe.13 

Wilkinson  started  upon  his  mission  in  January,  1809,  but 
having  been  delayed  at  Charleston  did  not  reach  Habana,  where 
he  was  to  confer  with  the  captain  general,  Someruelos,  until  late 
in  March.  Thus  Jefferson's  administration  had  come  to  an  end 
before  Wilkinson  began  negotiations  with  the  Spanish  authori- 
ties. Proceeding  from  Habana  to  Pensacola  and  finding  that 
Governor  Folch  had  gone  to  Baton  Rouge,  the  American  agent 
continued  his  journey  westward.  In  the  meantime  some  dis- 
cussion had  taken  place  between  Claiborne,  governor  of  Orleans 
Territory,  and  Vidal  and  Folch,  Spanish  vice  consul  at  New 
Orleans  and  governor  of  West  Florida,  respectively,  with  regard 
to  an  alliance  between  the  United  States  and  the  Spanish  pos- 
sessions, in  the  event  that  they  should  declare  their  inde- 
pendence as  the  result  of  an  unhappy  outcome  of  Napoleon's 
invasion  of  Spain.  Vidal  spoke  with  reserve,  but  Folch  ad- 
mitted that  Mexico  and  Cuba  would  need  a  foreign  alliance  to 

i«  Cox,  The  Pan-American  Policy  of  Jefferson  and  Wilkinson,  217. 


EAELY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION     271 

maintain  their  independence,  and  he  declared  that  they  would 
approach  both  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  on  the 
subject,  but  preferably  the  latter.  Claiborne  spoke  of  the  ex- 
clusion from  this  continent  of  all  European  influence,  particu- 
larly British  and  French,  as  a  guarantee  that  in  their  struggle 
for  independence  Mexico  and  Cuba  might  rely  absolutely  on 
the  friendship  of  the  United  States. 

At  a  dinner  given  while  these  discussions  were  going  on, 
Folch  gave,  though  with  doubtful  sincerity,  the  following  toast : 
"  The  liberty  of  the  New  World ;  may  it  never  be  assailed  with 
success  by  the  Old  World."  Upon  his  arrival  Wilkinson  had 
some  conversations  with  Folch  and  Vidal,  and  on  one  occasion 
proposed  that  in  the  event  of  Spain's  succumbing  to  Napoleon  it 
would  be  highly  desirable  to  form  an  alliance  to  embrace  Span- 
ish America,  Brazil,  the  United  States,  and,  if  necessary,  Eng- 
land. The  latter  power  was  included,  doubtless,  as  a  conces- 
sion to  the  friendly  feeling  aroused  in  the  colonies  by  the  efforts 
which  were  being  made  by  Great  Britain  to  drive  the  French 
from  the  Peninsula.14 

Although  Madison  discontinued  the  negotiations,  and  al- 
though the  nation's  freedom  of  action  was  greatly  restricted  by 
the  increasing  strain  and  final  break  with  Great  Britain,  yet 
there  was  manifested  during  his  presidency  no  less  interest  in 
the  ideal  of  American  unity  than  had  been  shown  during  previ- 
ous administrations.  Early  in  his  first  term,  Spanish  American 
revolutionary  agents  began  with  Monroe,  then  Secretary  of 
State,  a  series  of  negotiations  aimed  at  obtaining  from  the 
United  States  the  aid  necessary  to  make  successful  resistance 
to  the  rule  of  Napoleon,  if  not  to  achieve  a  complete  separation 
from  the  mother  country.15  As  early  as  July,  1809,  it  was 
suggested  by  the  government  at  Washington,  it  is  claimed,  to 
certain  of  these  agents  that  if  the  Spanish  colonies  would  de- 

i*  Cox,  The  Pan-American  Policy  of  Jefferson  and  Wilkinson,  222-236. 

15  Cf.  Cox.  Monroe  and  the  Early  Mexican  Revolutionary  Agents  (In: 
An.  Rep.  Am.  Hist.  Assn.  for  1911,  pages  197-215).  Gil  Fortoul,  Historia 
Constitutional  de  Venezuela,  I,  128. 


272       PAJST-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

clare  their  independence,  their  representatives  would  be  ad- 
mitted to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  and  an  effort  would 
be  made  to  form  a  confederation  of  the  whole  of  America.16 
In  1811  an  agent  of  the  revolutionary  party  in  Mexico  asked 
for  "  men,  money,  and  arms  "  to  aid  the  Mexicans  in  their 
struggle  for  independence  and  offered  in  return  mutually  ad- 
vantageous commercial  treaties  that  would  serve  to  cement  the 
friendship  of  all  American  peoples.  Monroe,  it  appears,  was 
interested,  sympathetic  and  ready  to  give  advice,  but  not  in- 
clined to  compromise  his  government  with  Spain  or  with  Spain's 
ally,  Great  Britain.17 

In  the  midst  of  growing  international  difficulties,  President 
Madison's  thoughts  were  of  the  continent  as  a  whole.18  Speak- 
ing in  his  annual  message  of  November  5,  1811,  of  the  great 
communities  occupying  the  southern  portion  of  the  hemisphere, 
he  declared,  as  has  been  pointed  out  in  a  previous  chapter,  that 
"  an  enlarged  philanthropy  and  an  enlightened  forecast  concur 
in  imposing  on  the  national  councils  an  obligation  to  take  a  deep 

16  Gil  Fortoul,  Historia  Constitutional  de  Venezuela,  I,  128. 

17  Cox,  Monroe  and  the  Early  Me&ican  Revolutionary  Agents,  201. 

is  At  this  time  Canada  was  included  in  the  idea  of  American  solidarity. 
The  United  States,  about  to  go  to  war  with  Great  Britain,  proposed  to 
wrest  it  from  the  mother  country.  The  Annals  of  Congress,  summarizing 
the  speeches  made  in  the  House  of  Representatives  during  the  first  session 
of  the  Twelfth  Congress  on  the  subject  of  foreign  relations,  records  the 
following  remarks,  in  substance,  of  the  eccentric  Randolph  of  Roanoke: 
"He  could  but  smile  at  the  liberality  of  the  gentleman  (Grundy  of  Ten- 
nessee) in  giving  Canada  to  New  York,  in  order  to  strengthen  the  northern 
balance  of  power,  while  at  the  same  time  he  forwarned  her  that  the 
western  scale  must  preponderate.  Mr.  R.  said  he  could  almost  fancy  that 
he  saw  the  capitol  in  motion  toward  the  falls  of  the  Ohio  —  after  a  short 
sojourn  taking  its  flight  to  the  Mississippi  and  finally  alighting  on  Darien, 
which,  when  the  gentleman's  dreams  are  realized,  will  be  a  most  eligible 
seat  of  government  for  the  new  Republic  (or  Empire)  of  the  two 
Americas!  "  426,  446. 

Under  the  treaty  of  alliance  of  1778  between  France  and  the  United 
States,  it  was  provided  that,  if  the  remaining  British  possessions  in  North 
America  should  be  wrested  from  the  mother  country,  they  were  to  be 
"  confederated  with  or  dependent  upon  "  the  United  States,  and  provision 
was  made  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation  (Article  XI)  for  the  full 
admission  of  Canada  into  the  Union.  Cf.  Moore,  American  Diplomacy,  224. 


EAELY  PEOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      273 

interest  in  their  destinies  " ;  and  on  December  10,  following,  a 
committee  to  whom  that  part  of  the  President's  message  had 
been  referred,  submitted  a  report  declaring  that  the  Senate 
and  House  of  Representatives  beheld  with  friendly  interest  the 
establishment  of  international  sovereignties  by  the  Spanish 
provinces  in  America. 

With  the  War  of  1812  at  an  end  and  peace  established  in 
Europe,  the  policy  of  neutrality  which  the  United  States  had 
maintained  from  the  beginning  between  Spain  and  her  revolted 
colonies  became  more  clearly  denned.  It  was  in  September, 
1815,  that  President  Madison  issued  his  proclamation  warning 
the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  especially  those  of  Louisiana, 
from  conspiring  together  to  set  on  foot  hostile  expeditions 
against  the  dominions  of  Spain;  and  it  was  in  response  to  his 
recommendation  that  Congress  passed  the  Neutrality  Act  of 
March  3,  181 Y.  When  Monroe  became  President,  more  cordial 
relations  with  Spain  had  been  established.  But  in  his  first 
annual  message  he  declared  that  it  had  been  anticipated  that 
the  contest  between  Spain  and  her  colonies  would  become  highly 
interesting  to  the  United  States;  that  it  was  natural  that  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States  should  sympathize  in  events  which 
affected  their  neighbors;  that  the  prosecution  of  the  conflict 
had  interrupted  the  commerce  of  the  United  States,  and  other- 
wise had  affected  the  persons  and  property  of  its  citizens;  but 
that  strict  neutrality  had  nevertheless  been  maintained.19 

In  1815  there  was  published  in  the  city  of  Washington  a 
pamphlet  under  the  title  of  Outlines  of  a  Constitution  for 
United  North  and  South  Columbia.20  The  author  was  William 
Thornton,  who  had  long  been  interested  in  the  fate  of  the  part 
of  the  continent  which  still  remained  under  the  dominion  of 

is  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  13. 

20  The  copy  in  the  New  York  Public  Library,  which  has  been  used  by  the 
present  writer,  is  bound  with  ten  other  pamphlets  in  a  volume  containing 
the  following  inscription:  "  M.  Dickerson  —  bo't  at  the  sale  of  President 
Jefferson's  Library  —  Mar.  6,  1829."  On  a  fly  leaf  is  written  an  index  of 
the  volume  in  Jefferson's  handwriting. 


274       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

European  powers.  Thornton  was  born  on  the  island  of  Tortola 
in  the  West  Indies,  was  educated  as  a  physician  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Edinburgh,  and,  toward  the  last  decade  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  came  to  the  United  States,  settling  finally  at  Philadel- 
phia. In  1802  he  was  appointed  to  fill  the  newly  created  office 
of  Commissioner  of  Patents,  in  which  position  he  continued  un- 
til his  death,  twenty-six  years  later.  He  was  a  man  of  great 
versatility  and  boldness  of  intellect.  Chosen  a  member  of  the 
American  Philosophical  Society,  he  was  awarded  by  that  or- 
ganization the  Magellanic  prize  for  an  essay  which  he  published 
in  1793  under  the  title  of  Cadmus:  or  a  Treatise  on  the  Ele- 
ments of  Written  Language.  He  was  a  painter  of  no  mean 
ability,  and  that  he  was  an  architect  of  merit  is  attested  by  the 
fact  that  he  designed,  among  other  notable  buildings,  the  Phila- 
delphia public  library  and  the  capitol  at  Washington.  More- 
over, he  was  an  inventor.  He  became  associated  with  John 
Fitch,  who  constructed,  about  1789,  a  steamboat  which  was  able 
to  creep  through  the  water  at  the  rate  of  three  miles  an  hour. 
Thornton  made  improvements  which  raised  the  speed  of  the 
vessel  to  eight  miles  an  hour.  This  velocity  the  boat  was  able 
to  sustain,  and  on  one  occasion  was  propelled  a  distance  of 
eighty  miles  in  one  day.  Hoping  to  make  further  improve- 
ments, the  inventors  began  the  construction  of  a  new  boat,  which 
Fitch  completed  and  tested  while  Thornton  was  away  on  a  visit 
to  the  West  Indies.  As  this  boat  proved  to  be  a  failure,  Fitch 
became  discouraged  and  went  to  France  to  continue  his  ex- 
periments. Upon  resuming  his  residence  at  Philadelphia, 
Thornton  turned  his  attention  to  other  things,  thus  abandoning 
the  honor  which  might  have  been  his  as  a  coinventor  of  the 
steamboat.21  Other  inventions  which  he  made  entitle  him, 
however,  to  a  place  among  American  inventors. 

Thornton's  many-sided  ability  and  his  more  or  less  intimate 

21  See  article  by  Gaillard  Hunt  in  The  Nation  for  May  21,  1914;  also  a 
paper  read  before  the  Columbia  Historical  Society  on  May  19,  1914,  by  Allen 
C.  Clark  and  printed  in  the  Records  of  the  Society,  XVIII. 


EAELY  PKOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      275 

association  with  Washington,  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  other 
eminent  men  of  his  time  give  added  interest  to  his  views  on  the 
subject  of  a  "  United  North  and  South  Columbia."  In  a  short 
introduction  to  his  pamphlet  he  declared  that  the  plan  which 
he  was  then  giving  to  the  public  was  taken  principally  from 
what  he  had  written  on  the  subject  some  fifteen  years  before. 
Keferring  without  doubt  to  Miranda,  he  declared  that  the  plan 
was  made  "  known  to  one  in  whom  the  worthy  Patriots  of  Ca- 
racas since  confided  and  who  promised  he  would  endeavor  to 
execute  what  he  appeared  so  much  to  approve;  but,"  he  con- 
tinued, "  unhappily  the  love  of  power  dazzled  a  mind  too  weak 
for  that  magnanimous  impulse  of  pure  virtue.  .  .  .  He  sought 
power  on  the  ruins  of  his  country,  and  wished  to  establish  a  con- 
sular government,  expecting  thereby  to  obtain  supreme  com- 
mand." 22 

These  remarks  show  that  Thornton  had  an  exaggerated  idea 
of  the  importance  of  the  venture  which  he  had  made  as  a  politi- 
cal organizer.  Nevertheless,  he  manifested  an  unusually  clear 
understanding  of  the  difficult  situation  in  which  the  New 
World  was  placed,  and  in  proposing  his  vast  scheme,  his  aim 
was  to  prepare  by  means  of  union  to  meet  the  dangers  which 
threatened  the  continent  as  a  whole.  At  the  time  the  plan  was 
published,  none  of  the  new  states,  it  must  be  remembered,  had 
as  yet  definitely  established  its  independence.  That  they  were 
all  destined  to  attain  the  status  of  free  people,  Thornton  firmly 
believed.  But  he  was  afraid  that  "  if  nothing  be  done ;  if 
governments  form  themselves  around  us  essentially  different; 
if  daring  chiefs  at  the  head  of  armies  and  ambitious  politicians 
disturb  our  repose,  it  will  be  vain  to  offer  the  branch  of  peace. 
Our  pacific  system,  if  continued,  would  then  but  offer  tempta- 
tions to  aggression,  and  we  would  repine  at  the  necessity  of 
armies  and  warfare,  now  so  justly  deprecated.  .  .  .  Men  vested 
with  high  military  authority  have  more  generally  obtained  by 
promises  of  reward  the  support  of  the  armies  they  commanded, 

22  Outlines  of  a  Constitution  for  United  North  and  South  Columbia,  2. 


276       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

and  then  assumed  the  power.  We  learn  this  not  only  from 
ancient  but  modern  example,  and  millions  now  groan  under 
the  oppressive  tyranny  of  despicable  upstarts  whose  depravity  is 
unbalanced  by  a  single  virtue.  .  .  .  With  a  knowledge  of  all 
that  has  preceded,  who  would  leave  to  chance  the  fate  of  the 
Western  Empire !  The  fool  only  that  cannot  think !  " 

Continuing,  Thornton  declared  that  it  was  essential  to  the 
future  undisturbed  repose  of  Columbia  that  a  complete  accord 
in  political  sentiments  should  be  established ;  and  that  if  all  the 
nations  of  this  vast  continent  were  to  constitute  as  rapidly  as 
possible  governments  on  the  plan  of  the  United  States,  as  nearly 
as  their  traditional  principles  and  practices  would  allow,  the 
whole  continent  being  divided  into  states  under  the  confederate 
plan,  but  one  more  step  would  be  required  to  complete  "  the 
grandest  system  that  has  ever  been  formed  by  the  most  ex- 
panded mind  of  man  —  a  system  that  would  secure  to  the  re- 
motest ages  the  tranquillity  and  peace,  the  virtue  and  felicity 
of  countless  millions."  23  In  order  that  this  high  end  might 
be  realized,  he  proposed  that  the  continent  and  its  islands 
should  be  divided  into  thirteen  sections  or  commonwealths. 

The  first  and  second  sections  or  commonwealths  were  to  em- 
brace the  whole  of  the  North  American  continent  lying  north  of 
the  forty-fourth  degree  of  north  latitude,  the  first  being  the 
western  half  of  the  territory  and  the  second  the  eastern  half, 
each  with  the  islands  adjacent  included.  The  third,  fourth,  and 
fifth  commonwealths  were  to  be  comprised  in  the  territory  lying 
between  the  forty-fourth  parallel  of  north  latitude  and  the 
tropic  of  Capricorn.  One  of  these,  the  third,  was  to  be  bounded 
by  the  Pacific,  the  Tropic  of  Capricorn,  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the 
Rio  Grande  to  the  point  at  which  it  intersects  the  thirty-third 
degree  of  north  latitude,  thence  by  a  line  north  to  the  southern 
boundary  of  the  first  commonwealth  and  along  this  line  to  the 
Pacific.  It  was  to  include,  in  short,  what  are  to-day  the  Pacific 
and  the  extreme  southwestern  states  of  the  United  States  and 

28  Outlines  of  a  Constitution  for  United  North  and  South  Columbia,  6. 


EARLY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      2Y7 

northern  Mexico.  The  fourth  republic  was  to  lie  between  the 
third  and  the  Mississippi  Kiver.  The  fifth  was  to  be  comprised 
in  the  remaining  territory  of  the  United  States  and  the  Floridas. 
The  sixth  was  to  include  the  portion  of  Mexico  lying  south  of 
the  Tropic  of  Capricorn  and  including  Central  America  as  far 
south  as  the  present  boundary  between  Nicaragua  and  Costa 
Rica.  The  region  which  is  to-day  embraced  in  the  republic  of 
Costa  Rica  and  Panama  was  to  be  known  not  as  a  common- 
wealth, but  as  the  District  of  America,  and  contain  on  the 
"  healthy  hills  that  intersect  the  Isthmus  at  or  near  Panama, 
and  where  a  canal  may  be  made  from  sea  to  sea,  by  locks,"  the 
City  of  America.  The  seventh  commonwealth  was  to  embrace 
the  West  India  islands. 

The  continent  of  South  America  was  to  be  divided  into  six 
republics,  from  the  eighth  to  the  thirteenth,  inclusive.  The 
eighth  was  to  include  that  part  of  the  continent  lying  north  of 
the  equator;  that  is,  what  is  to-day  Colombia,  Venezuela,  the 
Guianas,  and  a  narrow  strip  of  northern  Brazil,  together  with  a 
small  part  of  northern  Ecuador.  The  ninth  was  to  be  com- 
prised between  the  equator,  the  sixty-second  degree  of  west  longi- 
tude,24 the  thirteenth  degree  of  south  latitude,  and  the  Pacific, 
including  nearly  all  of  Ecuador  and  Peru,  northern  Bolivia, 
and  a  part  of  western  Brazil.  The  tenth  was  to  include  Brazil, 
with  the  limitations  already  indicated,  as  far  south  as  the  fif- 
teenth degree  of  south  latitude,  west  along  that  line  to  the  Para- 
guay River,  then  northerly  along  that  river  to  the  eastern  bound- 
ary of  the  ninth,  and  thence  to  the  equator.25  The  eleventh 
was  to  be  bounded  by  the  southern  boundary  of  the  ninth,  the 
Paraguay  River  to  the  twenty-eighth  degree  of  south  latitude, 
and  thence  westward  to  the  Pacific.  This  would  have  included 

24  The  author  makes  this  line  intersect  the  Paraguay  River  and  follow 
that  stream  to  the  thirteenth  degree  of  south  latitude.     Modern  maps,  how- 
ever, indicate  that  the  Paraguay  does  not  extend  so  far  north. 

25  This  line  would  have  been  in  effect  along  the  fifteenth  degree  of  south 
latitude  to  the  sixty-second  degree  of  west  longitude  and  thence  to  the 
equator. 


278       PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  greater  part  of  Bolivia,  southern  Peru,  and  the  northern 
parts  of  Chile  and  Argentina.  The  twelfth  was  to  be  com- 
prised between  the  southern  boundary  of  the  tenth,  the  Atlantic 
Ocean,  and  the  Paraguay  River.  It  would  have  included  south- 
ern Brazil,  the  greater  part  of  Paraguay,  Uruguay,  and  a  small 
part  of  Argentina.  The  thirteenth  was  to  include  the  remainder 
of  the  continent  south  of  the  twenty-eighth  degree  of  south  lati- 
tude; that  is,  the  greater  part  of  Chile  and  of  the  Argentine 
republic.26 

The  division  in  some  instances,  Thornton  admitted,  appeared 
unequal,  but  it  arose  from  the  situation  of  the  countries  with 
respect  to  soil,  climate,  natural  boundaries,  and  political  rela- 
tions; and  it  was  his  opinion  that,  everything  considered,  a 
more  equable  division  could  not  be  easily  made.  If,  however, 
the  ancient  attachment  of  the  inhabitants  to  accidental  bounda- 
ries, already  established,  should  induce  them  to  wish  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  former  boundaries,  they  ought  to  weigh  ma- 
turely all  the  advantages  that  would  be  obtained  in  the  equali- 
zation of  limits ;  for  whatever  might  be  lost  on  one  side  would 
probably  be  more  than  compensated  on  the  other.  Besides, 
since  all  would  be  under  the  same  general  government,  why 
should  there  be  any  petty  disputes  about  limits  ?  In  the  United 
States,  individual  states  had  given  up  as  much,  voluntarily,  as 
was  sufficient  to  create  new  states.  The  lines  of  the  new  states 
were  imaginary  with  relation  to  the  connection  of  the  in- 
habitants ;  for  the  produce  of  all  was  sent  to  the  nearest  and  best 
market,  and  it  ought  to  be  the  same,  Thornton  thought,  in  the 
combined  commonwealths  or  sectional  governments ;  for  it  would 
be  considered  as  a  fundamental  principle,  that  whoever  was  a 
citizen  of  one  should  be  a  citizen  of  all,  with  his  rights  extend- 
ing throughout  the  whole.27 

Thornton  recommended  that  each  commonwealth  adopt,  as 
far  as  circumstances  would  permit,  the  constitution  of  the 

2«  Outlines  of  a  Constitution  for  United  North  and  South  Columbia,  7-9. 
27  ibid.,  10. 


EAKLY  PEOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      279 

United  States.  The  Columbian,  Incal,  or  supreme  government, 
he  would  have  to  consist  of  an  Inca,  or  chief  executive,  twenty- 
six  sachems,  two  from  each  commonwealth,  constituting  a  coun- 
cil of  sachems,  or  senate,  of  the  supreme  government;  fifty-two 
caciques,  four  from  each  commonwealth,  constituting  a  council 
of  caciques,  or  house  of  representatives,  and  thirteen  judges, 
representing  each  of  the  commonwealths,  forming  a  supreme 
court.  It  was  proposed  that  the  Inca  should  be  elected  from  the 
council  of  sachems  by  a  joint  ballot  of  the  sachems  and  caciques. 
The  next  on  the  ballot  would  be  the  grand  sachem,  who  would 
preside  in  the  council  of  sachems.  In  the  event  of  the  death, 
removal,  or  resignation  of  the  Inca  the  grand  sachem  would  suc- 
ceed him.  The  Inca  might  be  elected  for  eight  years,  but 
should  not  be  reeligible.  The  sachems  and  caciques  might  be 
elected  for  eight  and  four  years  respectively,  and  they  might  be 
reeligible. 

The  Inca  should  have  authority  to  make  treaties  with  foreign 
nations,  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  a  majority  of  both  houses 
of  the  legislature ;  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  two-thirds 
of  both  houses  he  should  have  the  power  of  declaring  war.  He 
should  be  commander  in  chief  of  the  army  and  navy,  with  au- 
thority to  call  on  each  commonwealth  for  one-third  of  its  marine 
force,  in  time  of  peace ;  but  in  time  of  war,  he  would  command 
all  vessels,  no  commonwealth  being  allowed  to  retain  any  war- 
ships except  those  necessary  for  the  protection  of  trade  and 
revenue.  It  was  thought  proper  to  clothe  the  chief  executive 
with  great  naval  power,  because  he  would  be  able,  by  such  au- 
thority, not  only  to  repel  the  attacks  of  foreign  enemies,  but 
also  to  preserve  uninterrupted  harmony  between  the  govern- 
ments over  which  he  would  preside.  The  authority  of  the  com- 
monwealth presidents  would  extend  over  the  armies  of  their 
respective  sections  during  peace  times,  so  that  the  Inca  would  not 
actually  have  at  his  command  an  army  except  in  time  of  war.28 

.,  11-13. 


280       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

The  members  of  the  Supreme  Court  were  to  be  elected  by  the 
legislatures  of  the  commonwealths  upon  nomination  by  the  re- 
spective presidents.  The  judges  should  hold  office  during  good 
behavior.  They  should  have  original  jurisdiction  in  all  dis- 
putes between  the  different  sectional  governments,  in  all  cases 
affecting  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and  consuls  from 
foreign  states,  and  treaties  entered  into  by  the  supreme  govern- 
ment. They  would  have  appellate  jurisdiction  in  all  cases  in 
law  and  equity  arising  from  the  written  laws  of  the  district 
of  America,  in  all  cases  of  admiralty  and  maritime  jurisdiction, 
and  in  controversies  in  which  the  supreme  government  should 
be  a  party.  And  finally,  their  decisions  should  be  given  with 
their  reasons  at  length,  in  writing,  in  both  the  English  and 
Spanish  languages.29 

The  difficulties  which  were  presented  by  the  establishment 
of  a  political  system,  extending  over  so  vast  a  territory,  would 
be  overcome,  Thornton  thought,  by  the  exercise  of  the  federal 
power.  It  was  by  means  of  the  federal  power  that  the  states 
comprising  the  United  States  were  prevented  from  crumbling 
by  internal  division,  the  jealousy  of  rival,  or  the  combination 
of  adverse  states.  In  Europe,  where  another  system  prevailed, 
the  powers  were  kept  continually  embroiled  by  the  spirit  of 
jealousy.  The  efforts  which  had  been  made,  especially  by 
Henry  IV,  to  establish  and  maintain  peace  by  concerted  action, 
had  failed  because  based  upon  wrong  principles.  In  America 
the  probability  of  success  was  much  greater,  not  only  because 
the  principle  of  federation  was  to  be  applied,  but  because  "  we 
are,  happily,  far  removed  from  the  Old  World,  where  ancient 
prejudices  and  accustomed  modes  of  thinking  might  tend  to 
exclude  extensive  improvements  as  extravagant  innovations." 
Furthermore,  the  system  itself  precluded  the  inconvenience  that 
might  arise  from  extent  of  territory.  In  the  form  in  which 
the  continent  was  divided,  no  commonwealth  would  be  of  un- 
wieldy proportions,  and  since  each  would  have  immediate  ac- 

29  Ibid..   14. 


EAKLY  PEOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      281 

cess  by  sea  to  the  supreme  government,  the  difficulties  of  com- 
munication would  never  be  great.  Moreover,  the  telegraph, 
when  perfected,  would  convey,  from  the  remotest  bounds  of 
this  vast  empire,  communication  to  the  supreme  government 
with  ease ;  and  any  measure  dependent  on  this  knowledge  would 
be  as  rapid  as  the  occasion  might  require !  30 

At  this  point  a  brief  reference  may  be  made  to  the  views  of 
Henry  Clay,  the  most  ardent  of  all  the  North  American  advo- 
cates of  continental  unity.  As  early  as  1810  Clay,  at  that  time 
a  member  of  the  Senate,  speaking  in  defense  of  the  occupation 
of  West  Florida  and  referring  especially  to  the  usurpation  of 
the  Spanish  throne  by  Napoleon,  declared  that  he  had  no  com- 
miseration for  princes;  that  his  sympathies  were  reserved  for 
the  mass  of  mankind.31  And,  several  years  later,  as  a  member 
of  the  House,  speaking  on  the  bill  for  enforcing  neutrality,  he 
championed  the  belligerent  rights  of  the  colonies  and  expressed 
a  strong  desire  to  see  them  achieve  independence.  "  I  may  be 
accused,"  he  said,  "  of  an  imprudent  utterance  of  my  feelings  on 
this  occasion  —  I  care  not ;  when  the  independence,  the  happi- 
ness, the  liberty  of  a  whole  people  is  at  stake,  and  that  people 
our  neighbors,  our  brethren,  occupying  a  portion  of  the  same 
continent,  imitating  our  example  and  participating  of  the  same 
sympathies  with  ourselves,  I  will  boldly  avow  my  feelings  and 
my  wishes  in  their  behalf,  even  at  the  hazard  of  such  an  im- 
putation." 32 

On  subsequent  occasions  Clay  gave  evidence  of  his  interest 
in  the  welfare  of  the  new  states.  On  December  3,  1817,  he 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  all  the  acts  of  the  government  in 
enforcing  the  neutrality  laws  bore  against  the  colonies.  He 
trusted  that  the  House  would  give  the  subject  their  attention 
and  show  that  in  that  body  the  obligations  of  neutrality  would 
be  strictly  regarded  in  respect  to  Spanish  America.  On  March 

so  ibid.,  3,  14. 

si  Annals  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  llth  Cong.,  3d  Sess.,  35. 

32  A  nnals  of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  ISrfh  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  742. 


282       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

24,  1818,  when  an  appropriation  to  defray  the  expense  of  the 
mission  to  South  America  was  taken  up  in  the  House,  Clay 
moved  an  amendment  providing  for  an  outfit  and  a  salary  for 
a  minister  to  Buenos  Aires.  In  a  long  and  eloquent  speech 
which  he  made  on  the  following  day  in  support  of  this  proposal 
he  declared  that  "  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  Spanish  Amer- 
ica, once  independent,  whatever  might  be  the  form  of  the 
governments  established  in  its  several  parts,  those  governments 
would  be  animated  by  an  American  feeling,  and  guided  by  an 
American  policy.  They  would  obey  the  laws  of  the  system  of 
the  New  World,  of  which  they  would  form  a  part,  in  contradis- 
tinction to  that  of  Europe." 

Clay's  motion  was  lost  and  for  nearly  two  years  the  agitation 
in  Congress  in  favor  of  the  recognition  of  the  South  American 
governments  rested.33  On  May  10,  1820,  Clay  submitted  in 
the  House  a  resolution  declaring  it  to  be  expedient  to  provide 
by  law  for  the  sending  of  ministers  to  such  of  the  new  govern- 
ments as  had  established  and  were  maintaining  their  inde- 
pendence of  Spain.  "  It  is  in  our  power  to  create  a  system," 
he  said,  "  of  which  we  shall  be  the  center,  and  in  which  all 
South  America  will  act  with  us.  In  respect  to  commerce,  we 
should  be  most  benefited.  .  .  .  We  should  become  the  center  of 
a  system  which  would  constitute  the  rallying  point  of  human 
wisdom  against  all  the  despotism  of  the  Old  World."  34 

Discussions  of  continental  unity  were  not  confined  to  the 
United  States.  In  1810,  in  the  Politico-Christian  Catechism  of 
the  Chilean,  Martinez  de  Rozas,  it  was  proposed  that  local  gov- 
ernments be  set  up  in  the  different  Spanish  provinces  of  Amer- 
ica and  that  through  a  national  representation,  which  should 
reside  at  some  point  to  be  agreed  upon,  "  a  single  nation  and  a 
single  state  "  should  be  formed.85  Somewhat  later  in  the  same 

as  Moore,  Henry  Clay  and  Pan-Americanism  (Col.  Univ.  Quar.,  Sept., 
1915),  348-350.  Annals  of  the  Congress  of  the  U.  8.,  15th  Cong.,  1st  Seas., 
1482. 

34  Moore,  Henry  Clay  and  Pan-Americanism,  351.  Annals  of  the  Con- 
gress of  the  U.  8.,  16th  Cong.,  1st  Sees.,  2226. 

SB  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  VIII,  185-186. 


EARLY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      283 

year,  Juan  Egana,  noted  in  Chile  as  a  man  of  learning  and  abil- 
ity, submitted  to  the  provisional  government  of  that  province  a 
memorial  in  which  he  set  forth  at  length  a  general  plan  of 
organization  for  the  Spanish  possessions  in  America.  Unwill- 
ing that  the  colonies  should  accept  the  domination  of  France,  he 
recommended  that  an  attempt  be  made  to  organize  them  into  a 
single  nation.  "  It  would  be  desirable,"  said  Egana,  "  for  the 
government  to  write  to  the  rest  of  the  governments  of  America 
(or  to  those  of  the  south  only),  suggesting  that  they  have  their 
deputies  for  the  Cortes  ready,  to  the  end  that  if  Spain  should 
succumb,  they  might  constitute,  at  a  time  and  place  agreed  upon, 
a  provisional  congress  in  which  the  form  of  union  and  the  re- 
lations of  the  provinces  to  the  general  congress  might  be  deter- 
mined. Otherwise,  America,  torn  by  a  thousand  civil  dissen- 
sions, will  disintegrate  and  become  the  prey  of  foreigners."  36 

That  the  Chilean  projects  for  federation  came  to  nothing  is 
easily  explained.  In  the  first  place  Chile  occupied  a  remote 
situation  in  the  continent  and  communication  with  the  other 
sections  was  slow  and  extremely  difficult.  Secondly,  Peru,  the 
contiguous  province  on  the  north,  was  loyal  to  the  Regency  and 
being  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  viceroy  afforded  a 
soil  none  too  favorable  for  the  growth  of  revolutionary  ideas. 
And  finally  Buenos  Aires,  whose  cooperation  would  have  been 
highly  desirable,  proved  to  be  unfriendly  to  the  plan  of  feder- 
ating the  different  parts  of  Spanish  America  into  one  nation. 

At  the  time  the  proposals  of  Rozas  and  Egana  were  made, 
Buenos  Aires  had  become  practically  independent  of  Spain,  the 
viceroy  having  been  deposed  and  a  provisional  government  ad- 
ministered by  a  junta  having  been  set  up  instead.  The  domi- 
nant figure  in  this  junta  was  its  secretary,  Mariano  Moreno,37 

seBarros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  VIII,  241-244.  Egafia's 
memorial  setting  forth  his  plan  is  printed  in  full  in  Alvarez's  La  Diplo- 
matic, de  Chile,  257-262. 

ST  Mariano  Moreno  was  born  in  Buenos  Aires  in  1778.  After  studying 
in  his  native  city,  he  went  at  the  age  of  twelve  years  to  the  university  of 
Charcas,  in  Upper  Peru,  where  he  studied  law.  Returning  to  Buenos 


284       PAN- AMERICANISM :  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

who,  entertaining  certain  imperialistic  designs  which  he  hoped 
to  carry  out  through  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  did  not 
favor  the  plan  of  federating  the  colonies.  "  There  would  be 
nothing  irregular,"  he  wrote  in  the  Buenos  Aires  Gazette,  "  in 
the  cooperation  of  all  the  peoples  of  America  in  the  great  task 
which  the  provinces  have  under  consideration.  But  that  co- 
operation would  be  a  question  of  convention  and  not  of  obliga- 
tion, and  I  believe  that  it  would  be  impolitic  and  harmful  to 
insist  on  the  adoption  of  such  a  convention.  How  would  the 
wills  of  men  who  inhabit  a  continent  where  distances  are  meas- 
ured by  the  thousand  leagues  be  harmonized?  Where  would 
the  great  congress  hold  its  sessions,  and  how  could  it  meet  the 
urgent  demands  of  peoples  from  whom  it  could  receive  news 
only  after  the  lapse  of  three  or  four  months  ?  It  is  chimerical 
to  pretend  that  the  whole  of  Spanish  America  should  constitute 
a  single  state.  .  .  .  How  could  we  conciliate  our  interests  with 
those  of  Mexico?  That  kingdom  would  not  be  content  with 
anything  less  than  holding  these  provinces  in  the  condition  of 
colonies.  But  what  American  would  to-day  allow  himself  to  be 
placed  in  such  a  condition  ?  .  .  .  Every  effort  that  is  aimed 
at  preventing  the  provinces  from  establishing  their  own  politi- 
cal systems  is  meant  to  paralyze  the  enthusiasm  of  the  peoples 
until  the  occasion  presents  to  give  them  a  new  master."  88 

Moreno's  ideas  on  this  subject  have  been  handed  down  as 
a  sort  of  political  legacy  to  succeeding  generations  of  Argentine 
statesmen.  Though  he  died  in  1811,  yet  his  ideas  lived  after 
him.  Thus  Argentina  has  never  favored  any  of  the  schemes 
for  forming  a  political  union  of  American  states,  because  it 
has  always  considered  that  such  combinations  would  be  dan- 
Aires  he  began  the  practice  of  his  profession.  When  the  provisional  govern- 
ment was  established  on  May  25,  1810,  Moreno  was  made  its  secretary 
and  soon  became  its  moving  spirit.  He  died  in  March,  1811,  on  his  way 
to  England.  Cortes,  Diccionario  Biogrdfico  Americano,  328. 

88  Moreno,  Eacritos  politicos  y  economiooa,  297.     Antokoletz,  Hiatoire  de 
la  Diplomatic  Argentine,  105,  108. 


EAKLY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      285 

gerous  to  national  autonomy.  When,  therefore,  Chile  proposed 
in  1810  the  convocation  of  a  general  congress  the  Argentine 
junta  replied  that  the  idea  was  wholly  impracticable  and  sug- 
gested that  an  alliance  of  the  two  countries  would  be  preferable. 
Later  the  attitude  of  the  United  Provinces  toward  the  congress 
of  Panama  and  toward  the  attempts  which  were  afterwards 
made  to  bring  about  the  desired  confederation,  had  its  inspira- 
tion in  this  political  legacy  of  Mariano  Moreno.39  This,  per- 
haps, is  a  sufficient  explanation  of  Argentina's  historic  attitude 
toward  the  unification  of  American  states ;  but  if  an  additional 
motive  were  sought  it  would  no  doubt  be  found  in  the  aspira- 
tions of  Moreno  and  his  successors  for  Argentine  leadership. 
Of  this  more  will  be  said  in  subsequent  chapters. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  political  aims  which  prevented 
the  United  Provinces  from  joining  in  the  early  attempts  to  bring 
about  a  political  union  of  the  different  nations  of  the  continent, 
nothing  stood  in  the  way  of  their  contributing  to  the  general 
good  in  the  struggle  for  independence.  As  has  already  been 
noted,  the  Argentine  general,  San  Martin,  led  an  army  across 
the  Andes  and  clinched  the  independence  of  Chile;  he  it  was 
who  struck,  with  an  army  composed  in  good  part  of  his  fellow 
countrymen,  the  first  great  blow  for  independence  in  Peru ;  and 
Argentine  officers  and  soldiers  continued  to  play  an  important 
part  in  the  struggle  against  the  enemy  wherever  he  appeared, 
from  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  to  the  equator,  until  his  power  of 
resistance  was  at  last  destroyed  at  Ayacucho.  This  sort  of  co- 
operation was  not,  however,  unusual.  On  the  battlefields  of 
Peru,  men  of  Colombia,  Peru,  Chile,  and  the  United  Provinces 
fought  side  by  side ;  and,  but  for  the  difficulties  of  communica- 
tion, their  brothers  of  Mexico  and  Central  America  would 
surely  have  been  found  on  those  same  battlefields.  While  the 
struggle  lasted,  in  fact,  there  was  a  strong  tendency  toward  con- 
tinental unity  and  correspondingly  little  inclination  toward  the 

3»  Antokoletz,  Histoire  de  la  Diplomatic  Argentine,  109-112. 


286       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

intense  spirit  of  nationalism  which  developed  rapidly  enough 
as  soon  as  independence  appeared  to  be  reasonably  well  estab- 
lished. 

The  views  of  Bolivar  must  next  be  considered.  At  what 
point  in  his  career  he  first  conceived  the  idea  of  a  union  of 
American  nations  is  not  known.  His  first  definite  utterance 
on  the  subject  is  found  in  his  famous  "  prophetic  "  letter  of  Sep- 
tember 6,  1815,  cited  in  a  previous  chapter.  It  is  evident,  how- 
ever, from  the  thoroughgoing  manner  in  which  he  dealt  with 
the  problems  of  political  organization  on  that  occasion,  that 
he  had  given  it  mature  consideration,  possibly  over  a  period  of 
several  years.  Indeed,  the  idea  of  a  great  confederation  had 
been  suggested  in  Venezuela  as  early  as  April,  1810,  when  a 
circular  sent  out  by  the  recently  constituted  provisional  govern- 
ment of  that  province  brought  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the 
authorities  of  the  other  Spanish  American  capitals.  "  The  pa- 
triots of  Caracas,"  it  was  declared,  "  ought  to  have  imitators 
among  all  those  inhabitants  of  America  in  whom  the  long-con- 
tinued habit  of  slavery  has  not  deadened  the  moral  sense;  and 
their  resolution  ought  to  be  applauded  by  all  those  who  esteem 
virtue  and  enlightened  patriotism.  Your  body  affords  the  most 
appropriate  organ  for  spreading  these  ideas  among  the  people 
over  whom  you  preside  and  for  arousing  their  interest  and  ac- 
tivity in  the  promotion  of  the  great  work  of  the  confederation 
of  Spanish  America."  40 

Although  Bolivar  was  not  a  member  of  the  junta  which  was 
the  author  of  the  circular,  yet  he  had  already  begun  to  play  an 
important  part  in  the  affairs  of  the  province  and  it  is  not  likely 
that  the  suggestion  escaped  his  attention.  Moreover,  when  he 
was  sent  later  in  the  same  year  with  Lopez  Mendez  and  Bello 
on  a  mission  to  England,  he  received  instructions  marked  by 
such  expressions  as  the  following :  "  Veneziiela  will  always  ad- 
here to  the  general  interests  of  America  and  will  be  ready  to 

4°  Blanco-Azpurfia,  Docvmentoa,  II,  408;  Mancini,  Bolivar  et  Emancipa- 
tion des  Colonies  Espagnoles,  209. 


EARLY  PKOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      287 

enter  into  intimate  union  with  all  those  who  escape  the  domina- 
tion of  France.  .  .  .  Venezuela  will  gladly  abide  by  the  vote 
of  the  free  parts  of  the  Spanish  Empire."  41  If  to  these  cir- 
cumstances be  added  the  fact  that,  upon  the  arrival  of  the  mis- 
sion in  London,  Bolivar  became  associated  with  Miranda  in 
the  prosecution  of  plans  which  were,  as  has  been  indicated  above, 
continental  in  scope,  it  may  be  deduced  that  the  plans  of  the 
future  Liberator  for  forming  a  union  of  American  states  had 
thus  early  begun  to  take  shape. 

What  his  views  were  three  years  later  scarcely  admits  of 
question.  After  the  final  collapse  of  Miranda's  revolutionary 
enterprises  in  1812,  Bolivar  continued  the  struggle,  and  during 
the  following  year  won  notable  successes  in  New  Granada  and 
Venezuela.  It  was  as  a  result  of  these  victories  that  he  was 
given  the  title  of  Liberator.  During  this  period  he  exercised, 
by  common  consent,  dictatorial  authority  over  the  part  of  the 
country  recovered  from  the  enemy.  He  was  assisted  in  his 
administration  of  the  government  by  three  secretaries,  one  of 
whom,  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Eelations,  made  a  report,  dated 
December  31,  1813,  in  which  some  remarkable  views  on  foreign 
policy  are  set  forth.  These  views,  Larrazabal,  one  of  Bolivar's 
biographers,  considers  as  the  Liberator's  own,  rather  than  those 
of  his  secretary.42  In  boldness  of  conception  and  in  broad  com- 
prehension of  world  politics,  they  are  typical  of  the  productions 
of  Bolivar's  fertile  mind.  The  following  quotations  from  the 
report  are  given,  therefore,  in  confidence  that  they  represent 
the  views  of  the  chief  of  the  state  and  not  merely  those  of  the 
secretary  who  formulated  them. 

"  With  respect  to  New  Granada,  the  policy  of  your  Excel- 
lency has  been  not  solely  to  bring  about  a  closer  alliance  be- 
tween that  region  and  Venezuela.  Your  aim  has  been  rather 
to  fuse  the  two  into  a  single  nation.  Considerations  of  the 
greatest  importance  make  this  measure  indispensable.  The  in- 

4i  Mancini,  Bolivar  et  V Emancipation  des  Colonies  Espagnoles,  312-314. 
*2  Larrazabal,  Vida  del  Libertador,  Simdn  Bolivar,  I,  250. 


288       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

terest  of  New  Granada,  our  own  interest,  and  the  clearly  ex- 
pressed ideas  of  other  cabinets  urge  your  Excellency  to  take 
this  step  without  delay.  Our  strength  will  be  born  of  this 
union.  The  enemies  of  the  American  cause  will  tremble  before 
so  formidable  a  force,  united  to  resist  them  on  every  hand. 
.  .  .  Why  should  there  not  exist  a  close  union  between  New 
Granada  and  Venezuela  ?  Not  only  so,  but  why  should  not  the 
whole  of  South  America  unite  under  a  single  central  govern- 
ment? The  lessons  of  experience  should  not  be  lost  to  us. 
The  spectacle  which  Europe  offers  of  drenching  itself  in  blood 
to  reestablish  an  equilibrium  which  is  constantly  being  dis- 
turbed, should  correct  our  policy  and  save  it  from  that  sanguin- 
ary result.  .  .  .  We  are,  happily,  so  situated  at  present  as  to  be 
able  to  give  to  our  policy,  without  hindrance,  the  direction  which 
we  may  consider  most  advantageous.  Victorious  in  the  eyes 
of  all  America,  the  admiration  and  hope  of  all  your  fellow  citi- 
zens, your  Excellency  is  most  competent  to  unite  the  desires  of 
the  southern  regions,  to  undertake  at  once  the  formation  of  the 
great  American  nation  and  to  preserve  it  from  the  evils  which 
the  European  system  has  brought  upon  the  nations  of  the  Old 
World. 

"  In  addition  to  the  continental  balance,  which  Europe  seeks 
where,  apparently,  it  is  least  to  be  found  —  in  the  midst  of  war 
and  upheavals  —  there  is,  Sir,  another  balance  which  is  the  one 
of  importance  to  us :  the  balance  of  the  world.  The  ambition 
of  European  powers  imposes  the  yoke  of  slavery  upon  the  other 
parts  of  the  world,  and  these  all  ought  to  make  an  effort  to  es- 
tablish the  balance  between  themselves  and  Europe,  with  a  view 
to  destroy  the  preponderance  of  that  part  of  the  world.  I  call 
this  the  balance  of  the  world  and  it  should  enter  into  the  calcu- 
lations of  American  policy. 

"  It  is  necessary  that  the  force  of  our  nation  be  capable  of  re- 
sisting successfully  the  aggressions  which  the  ambition  of 
Europe  might  attempt ;  and  this  powerful  Colossus  which  should 
oppose  that  other  Colossus,  cannot  be  formed  except  by  the 


EAKLY  PKOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      289 

union  of  all  South  America  in  one  nation,  so  that  one  govern- 
ment may  apply  all  its  enormous  resources  to  the  single  end  of 
resisting  foreign  aggression,  and,  multiplying  mutual  coopera- 
tion among  the  individual  members  of  the  union,  elevate  us  to 
the  pinnacle  of  power  and  prosperity."  43 

In  his  letter  of  September  6,  1815,  Bolivar  discussed  at  some 
length  the  general  political  situation  in  the  different  sections  of 
Spanish  America,  pointing  out  the  difficulties  that  had  been 
encountered  in  the  struggle  for  freedom,  and  in  the  establish- 
ment of  stable  national  governments.  Declaring  that  the 
consolidation  of  the  vast  territory  of  the  former  Spanish 
colonies  into  a  single  monarchy  would  be  extremely  difficult, 
and  into  a  republic  of  like  dimensions  impossible,  he  yet  con- 
sidered it  feasible  to  associate  these  widely  separated  units  into 
some  sort  of  political  union.  "  The  consolidation  of  the  New 
World,"  he  declared,  "  into  a  single  nation  with  a  single  bond 
uniting  all  its  parts  is  a  grand  conception.  Since  the  different 
parts  have  the  same  language,  customs,  and  religion,  they  ought 
to  be  confederated  into  a  single  state;  but  this  is  not  possible, 
because  differences  of  climate,  diverse  conditions,  opposing  in- 
terests, and  dissimilar  characteristics  divide  America.  How 
beautiful  it  would  be  if  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  should  become 
for  us  what  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth  was  for  the  Greeks !  Would 
to  God  that  we  may  have  the  fortune  some  day  of  holding  there 
some  august  congress  of  the  representatives  of  the  republics, 
kingdoms,  and  empires  of  America,  to  deliberate  upon  the  high 
interests  of  peace  and  of  war  not  only  between  the  American 
nations,  but  between  them  and  the  rest  of  the  globe."  44 

The  next  reference  which  occurs  in  Bolivar's  writings  on  the 
subject  of  a  political  union  of  American  states  is  found  in  a 
letter  dated  June  12,  1818,  to  Pueyrredon,  Supreme  Director 

43  Larrazabal,  Vida  del  Libertador,  I,  250-251. 

4*  Moore,   Henry   Clay   and  Pan- Americanism,   348;    Cartas   de   Bolivar, 
Sociedad  de  Edicidnes,  145-50. 


290       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

of  the  United  Provinces  of  Eio  de  la  Plata.  In  this  letter,  Boli- 
var, in  reciprocating  the  expressions  of  friendship  contained  in 
a  communication  previously  received  from  Pueyrredon,  made 
the  following  interesting  declarations :  "  Your  Excellency  may 
assure  your  compatriots  that  they  will  be  received  and  treated 
here  not  only  as  members  of  a  friendly  republic,  but  even  as 
citizens  of  Venezuela.  We  Americans  should  have  but  a  single 
country,  since  in  every  other  way  we  have  been  perfectly  united. 
.  .  .  When  Venezuela's  triumphant  arms  shall  have  com- 
pleted the  work  of  independence,  or  when  favorable  circum- 
stances allow  us  more  frequent  communication  and  make  pos- 
sible more  intimate  relations,  we,  for  our  part,  shall  hasten  with 
the  most  lively  interest  to  establish  the  American  compact, 
which,  forming  all  our  republics  into  a  single  body  politic,  will 
present  America  to  the  world  in  an  aspect  of  majesty  and 
grandeur  unexampled  among  the  nations  of  antiquity.  Amer- 
ica thus  united,  if  Heaven  grant  our  desire,  may  be  called  the 
queen  of  nations  and  the  mother  of  republics.  I  hope  that 
Rio  de  la  Plata  will  cooperate  with  its  powerful  influence  in 
perfecting  the  political  edifice  whose  corner  stone  was  laid  the 
day  on  which  we  first  struck  for  freedom."  45 

These  ideas  were  expressed  at  a  time  when  there  could  have 
been  little  hope  of  carrying  them  immediately  into  execution; 
for  the  Patriots,  having  met  with  reverses  on  every  hand,  had 
only  begun  to  achieve  the  victories  which  were  to  fix  their 
destiny.  By  the  middle  of  the  year  1822,  however,  things  had 
changed.  The  republic  of  Colombia  had  come  into  existence; 
Mexico  had  been  proclaimed  an  empire ;  a  part  of  Peru  had  been 
rendered  independent ;  and  the  position  of  the  United  Provinces 
of  Rio  de  la  Plata  and  of  Chile  had  become  more  secure.  Al- 
though independence  was  now  well  enough  established  and  the 
governments  were  well  enough  organized  to  allow  the  separate 
units  to  feel  a  degree  of  security,  yet  prudence  seemed  to  coun- 
sel the  formation  of  some  sort  of  league  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 

4»  Blanco- Azpurfia,  Documentoa,  VI,  402. 


EARLY  PEOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      291 

senting  a  united  front  to  the  internal  and  external  dangers 
which  were  recognized  as  common  to  all.  Accordingly,  Colom- 
bia, at  the  instance  of  Bolivar,  took  the  lead,  and  adopting  cer- 
tain preliminary  articles  as  the  basis  of  what  was  to  be  a  "  new 
federal  system  "  dispatched  envoys  to  negotiate  treaties  with 
the  Spanish  American  governments.46 

Joaquin  Mosquera,  the  agent  sent  to  negotiate  with  the  gov- 
ernments of  Peru,  Chile,  and  Buenos  Aires,  received  instruc- 
tions in  part  as  follows : 

"  Nothing  is  of  so  much  interest  at  the  present  moment  as 
the  formation  of  a  league  truly  American.  But  this  confedera- 
tion ought  not  to  rest  merely  upon  the  foundation  of  an  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance;  it  ought  to  be  more  intimate  than  the 
one  which  has  been  lately  formed  in  Europe  against  the  liberty 
of  peoples.  It  is  necessary  that  ours  should  be  a  society  of 
brother  nations,  for  the  present  separated  and  in  the  exercise 
of  their  sovereignty  through  the  course  of  human  events,  but 

46  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXVIII,  120,  537. 

In  a  report  which  Pedro  Gual,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  made  to 
the  Congress  of  Colombia  on  April  17,  1823,  the  bases  were  stated  to  be  as 
follows : 

I.  "  That  the  American  states  be  forever  in  alliance  and  confederation, 
in  peace  and  war,  for  the  consolidation  of  the  liberty  and  independence, 
guaranteeing  to  each  other  the  integrity  of  their  respective  territories. 

II.  "  That  in  order  to  render  this  guaranty  effective,  the  uti  possidetis  of 
1810,  according  to  the  demarkation  of  territory  of  each  captain-generalship 
or  viceroyalty,  erected  into  a  sovereign  state,  be  taken  as  the  rule. 

III.  "That,  with  respect  to  the  personal  rights,  trade,  and  navigation 
of  each  state,  their  citizens  and  subjects  shall  enjoy,  indiscriminately,  in 
their  persons,  properties,  and  foreign  and  domestic  traffic,  the  same  privi- 
leges and  prerogatives  as  the  natives  of  the  country  in  which  they  reside, 
whether  domiciled  or  transient. 

IV.  "That,  in  order  to  consummate  this  compact  of  perpetual  alliance 
and  confederation,  a  meeting  be  held  in  Panama,  of  two  plenipotentiaries 
from  each  of  the  contracting  parties,  which  might  serve  as  a  point  of 
contact  in  times  of  common  danger,  be  the  faithful  interpreter  of  their 
public  treaties,  when  difficulties  occur,  and  judges,  arbiters,  and  concilia- 
tors, in  their  disputes  and  differences. 

V.  "  That  this  treaty  of  perpetual  alliance  and  confederation  shall  not 
interfere,  in  any  way,  with  the  exercise  of  sovereignty  of  each  and  all  of 
the  contracting  parties,  with  respect  to  their  relations  with  other  inde- 
pendent powers."    British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  X,  743. 


292       PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

united,  strong,  and  powerful  to  resist  the  aggressions  of  the 
foreigner.  It  is  indispensable  that  you  should  constantly  in- 
sist upon  the  necessity  of  laying  at  once  the  foundations  of  an 
Amphictyonic  body  or  assembly  of  plenipotentiaries,  which  shall 
promote  the  common  interests  of  the  American  states,  which 
shall  settle  the  difficulties  which  may  arise  in  the  future  between 
peoples  who  have  the  same  manners  and  customs  and  who,  for 
the  lack  of  some  such  sacred  institution,  might  perchance  be- 
come involved  in  the  desolating  wars  which  have  afflicted  other 
less  fortunate  regions.  The  government  and  the  people  of  Co- 
lombia are  strongly  disposed  to  cooperate  in  so  praiseworthy  an 
object  and  will  immediately  send  one  or  more  plenipotentiaries 
to  the  place  that  may  be  designated,  provided  the  other  Amer- 
ican states  agree  to  the  plan.  Then  we  should  be  able  to  deter- 
mine definitely  the  functions  of  this  truly  august  assembly."  47 

On  July  6,  1822,  two  treaties  between  the  republic  of  Co- 
lombia and  the  state  of  Peru  were  concluded  at  Lima.  One  of 
these  was  a  general  treaty  of  perpetual  union,  league,  and  con- 
federation, and  the  other  a  special  convention,  relating  to  a 
meeting  of  plenipotentiaries,  for  which  a  provision  had  been 
made  in  the  former  instrument.  An  examination  of  these 
treaties  is  essential  to  a  proper  understanding  of  the  subject  un- 
der consideration.  The  following  articles  of  the  general  treaty 
are  quoted  in  full. 

1.  "  The  republic  of  Colombia  and  the  state  of  Peru  do 
unite,  league,  and  confederate,  from  this  time  forward  for  ever 
more,  in  peace  and  war,  to  sustain  with  their  influence,  and 
forces  by  sea  and  land,  as  far  as  circumstances  may  permit, 
their  independence  of  the  Spanish  nation,  and  of  every  other 
foreign  dominion;  and  to  secure,  after  the  recognition  of  their 
independence,  mutual  prosperity,  perfect  harmony,  and  good 
understanding  between  their  peoples,  subjects,  and  citizens,  as 
well  as  with  such  other  powers  as  may  enter  into  relations  with 
them. 

47  Zubieta,  Congress  de  PanamA  y  Taoubaya,  19. 


EARLY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      293 

2.  "  With  this  view,  the  republic  of  Colombia  and  the  state 
of  Peru  do  voluntarily  engage  in,  and  contract  with  each  other, 
a  perpetual  treaty  of  intimate  alliance  and  firm  and  lasting 
friendship  for  their  common  defense,  the  security  of  their  inde- 
pendence and  liberty,  their  mutual  and  general  good,  and  for 
their  internal  tranquillity;  binding  themselves  to  succor  each 
other  and  to  repel,  in  common,  any  attack  or  invasion  that  may 
threaten  their  political  existence. 

3.  "  In  cases  of  sudden  invasion,  both  parties  may  engage  in 
war  in  the  territories  of  either  party,  should  the  exigency  of  the 
moment  not  afford  time  to  communicate  with  the  government  to 
which  the  invaded  territory  may  belong.     But  the  party  thus 
acting  shall  observe  and  cause  to  be  observed,  the  statutes,  ordi- 
nances, and  laws  of  the  invaded  state,  as  far  as  circumstances 
may  permit,  and  shall  cause  its  government  to  be  respected  and 
obeyed.     The  expenses  that  may  be  incurred  in  these  operations 
shall  be  arranged  by  separate  conventions,  and  shall  be  settled 
within  one  year  after  the  present  war. 

4.  "  In  order  to  perpetuate  and  secure,  in  the  best  possible 
manner,  a  lasting  friendship  and  good  understanding  between 
both  states,  the  citizens  of  Colombia  and  Peru  shall  enjoy  the 
rights  and  prerogatives  which  belong  to  native-born  citizens  of 
either  territory :  that  is  to  say,  Colombians  shall  be  considered 
in  Peru  as  Peruvians,  and  the  latter  in  the  republic  as  Colom- 
bians; without  prejudice,  however,  to  the  amplifications  or  re- 
strictions which  the  legislative  power  of  both  states  may  have 
made,  or  may  think  fit  to  make,  regarding  the  qualifications 
necessary  in  order  to  exercise  the  chief  magistracies ;  but  in  or- 
der to  enjoy  the  other  active  and  passive  rights  of  citizens,  it 
is  sufficient  that  they  establish  their  residence  in  the  state  to 
which  they  prefer  to  belong. 

5.  "  The  subjects  and  citizens  of  both  states  shall  have  full 
egress  and  ingress  in  their  respective  ports  and  territories ;  and 
shall  enjoy  in  them  all  the  civil  rights  and  privileges  of  trade 
and  commerce:  being  liable  only  to  such  duties,  imposts,  and 


294       PAN-AMEBICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

restrictions  as  the  subjects  and  citizens  of  each  of  the  contract- 
ing parties  are  liable." 

Article  6  relates  to  the  payment  of  duties  on  importation,  ex- 
portation, anchorage,  and  tonnage,  under  the  general  principle 
laid  down  in  the  preceding  article ;  article  7  provides  that  succor 
be  given  to  ships  of  war  and  merchantmen  entering  the  ports  of 
the  respective  states,  in  distress ;  article  8  extends  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  maritime  courts  of  justice  of  the  contracting  parties 
to  all  privateers  of  either  state  and  to  their  prizes ;  article  9  pro- 
vides for  the  settlement  of  boundaries  by  a  special  convention ; 
article  10  binds  both  parties  to  make  common  cause  against 
the  internal  enemies  of  their  respective  governments,  "  lawfully 
established  by  the  voice  of  the  people";  article  11  provides 
for  the  extradition  of  persons  guilty  of  treason,  sedition,  or 
other  grave  crime,  including  desertion  from  the  army  and  navy ; 
and  finally,  article  12  describes  the  manner  of  ratification.48 

The  essential  articles  of  the  special  treaty  are  as  follows: 

1.  "  In  order  to  draw  closer  the  bonds  which  should  in  fu- 
ture unite  both  states,  and  to  remove  any  difficulties  which  may 
arise,  and  in  any  way  interrupt  their  harmony  and  good  under- 
standing, a  meeting  shall  be  held,  composed  of  two  plenipo- 
tentiaries on  each  side,  in  like  manner,  and  with  the  same 
formalities,  as  are  observed  according  to  established  usage,  in 
the  nomination  of  ministers  of  similar  rank  to  the  governments 
of  foreign  powers. 

2.  "  Both  parties  oblige  themselves  to  interpose  their  good 
offices  with  the  other  states  of  America,  formerly  belonging  to 
Spain,  to  induce  them  to  enter  into  this  treaty  of  perpetual 
union,  league,  and  confederation. 

3.  "  As  soon  as  this  grand  and  important  object  shall  be  at- 
tained, there  shall  be  assembled  a  general  meeting  of  American 
states,  composed  of  their  respective  plenipotentiaries,  instructed 

48  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XI,  105-112. 
Blanco-Azpurtia,  Documentos,  VIII,  453-455. 
With  reference  to  article  10  see  infra,  p.  300. 


EAELY  PKOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      295 

to  lay  the  most  solid  foundation  for,  and  to  establish  the  inti- 
mate relations  which  ought  to  subsist  between  all  and  each  of 
them ;  and  that  may  serve  them  as  counsel  in  great  emergencies, 
as  a  point  of  union  in  cases  of  common  danger,  as  a  faithful 
interpreter  of  their  public  treaties  should  difficulties  arise,  and 
as  a  judicial  reference  and  mediator  in  their  disputes  and  differ- 
ences. 

4.  "  The  Isthmus  of  Panama  being  an  integral  part  of  the 
republic  of  Colombia,  and  the  best  adapted  for  this  august  meet- 
ing, this  republic  pledges  itself  cheerfully  to  furnish  all  the 
aid  which  hospitality  demands  among  friendly  nations,  and  to 
observe  a  sacred  and  inviolable  regard  toward  the  persons  of 
the  plenipotentiaries  who  may  there  form  the  Assembly  of 
American  States. 

5.  "  The  state  of  Peru  binds  itself  to  the  like  obligations, 
should  the  events  of  the  war,  or  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the 
American  states,  cause  the  before-named  meeting  to  be  held 
in  its  territories,  in  the  same  manner  that  the  republic  of  Co- 
lombia has  engaged  to  do  by  the  preceding  article ;  as  well  with 
regard  to  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  as  to  any  other  part  of  its 
jurisdiction,  which  on  account  of  its  .central  position  between 
the  northern  and  southern  states  of  America  formerly  belong- 
ing to  Spain,  may  be  deemed  convenient  for  this  most  important 
purpose. 

6.  "  This  treaty  of  perpetual  union,  league,  and  confedera- 
tion shall  not  in  any  wise  interrupt  the  exercise  of  the  national 
sovereignty  of  each  of  the  contracting  parties,  as  far  as  relates 
to  their  laws,  and  the  form  and  establishment  of  their  respective 
governments,  as  well  as  to  their  relations  with  foreign  powers. 
But  they  bind  themselves,  expressly  and  irrevocably,  not  to 
accede  to  any  demands  in  the  nature  of  tributes  or  exactions 
which  either  the  Spanish  Government  may  propose  on  account 
of  the  loss  of  its  dominion  over  these  countries,  or  which  any 
other  nation  may  prefer  in  the  name,  or  as  a  representative,  of 
that  government ;  nor  to  negotiate  any  treaty,  either  with  Spain 


296       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

or  any  other  nation,  in  prejudice  or  depreciation  of  this  inde- 
pendence; sustaining  everywhere  and  on  all  occasions  their 
reciprocal  interests,  with  the  energy  and  dignity  of  free,  inde- 
pendent, friendly,  brotherly,  and  confederated  nations. 

7.  "  The  republic  of  Colombia  especially  binds  itself  to  keep 
on  foot  a  force  of  four  thousand  men,  armed  and  equipped,  for 
the  ends  stated  in  the  foregoing  articles.     Its  national  navy, 
whatever  it  may  be,  shall  likewise  be  employed  in  such  manner 
as  to  give  effect  to  the  above  stipulations. 

8.  "  The  state  of  Peru  shall  likewise  assist  with  its  maritime 
forces,  whatever  they  may  be,  and  with  a  like  number  of  troops 
as  the  republic  of  Colombia."  49 

These  treaties  were  ratified  by  Peru  on  July  15,  1822,  and 
by  Colombia  on  July  12,  1823.  Colombia,  however,  in  ratify- 
ing the  general  treaty  made  exception  of  the  words  "  and  for 
their  internal  tranquillity,"  in  the  second  article;  rejected  the 
whole  of  article  10;  and  of  article  11  accepted  only  the  part 
relating  to  deserters  from  the  army  or  navy.  The  other  treaty 
was  ratified  without  change.50 

The  Colombian  envoy,  in  compliance  with  his  instructions, 
proceeded  southward  to  arrange  similar  conventions  with  Chile 
and  the  United  Provinces.  With  the  former  he  signed,  on 
October  21,  1822,  a  treaty  embodying  the  principal  provisions 
of  the  treaties  of  July  6  between  Colombia  and  Peru.  This  in- 
strument, however,  was  never  ratified  by  the  government  of 
Chile,  the  failure  being  due,  perhaps,  more  to  the  disorganized 
condition  of  the  country  than  to  indifference  or  hostility  to  the 
plan  of  union,  the  realization  of  which  was  the  main  purpose 
of  the  treaty.51  Passing  to  Buenos  Aires,  Mosquera  entered 
into  negotiations  with  the  government  of  that  province.  True 

« British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XI,  115-120;  Blanco-Azpurfia, 
Documentor,  VIII,  456-457. 

»oOdriozola,  Documentos  Histdricos  del  Pert,  V,  161,  165;  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XI,  114,  121. 

si  Barroa  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XIII,  691-693;  British  and 
Foreign  State  Papers,  XI,  213-225. 


EARLY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      297 

to  the  policy  of  Mariano  Moreno,  Buenos  Aires  declined  to  be- 
come a  party  to  the  proposed  confederation.  Accordingly  the 
representatives  of  the  two  governments  —  Rivadavia  acting  for 
Buenos  Aires  —  omitting  all  reference  to  an  assembly  of  pleni- 
potentiaries, signed,  on  March  8,  1823,  a  brief  treaty  of  friend- 
ship and  alliance,  which  was  ratified  by  Buenos  Aires  on  June 
10  following,  and  by  Colombia  exactly  a  year  later.52 

The  government  of  the  United  States  received,  through  its 
agents,  information  regarding  these  negotiations.  Todd  had 
sent  communications  on  the  subject  from  Bogota ;  Prevost  had 
written  from  Peru,  and  Forbes  from  Buenos  Aires.  Secretary 
Adams,  in  giving  instructions,  on  May  27,  1823,  to  Anderson, 
the  first  United  States  minister  to  Colombia,  declared  that  Pre- 
vost, as  well  as  Gual,  the  Colombian  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, entertained  higher  expectations  of  the  success  of  the  ne- 
gotiation at  Buenos  Aires  than  Mr.  Forbes ;  that  Prevost  thought 
that  it  must  succeed,  although  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires 
was  secretly  averse  to  it,  as  it  was  implicated  in  secret  intrigues 
with  the  Portuguese  Government  and  General  Le  Cor,  for  a 
confederacy  of  a  different  character;  that  Gual  told  Todd  that 
proposals  had  been  made  by  the  Portuguese  Government  at  Lis- 
bon, to  Colombia,  for  a  general  confederacy  of  all  America, 
north  and  south,  together  with  the  constitutional  governments 
of  Portugal  and  Spain  as  a  counterpoise  to  the  European  Holy 
Alliance,  but  that  the  proposals  had  been  rejected  on  account 
of  their  European  aspect.  Adams  added  that  loose  and  indefi- 
nite projects  of  the  same  kind  had  been  presented  by  the  Portu- 
guese Government  to  the  United  States,  but  that  they  had  never 
been  considered  even  as  objects  of  deliberation.53 

A  treaty  of  perpetual  union,  league,  and  confederation,  em- 
bodying in  substance  the  main  provisions  of  the  treaties  of 

52  Mitre,  Historia  de  San  Martin,  IV,  57 ;  Registro  Oficial  de  la  Republica 
Argentina,  II,  38;  Blanco- Azpurfia,  Documentos,  IX,  298. 

ss  Register  of  Debates  in  Congress  (1826)  II,  Appendix,  80;  American 
State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  V,  894. 


298       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

July  6,  1822,  was  signed  by  representatives  of  the  governments 
of  Colombia  and  Mexico  on  October  3,  182  3. 54  This  was,  it 
will  be  noted,  some  time  after  the  negotiations  with  Peru,  Chile, 
and  Buenos  Aires  had  been  brought  to  a  close.  The  delay, 
however,  was  not  due  to  design  on  the  part  of  Colombia;  for 
President  Bolivar  appointed  in  October,  1821,  a  minister,  Mi- 
guel Santa  Maria,  to  the  Mexican  Empire,  with  authority  to 
negotiate  a  treaty  in  accordance  with  the  general  plan  of  un- 
ion,55 and  as  this  minister  arrived  in  Mexico  in  April  of  the 
following  year,  the  treaty  might  have  been  concluded  within  a 
very  short  time  thereafter  if  the  course  of  events  in  Mexico  had 
not  prevented.56 

Santa  Maria,  upon  reaching  Vera  Cruz  in  March,  1822,  im- 
mediately wrote  Jose  Manuel  de  Herrera,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  at  Mexico,  of  his  arrival.  In  the  letter  to  Herrera 
the  Colombian  envoy  spoke  of  the  joy  with  which  the  news  of 
Mexican  independence  was  received  in  Colombia  and  of  the 
great  interest  of  his  government  in  extending  and  strengthen- 
ing the  friendly  relations  of  the  two  countries  "  called  by  na- 
ture and  impelled  by  circumstances  to  lend  each  other  assist- 
ance in  a  spirit  of  fraternal  good  will."  He  congratulated  the 
empire  of  Mexico  upon  its  brilliant  military  success,  expressed 
the  most  ardent  wishes  for  its  future  prosperity,  and  finally 
invited  it  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  perpetual  peace,  friendship, 
and  union  with  the  government  of  Colombia.57  Upon  reach- 
ing the  capital,  Santa  Maria  addressed  another  letter  to  Herrera 
with  which  he  sent  a  copy  of  the  constitution  of  Colombia. 
Santa  Maria  declared  that  he  had  been  instructed  to  assure  the 
government  of  Mexico  that  whatever  its  form  the  republic  of 

5*  For  the  treaty  see  La  Diplomatic!,  Mexicana,  I,  243-249,  and  British 
and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XI,  784-792. 

55  Santa  Maria's  letter   of   credence  was   dated   October    10,    1821.     La 
Diplomatia  Mexicana,  I,  239. 

56  La  Diplomatic  Mexicana,  I,  212. 

67  Santa  Maria  to  Herrera,  March  23,  1822,  La  Diplomada  Mexicana, 
I,  8-12. 


EAELY  PEOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      299 

Colombia,  for  its  part,  would  always  have  the  glory  of  con- 
tributing to  the  maintenance  of  the  cause  of  national  independ- 
ence.58 Events  seemed  to  show  that  this  assurance  may  have 
been  intended  to  be  ambiguous.  On  May  11  Santa  Maria  was 
informed  that  the  regency  of  the  empire  recognized  him  as  envoy 
extraordinary  and  minister  plenipotentiary  of  the  republic  of 
Colombia.59  A  few  days  later,  May  19,  Iturbide  was  pro- 
claimed emperor,  after  which  Santa  Maria,  awaiting  instruc- 
tions from  his  government,  declined  to  treat  with  the  new  re- 
gime. What  instructions  he  may  have  received  can  only  be 
inferred  from  the  fact  that  he  soon  became  involved  in  a  con- 
spiracy aimed  at  the  overthrow  of  Iturbide  and  was  dismissed 
by  the  imperial  government.60  Upon  the  downfall  of  the  em- 
pire, Santa  Maria,  who  had  not  yet  left  the  country,  was  re- 
called by  resolution  of  the  congress  "  to  fulfill  in  accordance 
with  the  desires  of  the  Mexican  nation  the  high  duties  of  his 
mission."  61  Under  these  altered  circumstances,  negotiations 
were  begun,  and  the  treaty  having  been  concluded  as  indicated 
above  was  ratified  by  Mexico  on  December  2,  1823,  and  by 
Colombia  on  June  30,  1824.62 

The  treaty,  as  has  already  been  said,  was  substantially  the 
same  as  those  concluded  with  Peru  and  Chile.  But  it  contained 
one  important  article  on  the  subject  of  territorial  integrity 
which  was  not  included  in  the  earlier  conventions  and  which 
indeed  seems  to  have  been  framed  to  meet  a  special  situation. 
In  the  case  of  the  treaty  between  Colombia  and  Peru  the  ques- 
tion of  the  delimitation  of  their  respective  territories  proved 
to  be  the  only  obstacle  to  the  acceptance  by  Peru  of  the  draft 
of  the  treaty  presented  by  Mosquera,  and  as  no  agreement  could 
be  reached  on  that  point  it  was  left  to  be  settled  by  a  special 

ss  Santa  Maria  to  Herrera,  April  16,  1822,  La  Diplomacies  Mexicana,  I,  19. 
59  Minuta  del  Ministro  Herrera,  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  24. 
eo  Herrera  to  Gual,  September  28,  1822;  Herrera  to  Santa  Maria,  October 
18,  1822.     La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  33-35 ;  36. 
si  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  211. 
62  Ibid.,  I,  251,  253. 


300       PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

convention.63  In  the  draft  presented  by  Mosquera  as  a  basis 
of  discussion  with  Chile  two  articles  were  proposed,  one  guar- 
anteeing the  territorial  integrity  of  the  respective  states,  and 
the  other  indicating  specifically  the  boundaries  of  Colombia. 
But  Chile  saw  no  advantage  in  such  an  arrangement  and  con- 
sequently declined  to  subscribe  to  the  articles.64  The  fact  that 
Mexico  accepted  the  proposal  of  a  mutual  guarantee  of  terri- 
torial integrity  may  have  been  in  prevision  of  future  conflicts 
with  the  United  States.65 

The  article  to  which  reference  is  made  is  as  follows:  Arti- 
cle 8.  "  Both  parties  mutually  guarantee  the  integrity  of  their 
territories  on  the  footing  on  which  they  stood  before  the  present 
war,  also  recognizing  as  integral  parts  of  either  nation  every 
province  which  though  formerly  governed  by  an  authority 
entirely  independent  of  the  late  viceroyalties  of  Mexico  and 
New  Granada,  may  have  agreed  or  shall  agree  in  a  lawful  man- 
ner to  become  incorporated  with  it."  66 

63  Paz  Soldan,  Historia  del  Peru  Independiente,  I,  304 ;  Olarte  Camacho, 
Los  Convenios  con  el  Peru,  21-24. 

64  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XIII,  692. 

What  is  believed  to  be  the  Mosquera  draft  is  printed  in  Sesiones  de  los 
Cuerpos  Legislatives  de  la  RepuUica  de  Chile,  1811  d  1845  (VI,  328-330). 
A  translation  of  article  10  of  that  document  follows:  "Both  parties 
mutually  guarantee  the  integrity  of  their  territories  on  the  same  footing 
on  which  they  stood  before  th|  present  war,  the  limits  of  each  captaincy 
general  or  vice  royalty  which  has  reassumed  the  rights  of  sovereignty  being 
accepted,  unless  in  some  lawful  way  two  or  more  may  have  agreed  to  form 
a  single  nation,  as  has  happened  in  the  case  of  the  former  captaincy 
general  of  Venezuela  and  the  new  kingdom  of  Granada,  which  to-day  con- 
stitute the  republic  of  Colombia,"  p.  329. 

65  There  is   reason  for   believing  that   Mexico   had   for   some   time   past 
foreseen   trouble   over   boundary    questions   with    the    United    States.     On 
October  31,  1822,  Zozaya,  the  minister  of  the  empire  to  the  United  States, 
was  instructed  confidentially  to  find  out  the  real  opinion   of  "  those   re- 
publicans "  with  regard  to  their  limits  beyond  Louisiana  and  the  Floridas ; 
to  learn  whether  they  were  content  with  the  last  treaties  with  Spain,  and 
whether  they  had  planned  or  effected  any  establishments  that  might  in  any 
way  prove  prejudicial  to  the  empire.      (La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  I,  85.) 
Moreover  at  the  time  the  treaty  between  Colombia  and  Mexico  was  being 
negotiated   it    was   not   yet   known   what    would    be   the   outcome   of    San 
Salvador's  move  for  annexation  to  the  United  States. 

ee  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XI,  788. 


EARLY  PEOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      301 

At  the  time  the  negotiations  with  Mexico  were  begun  the 
provinces  of  Central  America  constituted  a  part  of  the  empire. 
Upon  the  overthrow  of  Iturbide  those  provinces,  it  will  be  re- 
called, withdrew  and  set  up  an  independent  federal  republic. 
With  this  republic  there  was  concluded  at  Bogota  on  March  15, 
1825,  the  last  of  the  treaties  of  perpetual  union,  league,  and 
confederation.  This  treaty  was  ratified  by  Colombia  on  April 
12  and  by  Central  America  on  September  12,  1825.67 

During  this  period  of  two  or  three  years  of  diplomatic  nego- 
tiation, a  campaign  of  publicity  was  carried  on  with  a  view 
to  the  formation  of  a  public  opinion  favorable  to  the  plan  of 
confederation.  Newspapers  not  infrequently  published  arti- 
cles on  the  subject  and  these  were  widely  copied  throughout  the 
continent.  Pamphlets  were  published  in  both  Europe  and 
America  and  distributed  wherever  it  was  believed  support  might 
be  obtained.  Finally,  private  correspondence  was  employed  to 
gain  adherents  among  the  influential  men  of  the  time.  The 
need  of  propaganda  was  great,  for  indifference  was  great. 
Moreover  the  spirit  of  localism  tended  to  increase  as  the  com- 
mon danger  decreased.  An  idea  of  the  need  for  the  awakening 
of  public  interest  may  be  obtained  from  the  following  extracts 
from  an  article  entitled  Confederation  Americana,  published  in 
El  Patriota  de  Guayaquil  and  copied  by  the  Gaceta  de  Colombia. 
"  We  can  do  no  less,"  declared  the  writer  of  the  article,  "  than 
express  our  surprise,  and  we  might  say  our  despair,  at  seeing 
pass  unnoticed  the  greatest  of  American  acts.  The  Gaceta  de 
Lima  of  September  17,  1822,  published  the  compact  of  per- 
petual union,  league,  and  confederation  between  Colombia  and 
Peru.  Everybody  has  read  this  treaty  with  the  indifference 
with  which  they  might  read  a  pastoral  or  a  pamphlet  such  as 
those  which  constantly  afflict  the  public.  It  seems  that  a  gen- 
eral meeting  of  America  under  a  social  pact  excites  no  interest, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  all  men  of  enlightenment  have 

67  Blanco- Azpurtia,  Documentos,  IX,  717-720;  Bancroft,  History  of  Cen- 
tral America,  III,  81. 


302       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

desired  this  confederation  as  the  means  of  obtaining  the  liberty 
and  salvation  of  America.  And  if  at  last  the  editor  of  La  Abeja 
Argentina  of  Buenos  Aires  has  broken  the  silence  it  has  been 
to  tell  us  in  the  most  absolute  manner  that  the  best  compact  of 
league  and  confederation  that  America  can  make,  is  none  at 
all."  Following  this  rather  disconsolate  introduction  the 
writer  takes  up  in  detail  the  objections  of  the  Argentine  paper 
—  the  great  distances  which  separate  the  parts  to  be  confed- 
erated, the  difference  in  institutions,  the  inability  of  a  con- 
gress of  plenipotentiaries  to  command  obedience  to  its  decrees 
and  the  like  —  and  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that  none  of  these 
obstacles  is  insuperable.  "  For,"  he  declares,  "  in  America  it 
is  a  question  of  unity,  unity,  unity.  .  .  .  From  upper  Cali- 
fornia to  Chile  is  a  single  nation.  One  faith,  one  language, 
one  sentiment,  one  being,  we  may  say,  covers  the  face  of  Amer- 
ica." 68 

If  space  permitted,  extensive  quotations  from  newspaper 
articles  might  be  given.  No  more  can  be  done,  however,  than 
to  mention  some  of  the  principal  discussions  appearing  in  the 
press  of  the  time.  In  a  paper  called  Noticioso  General  de 
Mexico  there  appeared  an  article  in  which  it  was  declared  that 
the  proposed  congress  would  without  sword  or  cannon  destroy 
the  Holy  Alliance  and  that  persecuted  liberty  would  fly  to  the 
protection  of  the  new  league.69  The  Gaceta  del  Gobiemo  of 
Lima,  referring  to  the  entry  of  Simon  Bolivar  in  that  city  on 
September  1,  1823,  avers  that  on  that  occasion  there  was  heard 
in  the  midst  of  general  applause  nothing  but  repeated  expres- 
sions of  good  will  for  the  formation  of  a  permanent  alliance 
between  the  four  great  sections  of  the  continent.70  An  article 

«s  Oaceta  de  Colombia,  June  29,  1823.  The  article  of  La  Abeja  Argentina 
referred  to  was  probably  one  which  appeared  in  the  issue  of  December  15, 
1822  (No.  9,  Tomo  2).  Another  article  entitled  Nueva  Ojeada  sobre  el 
tratado  de  Colombia  y  Lima  appeared  in  the  number  of  La  Abeja  for  Feb- 
ruary 15,  1823. 

«»  Reproduced  in  the  Oaceta  de  Colombia  of  September  21,  1823. 

TO  Qaceta  del  Oobiemo,  September  3,  1823. 


EAKLY  PEOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      303 

in  the  Gaceta  de  Colombia  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
people  of  South  America,  electrified  by  the  idea  of  independence 
and  moved  by  the  noble  desire  of  following  in  the  footsteps 
of  their  "  brothers  of  the  north,"  began  to  form  separate  fed- 
eral governments,  thus  destroying  the  precious  unity  which 
was  the  indestructible  foundation  of  freedom.  The  writer 
recommended  the  formation  of  strong  central  governments  as  a 
prerequisite  to  a  closer  imitation  of  the  sons  of  Washington. 
With  Mexico,  Peru,  Chile,  New  Granada,  and  Buenos  Aires 
forming,  as  before  the  war,  great  independent  states  with  a 
strongly  centralized  administration,  he  thought  that  an  excellent 
federal  system  might  then  be  effected.71  In  July,  1825,  a 
paper  published  in  Cartagena,  the  Correo  de  Magdalena,  taking 
as  a  point  of  departure  a  letter  received  from  Europe  with  news 
that  the  Congress  of  Milan  had  probably  by  that  time  taken 
place,  pointed  out  in  a  lengthy  article  the  contrast  between  the 
two  systems  represented  by  the  Holy  Alliance  and  the  proposed 
American  Confederation.  It  was  the  opinion  of  the  writer  that 
the  assemblies  of  kings,  or,  tyrants  as  he  preferred  to  call  them, 
had  no  other  object  than  the  extinction  of  the  ideas  of  liberty; 
that  the  hopes  of  the  liberals  in  Spain,  in  Naples,  and  in  the 
Piedmont  had  been  frustrated  by  a  league  which  with  un- 
heard-of audacity  was  called  holy;  that  on  the  contrary  the 
proposed  congress  of  plenipotentiaries  at  Panama  had  a  benefi- 
cent design  not  only  toward  America  but  toward  the  rest  of 
the  world  as  well,  and  that  it  aimed  to  hasten  the  epoch  when, 
with  liberty  and  justice  enthroned  in  America,  happiness  and 
prosperity  would  prevail  throughout  the  world.72 

As  the  agitation  of  the  subject  grew  in  Spanish  America,  the 
newspapers  of  the  United  States  became  interested  and  joined 
in  the  discussion.  According  to  the  Gaceta  de  Colombia,  a 
New  York  paper  published  on  January  6,  1825,  extracts  from 
a  Mexican  paper  in  which  the  objects  of  the  confederation  and 
the  nature  of  its  organization  were  set  forth. 

71  Gaceta  de  Colombia,  January  11,  1824. 

72  Correo  de  Magdalena,  July  21,  1825. 


304       PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

The  plan  suggested  was  that  the  congress  be  composed  of 
three  representatives  from  each  state  and  that  it  meet  at  any 
place  in  the  Floridas  that  the  United  States  might  choose  to 
designate.  An  expedition  composed  of  the  combined  forces 
of  the  confederation  —  that  is,  of  the  United  States,  Mexico, 
Colombia,  Buenos  Aires,  Peru,  Chile,  and  Santo  Domingo  — 
would  forthwith  be  fitted  out  against  the  island  of  Cuba.  After- 
ward an  amphictyonic  council  would  be  formed  at  Habana, 
which  in  case  of  emergency  would  name  a  general  to  command 
the  forces  of  the  confederation,  though  the  election  might  be 
left  to  each  of  the  states  by  turn. 

Commenting  on  the  Mexican  proposal,  a  writer  in  the  Gar.eta 
de  Colombia,  described  as  being  one  of  the  highest  officers  of 
state  in  that  republic,  expressed  the  fear  that  a  meeting  of 
American  plenipotentiaries  in  Florida  would  not  fail  to  sug- 
gest objections  arising  from  the  neutrality  of  the  United  States. 
He  believed  that  the  deliberations  could  be  conducted  at  Panama 
with  greater  freedom  and  that  if  their  "  good  and  illustrious 
friends,  the  United  States,"  were  willing  to  contribute,  they 
might  do  so  with  propriety  by  taking  part  in  those  delibera- 
tions which  were  not  of  a  hostile  character.  Having  made  this 
distinction  the  writer  proceeded  to  indicate  in  detail  the  objects 
upon  which  the  congress  might  deliberate.  As  those  objects 
will  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter  they  need  not  be  men- 
tioned here.  A  translation  of  the  article  of  the  Gaceta  de  Co- 
lombia was  published  some  time  later  in  Niles'  Weekly  Register. 
This  paper  regarded  the  congress  as  of  great  importance  and 
believed  that  the  United  States  ought  to  take  part  in  it,  for  the 
time  might  come  when  it  would  be  necessary  to  rally  the  free 
nations  of  the  American  continent  in  opposition  to  "  the  despots 
of  the  other  with  their  herds  of  slaves."  78 

73  The  article  of  the  Oaceta  de  Colombia  referred  to  was  copied  by  the 
Gaceta  del  Gobiemo  (Peru)  in  its  issue  of  May  22,  1825,  and  by  Niles' 
Weekly  Register  of  April  30,  1825.  For  other  articles  in  the  press  of  the 
United  States  see  the  National  Gazette  and  Library  Register  of  Phila- 


EAKLY  PKOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      305 

In  Great  Britain,  interest  in  the  affairs  of  Spanish  and  Portu- 
guese America  had  always  been  keen.  The  English  newspapers 
gave  attention  to  the  project  of  federating  the  new  American 
states  and  opinion  was  generally  favorable  to  the  project.  The 
following  extract  from  a  leading  article  of  the  Times  of  April 
11,  1825,  may  be  taken  as  typical  of  British  opinion  and  of  the 
attitude  of  the  British  public. 

"  It  is  stated  in  accounts  from  the  United  States,"  says  the 
Times,  "  that  after  the  return  of  Bolivar  from  Peru  one  of  his 
first  acts  will  be  to  attend  a  meeting  of  deputies  from  all  the 
new  American  states,  who  are  to  assemble  at  Panama  to  confer 
on  such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  general  safety. 
To  contrast  this  congress  and  the  confederation  which  may 
probably  result  from  it  with  the  Holy  Alliance,  it  is  to  be 
denominated  the  Most  Holy  Alliance.  The  name  may  be  need- 
less or  ill  chosen ;  but  far  different  is  the  thing  which  it  signi- 
fies. The  most  important  and  alluring  event  that  we  can  well 
imagine  to  those  against  whom  it  is  to  operate  must  undoubtedly 
be  a  defensive  league  against  the  unjust  —  of  the  injured  against 
the  aggressors  —  of  free  nations  and  their  magistrates  against 
a  band  of  tyrants,  who  have  none  to  protect  them  but  their  own 
dissatisfied  and  distrusted  slaves.  In  truth,  such  an  union  re- 
quires no  congress  to  sanction  or  attest  it.  The  alliance  of  all 
the  free  against  all  the  enemies  of  freedom  exists  and  flourishes 
at  this  moment,  substantially  and  sensibly  over  the  whole  earth, 
without  any  formal  compact.  .  .  .  The  free  confederacy  which 
was  acted  upon  in  one  shape  by  the  new  republics  when  they 
assisted  each  other  and  extinguished  the  Spanish  power  in  Peru, 
has  not  been  confined  to  the  western  coast  of  the  Atlantic.  It 
embraces  England,  as  distinctly  and  specifically,  as  if  she  had 
been  enrolled  by  positive  treaty  among  its  members.  England 
became  a  member  of  the  league  from  the  moment  in  which  she 
declared  that  no  European  power  but  Spain  (and  Spain  long 

delphia  for  April  23,  1825,  and  the  National  Intelligencer  of  Washington  for 
April  26,  1825. 


306       PAN-AMEBICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

ceased  to  be  a  power),  that  is,  in  fact,  that  no  power  whatever 
should  molest  the  American  republics."  74 

In  France  opinion  on  the  American  question  was  divided, 
the  liberal  element  of  the  population,  as  was  the  case  through- 
out Europe,  sympathizing  with  the  aims  of  the  new  states  and 
desiring  the  government  to  establish  friendly  relations  with 
them.  The  liberal  paper,  Le  Constitutionnel,  was  an  important 
organ  of  propaganda  in  favor  of  the  American  cause.  In  its 
issue  of  March  24,  1825,  there  appeared  an  article  in  which  the 
success  of  the  revolution  in  America  was  described  as  marking 
the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in  the  world's  history.  It  was  the 
opinion  of  the  writer  that  Europe  could  not  reduce  these  coun- 
tries to  submission  and  that  consequently  everything  should  be 
done  to  gain  their  friendship  and  to  secure  a  share  in  their  rich 
commerce.75  But  in  France  a  special  propaganda  in  favor  of 
the  new  states  had  been  carried  on  for  some  time  through  the 
publications  of  the  Abbe  de  Pradt.  In  the  month  of  August, 
1825,  the  abbe  published  in  Paris  a  pamphlet  on  the  proposed 
congress  of  Panama  in  which  the  highest  praise  was  given  to  the 
author  of  the  idea.  De  Pradt  based  his  study  upon  an  official 
announcement  of  the  objects  of  the  congress  which,  he  says,  ap- 
peared in  the  Gaceta  de  Colombia,  and  was  reproduced  some 
four  months  later  by  Le  Moniteur  of  Paris.7®  And  he  may 
have  received  information  direct  from  the  government  of  Co- 
lombia or  from  Bolivar  himself;  for,  with  the  latter,  the  abbe 
had  been  in  correspondence  for  some  time  past.77  It  does  not 
appear  that  De  Pradt  was  commissioned  to  write  the  pamphlet 
on  the  Congress  of  Panama,  but  it  is  known  that  beginning 
with  1825  he  received  from  Bolivar  an  annuity  of  3,000  pesos, 

7*  Supplement  to  The  Times,  April  11,  1825. 

TS  Gaceta  del  Oobierno  (Peru),  September  18,  1825.  For  the  attitude  of 
Le  Conatitutionnel  toward  the  Monroe  Declaration  of  1823  see  Polit.  8ci. 
Quar.,  VI,  555. 

™  Pradt,  Congrts  de  Panama,  4,  92. 

"  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XII,  181-188. 


EARLY  PEOJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      307 

undoubtedly  as  compensation  for  carrying  on  a  general  propa- 
ganda in  favor  of  the  American  cause.78 

That  Bolivar  should  desire  his  project  for  holding  a  congress 
at  Panama  to  be  favorably  regarded  in  Europe  is  not  to  be  ex- 
plained by  mere  vanity  on  his  part,  but  by  the  hard  necessity 
in  which  he  found  himself  of  maintaining  the  credit  of  the  new 
states  until  their  internal  affairs  should  have  reached  some 
degree  of  stability  and  until  their  relations  with  Spain  and  the 
other  powers  should  have  been  placed  on  a  satisfactory  foot- 
ing. It  is  not  unlikely,  therefore,  that  the  highly  eulogistic 
manner  in  which  De  Pradt  refers  to  the  Liberator  in  his  Con- 
gres  de  Panama  was  meant  to  give  popularity  to  the  movement 
by  directing  attention  to  the  man  who  initiated  it.  But  in 
America,  naturally,  the  case  was  different.  It  was  necessary 
to  avoid  bringing  the  prime  mover  too  much  into  view,  for  al- 
ready jealousy  of  his  power  and  suspicion  of  his  designs  had 
begun  to  undermine  his  influence.  In  a  pamphlet  prepared  by 
Bernardo  Monteagudo  and  first  published  in  Peru  in  1825,79 
the  subject  was  treated  in  a  wholly  impersonal  way ;  and  more- 
over the  general  aims  of  the  congress  were  dealt  with  in  the 
main,  rather  than  the  specific  ones  as  was  the  case  in  De  Pradt's 
little  treatise.  Monteagudo' s  ability  and  the  post  of  confidence 
which  he  held  under  the  rule  of  Bolivar  in  Peru  make  it  of 
interest  to  examine  briefly  the  ideas  which  he  advanced  on 
the  subject  of  a  confederation  of  American  states. 

Monteagudo  was  born  about  1787  in  the  viceroyalty  of  La 
Plata,  studied  law  at  Chuquisaca,  was  involved  in  the  early 
revolutionary  movements  in  Upper  Peru,  and  later  took  an  ac- 
tive and  zealous  part  in  the  overthrow  of  Spanish  rule  in  Buenos 

78  Sanchez,  Bibliografia. 

79  Monteagudo,  Bernardo,  Ensayo  sobre  la  necesidad  de  una  federaci6n 
jeneral  entre  los  Estados  Hispano- Americanos  y  plan  de  su  organization 
(Library  of  Congress),  Guatemala  edition.     The  essay  was  reprinted  from 
the  Chilean  edition  in  the  Coleccidn  de  Ensayos  y  Documentos  relatives  a 
la  unidn  y  confederacidn  de  los  pueblos  Hispano- Americanos,  published  in 
Santiago,  Chile,  in  1862, 


308       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Aires.  Compelled  by  intrigue  to  leave  the  country  in  1815, 
he  returned  in  time  to  accompany  the  expedition  of  San  Martin 
to  Chile  in  1817.  Going  with  San  Martin  to  Peru  he  served 
as  that  leader's  chief  political  adviser  and  as  minister  of  war 
and  navy  in  the  provisional  government  which  was  organized 
at  Lima  in  1821.  Shortly  before  San  Martin's  abdication, 
Monteagudo,  who  had  never  been  popular,  was  again  forced 
into  exile.  Upon  the  accession  of  Bolivar  he  returned  and  was 
restored  to  his  former  position  in  the  government.  He  was 
later  made  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  at  which  post  he  re- 
mained until  his  death  by  assassination  in  January,  1825. 
Among  the  papers  which  he  left  was  found  an  essay  in  manu- 
script on  the  necessity  of  a  general  federation  of  the  Spanish 
American  states.  The  essay,  though  unfinished,  was  imme- 
diately printed  at  Lima  and  during  the  same  year  it  was  re- 
printed in  Chile  and  in  Guatemala.80  And  although  the  pam- 
phlet was  not  translated  and  reproduced  in  the  United  States, 
yet  it  was  reviewed  at  length  in  the  North  American  Review  in 
an  article  attributed  to  Jared  Sparks.81 

Independence,  peace,  and  security  (gamniias) ,  according  to 
Monteagudo,  were  the  three  great  interests  of  the  new  states. 
Of  these,  independence  was  the  chief.  To  throw  off  the  yoke 
of  Spain,  to  destroy  the  last  vestige  of  her  domination,  and  to 
admit  no  other  was  an  enterprise  which  demanded,  and  would 
demand  for  a  long  time  to  come,  a  common  fund  of  resources 
and  unity  of  action  in  the  employment  of  them.  There  was 
still  danger  from  the  Holy  Alliance,  and  although  the  first  ves- 
sel that  should  sail  from  the  shores  of  Europe  against  the  lib- 
erty of  the  New  World  would  give  the  signal  of  alarm  to  -all 
those  who  formed  the  liberal  party  in  both  hemispheres,  and 
although  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  would  play  their 
proper  part  in  the  universal  conflict  which  would  result,  yet  the 
dangers  were  such  as  to  demand  that  the  new  states  band  them- 

so  Pax  Soldfin,  Historia  del  Pert  Independiente,  I,  199-202,  313. 
si  North  American  Review,  XXII,  162-176. 


EAKLY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION      309 

selves  together.  "  Human  foresight,"  he  declared,  "  is  unable 
to  predict  the  accidents  and  the  vicissitudes  which  our  republics 
will  suffer  unless  they  unite.  The  consequences  of  an  unfortu- 
nate campaign,  the  effects  of  some  treaty  concluded  in  Europe 
between  powers  that  maintain  the  present  balance,  a  few  do- 
mestic disturbances  and  the  consequent  change  of  principles, 
might  favor  the  party  of  legitimacy,  unless  we  assume  in  time 
an  attitude  of  uniform  resistance ;  and  unless  we  hasten  to  make 
a  real  compact,  which  we  may  call  a  family  compact,  to  guaran- 
tee our  independence,  as  a  whole  and  in  detail."  82 

By  the  second  interest,  peace,  Monteagudo  meant  to  imply 
peace  as  between  the  confederates  and  the  rest  of  the  world, 
peace  as  between  state  and  state  of  the  union,  and  peace  as 
between  factions  within  each  separate  state.83  Without  attrib- 
uting to  the  proposed  assembly  any  power  of  coercion,  which 
would  degrade  its  institution,  it  nevertheless  seemed  indispen- 
sable that,  at  least  for  the  first  ten  years,  the  general  direction 
of  the  foreign  and  domestic  policy  of  the  confederation  should 
be  in  charge  of  such  a  body  in  order  that  the  peace  might  not 
be  disturbed  and  in  order  that  its  conservation  might  not  be 
purchased  at  the  sacrifice  of  the  very  foundations  of  the  Amer- 

82  Coleccion  de  Ensayos  y  Documentos  relatives  d  la  unidn  y  confederacidn 
de  los  Pueblos  Hispano- Americanos,  164-169. 

ss  Article  10  of  the  treaty  of  union,  league,  and  confederation  between 
Colombia  and  Peru  signed  at  Lima,  June  6,  1822,  provided  that  in  case 
the  internal  tranquillity  of  either  of  the  confederated  states  should  be 
interrupted  by  turbulent  and  seditious  persons,  enemies  of  the  governments 
lawfully  established  by  the  people,  the  contracting  parties  engaged  to  make 
common  cause  against  them  until  order  should  be  reestablished.  This 
article,  it  will  be  recalled,  was  not  ratified  by  Colombia,  on  account,  prob- 
ably, of  the  following  incident:  While  the  discussion  of  the  ratification 
of  the  Colombia-Peru  treaties  was  going  on  in  the  Colombian  Senate,  news 
reached  Bogota  of  the  revolution  which  had  deposed  O'Higgins  in  Chile 
and  placed  Freyre  at  the  head  of  the  government.  The  Senate  requested 
the  executive  to  say  whether  the  government  of  O'Higgins  or  that  of  Freyre 
should  be  recognized.  The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  declared  that  he 
had  no  authority  to  decide  the  question  and  the  article  was  rejected. 
Santander,  writing  to  Bolivar  concerning  this  incident,  declared  that  if  it 
had  not  been  for  the  question  between  Freyre  and  O'Higgins  the  article 
would  have  passed.  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  538. 


310       PAtf -AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

ican  system.  The  assembly  would  be  able,  by  the  influence  of 
its  august  councils,  to  mitigate  the  spirit  of  localism,  which  in 
the  first  years  would  be  active  and  destructive.  An  interrup- 
tion of  the  peace  and  harmony  of  any  of  the  Hispano- American 
republics  would  cause  a  continental  conflagration  from  which 
none  could  escape,  however  much  distance  might  favor,  at  first, 
its  neutrality.  [For  the  political  affinities  created  among  the 
Hispano-American  republics  by  the  revolution,  united  to  moral 
and  physical  similarities,  would  cause  any  stress  or  movement 
which  any  one  or  more  of  them  might  receive  to  be  communi- 
cated to  the  rest,  as  when  in  mountains  the  echo  of  the  thunder- 
clap rebounds  from  one  peak  to  another.  It  seemed  clear, 
therefore,  that  in  case  of  the  disturbance  of  the  internal  tran- 
quillity of  any  one  of  the  states,  the  interposition  of  the  assem- 
bly would  be  necessary  to  prevent  the  evil  consequences  which 
might  arise  from  the  spread  of  the  disaster.84 

Discussing  the  third  great  interest,  security,  Monteagudo 
declared  that  among  the  causes  which  might  disturb  the  peace 
and  friendship  of  the  confederates  none  was  more  obvious  than 
the  lack  of  rules  and  principles  as  a  basis  for  their  public  law. 
Every  day  there  would  occur  among  these  new  republics  ques- 
tions of  reciprocal  rights  and  duties.  The  progress  of  com- 
merce and  navigation,  the  growing  intimacy  of  their  relations 
in  general,  and  the  existence  of  unjust  laws  and  practices  would 
demand  constant  negotiation  and  the  formation  of  numerous 
treaties,  from  which  much  friction  would  arise  unless  recourse 
to  an  impartial  assembly  provided  the  necessary  guarantees.85 

Such  was  Monteagudo's  conception  of  the  nature  and  func- 
tion of  an  American  League  of  Nations.  Under  the  conditions 
which  then  existed  it  was  natural  that  independence  should  be 
regarded  as  the  chief  desideratum.  It  was  the  great  object  for 
which  the  struggle  had  been  waged  against  Spain  for  fifteen 
long  years.  Once  independence  were  attained,  the  other  in- 

84  Coleccidn  de  Enaayoa,  etc.,  171-172. 
174. 


EARLY  PROJECTS  OF  CONTINENTAL  UNION 

terests,  peace  and  security,  would  take  first  place.  These  in- 
deed have  been  the  aims  of  all  the  historic  schemes  of  interna- 
tional cooperation,  from  the  Great  Design  of  Henry  IV  to  the 
Covenant  of  Versailles. 

An  idea  has  now  been  given  of  the  early  views  on  the  subject 
of  continental  unity ;  of  the  first  positive  steps  taken  to  convene 
a  general  American  congress,  and  of  the  character  of  the  propa- 
ganda carried  on  to  gain  adherents  to  the  plan.86  The  congress 
itself  must  now  be  considered  in  detail. 

se  No  special  consideration  has1  been  given  to  the  propaganda  carried  on 
by  means  of  private  correspondence.  In  the  first  twelve  volumes  of 
O'Leary's  Memorias,  consisting  of  letters  mainly  to  Bolivar,  there  may  be 
found  many  evidences  of  the  attention  which  the  subject  received  in  the 
letters  of  the  public  men  of  the  time. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE    PANAMA    CONGRESS 

CONFIDENT  of  a  final  victory  over  the  Royalist  forces  in  Peru, 
Bolivar  began  toward  the  close  of  the  year  1824  to  direct  his 
attention  anew  to  the  project  which  had  long  been  the  object 
of  his  solicitude;  namely,  the  unification  of  the  new  Spanish 
American  states  through  the  medium  of  an  international  assem- 
bly composed  of  representatives  of  the  several  independent  en- 
tities. The  official  action  which  he  had  taken  three  years  prior 
to  this  time,  looking  to  the  establishment  of  such  a  body,  hav- 
ing failed  to  give  the  desired  results,  he  now  revived  the  project 
in  his  well-known  circular  letter  of  December  7,  1824,  inviting 
the  American  republics,  formerly  colonies  of  Spain,  to  take  part 
in  'an  "  Assembly  of  Plenipotentiaries  "  to  be  held  at  Panama. 
Subsequently  the  United  States  and  Brazil  were  invited;  the 
United  States  by  the  governments  of  Colombia,  Mexico,  and 
Central  America,  and  Brazil  by  that  of  Colombia  alone.  It 
was  understood  that  these  two  powers  should  participate  to 
such  extent  as  their  position  as  neutrals  would  permit. 

Great  Britain  was  apparently  the  only  non- American  power 
to  be  distinguished  with  an  invitation,  though  the  Netherlands, 
whether  formally  invited  or  not,  sent  an  agent  to  be  present  at 
the  seat  of  the  council.  It  was  rumored  that  France  would  do 
likewise,  but  this  proved  not  to  be  true.  The  invitation  to 
Great  Britain  was  extended  by  the  minister  of  Colombia  at 
London  with  the  assurance  that  a  commissioner  sent  to  Panama 
by  the  British  Government  would  be  treated  "  cordially  and 
without  the  least  reserve."  The  Assembly,  usually  referred  to 
as  the  Congress  of  Panama,  finally  opened  its  sessions  on  June 
22,  1826,  and  adjourned  on  July  15  following,  with  the  under- 


THE  PANAMA  COJSTGKESS  313 

standing  that  the  plenipotentiaries,  after  having  reported  to 
their  respective  governments,  should  reconvene  at  Tacubaya, 
near  the  City  of  Mexico,  where  it  was  proposed  to  continue  the 
labors  of  the  congress.1 

Of  the  Spanish  American  states,  Peru,  Colombia,  Central 
America,  and  Mexico  were  represented  in  the  Assembly.  The 
United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata,  for  reasons  which  will  be 
explained  later,  declined  to  take  part.  Chile  professed  to  be 
friendly  to  the  movement,  and  the  Supreme  Director  of  the  re- 
public, after  some  delay,  submitted  the  question  to  the  national 
legislature  for  its  approval.  Further  delays  followed,  and 
when  the  Chilean  congress  finally  authorized  the  appoint- 
ment of  representatives  the  meeting  at  Panama  had  long  since 
adjourned.2  Paraguay  in  its  self-imposed  isolation  gave  a 
negative  reply.  Bolivia,  the  newest  of  the  republics,  appointed 
delegates,  but  too  late  for  them  to  be  able  to  participate  in  the 
congress.3  Brazil  accepted  the  invitation  and  designated  a  plen- 
ipotentiary; but 'for  some  reason  —  perhaps  for  fear  of  the 
intervention  of  the  congress  in  the  impending  conflict  of  the 
empire  with  Buenos  Aires  —  he  was  not  dispatched  on  his  mis- 
sion.4 The  British  Government  appointed  as  its  agent  Edward 
J.  Dawkins.  He  was  present  at  Panama  from  the  opening  of 
the  congress  to  its  close,  when  he  returned  to  England.5  The 
Netherlands  were  represented  by  Colonel  van  Veer,  who  at- 
tended, however,  in  a  wholly  unofficial  capacity.6 

The  United  States  accepted  the  invitation,  and  on  December 
26, 1825,  President  Adams  nominated  to  the  Senate,  Eichard  C. 

1  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  533-540 ;   Zubieta,  Congresos  de  Panama 
y  Tacubaya,   13,  28,   34,  36,   66,   130;    International  American  Conference 
(1889-1890),  IV,  23-24,  111;  American  State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  V.,  919. 

2  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XV,  87. 

3  Paz  Sold&n,  Historia  del  Peru  Independiente,  Segundo  Periodo,  II,  178. 
*  Arismendi   Brito,    Contestacidn   al   Discurso   de  F.    Tosta   Garcia,    32; 

O'Leary,  Memorias,  III,  216. 

s  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  555. 

e  Torres  Caicedo,  Vni6n  Latino-Americana,  38,  citing  Restrepo,  Historic, 
de  la  Revoluoidn  de  Colombia. 


314       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Anderson  of  Kentucky  and  John  Sergeant  of  Pennsylvania  "  to 
be  envoys  extraordinary  and  ministers  plenipotentiary  to  the 
assembly  of  American  nations  at  Panama."  7  These  appoint- 
ments were  not  confirmed  by  the  Senate  until  the  middle  of 
the  following  March,  and,  owing  to  a  long  debate  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  over  the  appropriation  necessary  for  carry- 
ing the  mission  into  effect,  it  was  not  until  May  8  that  Clay's 
general  instructions  to  Anderson  and  Sergeant  were  signed. 
Erom  the  instructions  it  appears  that  Anderson,  who  was  United 
States  minister  to  Colombia,  had  been  directed  to  proceed  from 
Bogota  to  Porto  Bello  to  be  joined  by  Sergeant,  whence  the  two 
should  travel  overland  to  Panama.8 

Under  the  circumstances  Anderson  could  scarcely  have 
reached  Panama  until  after  the  congress  had  adjourned.  As 
it  happened  he  left  Bogota  on  June  12,9  fell  ill  on  the  way, 
and  died  at  Cartagena  on  July  24. 10  The  departure  of  Ser- 
geant from  the  United  States  was  postponed  until  the  end  of  the 
year,  when  he  went  to  Mexico  for  the  purpose  of  attending  the 
congress  upon  the  renewal  of  its  sessions  at  Tacubaya.11  Joel 
R.  Poinsett,  minister  of  the  United  States  to  Mexico,  was  ap- 
pointed to  replace  Anderson.12  As  the  congress  did  not  reas- 
semble at  Tacubaya  at  the  time  set,  Sergeant,  after  a  few 
months'  sojourn  in  Mexico,  returned  to  the  United  States.18 

7  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  318,  320. 

8  International  American  Conference  (ISStMSQO),  IV,  113. 

QQaceta  de  Colombia,  June  18,  1826;  Am.  State  Papers:  For.  Rel.,  VI, 
555. 

10  Niles'  Register,  XXXI,  16. 

i!  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  356 ;  Adams, 
Memoirs,  VII,  183. 

12  Adams,  Memoirs,  VII,  223. 

is  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  385 ;  Adams, 
Memoirs,  VII,  312. 

Writers  have  not  always  been  accurate  in  their  reference  to  the  congress 
of  Panama.  Lyman,  for  example  (Diplomacy  of  the  United  States,  II, 
489),  and  Benton  (Thirty  Tears'  View,  I,  66)  declare  that  the  congress 
never  assembled  at  Panama.  Nearly  all  fall  into  error  respecting  dele- 
gates of  the  United  States.  Von  Hoist  (Constitutional  History  of  the 
U.  8.,  I,  432)  says  that  when  the  ambassadors  of  the  United  States  arrived 


THE  PANAMA  CONGEESS  315 

President  Adams  in  his  special  message  of  March  15,  1826, 
transmitting  to  the  House  of  Representatives  certain  documents 
relating  to  the  Congress  of  Panama,  expressed  the  opinion  that 
accidents  unforeseen  and  mischances  not  to  be  anticipated,  might 

in  Panama  the  congress  had  already  adjourned;  Tucker  (The  Monroe 
Doctrine,  34),  that  Anderson  and  Sergeant  at  last  set  out  to  attend  the 
meeting,  but  before  their  arrival  the  congress  had  assembled  and  adjourned; 
McMaster  (History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  V,  459),  that  An- 
derson died  on  the  way  and  that  Sergeant  reached  Panama  to  find  that  the 
delegates  had  assembled  and  adjourned  to  meet  again  in  Tacubaya;  Turner 
(American  Nation:  A  History,  XIV,  285),  that  one  of  the  delegates  died  on 
his  way  and  that  the  other  arrived  after  the  congress  had  adjourned ;  O'Leary 
(Memorias,  XXVIII,  556),  that  the  delegates  of  the  United  States  did  not 
take  their  seats  in  the  assembly  because  Anderson  died  on  the  way  and  upon 
the  arrival  of  Sergeant  the  representatives  of  the  other  countries  had  left 
for  Tacubaya.  Torres  Caicedo  (Unidn  Latino-Americana,  38,  quoting  the 
Columbian  historian,  Restrepo),  that  Anderson  died  in  Cartagena  on  his 
way  to  the  Isthmus  and  that  Sergeant  arrived  too  late;  Calvo  (Le  Droit 
International,  I,  72),  that  of  the  two  envoys  one  died  on  the  way  to  the 
Isthmus  and  the  other  arrived  after  the  adjournment  to  Tacubaya ;  Zubieta 
(Congresos  de  Panama  y  Tacubaya,  42),  merely  that  the  representatives  of 
the  United  States  did  not  attend. 

It  seems  quite  clear  that  Sergeant  did  not  go  to  Panama  at  all.  Secre- 
tary Clay,  in  a  report  dated  January  31,  1827  (For.  ReL,  VI,  555),  gives 
the  date  of  Sergeant's  commission  as  March  14,  1826  (Am.  State  Papers), 
but  states  that  his  salary  did  not  begin  until  October  24,  1826,  when  he 
was  notified  to  prepare  to  proceed  on  the  mission.  Clay  referred  here  to 
Tacubaya  undoubtedly,  for  before  this  time  the  Department  of  State  must 
have  received  the  dispatches  of  Poinsett,  dated  August  20  and  26  (Am. 
State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  VI,  357)  relative  to  the  change  of  meeting 
place.  Moreover,  in  his  annual  message  of  December  5,  1826,  President 
Adams  says :  "  The  decease  of  one  of  our  ministers  on  his  way  to  the 
Isthmus  and  the  impediments  of  the  season  which  delayed  the  departure 
of  the  other,  deprived  us  of  the  advantage  of  being  represented  at  the 
first  meeting  of  the  congress."  (Am.  State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  VI,  209).  If 
further  evidence  were  required  it  might  be  mentioned  that  Adams  speaks 
in  his  Memoirs,  (VII,  126,  154)  of  traveling  in  July,  1826,  with  Sergeant 
from  Philadelphia  to  New  York  and  of  seeing  him  again  in  Philadelphia 
in  the  following  October.  He  made  no  reference  to  the  mission  to  Panama. 
Finally  the  U.S.S.  Lexington  which,  according  to  Clay's  instructions  of 
May  8,  should  have  conducted  Sergeant  to  Porto  Bello  was  later  assigned 
to  other  duty,  spending  the  whole  summer  from  June  to  September  on  a 
cruise  to  northern  waters.  Immediately  upon  her  return  this  vessel  was 
sent  on  a  mission  to  the  Port  of  Spain.  (American  State  Papers,  Naval 
Affairs,  II,  731,  745).  Schouler  (History  of  the  United  States,  III,  365) 
makes  an  exact  statement  of  facts  relative  to  the  representatives  of  the 
United  States;  likewise  Chadwick,  The  Relations  of  the  United  States 
and  Spain,  214. 


316       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

baffle  all  the  high  purposes  and  disappoint  the  fairest  expecta- 
tions of  that  undertaking.  "  But  the  design,"  he  declared,  "  is 
great,  is  benevolent,  humane."  14  Clay  thought  that  the  assem- 
bling of  a  congress  at  Panama  composed  of  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives from  the  independent  American  nations  would  form 
a  new  epoch  in  human  affairs.  "  The  fact  itself,"  he  said, 
"  whatever  may  be  the  issue  of  the  conferences  of  such  a  con- 
gress, cannot  fail  to  challenge  the  attention  of  the  present  gen- 
eration of  the  civilized  world  and  to  command  that  of  pos- 
terity." 15  And  Bolivar,  the  father  of  the  idea,  had  previously 
predicted,  in  his  circular  letter  referred  to  above,  that  the  day 
on  which  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  several  governments  should 
exchange  their  powers,  would  mark  an  important  epoch  in  the 
diplomatic  history  of  America.  "  When  after  a  hundred  cen- 
turies," he  wrote,  "  posterity  shall  search  for  the  origin  of  our 
public  law  and  shall  recall  the  compacts  which  fixed  our  des- 
tiny, it  will  consult  with  veneration  the  protocols  of  the  Isthmus. 
In  them  will  be  found  the  plan  of  the  alliances  which  first  gave 
direction  to  our  relations  with  the  world.  What,  then,  will  the 
Isthmus  of  Corinth  be  compared  with  that  of  Panama  ?  "  16 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  Congress  of  Panama  did  not 
meet  the  high  expectations  of  its  great  protagonist  nor  of  its 
numerous  friends  and  supporters  who  played  a  lesser  part  in 
the  attempt  to  realize  its  noble  aims.  Bolivar,  in  a  moment  of 
disgust,  likened  it  to  the  crazy  Greek  who  of  old  sat  on  a  rock 
in  the  midst  of  the  sea  and  tried  to  direct  the  ships  that  sailed 
about  him.17  The  failure  of  the  congress  to  produce  tangible 
results  was  sufficient  to  cause  it  to  be  passed  over  with  indiffer- 
ence or  to  be  characterized,  and  thus  condemned,  as  illusory.18 

i*  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II,  340. 

is  International  American   Conference    (1889-90),   IV,    114. 

ie  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  253. 

17  Ibid.,  XXVIII,  563. 

is  Historians  of  the  United  States  who  give  any  consideration  at  all  to 
the  congress  of  Panama  treat  it  almost  wholly  from  the  standpoint  of  in- 
ternal politics.  The  fact,  for  example,  that  Ben  ton  believed  the  congress 
had  never  assembled  is  a  strong  witness  to  his  lack  of  interest  in  it  as  a 


THE  PANAMA  CONGKESS  317 

The  greatness,  the  benevolence,  the  humanity  of  its  design  ap- 
peared to  make  no  appeal  to  men's  imaginations.  The  mere 
fact  of  a  meeting  of  American  states  did  not  command,  as 
Henry  Clay  predicted  that  it  would  do,  the  attention  either  of 
that  generation  or  of  those  that  immediately  followed.  Never- 
theless the  central  idea,  continental  solidarity,  at  no  time  en- 
tirely ceased  to  be  a  force  in  American  affairs.19 

This  idea,  called  to-day  Pan-Americanism,  is  acquiring  a 
wider  extension  and  greater  momentum  than  it  ever  possessed 
in  the  time  of  Bolivar.  And  the  movement  is  now  being  carried 
along  mainly  by  states  which  ninety  years  ago  were  but  indiffer- 
ent or  mildly  interested  spectators  of  the  Liberator's  efforts  to 
establish  an  American  political  system.  The  republics  which 
he  founded  and  those  which  adhered  without  reservation  to 
the  Congress  of  Panama  are  far  from  occupying  at  the  present 
time  the  position  of  influence  which  he  aspired  to  have  them 
occupy  in  the  international  affairs  of  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
The  structure  which  is  to-day  being  reared  wears,  therefore,  a 
different  aspect  from  that  which  he  would  have  given  it.  But 
it  rests  upon  the  same  foundation  of  common  interests  and  com- 
mon ideals  as  that  upon  which  it  was  proposed  to  build  at  Pan- 
matter  of  continental  importance.  And  yet  he  says  it  was  a  master  sub- 
ject on  the  political  theatre  of  its  day  (Thirty  Years'  View,  I,  65).  Von 
Hoist  treats  rather  fully  the  constitutional  questions  involved.  McMaster 
gives  some  twenty-five  pages  to  a  consideration  of  the  debates  in  Congress, 
but  views  it  mainly  from  the  national  standpoint.  Schouler  declares  that 
the  whole  project,  incongruous  under  any  aspect,  proved  abortive  (History 
of  the  U.  8.,  Ill,  364).  Other  historians  of  the  United  States  either  give 
the  subject  scant  attention  or  do  not  mention  it  at  all.  The  same  criticism 
applies  generally  to  Latin  American  historians.  Alaman  does  not  discuss 
the  congress,  nor  does  Baralt.  Restrepo,  as  might  have  been  expected  from 
his  intimate  association  with  Bolivar,  gives  a  sympathetic  account  which 
is  closely  followed  by  Paz  Soldan.  Barros  Arana  gives  a  succinct  history 
of  the  movement,  but  declares  it  to  have  been  chimerical  (Historia  Jen.  de 
Chile,  XV,  87).  Mitre  dismisses  the  subject  with  a  few  words  as  a  fantas- 
tic dream  (Historia  de  San  Martin,  IV,  108). 

19  About  the  middle  of  the  last  century  there  was  manifested  a  strong 
movement  throughout  Hispanic  America  toward  a  revival  of  Bolivar's 
scheme  of  federation.  In  1847  and  in  1864  congresses  were  held  at  Lima, 
Peru,  for  the  purpose  of  putting  the  idea  into  effect. 


318       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

ama.  And  as  the  edifice  grows  toward  perfection  it  may  be 
possible  to  recognize  in  its  general  design  many  of  the  lines 
traced  by  the  hand  of  the  original  architect.  Thus  posterity 
will  ever  be  more  and  more  constrained  to  search  for  the  origins 
of  American  policy  not  in  the  protocols  of  the  Isthmus,  per- 
haps, but  in  the  political  ideals  of  Simon  Bolivar. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  Bolivar's  circular  of  December  7,  1824, 
the  government  of  Colombia  renewed  its  activity,  and  Vice 
President  Santander,  writing  immediately  to  the  Liberator, 
suggested  that  the  governments  of  Colombia  and  Peru  authorize 
their  plenipotentiaries  to  proceed  within  a  period  of  four  months 
to  the  Isthmus  and  having  begun  their  preparatory  conferences, 
to  enter  into  direct  correspondence  with  the  governments  of  Mex- 
ico, Guatemala,  Chile,  and  Buenos  Aires.  He  proposed  also 
that  the  plenipotentiaries  of  Colombia  and  Peru  be  given  full 
liberty  to  select  a  place  on  the  Isthmus  for  the  meeting;  that 
as  soon  as  they  should  be  joined  by  the  delegates  of  Mexico  or 
by  those  of  Guatemala,  a  day  for  the  opening  of  the  assembly 
should  be  set  by  common  consent ;  and  that  the  plenipotentiaries 
of  Colombia  and  Peru  should  on  no  account  absent  themselves 
from  the  Isthmus  until  the  general  congress  should  have  met 
and  terminated  its  sessions.20 

In  accordance  with  the  plan  proposed  by  Santander  the  gov- 
ernment of  Peru  appointed  its  representatives  to  the  congress 
and  dispatched  them  to  the  Isthmus  in  June,  1825. 21  The 
delegates  of  Colombia  were  appointed  in  August  of  that  year 
and  they  arrived  at  Panama  in  December.22  Preliminary  con- 
ferences were  at  once  begun  by  the  representatives  of  the  two 
countries,  and  communications  were  also  addressed  by  them  to  the 
governments  of  Mexico,  Central  America,  Chile,  and  Buenos 
Aires,  urging  that  their  plenipotentiaries  be  sent  to  the  Isthmus 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment.  The  ministers  designated  by 

20  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXIV,  254,  256. 

21  Ibid.,  XXIV,  262. 

22  ibid.,  XXIV,  270,  290. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGEESS  319 

the  united  provinces  of  Central  America  soon  arrived.  Those 
of  Mexico,  however,  though  long  expected,  did  not  reach  Pan- 
ama until  June  4,  1826,  almost  a  year  after  the  delegates  from 
Peru.23  It  was  then  decided  not  to  await  the  arrival  of  the 
representatives  of  other  countries,  and  the  congress  began  its 
sessions  on  June  22. 24 

The  delegates  of  Peru  were  Jose  Maria  de  Pando  and  Man- 
uel Lorenzo  de  Vidaurre.  Pando,  though  horn  in  Peru,  was 
educated  in  Spain  and  remained  there  until  1824.  For  a  time 
during  the  constitutional  regime  he  occupied  a  position  in  the 
cabinet  of  Ferdinand  VII.  He  was  the  author  of  works  on 
diverse  subjects,  among  which  was  a  posthumous  treatise  on 
international  law.  Before  the  congress  opened  he  was  recalled 
to  be  appointed  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  Lima.  He  was 
superseded  by  Manuel  Perez  de  Tudela,  who,  like  his  colleague, 
Vidaurre,  had  held  high  judicial  positions  under  the  independ- 
ent government  of  Peru.25 

Colombia  was  represented  by  Pedro  Gual  and  Pedro  Briceiio 
Mendez.  The  former  became  prominent  in  the  early  revolu- 
tionary movements  in  Venezuela  and  served  for  a  while  as  secre- 
tary to  General  Miranda.  Upon  the  defeat  of  the  Patriots  in 
1812,  he  escaped  to  the  United  States,  where,  after  studying 
law  and  being  admitted  to  the  bar,  he  began  the  practice  of  his 
profession  at  Washington.26  He  was  involved  in  the  Amelia 
Island  affair  of  181 Y,  as  related  elsewhere,  and  soon  thereafter 
returned  to  South  America  to  become  the  first  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  of  Colombia  under  the  constitution  of  1821.  After 
the  dissolution  of  Greater  Colombia  in  1830,  he  lived  for  some 
years  in  retirement.  In  1837  he  was  sent  on  a  mission  to  Eu- 
rope by  the  government  of  Ecuador.  In  1860  he  became  Presi- 
dent of  Venezuela,  but  resigned  the  following  year.  He  died 

23  Ibid.,  XXIV,  291,  292,  296-8,  307,  325. 
2*  Ibid.,  XXIV,  327. 

25  Calvo,  Le  Droit  International,  I,  97 ;  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  468, 
550. 

26  Appleton,  Cyclopedia  of  American  Biography. 


320       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

shortly  afterward  at  Guayaquil.  His  associate,  Briceiio  Men- 
dez,  had  won  distinction  as  a  soldier  in  the  wars  for  independ- 
ence. Both  ably  represented  their  government  at  Panama. 

Pedro  Molina  and  Antonio  Larrazabal  were  the  delegates 
of  the  republic  of  Central  America.  Molina  had  done  much 
by  his  writings  to  prepare  the  way  for  independence.  He  op- 
posed the  union  of  Central  America  with  the  Mexican  empire 
under  Iturbide,  and  upon  the  separation  in  1823  became  a  mem- 
ber of  the  provisional  government  of  the  Central  American  re- 
public. Sent  as  minister  to  Colombia  he  negotiated  with  that 
republic  in  1825  the  treaty  of  union,  league,  and  confedera- 
tion to  which  reference  was  made  in  the  preceding  chapter.  In 
1830,  while  he  was  at  the  head  of  the  state  government  of  Guate- 
mala, under  the  federation,  charges  were  brought  against  him 
as  a  result  of  which  he  was  suspended  from  office  and  tried. 
He  was  acquitted,  but  never  occupied  a  position  of  prominence 
thereafter.27  His  associate,  Larrazabal,  had  been  a  member  of 
the  first  Spanish  Cortes  and  was  reputed  to  be  "  a  man  of  much 
learning,  of  great  probity,  and  of  a  firm  and  reliable  char- 
acter." 28 

The  Mexican  delegates  were  Jose  Mariano  Michelena  and 
Jose  Dominguez.  The  former,  having  been  involved  in  the 
early  revolutionary  plots  in  Mexico,  was  arrested  and  sent  as  a 
prisoner  to  Spain,  where  he  later  served  in  the  army.  Having 
returned  to  Mexico,  he  became  a  member  of  the  provisional 
government  established  after  the  downfall  of  Iturbide.  In 
1824  he  was  sent  on  a  diplomatic  mission  to  Colombia,  and  was 
recalled  to  be  given  the  appointment  to  Panama.  Dominguez 
had  been  Minister  of  Justice  in  the  cabinet  of  Iturbide  and  at 
the  time  of  his  appointment  was  president  of  the  Court  of  Jus- 
tice of  Guanajuato.29 

Before  entering  upon  the  examination  of  the  work  of  the 

27  Monttifar,  Resefta  Historica,  I,  205-217. 

28  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  307. 

2»  Bancroft,  History  of  Mexico,  IV,  402 ;  Zubieta,  Congreaos  de  Panamd  y 
Tacubaya,  46. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS  321 

congress,  it  is  desirable  to  turn  back  for  a  moment  and  con- 
sider certain  documents  wbich  have  essential  bearing  upon  its 
deliberations. 

The  first  of  these  is  a  dispatch  dated  March  6,  1825,  from 
the  government  of  Colombia  to  Dean  Funes,  its  charge  d'affaires 
at  Buenos  Aires,  by  which  he  was  instructed  to  make  known  to 
the  latter  sovereignty  the  objects  of  the  assembly  and  to  express 
the  hope  that  the  views  of  the  two  governments  were  in  perfect 
accord.  The  objects  of  the  congress  were  stated  as  follows : 

1.  "  To  renew  the  treaty  of  union,  alliance,  and  perpetual 
confederacy  against  Spain  or  any  other  power  which  might  at- 
tempt to  dominate  over  us. 

2.  "  To  issue,  in  the  name  of  their  constituents,  a  suitable 
manifesto  upon  the  justice  of  their  cause,  exposing  the  sinister 
views  of  Spain  and  declaring  our  system  of  politics  with  respect 
to  the  other  powers  of  Christianity. 

3.  "  To  consider  the  condition  of  the  islands  of  Porto  Rico 
and  Cuba;  the  expediency  of  a  combined  force  to  free  them 
from  the  Spanish  yoke;  and  the  proportion  of  troops  which 
each  state  should  contribute  for  that  purpose ;  and  to  determine 
whether  the  islands  shall  be  united  to  either  of  the  confederated 
states  or  be  left  at  liberty  to  choose  their  own  government. 

4.  "  To  conclude  or  renew  a  treaty  of  commerce  between  the 
new  states  as  allies  and  confederates. 

5.  "  To  conclude  a  consular  convention  between  all,  which 
should  clearly  and  distinctly  lay  down  the  functions  and  pre- 
rogatives of  their  respective  consuls. 

6.  "  To  take  into  consideration  the  means  of  giving  effect 
to  the  declarations  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  in  his  message  to  the  Congress  of  last  year,  with  a  view 
to  frustrating  any  future  idea  of  colonization  on  this  continent 
by  the  powers  of  Europe,  and  to  resist  any  principle  of  inter- 
ference in  our  internal  affairs. 

7.  "  To  establish  in  concert  those  principles  of  the  rights  of 
nations,  which  are  of  a  controversial  nature,  and  especially  those 


322       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

which  relate  to  two  nations,  one  of  which  is  engaged  in  war, 
whilst  the  other  is  neutral. 

8.  "  Lastly,  to  declare  on  what  footing  the  political  and 
commercial  relations  of  those  parts  of  our  hemisphere,  which, 
like  the  island  of  Santo  Domingo  or  Haiti,  are  separated  from 
their  ancient  government,  and  have  not  yet  been  recognized  by 
any  European  or  American  power,  should  be  placed."  30 

A  few  days  before  this  letter  was  written,  there  appeared  in 
the  Gaceta  de  Colombia  an  article,  heretofore  mentioned  as  hav- 
ing been  copied  by  newspapers  in  Peru  and  in  the  United 
States,  and  as  having  been  used  by  De  Pradt  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  his  pamphlet,  in  which  the  objects  of  the  congress 
were  stated,  with  some  exceptions,  in  almost  the  same  language 
as  that  employed  in  the  dispatch.  The  article  in  the  Gaceta, 
however,  while  enumerating  as  one  of  the  objects  of  the  con- 
gress the  adoption  of  measures  for  the  liberation  of  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  did  not  raise  the  question  of  the  future  disposition 
of  the  islands;  nor  did  it  mention  the  subject  of  a  consular 
convention,  or  the  extension  of  the  war  to  the  coasts  of  Spain 
or  to  the  Canaries  and  the  Philippines.  The  last  three  objects 
specified  in  the  dispatch  and  in  the  Gaceta  were  identical,  and 
in  both  places  they  were  j  declared  'to>  be  appropriate  for  the  joint 
consideration  of  belligerents  and  neutrals,  if  any  of  the  latter 
should  take  part  in  the  congress.31 

The  foregoing  details  derive  importance  from  the  fact  that  the 
statement  of  the  objects  of  the  congress  which  must  have  been 
sent  to  the  rest  of  the  allied  governments  early  in  February, 
1825,  is  not  to  be  found  among  the  published  documents  relat- 
ing to  the  Congress  of  Panama.32  Nor  does  the  letter  to  the 

so  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XII,  894. 

si  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  VII,  894 ;  Oaceta  del  Gobierno 
(Peru),  May  22,  1825;  Niles'  Weekly  Register,  XXVIII,  132. 

32  Alamftn,  minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  Mexico,  writing,  March  30, 
1825,  to  Michelena,  Mexican  minister  at  London,  refers  to  communications 
received  from  the  governments  of  Colombia  relative  to  the  proposed  Con- 
gress of  Panama.  President  Victoria's  reply  to  Bolivar's  circular  of  De- 
cember 7,  1824,  was  dated  February  23,  1825.  As  the  circular  was  not  re- 


THE  PANAMA  COSTGKESS  323 

Colombian  charge  at  Buenos  Aires  appear  in  either  of  the  col- 
lections published  by  the  government  of  Venezuela.  O'Leary 
in  his  Memorias  says  that  Colombia  proposed  to  Peru  and  to 
the  rest  of  the  allies  the  essential  matters  upon  which  the  con- 
gress should  deliberate,  and,  without  giving  the  source  of  his 
information,  proceeds  to  specify  the  subjects  thus  proposed. 
The  matters  mentioned  by  him  as  appropriate  for  discussion 
by  belligerents  only  were  in  substance  the  same  as  those  enumer- 
ated in  the  Gaceta;  but  with  regard  to  the  subjects  suitable  for 
discussion  by  both  belligerents  and  neutrals  there  are  important 
differences.  The  most  important  of  these  relates  to  the  pro- 
nouncement of  President  Monroe,  which  O'Leary  describes  as 
a  declaration  "  relative  to  frustrating  in  the  future  any  at- 
tempt of  Spain  to  colonize  the  American  continent/'  33  thus 
depriving  it  of  its  true  significance. 

O'Leary' s  narrative  evidently  lacks  at  this  point  the  exact- 
ness which  characterizes  his  work  as  a  whole ;  for,  besides  mis- 
describing  the  Monroe  declaration,  he  includes  among  the  top- 
ics for  the  joint  consideration  of  belligerents  and  neutrals  sev- 
eral matters  which  clearly  pertained  to  belligerents  and  to  bellig- 
erents only ;  such  as  the  adoption  of  a  plan  of  hostilities  against 
Spain,  and  the  determination  of  the  contingent  of  land  and  sea 
forces  which  each  state  should  provide.  It  can  scarcely  be 

ceived  at  Bogota  until  February  4,  the  copy  sent  to  Mexico  must  have  gone 
direct  from  Peru,  for  the  time  intervening  between  February  4  and  February 
23  would  not  have  been  sufficient  to  permit  communication  between  Bogota 
and  Mexico.  In  view  of  all  the  circumstances  it  seems  to  be  a  fair  deduc- 
tion that  the  government  of  Colombia  communicated  to  the  other  govern- 
ments a  statement  of  the  objects  of  the  congress  similar  to  that  contained 
in  the  letter  to  Dean  Funes.  The  unpublished  documents  which  undoubt- 
edly exist  in  the  archives  of  Colombia  and  Mexico  would  clear  up  this 
point.  Cf.  La  Diplomacies  Mexicana,  III,  175;  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  XII,  175.  Gual,  in  a  letter  to  his  government  dated  Guaduas, 
October  4,  1825,  refers  specifically  to  a  communication  of  February  9, 
1825,  to  the  minister  of  Colombia  in  Mexico,  which  communication  evi- 
dently contained  a  statement  of  the  objects  of  the  congress.  Copies  of  it 
appear  to  have  been  sent  to  other  governments.  O'Leary,  Memorias, 
XXIV,  283,  285. 

33  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  542-548, 


324       PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

doubted  that  these  are  inadvertences;  but  they  show  the  im- 
portance of  having  recourse  to  a  source  of  information  free 
from  any  suspicion  of  inaccuracy.  Such  a  source  fortunately 
is  available  in  the  text  of  the  instructions  which  the  govern- 
ments of  Colombia  and  Peru  gave  to  their  respective  dele- 
gates. 

The  general  instructions  of  the  government  of  Peru  were 
the  first  to  be  prepared.  They  were  signed  on  May  15,  1825, 
by  Tomas  de  Heres,  who  then  occupied  the  post  of  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Council  of  Government  entrusted  by 
Bolivar  with  the  exercise  of  the  supreme  authority  which  he 
had  possessed  in  that  country  for  more  than  a  year.34  As 
Heres  was  a  Colombian  by  birth  and  as  Bolivar's  popularity  in 
Peru  was  then  at  its  height,  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
the  instructions  embodied,  in  the  main  at  least,  the  ideas  of  the 
Liberator.  They  contained  no  set  statement  of  the  objects  of  the 
congress ;  and  the  part  relating  to  the  organization  of  the  pro- 
posed confederacy  need  not  be  examined.  But  of  the  parts  re- 
lating to  the  pronouncement  of  President  Monroe,  to  the  libera- 
tion of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  and  to  the  question  of  determining 
the  future  status  of  Haiti,  the  substance  may  be  given. 

With  regard  to  the  first,  the  delegates  were  instructed  to 
endeavor  to  have  included  in  the  manifesto  which  it  was  pro- 
posed to  publish  to  the  world,  "  a  forceful  and  effective  declara- 
tion such  as  that  made  by  the  President  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  in  his  message  to  the  Congress  of  last  year,  rela- 
tive to  preventing  any  future  colonization  on  this  continent  by 
European  powers  and  in  opposition  to  the  principle  of  inter- 
vention in  our  domestic  affairs."  It  is  worthy  of  note  that 
there  is  no  suggestion  here  of  a  joint  declaration  to  which  the 
United  States  should  be  a  party,  nor  any  suggestion  of  coopera- 
tion with  that  power  to  defeat  the  aims  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 
Very  different  was  the  attitude  of  the  government  of  Colombia, 
as  will  presently  be  seen. 

s*  CFLeaiy,  Memoriae,  XXIII,  65. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS  325 

As  to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  the  delegates  were  instructed  to 
make  efforts  to  have  the  congress  decide  upon  their  fate;  for 
as  long  as  those  islands  remained  in  the  possession  of  Spain, 
the  Spanish  Government  would  be  able  to  promote  discord,  en- 
courage domestic  troubles,  and  even  threaten  the  independence 
and  the  peace  of  different  parts  of  America.  If  the  congress 
should  resolve  to  liberate  the  islands  the  delegates  were  in- 
structed to  advocate  that  the  allies  should  enter  into  a  treaty 
setting  forth  in  detail  the  contribution  which  each  state  should 
make  to  the  enterprise,  and  determining  whether  the  islands 
should  be  annexed  to  some  one  of  the  confederated  states  or  be 
left  free  to  set  up  for  themselves  the  government  which  they 
might  consider  most  appropriate.  And  finally  the  delegates 
were  instructed  to  urge  that  a  declaration  be  made  regarding  the 
political  and  commercial  relations  to  be  established  with  those 
parts  of  the  hemisphere  which,  like  Haiti  and  Santo  Domingo, 
had  emancipated  themselves  from  the  metropolis,  but  had  not 
yet  been  recognized  by  any  power,  either  American  or  Euro- 
pean.35 

On  August  31,  1825,  the  delegates  of  Colombia  were  given 
a  general  credential  and  full  power  with  corresponding  instruc- 
tions, signed  by  Jose  R.  Revenga,  who  had  succeeded  Gual  as 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  On  September  23  they  were  fur- 
nished with  a  special  credential  and  full  power  relative  to  ques- 
tions upon  which  both  belligerents  and  neutrals  might  delib- 
erate. In  the  general  instructions  the  Colombian  plenipoten- 
tiaries were  informed  that  their  activities  should  be  limited  to 
the  following  objects :  1.  The  renewal  of  the  pact  of  perpetual 
union,  league,  and  confederation  between  all  and  each  of  the 
American  states.  2.  The  fixing  of  the  contingents  of  land  and 
of  sea  forces  for  the  confederation.  3.  The  promulgation  of 
a  declaration  or  manifesto  relating  to  the  motives  and  objects 
of  the  assembly.  4.  The  arranging  of  commercial  affairs.  5. 
The  definition  of  the  rights  and  duties  of  consuls.  6.  The  abo- 

ssO'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  250-262;  XXVIII,  468. 


326       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

lition  of  the  slave  trade.  With  reference  to  the  first  and  sec- 
ond objects  the  delegates  were  told  that  their  full  powers  were 
broad  enough  to  permit  the  admission  into  the  American  league 
of  any  power  whatever  that  might  wish  to  make  common  cause 
with  it ;  and  that,  if  the  allies  of  Spain  should  arrogate  to  them- 
selves a  right  to  intervene  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  Amer- 
ican states,  the  result  would  be  a  war  in  which  all  the  powers 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere,  as  well  as  a  number  of  European 
powers,  would  be  involved.  The  delegates  were  accordingly 
instructed  to  do  whatever  they  could  to  increase  the  number  of 
Spain's  enemies  by  bringing  into  the  confederation  as  many 
states  as  possible. 

In  special  instructions  of  September  23,  1825,  the  delegates 
of  Colombia  were  informed,  among  other  things,  of  the  steps 
taken  by  their  government  to  secure  the  cooperation  of  the 
United  States  and  of  Great  Britain.  It  appeared  that  Hurtado, 
the  Colombian  minister  to  England,  had  been  authorized  to 
acquaint  Canning  with  the  objects  of  the  assembly,36  and  that 
Salazar,  at  Washington,  had  been  instructed  on  October  7,  1824, 
to  invite  the  United  States  to  take  part  in  it.37  The  instruc- 
tions of  October  7,  a  copy  of  which  was  furnished  to  the  dele- 
gates, contained  interesting  references  to  the  Monroe  pronounce- 
ment. The  following  extract  is  pertinent : 

"  The  United  States  is  as  interested  as  we  are  in  maintaining 
certain  conservative  principles  upon  which  the  destiny  of  this 
continent  in  general  depends.  This  is  clearly  shown  by  the  last 
message  of  President  Monroe,  which  establishes  two  maxims 
from  which  deductions  of  another  kind  may  be  made.  These 
maxims  are:  First,  that  no  further  European  colonization 
shall  be  permitted  on  the  American  continent;  and  secondly, 
that  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance  are  con- 

se  Of.  a  minute  of  the  conference  of  Colombian  minister  with  Canning 
on  November  7,  1825;  (XLeary,  Memorias,  XXIII,  352. 
87  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXIV,  270-280. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS  327 

sidered  to  be  prejudicial  to  the  peace  and  security  of  the  said 
United  States.  These  two  important  declarations  have  brought 
the  interests  of  Colombia  and  its  allies  into  closer  touch  with  the 
United  States.  And  as  the  declarations  are  of  vital  importance 
to  both  nations,  the  necessity  for  arriving  at  a  definite  under- 
standing with  regard  to  them  becomes  clearer  every  day.  In 
order  therefore  to  promote  this  essential  object  and  in  order  that 
America  may  be  seen  for  the  first  time  in  some  sort  united, 
the  executive  ardently  desires  that  the  United  States  should 
send  its  plenipotentiaries  to  Panama,  so  that  together  with 
those  of  Colombia  and  its  allies  they  may  agree  upon  some 
effective  means  for  preventing  foreign  colonization  in  our  con- 
tinent and  for  resisting  the  application  of  the  principles  of 
legitimacy  to  the  American  states  in  general. 

"  If  the  publication  of  these  proposed  objects,"  continued  the 
instructions  to  Salazar,  "  should  seem  to  you  to  be  prejudicial 
you  may  withhold  them,  and  give  as  the  ostensible  object  of  the 
meeting  of  the  plenipotentiaries  the  necessity  arising  out  of  the 
confusion  produced  by  the  late  wars  in  Europe  for  the  Ameri- 
can states  to  reach  an  agreement  upon  certain  principles  of  in- 
ternational law  applicable  to  times  of  war.  As  this  ostensible 
object  would  not  indicate  in  any  way  an  intention  on  the  part 
of  the  United  States  to  depart  from  the  neutrality  which  it  pro- 
claimed at  the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  it  is  to  be  pre- 
sumed that  the  invitation  which  you  are  authorized  to  extend 
to  that  government,  whenever  you  deem  it  opportune  to  do  so, 
will  not  be  considered  to  be  lacking  in  propriety.  If  the  United 
States  should  agree  to  send  its  plenipotentiaries  to  the  first 
congress  of  American  states,  as  it  is  to  be  assumed  it  will  do, 
the  business  of  the  congress  will  be  of  two  kinds;  first,  confi- 
dential, to  agree  upon  a  plan  for  giving  effect  to  the  two  maxims 
of  which  I  have  spoken  above,  and  secondly,  public,  to  agree 
upon  the  controversial  points  of  maritime  law  in  war,  in  order 
to  make  more  stable  and  lasting  the  relations  of  peace,  friend- 


328       PAST-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

ship,  commerce,  and  navigation  which  are  being  established 
between  all  the  states  of  the  continent."  38 

In  the  special  instructions  of  September  23  Revenga  declared 
that  steps  had  been  taken  to  secure  the  adhesion  of  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  because  of  the  frankness  and  friend- 
ship of  which  those  powers  had  given  proof.  Moreover  it  was 
desired  to  defeat  by  this  means  the  enemies  of  the  new  states 
who  might  take  advantage  of  the  occasion  to  represent  the  con- 
federation as  dangerous  to  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  the 
civilized  world.  Adverting  to  the  plan  of  conducting  both  se- 
cret and  public  discussions,  the  author  of  the  instructions  de- 
clared that  the  latter  would  serve  to  cloak  the  real  purpose  of 
the  congress.  "  This  is,"  he  said,  "  to  determine  what  part 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  will  take  with  us  in  case 
the  allies  of  Spain  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  the  new  American 
powers.  The  expressions  of  President  Monroe  and  those  of  the 
British  ministers  have  been  so  explicit  on  this  subject  that  there 
appears  to  be  no  doubt  of  their  disposition  to  enter  into  an  even- 
tual alliance  with  us.  If  the  casus  foederis  which  these  treaties 
would  recognize  as  a  basis  should  never  arise,  nothing  would 
have  been  lost,  by  having  taken  a  step  counseled  by  prudence 
and  foresight."  39 

Neither  the  instructions  of  August  31  nor  those  of  September 
23  contained  any  reference  to  Cuba,  Porto  Rico,  or  Haiti.  Re- 
garding the  island  of  Haiti,  however,  special  instructions  were 
given  by  Revenga  on  September  24.  In  these  the  Colombian 
delegates  were  directed  to  consult  the  assembly  as  to  the  future 
status  of  Haiti  and  of  any  other  parts  of  the  hemisphere  which 
might  be  found  in  a  similar  situation.  "  Upon  bringing  the 
matter  before  the  congress,"  said  Revenga,  "  you  should  make 
it  known  that  Colombia  feels  a  great  repugnance  to  maintaining 
with  Haiti  those  relations  of  courtesy  generally  observed  among 
civilized  nations,  but  that  it  desires  at  the  same  time  to  avoid, 

880'Leary,  Memorias,  613-515. 
89  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXIV,  278. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS  329 

by  a  policy  of  temporization,  every  occasion  for  unpleasantness. 
There  is  no  objection,  however,  to  continuing  to  admit  into 
Colombian  ports  merchant  vessels  flying  the  Haitian  flag,  sub- 
ject always  to  the  customary  laws  relating  to  foreigners.  Thus 
you  are  authorized  to  evade  any  proposal  which  has  for  its 
object  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Haiti;  that  is, 
any  proposal  looking  to  the  exchange  of  ministers  with  that 
government  or  to  the  celebration  of  treaties  with  it  in  the  form 
which  is  customary  between  Colombia  and  the  other  powers  of 
Europe  and  America."  40 

After  Gual  had  set  out  for  Panama  and  before  he  had  seen 
Briceiio  Mendez,  who  was  to  meet  him  at  Cartagena,  he  wrote 
to  his  government  requesting  instructions  respecting  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico ;  41  for  he  was  certain,  he  declared,  that  the  Mexican 
ministers  would  be  interested  in  discussing  the  fate  of  those 
islands.  On  October  14  Revenga  wrote  the  desired  instructions. 
They  had  to  do  partly  with  the  determination  of  the  quota  of 
troops,  ships,  or  money  to  be  contributed  by  each  state  to  the 
liberation  of  the  islands,  and  partly  with  the  disposition  which 
should  be  made  of  the  islands  after  they  had  been  liberated. 
On  the  latter  point  Revenga  said :  "  As  to  the  future  condition 
of  these  islands  and  of  any  other  Spanish  colonies  or  posses- 
sions which  it  may  be  decided  to  emancipate,  the  vice  president 
cannot  give  you  other  instructions  than  those  which  are  com- 
prehended in  the  law  of  March  24,  1824,42  a  copy  of  which  I 
have  the  honor  to  send  herewith.  Some  of  the  American  states 
would  perhaps  like  to  annex  one  or  another  of  the  islands,  but 
if  suspicions  should  arise  as  to  the  motives  for  engaging  in  the 
undertaking,  its  principal  merit  would  be  lost.  Striving,  there- 
to O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  285. 
4i  Ibid.,  XXIV,  283. 

*2The  law  referred  to  is  not  included  in  O'Leary's  collection  of  docu- 
ments relating  to  the  Congress  of  Panama.  Indeed  it  is  not  clear  to  what 
law  Revenga  here  refers;  for  there  were  no  laws  passed  in  Colombia  in 
March,  18*24,  the  congress  not  having  convened  that  year  until  April  5. 
In  the  Blanco- Azpurua  collection  a  list  of  the  laws  passed  at  that  session 
is  given  (IX,  336-366),  the  first  bearing  the  date  of  April  11. 


330       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

fore,  to  induce  the  other  confederates  to  be  content  with  the 
gratitude  and  the  friendship  which  would  result  from  so  benef- 
icent an  act,  you  will  endeavor  to  secure  their  adhesion  to  the 
law  referred  to ;  and  as  it  would  be  imperative  to  establish  pro- 
visional governments  to  begin  with,  the  inhabitants  of  the  islands 
would  have  the  opportunity  to  determine  their  own  political 
condition.  However,  you  will  inform  this  office  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible in  the  event  you  discover  designs  on  the  part  of  any  of 
the  states  relative  to  these  islands."  43 

Although  the  delegates  of  the  new  republic  of  Bolivia  re- 
ceived their  appointment  too  late  to  enable  them  to  take  part 
in  the  congress  of  Panama,  yet  the  instructions  which  were  pre- 
pared for  their  guidance  are  of  great  interest.  It  will  be  re- 
called that  a  provisional  government  under  General  Sucre  had 
been  established  in  Upper  Peru  in  the  year  1825,  and  that 
about  the  middle  of  the  following  year  a  constitution  framed 
by  the  Liberator  was  taken  into  consideration  and  was  shortly 
afterward  adopted  by  the  congress  of  the  republic.  For 
the  moment  Bolivar's  influence  in  that  quarter  was  supreme. 
Sucre,  who  had  been  provisional  president  and  who  later  be- 
came the  first  constitutional  president,  was  greatly  beloved,  and 
his  loyalty  to  Bolivar  made  it  possible  for  the  Liberator  to  se- 
cure more  consistent  support  for  his  political  plans  in  the  Bo- 
livian republic  than  he  had  been  able  to  obtain  in  Colombia  or 
in  Peru.  Moreover  his  influence  there  apparently  had  not  be- 
gun to  wane,  as  it  had  begun  to  do  in  the  rest  of  the  territory 
which  claimed  him  as  Liberator.  He  was  in  constant  com- 
munication with  Sucre,  and  the  instructions  of  the  Bolivian 
Government  to  its  delegates  to  Panama  undoubtedly  represented 
a  conscious  effort  to  embody,  at  least  in  part,  the  ideas  which 
Bolivar  entertained  at  the  time  on  the  subject  of  an  American 
confederation. 

In  a  letter  to  Bolivar,  dated  July  12, 1826,  Sucre,  in  referring 

43  (XLeary,  Memoriae,  XXIV,  287. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS  331 

to  the  appointment  of  the  delegates,44  one  of  whom  was  then 
in  Lima,  says :  "  I  am  sending  the  credentials,  etc.,  for  you  to 
deliver  to  Mendizabal  with  whatever  instructions  you  may  de- 
sire to  add.  You  will  also  note  our  instructions  to  these  gen- 
tlemen, and  you  will  find  a  sheet  in  blank  upon  which  you  may 
write,  if  you  wish,  other  instructions,  kindly  sending  me  a  copy, 
as  I  have  to  report  to  congress  upon  the  whole  matter."  45  This 
letter  of  Sucre's,  together  with  the  documents  which  accom- 
panied it,  could  not  have  reached  Lima  until  at  least  a  month 
later.  By  that  time  it  is  quite  certain  that  Bolivar  had  prac- 
tically lost  interest  in  the  congress  of  Panama.  It  is  not  likely, 
therefore,  that  he  wrote  any  new  instructions,  nor  is  it  likely 
that  he  changed  in  any  way  those  which  Sucre  had  sent  him 
for  delivery  to  the  delegate,  Mendizabal.  They  were  succinctly 
expressed,  and  they  differ  in  some  important  respects  from  the 
instructions  to  the  Colombian  and  Peruvian  delegates. 

The  following  statement  of  the  aims  of  the  congress,  though 
containing  no  new  idea,  is  unique  in  form  and  worthy  of  being 
quoted  in  full :  "  You  will  advocate  the  making  of  the  assem- 
bly a  permanent  body  with  the  following  objects:  1.  To  see  to 
the  exact  execution  of  the  treaties  and  to  provide  for  the  se- 
curity of  the  federation.  2.  To  mediate  in  a  friendly  way  be- 
tween any  of  the  allied  states  and  foreign  powers  in  the  event  of 
a  difference  arising  between  them.  3.  To  serve  as  a  concilia- 
tor and  even  as  an  arbitrator,  if  possible,  between  the  allies 
themselves  who  may  have  suffered,  unfortunately,  a  disturbance 
of  their  friendly  relations.  4.  To  expel  from  the  confedera- 
tion the  state  who  fails  to  live  up  to  its  obligations.  5.  To 
direct  the  united  forces  of  the  confederation  against  that  state 
who,  because  of  ideas  of  ambition  and  of  aggrandizement, 

44  The   Bolivian  delegates   were  not  appointed   until  July,    1826.     They 
were  Jose"  Marfa  Mendizabal,  minister  of  Bolivia  to  Peru,   and  Mariano 
Serrano,   Bolivian  minister  at   Buenos  Aires.     Cf.   O'Leary,   Memorias,   I, 
359;  XXIV,  375. 

45  O'Leary,  Memorias,  I,  359. 


332       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

should  attempt  to  violate  the  independence  of  another  state  of 
the  league."  46 

In  connection  with  the  last  statement,  especially,  it  will  be 
of  interest  to  note  what  instructions  were  given  relative  to  the 
forces  necessary  to  make  effective  the  will  of  the  federation. 
The  delegates  were  directed  to  advocate  the  formation  of  a  fed- 
eral army  and  navy  —  an  army  of  25,000  men  and  a  navy  of 
thirty  ships.  The  army  should  consist  of  contingents  furnished 
by  each  state  according  to  population,  and  the  navy  should  be 
manned  by  similar  contingents.  Each  state  should  provide 
for  the  maintenance  of  its  forces.  The  allies  should  contribute 
according  to  population  to  the  purchase  of  war  vessels,  but  as 
it  would  only  cause  delay  to  undertake  to  build  warships,  the 
vessels  then  owned  by  each  state  should  be  justly  appraised  and 
turned  over  to  the  confederation.  The  commanders  of  the  army 
and  of  the  navy,  respectively,  should  be  designated  by  the  as- 
sembly. In  the  event  of  the  union  of  the  land  and  sea  forces, 
the  senior  officer  should  be  commander  in  chief.  The  object 
of  such  a  union  of  forces  would  be:  The  defense  of  any  of 
the  allies  from  invasion;  the  liberation  of  the  islands  of  Cuba 
and  Porto  Rico;  or,  finally,  the  carrying  of  the  war  to  the 
coasts  of  Spain,  if  that  power  should  continue  to  refuse  to  make 
peace. 

No  reference,  other  than  that  just  indicated,  was  made  to 
Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  Nothing  was  said  respecting  a  manifesto 
similar  to  that  of  President  Monroe  and  nothing  was  said  about 
the  United  States  further  than  to  instruct  the  delegates  to 
sound  the  disposition  of  that  government  relative  to  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  independence  of  Bolivia.  As  to  relations  with  Bra- 
zil, the  other  neutral  American  state,  in  the  event  that  that 
power  should  send  representatives  to  the  congress,  the  delegates 
were  instructed  to  act  in  harmony  with  the  rest  of  the  confed- 
erates. And  as  to  Great  Britain,  they  were  instructed  to  sound 

«  O'Leary,  Memorial,  XXIV,  336. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGKESS  333 

the  British  minister  at  Panama  for  the  purpose  of  discovering, 
if  possible,  the  real  policy  of  his  government  with  respect  to 
the  new  states  of  America,  the  nature  of  the  relations  which 
that  power  would  be  disposed  to  establish  with  the  American 
states,  and  the  extent  to  which  it  would  carry  its  intimacy  with 
them;  for  once  the  disposition  of  Great  Britain  were  known 
an  alliance  with  her  might  at  an  opportune  moment  be  sought. 
It  was  suggested  to  the  delegates,  further,  that  close  association 
with  the  ministers  of  Colombia  would  afford  the  means  of  be- 
coming acquainted  with  British  aims.  Concise  references  to 
the  renewal  of  the  treaty  of  union,  league,  and  confederation, 
to  the  question  of  the  conditions  of  peace  with  Spain,  to  matters 
of  commerce,  to  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade,  and  to  certain 
debated  principles  of  international  law,  none  of  which  questions 
need  be  discussed  here,  constitute  the  remainder  of  these  brief 
instructions.47 

The  preliminary  treaties,  considered  in  the  preceding  chap- 
ter, indicate  in  a  general  way  the  character  of  the  confederation 
which  it  was  proposed  to  organize.  It  remains  now  to  review 
briefly  the  efforts  made  in  the  assembly  at  Panama  to  render 
effective  and  permanent  the  union  whose  foundations  were  laid 
in  those  treaties. 

The  informal  conferences  between  the  representatives  of  Peru 
and  Colombia  were  begun  on  December  17,  1825.  At  the  first 
meeting,  Yidaurre,  one  of  the  ministers  of  Peru,  presented  a 
plan  which  he  called  the  et  Bases  for  a  general  confederation 
of  America."  His  plan  differed  in  some  essential  points  from 
the  general  scheme  provided  for  in  the  preliminary  treaties  and 
for  this  reason  is  given  below  in  full. 

1.  "  The  interests  of  the  Confederation  shall  be  cared  for  by 
a  general  assembly  to  be  called  the  Amphictyonic  Congress. 

2.  "  The  confederated  states  shall  be  represented  by  plenipo- 
tentiaries. 

*7  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  337-338. 


334       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

3.  "  Each  member  of  the  confederation  shall  contribute  not 
only  to  the  defense  of  America  in  general,  but  also  to  that  of 
each  state  in  particular. 

4.  "  This  defense  shall  be  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  for- 
eign attacks. 

5.  "  The  territorial  integrity  of  the  states  comprehended  in 
the  confederation  shall  be  reciprocally  guaranteed. 

6.  "  No  state  shall  be  allowed  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  alli- 
ance with  any  non- American  power  without  having  previously 
obtained  the  consent  of  the  assembly. 

7.  "  Upon  no  pretext  whatever  shall  the  states  of  the  confed- 
eration make  war  upon  one  another.     All  of  their  differences 
shall  be  decided  in  the  general  congress. 

8.  "  The  assembly  shall  indicate  the  points  to  be  fortified, 
the  forces  to  be  maintained  in  each  state,  and  the  funds  which 
each  state  shall  contribute  to  carry  on  war  or  to  put  down  an- 
archy. 

9.  "  The  assembly  shall  pass  the  general  laws  which  may  be 
necessary  to  maintain  the  existence  of  the  confederation. 

10.  "  To  this  end  the  assembly  shall  be  perpetual  and  shall 
be  composed  of  two  plenipotentiaries  from  each  state. 

11.  "  The  citizens  of  the  confederated  republics,  upon  pass- 
ing from  the  state  of  which  they  are  citizens  to  another  state  of 
the  confederation,  shall  enjoy  the  same  rights  and  privileges 
as  those  which  the  native-born  citizens  of  the  latter  enjoy. 

12.  "  Any  American  residing  in  the  confederation  may  be 
appointed  to  any  office  or  dignity  in  any  of  the  states  without 
limitation  whatever.     The  citizens  of  any  one  of  the  confeder- 
ated states  shall  not  be  held  to  be  aliens  in  any  other  state. 

13.  "  Import  and  export  dues  when  applied  to  native  goods 
or  products  shall  be  the  same  in  all  the  republics. 

14.  "  No  article  of  commerce  shall  be  prohibited  in  the  recip- 
rocal trade  between  the  republics. 

15.  "  To  meet  emergencies  the  congress  may  dispose  of  an 


THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS  335 

armed  force  whose  commander  in  chief  the  congress  shall  ap- 
point. 

16.  "  The  states  which  compose  the  confederation  shall  not 
have  the  right  to  withdraw  until  after  a  period  of  fifty  years 
shall  have  elapsed. 

17.  "  They  shall  not  have  the  right  to  reject  articles  that  may 
have  been  stipulated  and  ratified  by  the  assembly. 

18.  "  During  the  said  fifty  years  they  shall  not  change  their 
form  of  government. 

19.  "  The  acts  of  the  congress  shall  become  valid  either  by 
common  consent  or  by  a  majority  vote. 

20.  "  The  decisions  of  the  congress  shall  be  valid  without 
the  ratification  of  the  individual  states. 

21.  "  The  plenipotentiaries  shall  not  be  held  answerable  for 
their  opinions  or  for  their  votes,  being  inviolable  in  their  per- 
sons, employments,  and  property  during  the  time  of  their  mem- 
bership in  the  assembly  and  after  their  connection  with  it  shall 
have  ceased."  48 

Vidaurre's  plan  met  with  a  cold  reception.  It  did  not  have 
the  approval  even  of  his  colleague,  Pando.  The  Colombian 
delegates,  in  giving  an  account  of  the  conference  to  Revenga, 
spoke  of  the  conflict  between  some  of  Vidaurre's  bases  and  the 
instructions  which  the  delegates  of  both  countries  had  been 
given  by  their  respective  governments.  And  Revenga,  in  re- 
plying, reminded  the  delegates  that  certain  stipulations  of  Vi^ 
daurre's  plan,  notably  numbers  9,  10,  11,  12,  14,  18,  and  20, 
were  contrary  to  the  fundamental  laws  of  Colombia.  The  pro- 
visions objected  to,  it  will  be  noticed,  were  those  which  were 
meant  by  the  author  of  the  plan,  no  doubt,  to  give  consistency 
to  the  confederation.  That  the  congress  should  make  general 
laws,  that  it  should  be  permanently  constituted,  that  there 
should  be  one  common  citizenship,  that  the  citizens  of  one  state 
should  be  eligible  to  office  in  the  other  states,  that  there  should 

«  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  293-294. 


336       PAN-AMEKECANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

be  no  barriers  to  commercial  interchange,  that  the  form  of 
government  in  each  state  should  be  guaranteed  by  the  congress, 
and  that  the  acts  of  the  congress  should  be  valid  without  the 
ratification  of  the  individual  members  of  the  confederation, 
were  all  provisions  which  implied  a  movement  in  the  direction 
of  a  common  sovereignty.  Such  proposals,  Eevenga  declared, 
were  inadmissible.  Colombia  desired,  he  said,  to  perpetuate 
the  American  confederation,  but  preferred  to  employ  indirect 
means  to  effect  that  end.  The  positive  benefits  of  such  an 
association  would  contribute  more  to  give  it  permanency  than 
would  such  restrictive  measures  as  those  advocated  by  Vidaurre. 
Moreover  Eevenga  feared  that  these  proposals  would  serve  to 
increase  the  suspicion  with  which  some  of  the  states  had  al- 
ready begun  to  view  the  confederation  and  that  they  would  also 
be  the  means  of  arousing  jealousies  and  ill  feeling  in  general 
among  the  republics,  which  condition  it  was  naturally  desired 
to  avoid.49 

It  will  be  recalled  that  by  Article  10  of  the  treaty  of  union, 
league,  and  confederation  concluded  between  Colombia  and 
Peru  on  July  6,  1822,  it  was  provided  that  if  unfortunately 
the  internal  tranquillity  of  any  part  of  either  state  should  be 
interrupted  by  "  turbulent  and  seditious  persons,"  the  contract- 
ing parties  would  make  common  cause  against  all  such  disturb- 
ers, aiding  each  other  with  all  the  means  in  their  power  to  estab- 
lish order  and  the  authority  of  the  laws.  And  it  will  be  re- 
membered that,  while  the  treaty  was  under  consideration  by  the 
senate  of  Colombia,  the  question  raised  as  to  the  application 
of  this  stipulation  to  the  dispute  between  O'Higgins  and  Freire 
in  Chile  led  Colombia  to  reject  the  article.  Buenos  Aires,  as 
has  elsewhere  been  shown,  was  also  extremely  jealous  of  any 
outside  interference  in  its  domestic  affairs.  No  state  except 
Peru  had  in  fact  reached  the  point  of  ratifying  a  treaty  con- 
taining the  intervention  principle ;  and  it  was  now  one  of  the 
delegates  of  Peru  who  proposed  a  plan  of  confederation  which 

4»  O'Leary,  Memorial,  XXIV,  292,  302. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGKESS  337 

would  have  given  the  general  assembly  the  right  to  intervene 
for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  lawful  governments  50  of  the 
states  of  the  confederacy  as  well  as  for  the  purpose  of  guaran- 
teeing their  territorial  integrity.  The  manner  in  which  Vi- 
daurre's  plan  was  received  gave  evidence  of  a  growing  spirit  of 
nationalism.  The  difficulties  of  establishing  a  real  confedera- 
tion began  to  be  more  clearly  seen.  The  delegates  of  Peru 
themselves  soon  received  new  instructions  which  indicated  that 
the  attitude  of  that  republic  had  undergone  a  profound  change. 
The  new  instructions  were  brought  to  Panama  early  in  April 
by  Manuel  Perez  de  Tudela,  who  had  been  sent  to  relieve 
Pando.51  The  Colombian  delegates  noted  at  once  the  changed 
attitude  of  the  representatives  of  Peru,  who  now  declared  that 
the  assembly  could  accomplish  within  a  few  days  all  that  was 
required  of  it.  Having  obtained  an  informal  statement  of  the 
instructions  which  Tudela  had  brought,  the  Colombian  minis- 
ters described  them  in  a  communication  to  Revenga,  in  sub- 
stance as  follows : 

Not  desiring  to  contribute  to  the  establishment  of  a  federal 
navy,  Peru  would  provide  troops  and  money  in  proportion  to 
its  population,  but  it  would  not  permit  its  troops  to  advance  be- 
so  The  following  articles  of  the  instructions  of  May  15,  1825,  to  the 
delegates  of  Peru  show  what  the  attitude  of  that  government  was  at  the 
time  the  instructions  were  prepared. 

Article  19.  "  As  America  is  in  need  of  a  long  period  of  rest  and  peace 
for  recovering  from  the  harm  she  has  suffered  in  the  war  with  Spain, 
and  as  a  tendency  toward  local  independence  and  sovereignty  is  clearly 
noticeable  through  the  whole  of  the  continent,  you  shall  endeavor  to  settle 
these  questions  which  may  arise  out  of  this  tendency,  and  obtain  some  de- 
cision about  what  portion  of  the  new  states  can  be  considered  representa- 
tives of  the  sovereignty  and  national  will,  and  in  what  manner  can  this 
will  be  expressed  to  have  legal  effects. 

Article  20.  "  After  this  point  is  decided,  you  shall  endeavor  to  obtain 
a  declaration  to  the  effect  that  the  American  states,  far  from  encouraging 
and  aiding  seditious  and  ambitious  disturbers  of  the  public  peace  and 
order,  will  on  the  contrary  cooperate  with  each  other,  by  all  the  means  in 
their  possession,  in  supporting  and  maintaining  all  legally  constituted 
governments."  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  172- 
173;  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  262. 

si  Gual  and  Bricefio  Mendez  to  Revenga,  April  6,  1825.  O'Leary, 
Memorias,  XXIV,  313. 


338       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

yond  its  own  frontiers  in  defense  of  the  other  members  of  the 
confederation.  It  would  make,  however,  a  money  contribution 
to  the  defense  of  the  other  states.  As  a  prerequisite  to  entering 
into  commercial  treaties  the  new  instructions  demanded  that 
the  Peruvian  Congress  should  first  agree  upon  the  fundamental 
principles  which  were  to  serve  as  the  basis  for  these  treaties. 
Peru  apparently  hesitated,  said  the  Colombian  delegates,  to  es- 
tablish an  alliance  or  to  adopt  sane  rules  for  the  conduct  of 
international  relations  because  its  government  had  conceived 
the  absurd  idea  that  the  assembly  would  attempt  to  make  its 
decisions  "  obligatory  upon  all  the  powers  of  Christendom." 
Another  matter  which  the  government  of  Peru  was  now  unwill- 
ing to  have  discussed  at  Panama  was  the  boundary  question  with 
Colombia.  And  finally  the  government  of  that  republic  would 
decline  to  treat  with  the  United  States  and  Brazil  unless  they 
entered  into  the  proposed  league.52 

Commenting  upon  the  changed  attitude  of  the  government  of 
Peru,  the  Colombian  delegates  declared  that  they  foresaw  in- 
superable obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  successful  outcome  of  the 
congress.  Considerations  of  a  local  character,  selfishness,  jeal- 
ousies, and  mistrust  of  the  most  puerile  sort,  inherent  in  the 
colonial  state  under  which  the  inhabitants  of  the  new  republics 
had  hitherto  lived,  made  united  action  extremely  difficult  to  at- 
tain. Nevertheless  they  had  remonstrated  with  their  Peruvian 
colleagues,  who,  convinced  of  the  justice  of  the  protest,  had  en- 
gaged to  ask  for  more  liberal  instructions.53 

52  ibid.,  314. 

Gual  declared  in  a  private  letter  to  Bolivar  dated  April  11,  1826,  that  it 
was  the  desire  of  Colombia  to  treat  with  the  United  States  and  Brazil  as 
neutrals,  in  order  to  open  the  way  to  the  establishment  of  more  intimate 
relations,  if  circumstances  should  demand.  O'Leary,  Memorias,  VIII, 
438. 

83  Gual  and  Bricefio  Me"ndez  to  Revenga,  April  10,  1826.  O'Leary, 
Memoriae,  XXIV,  314. 

BriceHo  Me"ndez,  writing  to  Bolivar  under  date  of  April  12,  1826,  voices 
his  disappointment  at  the  changed  attitude  of  the  Peruvian  delegates  and 
attributes  the  change  to  the  delegates  themselves  rather  than  to  their  gov- 
ernment. "  Who  would  have  believed,"  he  said,  "  that  Peru  would  be  the 


THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS  339 

In  a  letter  to  Santander,  dated  February  21,  1826,  Bolivar 
explained  the  situation  in  Peru  as  follows: 

"  As  to  the  proposals  of  this  government  relative  to  the  fed- 
eration I  shall  say  to  you  that  I  have  refrained,  through  motives 
of  delicacy,  from  intervening  in  its  resolutions  upon  this  sub- 
ject. I  foresee  that  they  will  not  care  to  become  involved  in  a 
very  close  federation,  for  several  reasons.  Those  which  occur 
to  me  I  regard  as  reflecting  honor  upon  myself,  but  there  may 
be  always  a  second  intention.  They  are  afraid,  moreover,  of 
expenses,  for  they  are  very  poor  and  greatly  in  debt:  here  they 
owe  much  and  they  owe  everybody.  They  do  not  wish  to  go 
to  Habana  because  they  have  to  go  to  Chiloe,  which  belongs  to 
them,  and  because  they  can  pay  Chile  with  that  island.  They 
have  more  than  enough  naval  forces  and  will  not,  therefore, 
care  to  buy  more  vessels.  They  are  afraid  to  become  too 
closely  bound  to  the  English  and  they  do  not  fear  an  uprising 
of  the  colored  folk,  who  are  very  submissive.  I  give  you  this 
information  in  order  that  you  may  know  what  are  the  principal 
ideas  opposed  to  those  of  Colombia."  54 

first  to  depart  from  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  confederation? 
When  I  arrived  here  I  was  afraid  that  our  time  would  be  thrown  away 
because  the  rest  of  the  states  would  not  accede  to  the  project  proposed  by 
the  Peruvians;  for  to  do  so  would  have  given  an  excessive  and  even  a 
dangerous  extension  to  the  central  authority.  Each  state  would  have  lost 
its  political  importance  by  being  absorbed  in  the  confederation.  But  this 
liberality  "is  a  thing  of  the  past.  They  now  intend  that  the  league  shall  be 
no  more  than  defensive.  ...  I  have  good  reasons  for  believing  that  its 
[Peru's]  ministers  here  are  the  ones  who  have  suggested  this  negative  pol- 
icy, and  as  Senor  Pando  has  been  recalled  by  his  government,  it  is  to  be 
supposed  he  will  promote  his  ideas  there.  He  is  not  a  friend  of  the  league 
and  less  of  Colombia  and  Colombians.  Senor  Vidaurre  is  a  partisan  of  the 
former;  but  perhaps  I  am  not  too  bold  in  affirming  that  this  is  promoted 
more  by  hatred  of  Colombia  than  by  a  desire  for  the  welfare  of  America." 
O'Leary,  Memorias,  VIII,  188-189.  See  also  Briceno  Me"ndez's  letter  to 
Bolivar  of  April  26,  Ibid.,  199. 

s*  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXXI,  167. 

Later  Bolivar  apparently  lost  all  hope  of  seeing  Peru  form  a  part  of 
the  confederation;  for  in  August  he  proposed  through  his  secretary,  P6rez, 
to  the  Colombian  ministers  at  Panama  a  plan  by  which  Colombia,  Mex- 
ico, and  Central  America  alone  should  constitute  a  federal  army  and 
navy  to  continue  the  war  against  Spain.  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  376. 


340       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Eevenga  received  the  news  of  the  threatened  defection  of 
Peru  with  deep  concern.  He  feared  that  the  assembly  would 
merit  the  contempt  of  the  American  states,  if,  after  having  at- 
tracted to  itself  the  attention  of  the  world,  it  should  now  lay 
aside  the  important  objects  for  which  it  had  been  convened. 
For  his  own  part  he  would  do  what  he  could  to  induce  the  gov- 
ernment of  Peru  to  return  to  the  more  liberal  policy  which 
it  had  previously  maintained.  He  believed  that  the  proximate 
arrival  of  the  Mexican  plenipotentiaries  would  react  favorably 
upon  the  attitude  of  Peru ;  for  the  republic  of  Mexico  appeared 
to  have  a  more  exact  idea  of  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  the 
union,  entertained  stronger  hopes  of  its  success  and  had  a 
broader  view  of  its  bearing  upon  the  happiness-  of  mankind.55 

In  reality  the  arrival  of  the  Mexican  delegates,  early  in  June, 
appeared  to  revive  the  hopes  of  Gual  and  Briceiio  Mendez,  who 
now  wrote  more  encouragingly  of  the  outlook.  The  Mexican 
Government,  they  learned,  desired  to  see  the  confederation  made 
effective;  and  even  though  nothing  more  should  be  done  than 
to  present  a  respectable  and  imposing  front  to  Spain,  they  be- 
lieved that  a  vast  deal  would  thus  have  been  accomplished, 
that  peace  would  have  been  attained,  and  that  the  existence  of 
the  confederation  would  be  assured  by  the  practical  demonstra- 
tion of  its  convenience  and  utility.  But  Mexico  wished  to  see 
the  sessions  of  the  congress  promptly  begun,  and,  like  Peru, 
believed  that  its  work  might  be  quickly  finished.56 

Accordingly,  after  a  few  days  more  of  preliminary  discus- 
sion, the  first  formal  meeting  of  the  assembly  took  place.  Be- 
tween June  22,  the  date  of  its  opening,  and  July  15,  the  date 
of  its  adjournment,  four  separate  conventions  were  concluded. 
They  were :  First,  a  treaty  of  perpetual  union,  league,  and  con- 
federation, based  upon  the  preliminary  treaties  discussed  in 
the  preceding  pages;  second,  a  convention  providing  for  the 
future  meetings  of  the  congress,  fixing  the  qualifications  of  its 

8«  CKLeary,  Memoriaa,  XXIV,  322-323. 
M  Ibid.,  XXIV,  325-320. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS  341 

members,  and  making  other  regulations  respecting  its  constitu- 
tion and  procedure;  third,  a  convention  fixing  the  contingent 
of  armed  forces  and  the  subsidies  which  each  republic  should 
contribute  to  the  formation  of  a  permanent  army  and  navy,  and 
establishing  certain  regulations  relative  thereto ;  fourth,  a  con- 
fidential agreement  additional  to  the  last-mentioned  conven- 
tion, relating  to  the  organization  and  movements  of  the  army 
and  navy.57 

The  treaty  of  union,  league,  and  confederation  contained 
thirty-one  articles,  and  an  additional  article.  Among  its  most 
important  provisions  were  those  relating  to  the  common  defense, 
the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  between  the  members  of  the 
confederation,  the  status  of  the  citizens  of  one  state  residing  in 
another,  the  maintenance  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  sev- 
eral states,  the  admission  of  other  powers  into  the  confedera- 
tion, the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade,  and  the  revision  of  the 
treaty  upon  the  conclusion  of  peace.  Article  25  provided  that 
the  commercial  relations  between  the  contracting  parties  should 
be  regulated  in  the  next  assembly.  The  additional  article  stip- 
ulated that  as  soon  as  the  treaty  of  union,  league,  and  confeder- 
ation had  been  ratified,  the  contracting  parties  should  proceed 
to  fix  by  common  agreement  all  the  points,  rules,  and  princi- 
ples that  were  to  govern  their  conduct  in  peace  and  war;  and 
it  was  provided  that  in  the  accomplishment  of  this  task  all 
friendly  and  neutral  powers  should  be  invited  to  take  an  active 
part.  None  of  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  gave  the  congress 
the  right  to  intervene  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  allied  states, 
and  by  Article  28  it  was  expressly  declared  that  the  treaty  did 
not  in  any  wise  interrupt,  nor  should  ever  interrupt,  the  exer- 
cise of  the  sovereignty  of  any  of  the  contracting  parties  in  the 
conduct  of  its  foreign  relations.  Article  29  provided  that  if 
any  of  the  republics  should  change  substantially  its  form  of 
government  such  republic  should  by  that  act  be  excluded  from 

"  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  174;  O'Leary, 
Memorias,  XXIV,  372. 


342       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  confederation,  subject  to  reinstatement  only  upon  the  unani- 
mous consent  of  the  parties  concerned.  That  the  character  of 
the  congress  was  intended  to  be  no  other  than  diplomatic  is 
made  clear  by  Article  13,  which  sets  forth  its  objects.  In  view 
of  the  importance  of  this  article  it  is  here  quoted  in  full : 

"  Article  13.  The  principal  objects  of  the  assembly  of  min- 
isters plenipotentiary  of  the  confederate  powers  are : 

"  First.  To  negotiate  and  conclude  between  the  powers  it 
represents  all  such  treaties,  conventions,  and  arrangements  as 
may  place  their  reciprocal  relations  on  a  mutually  agreeable 
and  satisfactory  footing. 

"  Second.  To  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  a  friendly 
and  unalterable  peace  between  the  confederate  powers,  serving 
them  as  a  council  in  times  of  great  conflicts,  as  a  point  of  con- 
tact in  common  dangers,  as  a  faithful  interpreter  of  the  public 
treaties  and  conventions  concluded  by  them  in  the  said  assem- 
bly, when  any  doubt  arises  as  to  their  construction,  and  as  a 
conciliator  in  their  controversies  and  differences. 

"  Third.  To  endeavor  to  secure  conciliation,  or  mediation, 
in  all  questions  which  may  arise  between  the  allied  powers,  or 
between  any  of  them  and  one  or  more  powers  foreign  to  the 
confederation,  whenever  threatened  of  a  rupture,  or  engaged  in 
war  because  of  grievances,  serious  injuries,  or  other  complaints. 

"  Fourth.  To  adjust  and  conclude  during  the  common  wars 
of  the  contracting  parties  with  one  or  many  powers  foreign  to 
the  confederation  all  those  treaties  of  alliance,  concert,  subsidies, 
and  contributions  that  shall  hasten  its  termination." 

The  articles  relating  to  the  question  of  territorial  integrity  are 
also  of  special  interest.  The  first  of  these  appears  to  have  been 
designed  to  give  effect  to  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe 
regarding  noncolonization ;  nothing  whatever  is  said  as  to  the 
nonintervention  principle.  The  articles  read  as  follows: 

"  Article  21.  The  contracting  parties  solemnly  obligate  and 
bind  themselves  to  uphold  and  defend  the  integrity  of  their 
respective  territories,  earnestly  opposing  any  attempt  of  colonial 


THE  PANAMA  CONGKESS  343 

settlement  in  them  without  authority  of,  and  dependence  upon, 
the  governments  under  whose  jurisdiction  they  are,  and  to  em- 
ploy to  this  end,  in  common,  their  forces  and  resources,  if  neces- 
sary. 

"  Article  22.  The  contracting  parties  mutually  guarantee 
the  integrity  of  their  territories  as  soon  as,  by  virtue  of  special 
conventions  concluded  between  each  other,  their  respective 
boundaries  shall  have  been  determined;  and  the  preservation 
of  these  frontiers  shall  then  be  under  the  protection  of  the 
confederation."  58 

The  special  conventions  relating  to  the  army  and  navy  show 
the  effects  of  the  nationalistic  reaction.  Although  elaborate 
regulations  were  made  respecting  the  number  of  troops  to  be 
maintained  by  each  republic,  the  conditions  under  which  one 
state  should  send  its  forces  to  the  aid  of  another,  and  the  equip- 
ment and  support  of  such  forces  in  the  field,  yet  no  provision 
was  made  for  a  central  direction  or  command  of  the  combined 
forces.  The  dream  of  a  confederate  army  had  not  been  re- 
alized. The  troops  of  one  state,  as  provided  in  the  treaty,  when 
sent  to  the  aid  of  another,  came  nominally  under  the  control 
of  the  latter  state ;  but  since  they  remained  under  the  command 
of  their  own  officers,  the  control  of  the  state  to  which  they  be- 
longed was  by  no  means  relinquished.  It  was  possible,  however, 
that,  even  if  it  should  in  any  case  be  deemed  advisable  to  take 
the  offensive  against  a  common  enemy  beyond  the  territory  of 
the  allies,  the  contracting  parties  would  then  agree  as  to  the 
object  of  the  expedition,  the  means  to  be  employed  in  carrying 
it  out,  the  commander  to  direct  the  operations,  and  the  tem- 

BS  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  184-190;  O'Leary, 
Memorias,  XXIV,  352-360.  In  an  instruction  dated  April  8,  1826,  Re- 
venga  referred  to  the  dispute  between  Buenos  Aires  and  Brazil  over  the 
possession  of  the  Banda  Oriental,  as  a  concrete  illustration  of  the  danger 
that  might  arise  out  of  a  stipulation  guaranteeing  the  territorial  integrity 
of  the  members  of  the  confederation.  He  thought  that  a  promise  mutually 
to  respect  the  territory  held  by  each  state  at  the  moment  of  concluding  the 
treaty  would  be  as  far  as  it  would  be  safe  to  go.  O'Leary,  Memorias^ 
XXIV,  312. 


344       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

porary  or  permanent  organization  to  be  given  to  the  country 
which  might  be  occupied  as  a  result  of  such  expedition.59  No 
reference  to  Cuba  or  Porto  Rico  other  than  this  veiled  one  ap- 
pears in  the  protocols  of  the  sessions. 

With  regard  to  the  navy  the  delegates  of  Peril,  in  accordance 
with  their  later  instructions,  declined  to  become  a  party  to  any 
convention  011  the  subject.  But  Colombia,  Central  America, 
and  Mexico  agreed  to  cooperate  in  the  maintenance  of  a  navy 
the  direction  and  command  of  which  was  to  be  placed  under  a 
commission  of  three  members  appointed  by  the  three  republics, 
respectively.  The  commission,  it  was  agreed,  should  have  the 
authority  of  a  high  military  officer,  if  the  contracting  govern- 
ments so  desired ;  and  in  order  that  its  members  might  have  the 
independence  and  liberty  necessary  to  the  fullest  discharge  of 
their  duties,  it  was  further  agreed  that  they  should  enjoy  the 
privileges  and  immunities  of  diplomatic  officers.  But  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  provisions  for  a  united  navy  as  marking  a 
tendency  toward  effective  confederation,  was  in  great  part  de- 
stroyed by  an  article  making  the  agreement  optional  after  the 
conclusion  of  peace  with  Spain.60 

Article  11  of  the  treaty  of  union,  league  and  confederation 
provided  that  the  congress  should  meet  every  two  years  in  time 
of  peace  and  every  year  in  time  of  war.61  Article  1  of  the 
special  convention  on  the  subject  of  future  meetings  stipulated 
that  the  assembly  should  remove  to  the  village  of  Tacubaya, 
one  league  distant  from  the  City  of  Mexico,  and  that  it 
should  continue  to  hold  its  sessions  there  or  at  some  other  point 
in  Mexican  territory,  so  long  as  reason  and  circumstances  should 
not  demand  the  selection  of  a  different  locality  having  equal 
advantages  of  healthfulness,  security,  and  convenience  for 

69  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  192-199;  O'Leary, 
Memoriae,  XXIV,  362-369. 

eo  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  199-200;  O'Leary, 
Memorias,  XXIV,  370-371. 

ei  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  186;  O'Leary,  Me- 
moriaa,  XXIV,  365. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGKESS  345 

communicating  with  the  nations  of  Europe  and  America.62 
The  unhealthfulness  of  the  Isthmus  was  undoubtedly  an  im- 
portant factor,  if  not  the  determining  one,  in  the  decision  to 
abandon  Panama  as  the  seat  of  the  congress.  Soon  after  the 
arrival  of  the  Colombian  delegates  at  Panama,  Briceno  Mendez 
wrote  Bolivar  that  the  place  was  the  worst  enemy  the  project 
had.  The  people  were  not  opposed  to  the  congress,  he  said, 
but  the  climate  was  so  merciless,  the  city  was  so  ugly  and  un- 
comfortable, poverty  was  so  general,  the  roads  were  so  difficult 
to  travel  over,  and  the  necessities  of  life  so  scarce  and  so  dear 
that  it  was  impossible  to  think  of  Panama  as  a  suitable  meeting 
place.63 

Fearing  that  Bolivar  would  be  displeased  at  the  decision  of 
the  congress  to  remove  to  Tacubaya,  Briceno  Mendez  wrote  on 
July  22  and  explained  that  the  change  had  been  deemed  neces- 
sary :  First,  because  by  that  means  it  was  assured  that  Mexico 
would  continue  in  the  league;  secondly,  because  the  unhealth- 
fulness of  Panama  made  it  impossible  for  the  delegates  to  live 
there.  Yellow  fever  and  the  black  vomit,  said  Briceno  Mendez, 
were  frightening  every  human  being  from  the  city.  The 
British  commissioner  had  lost  in  one  month  his  secretary  and 
another  member  of  his  suite.  The  Colombian  delegation  had 
lost  two  servants,  and  almost  everybody  connected  with  the 
congress  had  been  ill.64  Gual  called  attention,  in  addition  to 
the  reasons  assigned  by  his  colleague,  to  the  consideration  which 
Mexico  merited  by  virtue  of  the  importance  of  its  contingents  — 
more  than  half  of  the  total,65  to  the  greater  respectability  which 

62  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  191;  O'Leary,  Me- 
morias,  XXIV,  361. 

ea  O'Leary,  Memorias,  VIII,  186. 

«*  Ibid.,  210. 

es  The  contracting  parties  obligated  themselves  to  raise  and  maintain  on 
a  war  footing  an  army  of  60,000  men  in  the  following  proportions:  Colom- 
bia, 15,250;  Central  America,  6,750;  Peru,  5,250;  and  Mexico,  32,750.  For 
the  organization  and  maintenance  of  a  competent  naval  force  the  sum  of 
7,720,000  pesos  was  appropriated,  apportioned  as  follows:  Colombia,  2,- 
205,714  pesos;  Central  America,  955,811  pesos;  and  Mexico,  4,558,475  pesos. 
Int.  Am.  Con/.  (1889-90),  IV,  193;  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXIV,  363,  365. 


346       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  congress  would  acquire  at  its  new  seat,  and  to  the  more 
direct  contact  which  it  would  have  with  foreign  governments.66 

Other  considerations  undoubtedly  entered  into  the  resolution 
of  the  congress  to  remove  to  Mexico,  among  which  were  personal 
jealousies  and  the  ever-present  spirit  of  localism.  Gual  and 
Briceno  Mendez  refer  frequently  in  their  letters  to  the  un- 
friendly attitude  of  the  Peruvian  delegates  toward  Colombia 
and  toward  Bolivar  and  the  Colombians  in  general.67  Gual 
later  became  convinced  that  the  failure  of  the  congress  to  re- 
new its  sessions  at  Tacubaya  was  due  in  great  part  to  the 
indifference  of  the  government  of  Mexico.68  It  was  even 
charged  that  Mexico  defeated  the  project  out  of  jealousy  of 
Bolivar.69  Whether  or  not  this  was  true,  it  is  certain  that  Boli- 
var viewed  the  removal  with  misgivings.  "  The  transfer  of 
the  assembly  to  Mexico,"  he  wrote  Briceno  Mendez,  "  is  going  to 
put  it  under  the  immediate  influence  of  that  power,  already  too 
preponderant,  and  also  under  the  influence  of  the  United  States 
of  the  North.  These  and  other  reasons  oblige  me  to  ask  that 
the  treaties  be  not  ratified  until  I  arrive  at  Bogota  and  have 
the  opportunity  of  examining  them  with  you  and  others."  ™ 

It  was  agreed  at  the  tenth  and  last  conference,  held  on  July 
15,  that  the  ministers,  Briceno  Mendez,  Molina,  and  Vidaurre, 
should  return  to  their  respective  countries  for  the  purpose  of 
reporting  upon  the  work  accomplished  at  Panama  and  for  the 
purpose  of  securing,  if  possible,  the  ratification  of  the  four 
conventions  which  had  been  concluded.  The  other  delegates, 
Gual,  Larrazabal,  and  Perez  de  Tudela,  together  with  the  Mex- 
ican representatives,  were  to  proceed  to  Tacubaya,  where  it  was 
proposed  to  renew  the  sessions  of  the  congress.  This  plan  was 

ee  Gual  to  Bolivar,  July  17,  1826.     O'Leary,  Memoriaa,  VIII,  448. 
For  the  report  of  the  Mexican  delegates  on  the  subject  of  the  transfer 
of  the  congress  to  Tacubaya  see:  American  State  Papers:  For.  Rel.,  VI,  362. 
er  O'Leary,  Memoriaa,  VII,  189,  199,  439,  442. 
o«  O'Leary,  Memoriaa,  XXIV,  397,  407. 

69  Niles,  History  of  South  America  and  Mexico,  I,  194. 

70  O'Leary,  M emoriaa,  XXVIII,  660. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGBESS  347 

carried  out,  as  far  as  the  several  destinations  of  the  delegates 
were  concerned,  with  the  exception  that  Perez  de  Tudela,  after 
having  waited  at  Panama  until  the  following  January  (1827), 
received  instructions  from  his  government  to  return  to  Peru, 
as  it  was  considered  that  his  services  would  be  more  useful  at 
home  than  in  the  general  assembly  of  American  nations.71 

Of  the  republics  represented  at  Panama,  Colombia  was  the 
only  one  to  ratify  the  conventions.  The  ratification  did  not 
take  place,  however,  until  about  the  middle  of  the  year  1827, 
and  then  it  was  effected  in  spite  of  the  indifference  and  per- 
haps even  the  opposition  of  the  Liberator.  That  Peru  should 
have  failed  to  ratify  the  treaties  is  not  difficult  to  understand, 
in  view  of  the  attitude  which  that  republic  assumed  before  the 
formal  sessions  of  the  congress  began.  Moreover  the  return  of 
Vidaurre  to  Lima  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  ratification  of 
the  conventions  occurred  at  a  moment  when  the  reaction  against 
Bolivar's  political  plans  had  strongly  set  in.72  Bolivar  himself 
was  opposed  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaties  by  Peru  as  he 
had  been  to  their  ratification  by  Colombia,  and  wrote  to  Pando, 
who  was  still  loyal  to  him,  to  that  effect.  In  replying  Pando 
declared  that  he  rejoiced  to  learn  Bolivar's  opinion;  that  he 
had  himself  always  believed  that  the  philanthropic  project  of 
confederating  the  whole  of  America  was  impracticable  and  that 
nothing  would  come  of  the  general  assembly,  and  that  he  re- 
garded the  Panama  conventions  with  indifference.  More  than 
that,  he  regarded  them  as  doubly  prejudicial  to  Peru;  that  is, 
they  would  be  a  burden  to  the  country  standing  alone  and  an 
obstacle  to  its  federation  with  Colombia  and  Bolivia,  as  pro- 

71  Torres  Caicedo,   Unidn  Latino-Americana,  36;   O'Leary,  Memorias,  X, 
417.     International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  183. 

72  Bolivar  left  Lima  early  in  September,   1826,  to  return  to  Colombia. 
At  Guayaquil  he  met  Vidaurre,  who  had  stopped  there  on  his  way  to  Lima 
from  Panama.     On  September  14,  Bolivar  wrote  Jose"  de  Larrea  as  follows: 
"  Yesterday  I  talked  with  Vidaurre  and  he  expressed  to  me  a  desire  to 
proceed  to  Lima  with  the  treaties;  dissembling  my  motives  I  tried  to  lead 
him  to  change  his  mind,  advising  him  to  remain  here  a  while  longer." 
O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXXI,  266. 


348       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

posed,  under  a  general  government  presided  over  by  the  Lib- 
erator. 

A  sufficient  explanation  of  the  failure  of  the  government  of 
the  Central  American  republic  to  ratify  the  conventions  is  to  be 
found  in  the  state  of  anarchy  into  which  that  section  of  the 
continent  had  fallen.73  The  rejection  of  the  treaties  by  Mexico, 
as  well  as  the  final  abandonment  of  the  plan  for  the  reassem- 
bling of  the  congress  at  Tacubaya,  is  set  forth  in  a  series  of 
illuminating  dispatches  which  the  Colombian  plenipotentiary, 
Gual,  sent  to  his  government  during  his  stay  of  more  than  two 
years  in  Mexico.74 

Proceeding  upon  his  mission,  soon  after  the  adjournment  of 
the  Panama  Congress,  Gual  reached  Acapulco  in  August,  and 
remained  there  until  toward  the  close  of  the  year,  when  he  con- 
tinued his  journey  to  the  City  of  Mexico.  On  January  29, 
1827,  he  wrote  from  the  Mexican  capital  that  the  Panama 
treaties  were  being  considered  by  the  house  of  deputies,  and 
that  he  believed  they  would  be  approved.75  The  only  foreign 
representatives  present,  he  said,  were  Larrazabal,  the  Central 
American  delegate,  and  Sergeant,  the  minister  of  the  United 
States,  who  had  arrived  a  few  days  before.  As  the  Mexican 
congress  later  adjourned  without  having  acted  upon  the  trea- 
ties, Gual  became  somewhat  discouraged.  No  other  representa- 
tives had  arrived.  On  the  other  hand,  Sergeant  had  returned 
to  the  United  States,  while  Van  Veer,  the  agent  of  the  Nether- 
lands, who  had  come  to  Mexico  from  Panama,  had  quit  the 
country.  Moreover  a  discouraging  state  of  disorder  reigned 
throughout  the  new  republics.  Reviewing  the  situation,  Gual 
raised  the  question  whether  it  was  possible  to  establish  a  con- 

73  For  an  account  of  the  situation  in  Central  America  at  this  time,  see 
Bancroft,  History  of  Central  America,  III,  79-104.  For  a  fuller  account 
see  Marure,  Basque  jo  Histdrico  de  las  Revoluciones  de  Centro- America,  I, 
169-191;  II,  6-143. 

7*  Extracts  from  these  dispatches  are  found  in  O'Leary's  Memorias,  XXIV, 
377-408. 

™  Article  50,  section  13,  of  the  Mexican  constitution  of  1824  provided 
that  treaties  should  be  approved  by  the  general  congress. 


THE  PANAMA  COJSTGKESS  349 

federation  of  such  discordant  and  disorganized  elements.  Was 
the  confederation,  he  inquired,  to  be  the  efficient  means  of  cor- 
recting the  internal  evils  of  the  several  states,  or  was  it  to  be 
itself  the  product  of  order  and  purpose  in  each  of  the  units? 
To  his  concern  over  this  state  of  affairs  and  over  the  failure  of 
Mexico  to  ratify  the  treaties,  was  now  added  the  anxiety  caused 
by  the  continued  inaction  of  his  own  government.  In  July, 
however,  he  was  cheered  by  a  decree  of  President  Victoria  call- 
ing an  extra  session  of  the  congress  to  consider,  among  other 
things,  the  pending  treaties.  And  in  November  he  at  last 
learned  through  a  private  source  that  the  long-awaited  ratifica- 
tion by  Colombia  had  been  effected.76 

But  Gual  was  destined  to  suffer  further  disappointment. 
The  special  session  of  the  Mexican  congress  took  no  action  upon 
the  treaties  and  the  government  showed  no  disposition  to  ad- 
vance the  cause  of  union.  By  the  end  of  January,  1828,  the 
Colombian  representative  became  convinced  that  to  remain 
longer  in  Mexico  would  lead  to  no  useful  result.  Upon  inform- 
ing President  Victoria,  however,  of  his  intention  to  retire  from 
the  country,  Gual  was  urged  by  that  functionary  with  such  man- 
ifestations of  sincerity  to  postpone  his  departure  until  a  further 
effort  had  been  made  to  secure  favorable  action  on  the  part 
of  the  national  congress,  that  he  resolved  to  remain  at  his  post 
a  while  longer.  Some  days  later  he  wrote  in  a  more  hopeful 
vein.  It  then  seemed  likely  that  the  American  assembly  would 
soon  be  able  to  resume  its  sittings.  In  March  the  treaties  were 
approved  by  the  house  of  deputies  and  having  passed  to  the 
senate  were  referred  to  a  committee  of  that  body.  But  this  led 
Gual  to  suspect  that  further  delay  would  follow ;  for  it  was  un- 
certain when  the  senate  committee  would  report.  He  again 
became  greatly  discouraged  when  he  learned  that  some  of  the 
members  of  the  Mexican  congress  were  saying  that  Mexico  had 
no  need  of  a  confederation,  and  that  the  republic  ought  not  to 
cast  in  its  fortune  with  a  lot  of  unimportant  republics  where 

76  Q'Leaiy,  Memorias,  XXIV,  378?  380,  383-386,  389f 


350      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

anarchy  reigned  supreme.  One  of  the  gentlemen,  indeed,  had 
even  had  the  impudence,  as  Gual  expressed  it,  to  speak,  after 
the  manner  of  the  ungrateful  Peruvians,  disparagingly  of  Co- 
lombia, supposing  it  to  be  dominated  by  a  tyrant,  as  the  illustri- 
ous Bolivar  was  characterized.77 

In  May  Gual  wrote  that  the  congress  had  again  adjourned 
without  ratifying  the  treaties.  But,  inasmuch  as  the  president 
had  spoken  hopefully  of  the  future,  the  Colombian  plenipo- 
tentiary deemed  it  prudent,  in  spite  of  his  growing  distrust,  to 
await  the  holding  of  another  special  session,  which  was  soon 
to  be  called.  It  met  on  July  1,  1828,  but  the  senate  shortly 
afterward  resolved,  without  explaining  upon  what  ground,  that 
the  treaties  should  be  again  referred  to  the  executive.  This 
in  effect  meant  their  defeat.  Gual  now  began  to  make  prepa- 
rations to  return  to  Colombia.78  On  October  9,  he  had  a  formal 
conference  with  Larrazabal,  and  the  two  Mexican  ministers, 
Michelena  and  Dominguez,  in  which  he  reviewed  the  efforts  he 
had  made  to  discharge  his  mission  and  explained  the  motives 
that  at  last  impelled  him  to  leave  the  country.  In  brief,  he 
made  it  clear  that  he  had  become  convinced  that  the  plan  of  re- 
assembling the  congress  at  Tacubaya  was  a  failure,  thanks 
mainly,  as  he  believed,  to  Mexico.  With  these  views  the  Cen- 
tral American  delegate  was  in  substantial  accord.79 

In  fairness  to  Mexico  it  must  be  said  that  the  charge  that  its 
government  was  responsible  for  the  failure  of  the  project  of 
confederation  was  not  altogether  just.  The  Mexican  pleni- 
potentiaries maintained  that,  even  if  the  conventions  had  been 
ratified  by  Mexico,  it  would  not  have  been  possible  to  proceed 
to  the  exchange  of  ratifications;  for  in  Central  America  there 
was  no  legislative  body  in  existence  to  approve  the  treaties,  and 
in  Peru  there  was  not  sufficient  interest  to  induce  the  government 
to  send  ministers  to  Tacubaya.  What  advantage  would  there 

"  O'Leary,  M emorias,  XXIV,  397-399. 
™  Ibid.,  401,  405. 

™  Ibid.,  405.  For  the  protocol  of  the  conference  of  October  9,  see 
Zubieta,  Congresoa  dc  Panamd  y  Tacubaya,  169-181. 


THE  PANAMA  CONGKESS  351 

have  been,  they  inquired,  in  having  the  approval  of  Mexico 
and  Colombia  alone?  And  of  what  value,  they  might  have 
added,  was  the  ratification  of  Colombia,  then  already  on  the 
eve  of  dissolution  ?  It  was  true  that  the  sessions  of  the  congress 
could  not  be  renewed  in  Mexican  territory  without  the  effective 
cooperation  of  the  Mexican  government;  but  it  was  also  true 
that  the  congress  could  not  fulfill  its  mission  without  the  con- 
currence of  the  other  members  of  the  proposed  confederacy. 
That  concurrence,  under  the  circumstances,  it  was  impossible 
to  secure.  The  spirit  of  particularism  had  become  supreme. 

A  protocol  of  the  conference  of  October  9  was  drawn  up  and 
signed  by  Gual,  Larrazabal,  Michelena,  and  Dominguez.  Apart 
from  the  recital  of  the  unavailing  efforts  which  had  been  made 
to  clear  the  way  for  the  reassembling  of  the  congress  at  Tacu- 
baya,  the  protocol  contains  a  brief  reference  to  what  appears 
to  have  been  the  only  measure  of  importance  which  the  delegates 
in  their  informal  conferences  had  had  under  consideration  dur- 
ing their  residence  in  Mexico;  namely,  the  mediation  of  Co- 
lombia and  Mexico  —  in  default  of  a  general  congress  with  au- 
thority to  intervene  —  between  the  parties  to  the  civil  war 
then  raging  in  Central  America.80  Gual  believed  that  such  a 
friendly  interposition  would  have  resulted  in  restoring  order  in 
that  distracted  quarter.  Nothing,  however,  was  done,  and  this 
failure  Gual  also  charged  to  the  Mexican  Government. 

In  this  conference  of  October  9,  Poinsett,  the  American  min- 
ister to  Mexico,  though  he  had  been  authorized  to  attend  the 
meetings  of  the  general  congress  whenever  they  should  be  re- 
sumed, took  no  part.  Indeed  Poinsett  appears  not  to  have 
participated  in,  nor  to  have  desired  to  participate  in,  any  of 
the  informal  negotiations  which  the  delegates  of  Colombia,  Cen- 
tral America,  and  Mexico  had  been  conducting  in  the  Mexican 
capital.  Having  gone  to  Mexico  at  a  time  when  British  in- 
fluence was  in  the  ascendancy,  he  had  intervened  in  the  internal 

so  See  a  memorandum  by  Gual  of  a  conference  held  on  December  28,  1827, 
to  discuss  the  subject.  Zubieta,  Congresos  de  Panamd  y  Tacubaya,  153-158. 


352       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

affairs  of  the  republic  with  a  view  to  forming  what  he  repeatedly 
spoke  of  as  an  American  party.  In  this  he  met  with  success 
and  soon  the  York  rite  masons  whom  he  helped  to  organize  were 
in  control  of  the  government.  After  a  time  resentment  against 
Poinsett  on  account  of  his  intermeddling  in  domestic  affairs  be- 
came very  bitter.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  year  1827  the  Plan 
of  Montano,  the  principal  demand  of  which  was  that  the  minis- 
ter of  the  United  States  should  be  furnished  with  his  passports, 
was  proclaimed,  and  a  revolution  was  started  to  force  its  adop- 
tion. The  movement  was  soon  put  down  by  government  forces 
and  Poinsett  remained  at  his  post.  But  as  it  was  believed  that 
he  continued  to  exercise  undue  influence  in  domestic  affairs,  at- 
tacks upon  him  in  the  public  press  became  frequent.  Finally, 
in  July  1829,  President  Guerrero,  who  had  succeeded  Victoria, 
requested  his  recall.  In  October  the  request  was  complied 
with.81 

In  the  mind  of  Gual,  and  perhaps  also  in  the  minds  of  the 
other  ministers  accredited  to  the  congress  of  Tacubaya,  Mex- 
ico's lack  of  interest  in  the  plan  of  confederation  was  associated 
with  the  undue  influence  which  Poinsett  was  thought  to  exercise 
over  the  government.  In  the  published  extracts  of  the  Colom- 
bian representative's  dispatches  there  are  casual  references  to 
Poinsett,  and  these  leave  one  to  wonder  whether  the  relations  be- 
tween the  two  ministers  were  on  the  most  cordial  footing.  In 
May,  1827,  Gual  wrote  that  it  seemed  strange  that  the  pending 
treaty  between  Mexico  and  the  United  States  had  not  been  ap- 
proved by  the  Mexican  government,  in  view  of  the  influence 
which  Poinsett  had  acquired  in  the  republic  by  means  of  the 
York  rite  lodges.  In  January,  1828,  he  wrote  that  Poinsett  had 
been  spreading  the  report  that  Peru  had  disapproved  the  Pan- 
si  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  U.  8.  and  Mexico, 
80-82,  190-204;  349-377.  See  also  Poinsett's  Career  in  Mexico  by  Justin 
Harvey  Smith  in  Proceedings  of  the  American  Antiquarian  Society,  April, 
1914,  77-92.  The  contemporary  Mexican  historians  were  generally  hostile 
to  Poinsett;  but  for  a  friendly  appreciation  see  Zavala,  Ensayo  Ifistdrico 
de  las  Itevoluciones  de  Mexico,  I,  339, 


THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS  353 

ama  treaties,  the  implication  being  that  Poinsett' s  object  was  to 
put  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  resumption  of  the  conferences  of 
the  general  assembly  at  Tacubaya.  And  in  May  following  Gual 
declared  that  to  whatever  it  might  be  due,  whether  to  party 
spirit,  whether  to  a  conviction  that  Mexico  could  stand  alone, 
or  whether  to  the  intrigues  of  the  American  minister,  Poinsett, 
the  fact  remained  that  the  business  of  the  assembly  had  made 
no  progress.82 

Under  the  circumstances  Poinsett's  colleagues  would  have 
been  unlikely  to  solicit  his  participation  in  the  preliminary 
conferences.  And  if  they  had  done  so  it  is  not  likely  that  he 
could  have  acceded  to  their  desire,  for  the  general  instructions 
given  by  Clay  under  date  of  March  16,  1827,  supplementary  to 
the  general  instructions  of  May  8,  1826,  appear  to  have  con- 
templated little  activity  on  the  part  of  the  delegates  of  the 
United  States  in  promoting  the  designs  of  the  congress  as  they 
were  then  understood.  "  The  intelligence,"  said  Clay,  "  which 
has  reached  us  from  many  points  as  to  the  ambitious  projects 
and  views  of  Bolivar,  has  abated  the  strong  hopes  which  were 
once  entertained  of  the  favorable  results  of  the  congress  of  the 
American  Nations.  If  that  intelligence  is  well  founded  (as 
there  is  much  reason  to  apprehend),  it  is  probable  that  he  does 
not  look  upon  the  Congress  in  the  same  interesting  light  that  he 
formerly  did."  Although  the  secretary  of  state  went  on  to 
say  to  the  delegates  that  the  highly  important  objects  contem- 
plated by  their  instructions  ought  not  to  be  abandoned  while  any 
hope  remained,  and  that  the  value  of  those  objects  did  not  de- 
pend entirely  upon  the  forms  of  government  which  might  con- 
cur in  their  establishment,83  yet  it  is  an  evident  conclusion  that 
in  the  words  quoted  above,  Poinsett  found  warrant  for  his  pas- 
sivity concerning  the  general  assembly. 

With  the  signature  of  the  protocol  of  October  9,  the  efforts 
to  revive  the  assembly  of  American  plenipotentiaries  came  to  an 

82  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  385,  394,  403. 

83  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  152. 


354      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

end.  Gual  soon  afterward  presented  his  letter  of  recall,  and 
when  in  January,  1829,  he  set  out  for  Colombia  it  was  to  re- 
turn to  a  land  torn  by  internal  strife  and  bleeding  from  a  war 
with  a  sister  republic.  When  Gual  reached  Bodegas  de  Baba- 
hoyo,  a  little  town  near  Guayaquil,  he  wrote  Bolivar  in  a  spirit 
of  despair.  "  I  left  Mexico,"  he  said,  "  sick  of  revolutions 
caused  by  those  exaggerated  doctrines  which  our  people  neither 
understand  nor  can  understand.  On  the  way  down  [from 
Acapulco]  we  ran  short  of  water  and  had  to  put  in  at  Realejo, 
a  port  of  Central  America,  where  we  found  everything  in  the 
greatest  confusion ;  for,  having  executed  their  governor,  Cerda, 
they  had  not  so  much  as  a  vestige  of  government.  I  left  there 
with  the  hope  of  finding  further  to  the  south  a  more  consoling 
order  of  things  and  I  ran  upon  the  Peruvians  in  Guayaquil, 
converted  into  propagandists  of  anarchy  and  of  the  subversion  of 
all  social  principles.  What  a  terrible  state  of  affairs !  Colom- 
bia is  apparently  in  a  better  situation  than  the  rest  of  Spanish 
America,  for  it  still  possesses  a  single  bond  of  union,  which  I 
hope  you  will  not  think  for  a  moment  of  allowing  us  to  lose. 
They  tell  me  that  you  have  aged  greatly  and  that  your  health 
is  bad.  Take  care  of  yourself  and  preserve  with  your  life 
the  hopes  of  the  three  millions  of  your  compatriots."  84 

The  Liberator,  the  single  bond  of  union,  had  indeed  become 
prematurely  old  and  his  increasing  ill  health  obliged  him  within 
a  year  to  release  his  hold  on  the  conflicting  elements  which 
now  only  nominally  constituted  the  republic  of  Colombia.  This 
was  the  signal  for  the  dissolution  of  the  republic.  And  thus 
the  state  which  Bolivar  desired  to  weld  into  a  powerful  nation 
and  which  he  hoped  to  make  the  controlling  factor  in  a  great 
American  confederation  abdicated  its  claim  to  a  position  of 
leadership  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

s*  Gual  to  Bolivar,  May  29,  1829.     O'Leary,  Memoriaa,  VIII,  449. 


CHAPTER  IX 

BRITISH    INFLUENCE 

APART  from  the  adoption  of  the  four  conventions  referred  to 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  no  official  action  of  importance  was 
taken  by  the  Congress  of  Panama.  Matters  of  weight  were  dis- 
cussed informally,  however,  as  is  revealed  hy  the  correspondence 
of  some  of  the  delegates  and  hy  the  dispatches  of  the  British 
commissioner.  Relative  to  Cuba,  for  example,  Briceno  Mendez, 
writing  from  Buenaventura  on  July  22,  1826,  makes  the  fol- 
lowing remarks :  "  The  Mexicans  have  also  manifested  a  desire 
to  incorporate  Cuba  into  their  already  immense  republic.  They 
have  proceeded  with  caution,  it  is  true,  and  they  have  succeeded 
in  evading  our  efforts  to  make  them  speak  out  clearly  on  the 
matter;  but  as  good  understanders  require  few  words,  we  are 
no  longer  at  a  loss  to  know  what  their  attitude  is.  We  have 
in  this  question  the  first  germ  of  division  in  America,  unless 
we  know  how  to  reach  a  compromise,  putting  aside  our  national 
egoism."  1 

In  a  postscript  to  the  letter  from  which  the  above  extract  is 
taken,  Briceno  Mendez  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  fate  of 
Cuba  and  of  Porto  Rico  was  one  of  the  great  difficulties  which 
stood  in  the  way  of  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the 
new  states  by  Ferdinand  VII.  The  desire  of  that  monarch  was 
to  have  his  possession  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  guaranteed  by  the 
mediating  powers  (England,  France,  and  the  United  States) 
and  by  the  new  states.  This  pretension  of  the  Spanish  king, 
said  IJriceiio  Mendez,  was  being  supported  by  the  United  States, 
who  had  formally  declared  that  it  would  not  permit  the  islands 
to  pass  to  any  of  the  new  republics  nor  to  be  held  by  any  Euro- 
pean power  other  than  Spain.  England  apparently  adhered  to 
this  policy  because  she  desired  to  be  on  friendly  terms  with  the 

i  O'Leary,  Memorias,  VIII,  210. 

355 


356       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

United  States  and  because  she  feared  to  have  the  islands  fall 
into  the  hands  of  some  power  that  might  absorb  the  British 
possessions  in  the  West  Indies.2  To  an  understanding  of  this 
subject  a  brief  review  of  the  negotiations  which  the  United 
States  had  been  conducting  relative  to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  is 
essential.3 

The  United  States  was  in  effect  unwilling  that  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico  should  be  transferred  to  any  European  power  or  be 
annexed  by  any  of  the  new  American  states.  Not  only  so,  but 
the  United  States,  being  convinced  that  the  islands  were  inca- 
pable of  self-government,  was  opposed  to  any  project  to  liberate 
them  with  a  view  to  their  independence.  The  situation  was  one 
of  great  concern  to  the  government  at  Washington ;  for,  as  long 
as  the  war  lasted,  there  was  danger  of  a  change  in  the  status 
quo  of  Cuba  and  of  Porto  Rico,  with  possibly  serious  conse- 

2  Ibid.,  214.     The  part  of  the  letter  here  referred  to  is  as  follows:     "  The 
question  of  recognition  is  progressing,  so  much  so  that  even  France  has 
taken  an  active  part  in  our  favor.     Do  not  doubt  it.     There  are  only  two 
difficulties  that  keep  Ferdinand  from  deciding:   first,  the  fate  of  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  which  he  asks  to  have  guaranteed  by  us  and  by  the  powers  that 
mediate  in  the  recognition,  and  secondly,  Spain's  burden  of  debt,  and  es- 
pecially the  part  of  which  she  contracted  with  France  during  the  campaign 
of  restoration  and  during  the  occupation.     In  the  first,  Spain  is  sustained 
by  the  government  of  the  United  States,  which  has  formally  declared  that 
it  will  not  consent  to  the  possession  of  those  islands  by  any  of  the  new 
republics  nor  by  any  European  power  other  than  Spain.     It  appears  that 
England  also  adheres  to  this  in  conformity  with  her  policy  of  courting 
and  humoring  the  United  States,  and  because  she  does  not  view  with  pleas- 
ure the  creation  of  an  insular  power  in  the  Antilles,  which  might  absorb 
her  colonies  or  fall  into  the  power  of  Haiti.     In  the   second,  interest  is 
shown  in  a  general  way  by  France,  who  sees  no  other  way  of  being  reim- 
bursed by  a  ruined  Spain;  the  worst  of  it  is  that  England  is  supporting 
France  in  this  because  England  has  debts  to  cover  and  above  all  because 
it  suits  her  convenience  to  keep  France  as  a  friend  against  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance.    You  see  how  the  question  of  our  independence  has  become  involved 
with  the  great  interests  of  the  leading  maritime  powers.     We  are.  forced 
therefore  to  make  a  prompt  decision,  for  each  day  the  outcome  grows  more 
complicated  and  more  difficult." 

3  For  the  general  diplomatic  history  of  this  period  relative  to  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico  see:  Moore,  Digest  of  Int.  Law,  VI;  Callahan,  Cuba  and  Inter- 
national  Relation*;    Manning,    Early   Diplomatic   Relations    between    the 
United  States  and  Mexico;  Chad  wick,  The  Relations  of  the  United  States 
and  Spain;  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  V. 


BEITISH  INFLUENCE  357 

quences  to  the  peace  and  tranquillity  of  the  United  States.  Ac- 
cordingly, early  in  Adams'  administration,  Clay  began  nego- 
tiations looking  to  the  termination  of  the  war  on  the  basis  of 
Spain's  recognizing  the  independence  of  the  new  American  re- 
publics, while  retaining  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  Middleton,  the 
American  minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  was  instructed  in  May, 
1825,  to  disclose  this  policy  to  the  Russian  emperor  in  the  hope 
that  that  monarch  would  lend  the  high  authority  of  his  name  to 
the  attainment  of  peace  and  to  the  prevention  of  further  waste 
of  human  life.4 

At  about  the  same  time  instructions  were  given  to  Alexander 
Everett,  the  United  States  minister  at  Madrid,  to  impress  upon 
Spain  the  necessity  of  peace.  The  American  ministers  in 
France  and  England  were  instructed  to  invite  the  cabinets  of 
Paris  and  London  to  second  this  advice.  It  was  hoped  that 
by  the  united  exertion  of  all  the  powers,  and  especially  of  Rus- 
sia, Spain  might  be  brought  to  see  her  true  interest  in  ending 
the  war.5  The  negotiations,  however,  produced  no  favorable 
result,  and  Middleton  was  later  instructed  to  say  to  the  Russian 
Government  that,  if  Spain  should  obstinately  resolve  on  con- 
tinuing the  war,  the  United  States,  although  it  did  not  desire 
to  see  either  Colombia  or  Mexico  acquire  the  islands,  could  not 
forcibly  interfere  to  prevent  them  from  so  doing.  The  libera- 
tion of  Spain's  remaining  possessions  being  a  lawful  operation 
of  war,  Clay  declared  that  his  government  could  not  interpose 
unless  the  struggle  should  chance  to  be  conducted  in  such  a  man- 
ner and  with  such  results  as  to  endanger  the  quiet  and  safety  of 
the  United  States.  Nor  did  he,  he  said,  apprehend  that  it 
would  become  necessary  for  the  United  States  to  depart  from 
its  position  of  a  neutral  observer  of  the  progress  of  events.6 

*  Clay  to  Middleton,  May  10,  1825.  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel  V, 
846-849. 

s  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  V,  887 ;  for  the  correspondence  re- 
ferred to  see  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  U.  S.  and 
Mexico,  115. 

«  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  V,  850. 


358      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Before  these  instructions  were  prepared,  Clay  had  taken  steps 
to  forestall  the  complications  that  might  have  arisen  from  an 
invasion  of  Cuba  and  of  Porto  Rico  by  the  new  states.  Al- 
though he  recognized  the  right  of  Spain's  enemies  to  attack  her 
at  any  vital  point,  Clay  requested  the  governments  of  Colombia 
and  Mexico  to  suspend  the  expedition  which  it  was  understood 
they  were  fitting  out  against  the  islands  until  the  results  of 
the  negotiations  already  initiated  by  the  United  States  with  a 
view  to  bring  about  peace,  should  have  been  ascertained.7  Co- 
lombia's reception  of  this  request  was  friendly  though  not  very 
cordial.  In  a  note  addressed  to  the  American  minister  at  Bo- 
gota the  Colombian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  declared  that 
the  importance  of  the  matter  demanded  that  it  be  duly  weighed. 
On  one  side  of  the  balance,  he  observed,  were  the  noble  efforts 
of  the  United  States  to  effect  and  to  maintain  a  general  peace 
and  to  afford  to  the  American  continent  an  opportunity  to  heal 
its  wounds;  on  the  other  side  were  the  treaties  which  bound 
Colombia  to  its  allies,  the  greater  probability  of  bringing  the 
war  to  a  close  by  driving  the  enemy  from  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, and  the  guarantee  which  would  be  obtained  for  the  fu- 
ture tranquillity  of  the  continent  by  withholding  from  Spain 
the  hand  of  friendship  until  she  had  recognized  her  utter 
defeat. 

He  therefore  expressed  the  opinion  that,  as  it  was  not  clear 
that  Spain  intended  to  abandon  hostilities  against  the  Ameri- 
can states,  the  suspension  of  vigorous  and  effective  war  against 
her  would  be  a  cause  for  regret,  and  that  the  postponement  of 
operations  against  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  in  order  to  give  the 
United  States  a  new  proof  of  friendship  and  of  confidence  in 
the  continuance  of  its  good  offices,  would  result  only  in  making 
more  evident  the  contumacy  and  heedlessness  of  Spain.  Never- 
theless Colombia  wished,  he  said,  to  carry  its  deference  to  the 

f  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  V,  840,  851. 

A  good,  brief  account  of  the  question  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  from  the 
Colombian  standpoint  is  given  by  Restrepo,  Historia  de  la  Revolucidn  de  la 
Republica  de  Colombia  (1858),  III,  488-494. 


BRITISH  INFLUENCE  359 

United  States  as  far  as  its  own  security,  its  treaty  obligations, 
and  its  vital  interests  would  permit;  in  consequence  of  which, 
operations  of  magnitude  against  Cuba  would  not  be  carried  for- 
ward until  the  allies  had  had  an  opportunity  to  deliberate  upon 
the  matter  in  the  congress  to  be  assembled  at  Panama.8 

Mexico  on  the  other  hand  gave  to  Clay's  request  a  cold  recep- 
tion. President  Victoria,  after  having  received  from  Poin- 
sett  a  full  explanation  of  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  re- 
garding Cuba,  declared  that  his  government  "  had  no  intention 
to  conquer  or  keep  possession  of  the  island,  [but]  that  the  object 
of  the  expedition  which  they  contemplated  was  to  assist  the 
revolutionists  to  drive  out  the  Spaniards  and  in  case  they  suc- 
ceeded to  leave  that  people  to  govern  themselves."  A  few  days 
before  this  conference  took  place  the  Mexican  senate  had  passed 
a  resolution  granting  permission  to  the  executive  to  undertake 
an  expedition  against  Cuba  jointly  with  Colombia.  When  the 
question  came  before  the  chamber  of  deputies  that  body  voted 
to  postpone  further  consideration  of  the  subject  until  the  execu- 
tive should  have  submitted  to  them  the  plans  which  were  to 
be  agreed  upon  at  Panama.9  These  things  occurred  shortly 
before  Clay's  request  for  a  suspension  of  the  expedition  against 
Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  came  into  the  hands  of  the  Mexican  cabinet. 

s  Revenga  to  Andersin,  March  17,  1826.  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIII, 
506-508. 

A  few  days  before  this  Santander  had  written  to  Bolivar,  making  the 
following  comment  on  the  subject:  "Revenga  will  inform  you  confiden- 
tially of  the  interposition  of  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of  asking  us 
to  suspend  the  expedition  against  Cuba,  because  it  might  interfere  with 
the  negotiations  which  Russia  is  carrying  on  at  Madrid  in  favor  of  our 
recognition.  Habana  is  a  point  of  great  commercial  importance  to  the 
United  States,  and  as  commerce  is  the  god  of  the  Americans,  they  are 
afraid  that  the  independence  of  that  island  would  be  harmful  to  their 
trade.  I  shall  have  the  answer  given  in  equivocal  terms  in  such  a  way 
as  neither  to  reject  the  interposition  nor  declare  that  we  will  suspend 
our  preparations,  which  would  give  great  satisfaction  to  our  enemies  and 
encourage  them  to  come  and  attack  our  coasts."  O'Leary,  Memorias,  III. 
For  Revenga's  communication  to  Bolivar,  see  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIII, 
484. 

» Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  143-144. 


360      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

The  request  was  presented  by  Poinsett  in  March,  1826,  and 
he  soon  discovered  that  the  reasons  urged  by  Clay  for  suspend- 
ing the  expedition  tended  rather  to  incline  the  government  of 
Mexico  to  persist  in  it.  He  reported  that  Mexico,  relying  upon 
the  protection  of  Great  Britain  and  of  the  United  States,  no 
longer  feared  Spain  nor  the  Holy  Alliance,  and  regarded  with 
indifference  the  question  of  Spain's  recognition  of  her  inde- 
pendence; that  her  greatest  apprehension  was  that  the  powers 
might  compel  a  peace  on  the  basis  of  Spain's  retaining  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  "  which  would  deprive  Mexico  of  the  advantage  and 
glory  of  emancipating  those  islands,"  and  that  she  also  feared 
that  Colombia  alone  might  liberate  and  thereafter  control  them. 
Poinsett  further  reported  that  a  messenger  had  recently  brought 
news  of  the  fitting  out  at  Cartagena  of  a  large  squadron  against 
Cuba;  that  it  was  current  rumor  that  Bolivar  would  arrive  in 
April  to  take  command ;  that  the  Mexican  Government  was  de- 
sirous to  participate  in  the  enterprise  in  order  to  acquire  the 
right  to  a  voice  in  the  future  disposition  of  the  conquered  ter- 
ritory ;  and  that  President  Victoria,  being  without  authority  to 
send  troops  out  of  the  country,  was  planning  to  dispatch  the 
Mexican  fleet,  with  as  many  men  as  by  a  forced  interpretation 
might  be  considered  marines,  to  cooperate  with  the  Colombian 
expedition.  Poinsett  believed  that  this  would  be  done  in  spite 
of  Clay's  request.10 

That  Victoria's  plans  were  not  carried  into  execution  by  no 
means  detracts  from  their  significance.  As  has  been  shown  in 
a  previous  chapter,  Mexico,  almost  from  the  beginning  of  its 
independence,  had  regarded  Great  Britain  as  the  only  effective 
barrier  to  the  intervention  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in  the  war  be- 
tween Spain  and  her  former  colonies  in  America.11  The  es- 
tablishment of  relations  of  friendship  and  commerce  with  Great 
Britain,  it  was  believed,  would  be  the  "  foundation  of  the  pros- 

10  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  146-147. 

11  See  supra,  p.  228  et  seq. 


BKITISH  INFLUENCE  361 

perity  and  greatness  of  Mexico,  which  needed  only  to  obtain  the 
protection  of  so  important  a  power  to  be  able  to  advance 
rapidly  to  a  high  position  among  nations."  12  England  in  turn 
being  desirous  of  cultivating  friendly  relations  with  Mexico, 
early  established  informal  diplomatic  intercourse  with  that 
country.  Dr.  Mackie,  the  first  British  agent  to  be  sent  to  Mex- 
ico, was  appointed  in  December,  1822,  and  arrived  in  Mexico 
about  the  middle  of  the  following  year,  after  the  downfall  of 
the  empire.  The  Mexican  Government  appointed  General  Vic- 
toria to  treat  with  Mackie,  and  four  conferences  were  held  in 
July  and  August,  in  which  the  foundations  were  laid  for  fu- 
ture diplomatic  relations.13  Upon  the  conclusion  of  the  confer- 
ences Mackie  returned  to  England.  A  second  mission,  consist- 
ing of  Hervey,  0' Gorman,  and  Ward,  was  appointed,  and  re- 
ceiving instructions  from  Canning  on  October  10,  1823,  set 
out  in  time  to  reach  Mexico  before  the  close  of  the  year.14 
Migoni,  the  first  diplomatic  agent  of  Mexico  in  Great  Britain, 
was  appointed,  but  without  diplomatic  character,  soon  after  the 
fall  of  Iturbide.  A  commission  as  diplomatic  agent  which  was 
later  issued  to  him  was  borne  to  England  by  Mackie  upon  his 
return.  Michelena,  the  first  regular  minister,  was  appointed 
in  March,  1824.  He  reached  England  aboard  a  British  warship 
about  the  middle  of  the  year.15  De  facto  relations  continued 
until  England  recognized  the  independence  of  Mexico  early  in 
1825.  The  British  Government  then  appointed  Ward,  one  of 
the  three  commissioners  above  mentioned,  as  charge  d'affaires 
to  the  Mexican  republic.16 

12  La  Diplomacies  Mexicana,  II,  98.  For  Colombia's  plan  relative  to 
Cuba,  see  Santander  to  Bolivar,  January  21,  1826;  O'Leary,  Memorias,  III, 
237. 

is  For  the  protocols  of  these  conferences,  see  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana, 
II,  109-113,  128. 

i*  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  62. 

is /bid.,  56;  La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  II,  135,  150;  III,  1,  13,  )9. 

16  Ward  was  received  by  President  Victoria  on  May  31,  before  Poinsett, 
the  American  minister,  was  received.  See  Bocanegra,  Historia  de  Mexico, 
I,  379. 


362       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

During  these  years  the  United  States  had  done  little  to  es- 
tablish definitive  relations  with  Mexico.  Zozaya,  who  was  sent 
by  the  empire  to  Washington  as  minister  in  1822,  was  re- 
ceived by  President  Monroe;  but,  being  neglected  by  his  own 
government  and  therefore  unable  to  accomplish  anything,  he 
finally  left  the  legation  in  charge  of  the  secretary,  Torrens,  and 
quit  the  country.  Not  until  the  arrival  of  Obregon  as  minis- 
ter in  the  fall  of  1824  did  the  Mexican  legation  at  Washington 
have  any  important  dealings  with  the  government  of  the  United 
States.17  On  the  other  hand,  the  mission  of  Poinsett  in  1822 
had  tended  rather  to  postpone  than  to  hasten  the  appointment  of 
a  minister  to  Mexico  by  the  United  States ;  and  when  Poinsett, 
who  was  finally  designated  as  minister  in  March,  1825,  reached 
the  Mexican  capital,  he  found  that  British  influence  in  the 
affairs  of  Mexico  had  become  thoroughly  entrenched.  Any 
advantage  the  United  States  might  have  derived  from  having 
been  the  first  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the  new  states, 
or  from  having  taken  a  stand  against  the  intervention  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  in  behalf  of  Spain,  was  in  great  part  lost.18 

The  question  of  Cuba  was  early  discussed  between  Great 
Britain  and  Mexico.  In  the  last  of  the  four  conferences  here- 
tofore mentioned,  Mackie  protested  that  the  British  Government 
desired  the  absolute  freedom  of  Habana,  with  no  other  design 
than  to  prevent  its  being  occupied  by  any  foreign  power,  leav- 
ing to  the  island  the  choice  of  constituting  an  independent  state 
or  of  uniting  with  Mexico.19  But,  in  spite  of  this  declaration, 
the  British  Government  later  offered  to  mediate  between  Spain 
and  her  former  colonies  on  the  basis  of  tHe  recognition  of  the 
independence  of  the  new  states  and  the  retention  of  Cuba  by 

if  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  6,  12,  15,  17,  19,  25. 

is  For  a  full  account  of  British  influence  in  Mexico  prior  to  Poinsett's 
arrival,  see  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Mexico,  55-88. 

i»  La  Diplomacia  Me&icana,  II,  127. 


BRITISH  INFLUENCE  363 

Spain  under  the  guarantee  of  Great  Britain.20  About  the  mid- 
dle of  1825,  however,  Canning  informed  Michelena,  who  had 
been  seeking  a  conference  with  him,  that,  as  much  time  had 
passed  and  Spain  had  not  accepted  the  offer  of  mediation,  both 
parties  were  at  liberty  to  act  as  they  pleased.  Canning  further 
intimated,  so  Michelena  avers,  that  England,  while  opposing  the 
acquisition  of  Cuba  either  by  France  or  by  the  United  States, 
would  not  be  displeased  if  it  were  united  to  Mexico.21 

Michelena  had  been  led  to  seek  a  conference  with  Canning  on 
the  subject  of  Cuba  by  news  from  Obregon  at  Washington  to 
the  effect  that  the  United  States  was  planning  to  seize  the  island 
on  the  pretext  of  suppressing  piracy.  In  Mexico  the  same  news 
caused  consternation,  and  although  it  soon  became  evident  that 
the  United  States  had  no  intention  of  seizing  Cuba  on  such  a 
pretext,22  the  report  had  the  effect  of  intensifying  the  suspicion 
with  which  the  policy  of  the  government  at  Washington  had 
begun  to  be  regarded.  In  these  circumstances,  it  is  not  a  violent 
assumption  that  Mexico's  belief  that  Great  Britain  would  not 
object  to  her  annexing  Cuba,  to  say  nothing  of  Canning's  avowed 
policy  of  defeating  "  certain  claims  and  pretensions  "  of  the 
Monroe  pronouncement,23  materially  influenced  her  in  her  re- 
fusal to  suspend  hostilities  against  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico. 

Returning  now  to  the  Congress  of  Panama,  it  is  interesting 
to  note  the  course  of  the  British  representative  on  the  Isthmus  in 
promoting  Canning's  policy  as  to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  From 
the  published  correspondence  of  the  delegates  it  can  scarcely  be 
determined  what  really  took  place  at  Panama  respecting  those 

20  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  102. 

21  Memorandum  de  la  conferencia  del  dia  17  de  Junio  de  1825,  entre  el 
Honorable  Sr.  George  Canning,  el  General  Michelena  y  el  Sr.  Rocafuerte. 
La  Diplomacia  Mexicana,  III,  196-197. 

22  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  103-104. 

23  Temperley,  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning,  American 
Historical  Review,  XI,  779-782. 


364      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

islands.  The  reference  to  the  subject  in  the  letter  of  Briceno 
Mendez,  heretofore  cited,  leaves  to  surmise  the  nature  of  the 
discussions  that  may  have  taken  place.  In  a  later  communica- 
tion, however,  which  he  made  to  his  government  on  arriving  at 
Bogota  in  August  following  the  adjournment  of  the  congress, 
Briceno  Mendez  drops  a  remark  which  is  not  without  sig- 
nificance. The  British  agent,  Dawkins,  had  heen  urging  upon 
the  delegates  the  necessity  of  a  compromise  with  Spain,  main- 
taining that  the  question  of  recognition  by  the  mother  country 
became  more  complicated  day  by  day.  "  In  order  to  support 
this  assertion,"  said  Briceno  Mendez,  "  he  adduced  the  declara- 
tion which  the  United  States  had  made  relative  to  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  adding  that  the  intervention  which  that  republic 
had  given  to  Russia  in  the  matter  had  already  caused  great 
difficulties,  and  would  cause  greater  ones."  24  Was  Dawkins 
trying  to  defeat  certain  "  pretensions  "  of  the  United  States  by 
arousing  suspicions  relative  to  its  policy  in  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico  and  by  disparaging  its  efforts  to  bring  about  peace  between 
Spain  and  the  new  American  states  ?  The  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion is  to  be  found  in  Canning's  instructions  to  Dawkins  and 
in  the  latter's  report  of  what  occurred  at  Panama. 

In  the  autumn  of  1825  negotiations  took  place  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  with  reference  to  the  designs  of 
France  in  sending  a  squadron  to  the  West  Indies  and  the  pro- 
posed expedition  of  Bolivar  against  Cuba.  Vaughan,  the  Brit- 
ish minister  at  Washington,  conversing  with  Clay  on  the  latter 
subject,  actually  "  suggested  an  interference  by  the  United 
States  of  America  to  dissuade  the  Mexicans  and  Colombians 
from  making  any  attack  upon  Cuba."  Canning  promptly  dis- 
avowed Vaughan  and  gave  him  fresh  instructions  in  which  the 
following  declaration  is  found :  "  If  it  be  merely  the  interests 
of  the  United  States  that  are  concerned,  that  ground  of  inter- 
ference can  only  belong  to  them,  nor  is  there  any  obligation  upon 

240'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXVIII,  674. 


BRITISH  INFLUENCE  365 

us,  to  share  the  odium  of  such  an  interposition."  25  In  his  in- 
structions to  Dawkins,  Canning,  though  avowing  an  earnest  de- 
sire on  the  part  of  his  government  to  have  Cuba  remain  a  colony 
of  Spain,  sought  to  create  the  impression  among  the  delegates 

25  Temperley,  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning,  American 
Historical  Review,  XI,  791,  citing  Public  Kecord  Office,  F.  O.,  America. 

The  instructions  to  Vaughan,  dated  February  8,  1826,  were  printed  in 
full  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society  for  Novem- 
ber, 1912,  233-235. 

Temperley,  in  his  otherwise  excellent  study  of  the  later  American  policy 
of  George  Canning,  is  extremely  severe  and  unsympathetic  in  his  treatment 
of  the  Panama  Congress.  He  says,  "  The  congress  was  announced  with  the 
most  extravagant  boasts  and  rodomontades,  fully  worthy  of  the  swaggering 
Don  Guzmans  and  Don  Alvarados  of  Spanish  romance.  Bolivar  and  his 
friends  frequently  spoke  of  it  as  one  of  the  most  important  events  of  the 
world's  history."  To  confirm  this  judgment  he  quotes  as  follows  from  a 
speech  of  the  Peruvian  delegate,  Vidaurre :  "  An  entire  world  is  about  to 
witness  our  labors.  .  .  .  From  the  first  sovereign  to  the  last  inhabitant  of 
the  southern  hemisphere  nobody  is  indifferent  to  our  task.  This  will  prob- 
ably be  the  last  attempt  to  ascertain  whether  mankind  can  be  happy. 
Companions!  the  field  of  glory  —  cleared  by  Bolivar,  San  Martin,  O'Hig- 
gins,  Guadalupe,  and  many  others  superior  to  Hercules  and  Theseus,  is 
before  us.  Our  names  are  about  to  be  written  either  in  immortal  praise 
or  in  eternal  opprobrium.  Let  us  raise  ourselves  above  a  thousand 
millions  of  inhabitants,  and  may  a  noble  pride  inspire  us,  likening  us  to 
God  himself  on  that  day  when  He  gave  the  first  laws  to  the  universe." 
American  Hist.  Rev.,  XI,  785,  786. 

Although  the  other  representatives  disclaimed  responsibility  for  this 
speech,  yet  Temperley  is  of  the  opinion  that  it  represented  —  more  or  less 
—  the  general  feeling  of  the  time.  It  is  true  that  high  hopes  were  enter- 
tained by  men  of  distinction  in  both  Americas  with  regard  to  the  Panama 
Congress.  But  the  extravagant  expression  of  Vidaurre  did  not  represent 
the  feelings  of  the  time,  as  contemporary  records  abundantly  demonstrate. 
The  address  was  printed  in  a  Gazeta  Extraordinaria  of  Panama  on  June 
23,  the  day  after  the  congress  assembled.  On  that  same  day  the  Colom- 
bian delegates  entered  a  formal  protest  against  the  publication  (O'Leary, 
Memorias,  XXIV,  340).  After  the  Mexican  delegates  had  returned  to 
Mexico,  Poinsett  wrote  Clay  that  he  had  adverted,  in  the  course  of  a  con- 
versation with  them,  to  the  very  extraordinary  sentiments  contained  in 
Vidaurre's  speech  on  the  opening  of  the  congress.  They  assured  Poinsett 
that  Vidaurre  had  never  delivered  that  discourse,  but  published  it  without 
the  knowledge  of  his  colleagues;  that  on  the  following  day  they,  the 
Mexican  delegates,  remonstrated,  verbally,  both  against  the  publication  and 
against  the  sentiments  it  contained.  (American  State  Papers,  For.  ReL, 
VI,  361.)  The  address  is  to  be  found  in  American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel., 
VI,  359-361;  in  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  329-336;  and  in  Blanco-Az- 
purfia,  Documentos,  X,  433-436, 


366      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

at  Panama  that  the  United  States  was  the  only  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  an  expedition  against  the  remaining  Spanish  strong- 
holds in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  instructions  were  dated 
March  18,  1826,  and  the  part  referring  to  Cuba  reads  as  fol- 
lows: 

"  You  will  see  how  earnestly  it  is  desired  by  the  U[nited] 
S[tates],  by  France  and  by  this  country  that  Cuba  should  re- 
main a  colony  of  Spain.  The  B[ritish]  Gov[ernmen]t  indeed, 
are  so  far  from  denying  the  right  of  the  new  States  of  America 
to  make  a  hostile  attack  upon  Cuba,  whether  considered  simply 
as  a  possession  of  a  power  with  whom  they  are  at  war,  or 
as  an  arsenal  from  which  expeditions  are  fitted  out  against 
them,  that  we  have  uniformly  refused  to  join  with  the  U[nited] 
S[tates]  in  remonstrating  that  we  should  feel  displeasure  at  the 
execution  of  it.  We  should  indeed  regret  it,  but  we  arrogate 
to  ourselves  no  right  to  control  the  operations  of  one  belligerent 
against  another.  The  Government  of  the  U[nited]  S[tates] 
however  professes  itself  of  a  different  opinion.  It  conceives 
that  the  interests  of  the  U[nited]  S[tates]  would  be  so  di- 
rectly affected  by  either  the  occupation  of  Havannah  by  an 
invading  force,  or  by  the  consequences  which  an  attack  upon 
Cuba,  even  if  unsuccessful,  might  produce  in  the  interior  of 
the  island,  that  the  cabinet  of  Washington  hardly  disguises  its 
intention  to  interfere  directly,  and  by  force,  to  prevent  or  re- 
press such  an  operation.  Neither  England  nor  France  could 
see  with  indifference  the  U[nited]  S[tates]  in  occupation  of 
Cuba.  Observe,  therefore,  the  complicated  consequences  to 
which  an  ^expedition  to  Cuba  by  Mexico  and  Colombia  might 
lead,  and  let  the  States  assembled  at  Panama  consider  whether 
it  is  worth  while  to  continue  a  war  the  only  remaining  operation 
of  which  (that  is  likely  to  be  sensibly  felt  by  their  adversary) 
is  thus  morally  interdicted  to  them  by  the  consequences  to 
which  it  would  lead."  26 

2«  Temperley,  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning,  American 
Historical  Review,  XI,  792,  citing  Public  Record  Office,  F.  0.,  Colombia. 


BKITISH  INFLUENCE  367 

These  instructions  require  no  comment.  The  spirit  in  which 
Dawkins  would  be  likely  to  carry  them  out  may  be  inferred 
from  Canning's  definition  of  the  general  attitude  of  England 
toward  the  whole  American  situation.  Referring  to  the  nascent 
states  he  requested  information  "  about  their  feelings  toward 
each  other,  and  the  degree  of  influence  in  their  concerns  which 
they  may  appear  to  allow  to  the  United  States  of  North  Amer- 
ica. You  will  understand/7  continued  Canning,  "  that  to  a 
league  among  the  states,  lately  colonies  of  Spain,  limited  to  ob- 
jects growing  out  of  their  common  relations  to  Spain,  H[is] 
M[ajesty']s  Gov[ernmen]t  would  not  object.  But  any  project 
for  putting  the  Ufnited]  S[tates]  of  North  America  at  the  head 
of  an  American  Confederacy,  as  against  Europe,  would  be 
highly  displeasing  to  your  Gov[ernmen]t.  It  would  be  felt  as 
an  ill  return  for  the  service  which  has  been  rendered  to  those 
states,  and  the  dangers  which  have  been  averted  from  them,  by 
the  countenance  and  friendship,  and  publick  declarations  of 
Great  Britain;  and  it  would,  too,  probably  at  no  very  distant 
period,  endanger  the  peace  both  of  America  and  of  Europe."  27 

Dawkins  did  not  take  part  in  the  deliberations  of  the  congress, 
but  apparently  held  frequent  informal  conferences  with  the 
delegates.28  He  reported  to  Canning  that  on  making  one  of 

For  a  translation  into  Spanish  of  the  instructions  to  Dawkins,  see  Vil- 
lanueva,  El  Imperio  de  los  Andes,  149-159. 

27  Temperley,  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning,  Amer.  Hist. 
Rev.,  XI,   787,   citing  Canning  to  Dawkins,   Public   Record  Office,    F.   O., 
Colombia. 

28  In  his  instructions  to  Vaughan,  written  shortly  before  the  instruc- 
tions  to   Dawkins,    Canning   had   said :     "  The  avowed   pretension   of   the 
United  States  to  put  themselves  at  the  head  of  a  confederacy  of  all  the 
Americas,  and  to  sway  that  confederacy  against  Europe    (Great  Britain 
included),  is  not  a  pretension  identified  with  our  interests,  or  one  that  we 
can  countenance  as  tolerable."     See  also  Dunning,  The  British  Empire  and 
the  United  States,  56.     In  a  dispatch  dated  September  23,  1826,  Poinsett 
makes    the    following    statement:     "The    agent    sent    to    Panama    by    his 
Majesty,  the  King  of  Netherlands,  is  arrived  here,  but  his  Britannic  Maj- 
esty's commissioner,  Mr.  Dawkins,  is  returned  to  England.     These  gentle- 
men were  not  present  at  the  deliberations  of  the  congress."     (American 
State  Papers,  For.  Rel,  VI,  362.)     Poinsett  meant,  of  course,  that  the  rep- 
resentatives of  Great  Britain  and  the  Netherlands  did  not  attend  the  meet- 


368       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

his  almost  daily  visits  to  Gual  on  June  26,  he  had  found  the 
Colombian  delegate  somewhat  cold  and  incredulous  as  to  the 
good  wishes  of  England.  He  discovered  later  that  Gual's  atti- 
tude had  been  caused  by  his  having  read  some  published  dis- 
patches of  Everett,  the  minister  of  the  United  States  to  Spain. 
These  dispatches  were  distinctly  unfavorable  in  their  criticism 
of  the  English  procedure  at  Madrid,  and  among  other  things 
asserted  that  Lambe,  the  British  minister  to  Spain,  had  not 
been  active  in  persuading  Ferdinand  to  grant  recognition.29 

ings  of  the  congress  and  not  that  they  were  not  present  in  the  city  of 
Panama  while  the  assembly  was  in  session;  for  he  must  have  had  accurate 
information  on  this  point.  It  is  probably  due  to  the  above  statement  that 
Manning  makes  the  mistake  of  saying,  in  speaking  of  the  congress,  that 
"  neither  the  English  nor  the  American  representatives  were  present." 
(Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  157.) 

29  The  dispatches  here  referred  to  were  undoubtedly  those  contained  in  a 
document  entitled,  "  The  executive  proceedings  of  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  on  the  subject  of  the  mission  to  the  congress  at  Panama  together 
with  messages  and  documents  relating  thereto,"  published  March  22,  1826. 
The  following  extract  (p.  84)  from  one  of  the  dispatches,  dated  October  20, 
1825,  would  account  for  Gual's  attitude  and  for  Dawkins'  concern. 

"  Mr.  Lambe's  sentiments  in  regard  to  the  South  American  question  are, 
of  course,  precisely  the  same  with  ours.  I  was  desirous  to  ascertain 
whether  the  British  Government  had  lately  made  any  attempts  to  urge 
Spain  to  a  recognition  of  the  new  states,  and  questioned  Mr.  Lambe  upon 
this  point.  He  said  he  had  had  one  or  two  conversations  with  Mr.  Zea 
soon  after  his  arrival  (he  has  been  here  about  five  months),  and  stated  the 
substance  of  what  had  passed  between  them.  The  minister,  it  seems,  gave 
to  him  the  same  answer  which  he  has  since  given  to  me,  and  cited,  to  illus- 
trate his  argument,  the  same  examples  of  Louis  XVIII  and  Bonaparte.  No 
offer  of  formal  mediation  has  been  made  by  England  since  her  recognition. 
Indeed  her  interest  as  a  commercial  and  manufacturing  country,  is  now  on 
the  other  side.  The  longer  the  war  continues,  the  longer  she  enjoys  monop- 
oly of  the  Spanish  American  market  for  her  fabrics,  and  the  more  difficult 
will  Spain  find  it  to  recover  her  natural  advantages  upon  the  return  of 
peace.  England  will,  therefore,  probably  be  very  easy  in  regard  to  this 
matter,  and  will  leave  Spain  to  pursue,  unmolested,  the  course  she  may 
think  expedient.  I  suggested  this  point  both  to  Mr.  Zea  and  to  the  Russian 
minister,  and  was  inclined  to  think  from  what  they  said  of  it,  that  it  had 
more  weight  with  them  than  any  other  consideration  in  favor  of  recognition. 
They  both  admitted  the  justice  of  my  remarks,  and  the  great  inconvenience 
that  resulted  in  this  way  from  the  present  state  of  things,  and  could  only 
avoid  the  proper  conclusion,  by  reverting  to  their  common  places,  of  the 
probability  of  a  return  of  the  colonies  to  their  allegiance,  which  they  really 
seem  to  imagine  will  come  about  sooner  or  later,  without  any  effort  on  the 
part  of  either  Spain  or  her  allies,  and  by  the  aid  of  some  unlocked  for  in- 


BEITISH  INFLUENCE  369 

Dawkins  was  greatly  concerned  and,  having  read  the  corre- 
spondence, wrote  to  Gual  and  contradicted  the  statements  of 
Everett.  He  also  furnished  Gual  with  copies  of  English  dis- 
patches which  were  intended  to  prove  that  Great  Britain  had 
been  active  and  sincere  in  her  attempts  to  secure  recognition. 
According  to  Dawkins,  British  ascendancy  at  the  congress  was 
soon  completely  recovered,  and  Gual  freely  expressed  his  opinion 
"  of  the  imprudence  of  the  United  States,  of  the  errors  com- 
mitted hy  Mr.  Everett,  and  of  the  mischief  which  may  be 
done  by  the  indiscreet  publication  of  his  correspondence." 
Furthermore,  Gual  promised  to  bring  before  the  congress  a  proj- 
ect for  terminating  the  war  through  the  mediation  of  Great 
Britain.30  Evidently  the  British  agent  believed  that  he  had 
satisfactorily  accomplished  at  least  a  part  of  his  mission  —  the 
making  of  the  United  States  an  object  of  suspicion  to  the 
Spanish  Americans.  In  summing  up  the  general  results  of  the 
congress  in  a  later  dispatch  he  called  attention  to  the  fact  that 

tervention  of  Divine  Providence.  I  learned  nothing  material  from  Mr.  L. 
excepting  the  fact  that  the  British  Government  is  now  quiet  in  regard  to 
this  matter,  and  makes  no  attempts  to  influence  the  decision  of  Spain.  He 
professed  to  have  but  little  information  as  to  the  state  of  the  Spanish  set- 
tlements in  America,  and  having  passed  the  greater  part  of  his  life,  in- 
cluding the  last  eight  or  ten  years,  on  the  Continent,  has  been,  in  fact, 
rather  out  of  the  way  of  obtaining  it."  Cf.  also  American  State  Papers, 
For.  Rel.,  V.  869. 

About  a  year  prior  to  the  date  of  Everett's  dispatch  the  French  minister 
at  Washington  had  written  his  government  as  follows :  "  North  America 
believes  that  the  mere  force  of  its  example  will  be  sufficient  protection 
against  the  dangers  of  democracy;  as  for  England,  she  does  not  yet  wish  to 
see  in  all  these  commotions  anything  beyond  her  commercial  interests,  for 
which  reason  she  is  secretly  putting  obstacles  in  the  way  of  any  agreement 
between  Spain  and  her  colonies."  Villanueva,  El  Imperio  de  los  Andes, 
citing  Mareuil  to  Villele,  Ministere  des  Affaires  Estrangeres,  States  Unis, 
1823-1824,  No.  80. 

It  seems  unlikely  in  view  of  Canning's  instructions  to  Dawkins  that  the 
policy  of  Great  Britain  was  to  prevent  the  termination  of  the  war  between 
Spain  and  her  former  colonies.  It  appears  to  be  indisputable,  however, 
that  Canning  was  doing  everything  possible  to  prevent  any  other  power, 
and  especially  the  United  States,  from  gaining  the  good  will  of  the  new 
states  by  mediating  in  their  behalf. 

so  Temperley,  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning,  Am.  Hist. 
Rev.,  XI,  789. 


370      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  United  States  had  failed  to  get  any  commercial  treaties  in 
its  favor,  owing  to  the  opposition  of  Mexico  and  Peru.  "  The 
general  influence  of  the  United  States/'  he  said,  "  is  not,  in  my 
opinion,  to  be  feared.  It  certainly  exists  in  Colombia,  but  it 
has  been  very  much  weakened  even  there  by  their  protests 
against  an  attack  on  Cuba,  and  by  the  indiscretions  they  have 
committed  at  Madrid."  31 

Though  a  man  of  discernment  and  not  lacking  in  diplomatic 
experience  and  skill,32  Dawkins  appears  to  have  placed  too  high 
a  valuation  upon  what  he  was  able  to  accomplish  at  Panama. 
The  attitude  of  the  new  states  toward  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  was  the  product  of  a  number  of  factors  which 
had  been  quietly  producing  their  effects  over  a  period  of  years. 
No  amount  of  manipulation  at  the  congress  could  have  added 
greatly  to  British  prestige  in  Mexico  and  South  America,  nor 
could  have  detracted  appreciably  from  the  friendly  feeling  with 
which  the  United  States  was  generally  regarded  throughout 
the  continent.  Even  though  Dawkins  had  been  able  to  affect 
in  the  most  profound  manner  the  opinions  of  the  delegates,  he 
could  not  have  been  sure  of  any  consequent  change  in  the  atti- 
tude of  the  republics  which  they  represented ;  for  the  congress 
itself  was  destined  to  have  little  immediate  influence,  and  as  the 
individual  members  did  not  occupy  commanding  positions  in 
their  respective  countries  they  were  powerless  to  produce  im- 
portant changes.  To  the  question  of  Cuba,  particularly, 
Dawkins  attached  too  great  importance  as  affecting  the  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  the  southern  republics. 
On  this  question  there  was  no  clear  division  of  Spanish  America 

8i  Temperley,  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning,  Am.  Hist. 
Rev.,  XI,  793;  Dawkins  to  Canning,  October  15,  1826. 

32  He  was  formerly  British  minister  at  Athens.  Temperley  calls  him 
"the  astute  Mr.  Dawkins."  (Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  XI,  788)  and  the  Spanish 
American  delegates  at  the  congress  generally  spoke  of  him  with  praise. 
He  was  born  in  1792  and  died  in  1865.  (Cf.  Burke's,  The  Landed  Gentry 
of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  IV,  sup.) 


BEITISH  INFLUENCE  371 

against  Anglo- America.  Peru  and  Central  America  had  much 
less  interest  in  the  subject  than  had  Colombia  and  Mexico. 
And  the  latter  republics  were  more  suspicious  of  one  another 
than  either  was  of  the  United  States.  Briceno  Mendez  laments 
not  that  the  United  States  had  designs  on  the  islands  but  that 
he  and  his  colleague,  Gual,  had  not  been  able  to  induce  the  Mex- 
ican delegates  to  speak  out  clearly  on  the  subject.  And  Mexico 
had  been  pushing  its  plans  for  an  expedition  against  Cuba  more 
through  jealousy  of  Colombia  than  through  fear  that  the  United 
States  would  seize  the  islands.  These  were  conditions  which 
Dawkins'  efforts  could  have  done  little  to  change. 

But  Dawkins'  mission  to  Panama  was  intended  to  be  not 
merely  negative,  not  merely  destructive  of  the  influence  of  the 
United  States.  The  great  aim  was  the  positive  one  of  achieving 
a  lasting  ascendancy  for  Great  Britain  in  Hispanic  American 
affairs.  Such  an  end  could  be  attained  only  by  positive  con- 
tributions to  the  welfare  of  the  new  states,  the  pressing  need  of 
which,  for  the  moment,  was  peace  and  tranquillity.  Accord- 
ingly Dawkins  was  instructed  to  tender  the  good  offices  of  his 
government  for  reopening  negotiations  with  Spain.  As  to  the 
proposal  of  peace  —  a  proposal  which  had  often  been  discussed 
and  which  had  usually  been  indignantly  rejected  —  Canning 
gave  no  instructions.33  Some  record  of  this  subject  has  been 
left  by  the  delegates  of  Colombia  and  Peru  in  the  O'Leary 
papers.  The  following  references  throw  light  upon  this  par- 
ticular point  and  upon  the  whole  mission  of  the  British  agent, 
as  it  was  viewed  by  the  delegates  assembled  at  Panama. 

The  British  commissioner  arrived  at  Panama  on  June  2,  and 
his  credentials,  according  to  which  it  appears  that  he  had  been 
appointed  to  reside  at  whatever  place  the  congress  should  meet 
and  to  maintain  with  it  a  "  friendly  and  frank  communication," 
were  considered  at  the  second  formal  meeting  held  on  June  23. 

as  Temperley,  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning,  American 
Hist.  Rev.,  XI,  788. 


372       PAX-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

In  consideration  of  the  "  generous  and  liberal  policy  of  the  gov- 
ernment of  his  Britannic  Majesty  toward  the  American  states," 
the  assembly  resolved  that  a  letter  be  written  to  Canning  and 
another  to  Dawkins  in  acknowledgment  of  the  receipt  of  the 
credentials34  No  further  reference  to  the  British  commissioner 
appears  in  the  protocols  of  the  sessions  until  July  15,  when  it 
was  recorded  that  the  president  was  requested  to  inform  him  of 
the  removal  of  the  congress  to  Tacubaya.35  More  extended  al- 
lusions are  to  be  found  in  the  unofficial  correspondence  of  some 
of  the  delegates. 

On  June  4,  Briceno  Mendez  wrote  that  Dawkins  had  said 
to  the  Colombian  delegates,  among  other  things,  that  his  mission 
was  merely  one  of  deference  and  consideration  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain  toward  Colombia ;  that  there  were  great  hopes  of 
Spain's  giving  in  finally  and  recognizing  the  new  states;  that 
France  had  a  lively  interest  in  the  matter  and  had  agreed  to  take 
steps  which  could  not  fail  to  compel  Ferdinand  VII  to  acknowl- 
edge the  independence  of  his  former  colonies  in  America.36  On 
June  6,  Vidaurre  wrote  that  the  British  minister  had  paid  a 
visit  on  that  day  to  the  Peruvian  delegation,  on  which  occasion 
the  question  of  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Peru  by 
Great  Britain  was  discussed.  Dawkins  expressed  an  opinion 
unfavorable  to  such  a  measure,  because,  he  said,  Peru  had  not 
yet  established  a  constitutional  government  (gobiemo  consii- 
tuido  y  procendente  del  congreso  national).  "He  tells  me," 
wrote  Vidaurre,  "  that  we  ought  to  be  careful  to  proceed  in  such 
a  way  as  to  avoid  coming  into  conflict  with  the  system  of 
Europe,  as  well  as  to  avoid  arousing  the  prejudices  of  America. 
It  is  important  that  this  should  be  duly  considered.  This  gen- 
tleman assures  us  at  the  outset  that  his  government  wishes 
nothing  and  asks  nothing.  It  is  willing  to  help  us,  however, 

«*  Protocol  of  the  second  conference  of  the  congress.  O'Leary,  Memorial, 
XXIV,  340. 

ss  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  348. 

so  O'Leary,   Memoriae,  VIII,   205.     Bricefio  MSndez  to  Bolivar. 


BEITISH  INFLUENCE  373 

when  opportunity  may  permit."  37  Under  the  same  date  but 
in  a  separate  communication,  Tudela  gave  an  account  of  the 
conference  with  Dawkins,  agreeing  in  substance  with  the  report 
of  his  colleague.38 

In  a  joint  letter  dated  June  10,  Gual  and  Briceiio  Mendez 
wrote  that  the  amiable  and  frank  character  of  the  British  agent 
had  inspired  confidence ;  that  he,  Dawkins,  detested  the  idea  of 
intrigue  or  of  spying;  and  that  his  greatest  desire  was  to  be 
a  friend  to  all.39  A  month  later  the  Colombian  delegation 
wrote  that  the  assembly  had  not  had  time  to  investigate  what 
object  the  British  commissioner  might  be  seeking  in  Panama 
other  than  that  stated  in  his  credentials,  but  that  his  expressions 
to  some  of  the  delegates  demonstrated  that  Great  Britain  was 
moved  by  a  desire  to  contribute  to  the  termination  of  the  war.40 
After  the  adjournment  of  the  congress,  Briceno  Mendez  wrote: 
"  The  English  commissioner  in  Panama  never  ceased  preaching 
to  us  about  the  necessity  of  granting  an  indemnity  to  Spain  as 
a  sine  qua  non  of  recognition.  After  the  assembly  had  ad- 
journed he  suggested  that  Mr.  Canning  would  be  very  much  dis- 
pleased to  know  that  we  had  made  no  proposal  of  peace  to  Spain, 
and  that  this  would  be  viewed  in  Europe  as  proof  that  we  were 
for  settling  everything  by  force  and  thus  following  the  footsteps 
of  the  French  republic.  A  statement  of  so  positive  a  nature, 
after  all  we  had  heard  on  the  subject  of  an  indemnity,  could  do 
no  less  than  cause  us  to  view  the  proposition  as  coming  from  the 
British  ministry,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  commissioner  al- 
ways protested  that  these  opinions  were  his  own,  and  should  by 
no  means  be  taken  as  those  of  his  government.  Gual  and  I  had 
several  conferences  with  him  on  this  subject,  and  finally  after 
we  had  strongly  urged  him  to  say  what  in  his  opinion  would 

37  Vidaurre  to  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  of  Peru.     O'Leary,  Memorias, 
XXIV,  324. 

38  Perez  de  Tudela  to  Bolivar,  O'Leary.     Memorias,  X,  415. 

39  Gual  and  Bricefio  Me"ndez  to  the  secretary  of  foreign  relations  of  Co- 
lombia, O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  325. 

.,  335. 


374      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

be  acceptable,  lie  told  us  that  the  amount  was  between  sixty  and 
eighty  millions,  and  that  this  could  be  paid  without  making  it 
appear  as  an  indemnity,  for  everything  has  a  remedy.41 

"  He  concluded  by  assuring  us  that  on  this  basis  recognition 
was  more  than  certain,  and  that  his  government  would  take 
charge  of  the  mediation,  if  it  were  believed  to  be  necessary.  We 
had  him  understand  that  what  we  might  say  was  on  our  own 
responsibility,  for  we  were  not  authorized  to  enter  into  negotia- 
tions on  this  subject;  that  we  did  not  know  of  any  intentions 
of  our  government  except  in  a  contrary  sense,  as  appeared  in 
our  treaties  with  the  rest  of  the  republics ;  and  that  even  though 
we  had  the  requisite  knowledge  and  authority  we  would  refrain 
from  making  any  proposal  for  paying  an  indemnity,  because 
by  merely  making  such  an  offer  we  would  lose  the  fight,  and 
would  encourage  Spain  to  increase  her  pretensions  beyond  meas- 
ure, which  would  not  be  the  case  if  the  proposal  came  from  her 
and  we  were  the  ones  to  consider  it.  He  tried  to  reassure  us 
on  this  point,  giving  us  to  understand  that  neither  France  nor 
England  would  permit  too  great  pretensions  on  the  part  of  the 
metropolis,  since  both  were  greatly  interested  in  seeing  that  the 
new  republics  were  not  sacrificed,  and  that  Spain  should  not 
escape  too  suddenly  from  the  difficult  situation  in  which  she 
then  found  herself."  42 

4i  The  attitude  of  the  United  States  on  this  point  was  in  contrast  to 
that  of  Great  Britain.  Speaking  in  his  instructions  to  Anderson  and  Ser- 
geant of  the  desirability  of  peace,  Clay  declared  that  there  was  "  nothing  in 
the  present  or  in  the  future,  of  which  we  can  catch  a  glimpse,  that  should 
induce  the  American  republics,  in  order  to  obtain  it,  to  sacrifice  a  particle 
of  their  independence.  They  ought,  therefore,  to  reject  all  propositions 
founded  upon  the  principle  of  a  concession  of  perpetual  commercial  priv- 
ileges to  any  foreign  power.  The  grant  of  such  privileges  is  incompatible 
with  their  actual  and  absolute  independence.  It  would  partake  of  the 
spirit  and  bring  back,  in  fact,  if  not  in  form,  the  state  of  ancient  colonial 
connection.  Nor  would  their  honor  and  national  pride  allow  them  to  en- 
tertain or  deliberate  on  propositions  founded  upon  the  notion  of  purchasing, 
with  a  pecuniary  consideration,  the  Spanish  acknowledgment  of  their  inde- 
pendence." International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  124. 

«  Bricefio  Mendez  to  Bolivar,  aboard  the  Macedonia,  in  front  of  Buena- 
ventura, July  22,  1826.  O'Leary,  Memorial,  VIII,  215. 


BEITISH  INFLUENCE  375 

Upon  his  return  to  Bogota,  Briceno  Mendez  made  a  more  ex- 
tended report  on  the  proceedings  at  Panama,  in  which  he  again 
referred  to  Dawkins'  mission.  Expressing  great  satisfaction  at 
being  able  to  say  that  the  conduct  of  the  British  agent  had  been 
"noble,  frank,  and  loyal/'  he  added:  "  We  have  had  no  cause 
for  complaint  against  Mr.  Dawkins  and  no  reason  to  distrust 
him ;  on  the  contrary  all  the  delegations  manifested  toward  him 
very  flattering  marks  of  respect  and  consideration.  We  Co- 
lombians, particularly,  were  the  object  of  his  special  attentions 
and  I  am  not  ashamed  to  confess  that  my  famous  friend  and 
colleague,  Senor  Gual,  received  greater  consideration  than  any 
of  the  rest,  showing  clearly  the  high  opinion  in  which  his  talents, 
his  learning,  and  his  character  are  held."  Alluding  to  the  fact 
that  Dawkins7  relations  to  the  congress  were  not  official,  Brin- 
ceno  Mendez  continued :  "  He  limited  himself  to  counseling  that 
we  show  respect  for  the  institutions  of  other  countries,  whatever 
they  might  be;  that  we  not  only  avoid  everything  that  might 
serve  to  increase  the  fears  and  misgivings  which  Europe  already 
had  relative  to  revolutionary  principles,  but  that  we  make  an 
effort  to  demonstrate  that  republicanism  in  America  is  not  what 
France  professed  under  a  republican  regime ;  that  we  do  not  con- 
firm the  suspicion  that  we  are  aiming  to  form  a  separate  politi- 
cal system  in  opposition  to  Europe,  but  that  we  confine  ourselves 
to  looking  after  our  own  interests  and  to  providing  for  our 
national  security;  that  above  all  it  was  important  that  we 
give  proof  of  a  love  of  peace  and  of  a  disposition  to  embrace  it, 
even  though  it  were  at  the  cost  of  some  pecuniary  sacrifice.  On 
this  last  point  he  insisted  with  such  tenacity  that  I  have  had  no 
doubt  but  that  it  was  the  principal  object  of  his  mission,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  he  constantly  protested  that  what  he  said 
was  his  own  and  not  the  opinion  of  his  government."  43 

Continuing,  Briceno  Mendez  says  that  Dawkins  gave  every 
assurance  that  mediation  by  England  would  have  a  successful 

43  Bricefio  Mendez  to  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Relations  of  Colombia, 
Bogota,  August  15,  1826.  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXVIII,  573-574. 


376      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

outcome,  provided  the  money  consideration  were  taken  as  a 
point  of  departure  in  the  negotiations;  for  otherwise  France, 
without  whose  aid  England  could  make  no  progress,  would  not 
cooperate  in  the  enterprise.  It  is  at  this  point  that  Briceno 
Mendez  made  reference  to  Dawkins'  veiled  warning  against 
the  designs  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  and 
against  the  joint  mediation  of  the  United  States  and  Russia, 
for  the  purpose  of  terminating  the  conflict.  Furthermore 
Dawkins  declared,  in  a  moment  of  ardor,  that  none  of  the  re- 
publics would  be  able  to  obtain  a  loan  in  Europe  for  continuing 
the  war,  especially  a  war  of  invasion,  but  that  on  the  contrary 
there  would  be  no  trouble  in  procuring  money  as  the  price  of 
peace.  Expecting  that  the  congress  would  not  adjourn  without 
taking  some  notable  step  toward  peace,  Dawkins  was  unable  to 
hide  his  surprise  and  disappointment  on  learning  the  contrary. 
Briceno  Mendez  concludes  his  references  to  the  mission  of  the 
British  agent  in  the  following  significant  passage :  "  As  to  the 
results  of  the  deliberations  of  the  assembly  he  manifested  great 
alarm,  on  the  occasion  of  a  visit  which  Gual  and  I  made  him,  at 
the  action  of  the  confederates  in  renouncing,  as  he  believed,  the 
right  to  negotiate  with  foreign  nations  except  through  the  as- 
sembly. We  showed  him  his  mistake  and  in  order  to  remove 
any  suspicions  which  public  rumors  might  have  inspired  in 
him,  we  permitted  him  to  read  the  treaty  of  union  and  that 
of  contingents.  After  having  read  these  he  approved  all  their 
provisions,  excepting  the  one  relating  to  the  removal  of  the 
congress  to  Mexico ;  because,  he  said,  apart  from  its  geographi- 
cal position  and  its  political  importance,  the  services  of  Co- 
lombia to  the  cause  of  America  gave  it  the  right  to  have  the 
assembly  on  its  soil."  44 

In  view  of  the  prominent  part  which  the  name  of  Gual  has 
played  in  the  foregoing  discussion,  the  following  remarks  which 

"Ibid.,  674.  The  delegates  of  the  United  States  were  authorized  to 
agree  upon  a  transfer  of  the  conferences  from  Panama  to  any  other  place 
on  the  American  continent.  International  American  Conference  (1889- 
90),  IV,  117. 


BKITISH  INFLUENCE  377 

he  made  in  a  private  letter  to  Bolivar,  relative  to  the  mission  of 
the  British  agent,  will  be  of  interest.  Declaring  that  in  his 
opinion  the  object  which  was  then  demanding  the  chief  atten- 
tion of  the  British  cabinet  was  peace  between  Spain  and  the 
new  states,  and  adverting  to  the  persistence  of  Spain  in  her 
attempts  to  reconquer  the  lost  colonies,  Gual  said :  "  We  are  thus 
between  two  extremes  which  offer  not  the  least  point  of  con- 
tact. Mr.  Dawkins  believes  that  peace  may  be  bought  with 
money,  and  this  he  has  repeated  so  many  times  as  an  opinion 
of  his  own  (not  of  the  ministry)  that  I  am  almost  persuaded 
that  France  is  the  one  who  desires  to  negotiate  peace  under  these 
conditions  in  order  to  reimburse  herself  for  what  Spain  owes 
her.  In  a  word,  from  all  I  have  heard  on  this  subject,  I  deduce 
that  France  wishes  to  get  something  out  of  the  recognition  and 
leave  something  to  Ferdinand  VII,  who,  they  say,  thinks  of 
nothing  but  getting  money  to  buy  gewgaws  and  such  trifles  in 
London  and  Paris.  ...  I  confess  that  my  private  opinion  is 
not  altogether  contrary  to  making  some  sacrifice  for  peace,45 
provided  we  do  it  voluntarily  and  are  not  forced  into  it  by  a 
decree  in  the  French  style,  as  was  the  case  with  Haiti.  Peace 
would  be  an  immense  blessing  to  America,  for  without  it,  ex- 
posed as  we  are  to  domestic  disturbances  and  to  foreign  wars  of 
the  most  complicated  nature,  our  fate  would  always  be  uncer- 
tain. .  .  .  The  proposition  in  any  case  ought  to  come  from  the 
other  side,  so  that  we  might  consider  it ;  for  it  may  be  made  in 
such  diverse  forms  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  decide  upon 
its  acceptability  beforehand."  46  No  such  proposal  was  ever 

45  Sentiment,   however,  particularly  in   Colombia   and  Peru,   was   decid- 
edly against  the  payment  of  an  indemnity.     On  May  21,   1826,  Revenga 
wrote  to  Bolivar  as  follows :     "  I  have  to  add  a  request  which  I  make  from 
the  bottom  of  my  heart.     I  believe  it  to  be  very  desirable  that  you  should 
urge  the  congress  of  the  Isthmus  to  ratify  or  renew  the  compact  which  pro- 
hibits  Colombia   and  her   allies  from   conceding  in   return   for   peace,   in- 
demnity or  recompense  of  any  kind  in  detriment  to  our  honor  and  to  our 
independence.     The  plenipotentiaries  of  Colombia  have  instructions  in  con- 
formity with  this  ideal.     But  you  will  do  it  because  you  know  I  am  no 
visionary."     O'Leary,  Memorias,  VI,  515. 

46  Gual  to  Bolivar,  June  23,  1826.     O'Leary,  Memorm,  VIII,  447, 


378       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

made,  of  course,  by  the  obstinate  Ferdinand,  and  it  is  unlikely 
that  it  would  have  been  accepted,  even  if  it  had  been  made,  at 
so  late  a  day.  It  may  be  added  that  GuaTs  correspondence, 
like  that  of  Briceno  Mendez  and  of  the  Peruvian  delegates,  gives 
no  evidence  that  his  attitude  toward  the  United  States  had  in 
the  least  been  affected  by  his  conferences  with  Dawkins. 

Of  doubtful  success  in  one  of  its  main  objects,  that  of  coun- 
teracting the  influence  of  the  United  States  in  the  concerns 
of  the  new  governments,  the  mission  of  the  British  agent  in 
another  of  its  principal  aims,  the  bringing  about  of  an  accom- 
modation between  the  allied  belligerents  and  the  mother  coun- 
try, was  a  complete  failure.  But  this  failure  must  by  no  means 
be  regarded  as  a  sign  of  the  inefficacy  of  Canning's  American 
policy ;  for  on  the  whole  that  policy,  skillfully  prosecuted  as  it 
had  been  over  a  period  of  several  years,  had  succeeded  in  es- 
tablishing in  at  least  some  parts  of  Spanish  and  Portuguese 
America  the  ascendancy  which  Great  Britain  sought.  On  the 
whole,  also,  it  may  well  be  said  that  Dawkins'  mission,  in  view 
of  the  failure  of  the  congress  itself  and  in  view  of  what  British 
diplomacy  had  already  accomplished,  did  not  fall  far  short  of 
what  might  reasonably  have  been  expected  of  it.  He  had 
stood  in  the  relation  of  an  adviser  to  the  congress,  had  offered 
the  services  of  his  government  to  bring  about  peace,  had  cul- 
tivated friendly  relations  with  the  delegates  present,  and  in  a 
general  way  had,  no  doubt,  contributed  to  the  cordiality  of  in- 
tercourse between  Great  Britain  and  the  states  taking  part  in 
the  assembly.  Under  the  circumstances  little  more  was  pos- 
sible. 

Canning's  policy  of  maintaining  British  supremacy  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  had  a  singularly  ardent  and  tenacious  sup- 
porter in  Simon  Bolivar.  Not  that  Bolivar  was  interested  in 
British  supremacy  as  such,  but  that  he  believed  it  to  be  essential 
to  the  independence  and  future  prosperity  of  the  new  states. 
If  the  Liberator's  hopes  could  have  been  realized  the  Congress 
of  Panama  would  have  been  the  scene  of  the  negotiation  of  a 


BEITISH  INFLUENCE  379 

compact  in  virtue  of  which  the  nascent  American  states  would 
have  been  placed  under  the  protection  of  Great  Britain.  In 
such  a  contingency  the  declarations  of  President  Monroe  by 
implication  would  have  ceased  to  be  effective  in  their  original 
intention  and  scope.  Apparently  Canning  did  not  at  any 
time  approve  of  the  plan.  The  idea  was  Bolivar's  and  for  a 
period  of  nearly  fifteen  years  he  worked  untiringly  to  carry  it 
into  execution.  It  was  in  1815,  while  he  was  in  exile  in 
Jamaica,  that  Bolivar  began  a  propaganda  aimed  at  securing 
the  assistance  and  protection  of  Great  Britain,  and  in  order  that 
the  plan  which  he  later  wished  to  have  the  Congress  of  Panama 
adopt  may  be  viewed  in  its  proper  setting,  it  will  be  well  to 
glance  for  a  moment  at  some  of  his  earlier  expressions  on  the 
subject. 

Writing  to  Maxwell  Hyslop  on  May  19,  1815,  more  than  three 
months  before  he  penned  the  famous  prophetic  letter  so  often 
referred  to,  Bolivar  said :  "  The  time  has  arrived,  Sir,  and  per- 
haps there  will  not  be  another  opportunity,  for  England  to  take 
part  in  determining  the  fate  of  the  peoples  of  this  immense  con- 
tinent, who  will  succumb  or  be  exterminated  unless  some  power- 
ful nation  comes  to  their  rescue.  .  .  ."  Referring  then  to  the 
great  possibilities  which  were  open  to  England  for  the  exten- 
sion of  her  trade,  and  calling  attention  to  the  undeveloped  re- 
sources, especially  of  New  Granada,  where  he  declared  the 
mountains  were  filled  with  gold  and  silver,  he  exclaimed: 
"  What  a  bright  prospect  for  British  industry  is  offered  by  this 
spot  of  the  New  World !  I  shall  not  speak  of  the  other  regions 
which  but  await  the  day  of  freedom  when  they  will  receive  into 
their  midst  great  numbers  of  continental  Europeans  who  will 
constitute  in  a  few  years  another  Europe.  Increasing  by  this 
means  her  weight  in  the  political  balance  England  rapidly  dim- 
inishes that  of  her  enemies,  who  will  come  here  and  indirectly 
and  inevitably  contribute  to  England's  commercial  preponder- 
ance and  to  an  increase  in  her  military  strength  sufficiently  to 
maintain  the  colossus  which  embraces  every  part  of  the  earth. 


380       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

.  .  .  These  great  advantages  may  be  obtained  at  a  very  small 
cost :  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  rifles,  a  million  pounds  sterling, 
fifteen  or  twenty  war  vessels,  munitions,  a  few  agents,  and  the 
number  of  volunteers  who  may  choose  to  follow  the  flags  of 
America.  Here  you  have  all  that  is  needed  to  give  liberty  to 
this  hemisphere  and  to  establish  the  balance  of  the  world."  47 

Continuing,  Bolivar  declared  that  Costa  Firme  could  be  saved 
with  six  or  eight  thousand  rifles  and  ammunition  in  proportion, 
together  with  five  hundred  thousand  pesos  to  pay  the  expenses 
of  the  first  months  of  campaign.  Finally,  he  made  the  follow- 
ing remarkable  statement :  "  With  this  assistance  the  rest  of 
America  will  be  relieved  from  danger ;  and  at  the  same  time  the 
provinces  of  Panama  and  Nicaragua  may  be  delivered  to  Great 
Britain  in  order  that  she  may  make  of  these  countries  the  cen- 
ter of  the  world's  trade  by  constructing  canals,  which,  breaking 
through  the  barriers  separating  the  two  seas,  will  bring  nearer 
the  remote  parts  of  the  earth  and  render  permanent  England's 
dominion  over  commerce."  48  Bolivar,  explained  his  reasons 
for  seeking  the  aid  of  Great  Britain  a  few  days  later  in  a  letter 
to  Richard  Wellesley.  He  said :  "  If  I  had  had  a  single  ray  of 
hope  left  that  America  would  be  able  to  triumph  unaided,  no 
one  could  have  desired  more  than  I  to  serve  his  country  without 
the  humiliation  of  soliciting  foreign  protection.  This  is  why 
I  have  left  Costa  Firme.  I  came  in  search  of  aid;  I  will 
go  to  seek  it  in  that  superb  capital  —  if  it  were  necessary  I 
would  go  to  the  north  pole  —  and  if  everybody  is  insensible  to 
the  voice  of  humanity,  I  will  have  done  my  duty,  though  in- 
effectually, and  I  will  return  to  die  fighting  in  my  native 
land."  49 

Whether  or  not  as  a  result  of  Bolivar's  appeals,  the  struggling 
patriots  of  Costa  Firme  during  the  next  three  or  four  years  re- 
ceived substantial  aid  from  Great  Britain.  Meanwhile,  and 

«  Cartaa  de  Bolivar  (Sociedad  de  Edioiones),  116-117. 
«« Ibid.,  118. 
«» Ibid.,  123. 


BRITISH  INFLUENCE  381 

during  the  years  that  followed,  Bolivar's  faith  in  England  ap- 
parently never  wavered  and  his  desire  to  enter  into  some  sort 
of  intimate  political  association  with  the  British  Empire  grew 
stronger  as  the  difficulties  of  organizing  the  former  Spanish 
colonies  into  stable  governments  became  more  evident.  It  was 
not,  however,  until  Great  Colombia  had  been  established  and 
not  until  the  Liberator  had  taken  the  first  definite  steps  to  bring 
about  a  confederation  of  the  new  states  that  he  began  what 
appears  to  have  been  a  positive  propaganda  aimed  at  inclining 
the  minds  of  the  leaders  in  Colombia  and  Peru  to  the  acceptance 
of  the  scheme  which  he  was  destined  later  to  propose.  During 
the  eventful  period  immediately  preceding  the  battle  of  Aya- 
cucho  the  references  in  his  correspondence  to  Great  Britain  are 
frequent  and  most  friendly.  With  his  plans  for  the  liberation 
of  Peru  still  in  formation,  with  his  restless,  imaginative  mind 
running  forward  to  the  time  when  the  whole  of  America  would 
be  free,  and  to  the  time  when  the  necessity  for  the  organization 
of  a  stable  political  system  would  be  at  hand,  he  wrote  Sucre 
that  after  deep  meditation  he  had  become  more  strongly  con- 
firmed in  his  first  designs  and  that  every  day  he  was  becoming 
more  convinced  of  the  correctness  of  his  political  opinions. 
"  Everything  confirms  most  positively/'  he  said,  "  my  conjec- 
tures relative  to  an  early  peace.  England  is  the  most  interested 
in  this  transaction  because  she  desires  to  form  a  league  with  all 
the  free  peoples  of  America  and  Europe,  against  the  Holy  Al- 
liance, for  the  purpose  of  putting  herself  at  their  head  and  rul- 
ing the  world."  50 

Later  it  became  evident,  at  least  in  a  general  way,  what  part 
Bolivar  would  have  had  the  new  states  play  in  this  great  scheme 
of  world  dominion.  In  July,  1825,  he  wrote  to  Revenga  and 
to  Santander  setting  forth  his  ideas  on  the  subject,51  and  al- 
though these  letters  are  not  included  among  the  published  docu- 
ments relating  to  the  Liberator,  it  is  nevertheless  possible  to 

so  Bolivar  to  Sucre,  May  24,  1823.     O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXX,  274. 
si  O'Leary,  Memorias,  III,  207,  209;  VI,  499. 


382       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

determine  from  other  sources  what  were  the  essential  features  of 
the  plan  which  he  must  have  had  in  mind.  He  did  not,  it 
seems,  set  forth  his  scheme  in  detail;  for  Revenga  in  replying 
declared  that,  although  he  had  read  the  Liberator's  letters  on  the 
subject,  together  with  other  papers  furnished  him  by  the  vice 
president,  yet  he  was  left  in  doubt  as  to  the  nature  of  the  ar- 
rangement which  it  was  desired  to  make.  The  plan,  which 
at  first  seemed  "  perfectly  clear,  relatively  easy  to  carry  out, 
and  from  every  point  of  view  desirable,"  now  appeared  to  pre- 
sent certain  difficulties.  Was  it,  he  inquired,  a  question  of 
alliance  between  two  nations,  or  a  question  of  intimate  federa- 
tion, in  which  there  was  a  protector  with  more  or  less  privilege 
or  authority  of  one  kind  or  another  ?  In  attempting  to  answer 
this  question  Revenga  made  some  observations  which  it  is  of 
interest  to  quote. 

"  The  indefinite  nature  of  the  fears,"  said  Revenga,  "  which 
are  expressed  for  our  existence  and  which  in  present  circum- 
stances cannot  be  attributed  to  the  policies  of  continental 
Europe,  for  those  policies  are  gradually  becoming  milder  with 
respect  to  us;  and  the  supposition  that  supremacy  must  be 
yielded  to  some  one,  induce  the  conclusion  that  it  be  the  sec- 
ond [i.e.  a  protectorate]  ;  and  if  it  be  the  second,  however  much 
the  authority  and  the  privileges  of  the  protector  be  reduced,  it 
appears  clear  that  the  strength  of  none  of  the  confederates  can 
grow  without  increasing  in  geometrical  proportion  that  of  the 
protector,  who  will  excel  the  rest  in  this  way  as  well  as  in  knowl- 
edge, industry,  and  sources  of  wealth.  It  appears  equally  clear 
that  there  would  be  no  hope  of  being  able  to  separate  from  the 
federation  later,  for  that  same  growth  of  power  would  give  the 
protector  greater  prestige  among  foreign  nations,  more  means 
for  working  secretly  among  the  confederates,  a  stronger  hold 
on  their  respect,  and  a  greater  number  of  pretexts  for  demand- 
ing their  consideration  and  gratitude.  ...  I  speak  of  the  ob- 
jections to  this  kind  of  protectorate,  or  immediate  supremacy, 
such  as  England  exercises  over  the  Ionian  Islands,  because  the 


BKITISH  INFLUENCE  383 

other  species  of  protectorate  consisting  of  a  confederation  of 
sovereigns,  like  that  of  Austria  over  the  empire  is  not  advan- 
tageous except  in  so  far  as  it  presents  to  the  outside  world  a 
greater,  more  formidable,  more  harmonious  mass.  It  cannot 
have  any  influence  in  bettering  the  internal  condition  of  any 
of  its  members  except  by  means  of  friendly  counsel,  exclusively ; 
for  what  has  excited  in  the  Austrian  Empire  the  greatest  num- 
ber of  complaints  has  been  the  attempt  to  influence,  through  the 
Diet,  the  institutions  of  the  separate  states. 

"  After  considering  both  systems  I  have  come  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  you  were  referring  rather  to  an  alliance  as  close  and 
as  cordial  as  it  is  possible  to  conceive,  an  alliance  which  will 
contribute  to  the  conservation  of  the  federation,  present  it  to 
the  world,  shielded  by  all  the  power  of  the  new  ally,  and  at  the 
same  time  point  out  to  the  members  of  the  confederation  the 
road  to  prosperity.  Such  is  the  alliance  which  from  time  im- 
memorial has  existed  between  England  and  Portugal.  And  al- 
though it  might  be  argued  that  the  alliance  practically  exists  al- 
ready as  far  as  foreign  powers  are  concerned,  in  virtue  of  decla- 
rations which  have  been  made;  that  the  breach  of  neutrality 
which  it  would  occasion  and  the  results  which  would  follow  in 
Europe  are  opposed  to  it ;  and  that  the  friendly  counsels  which 
would  be  obtained  under  such  an  arrangement  would  be  avail- 
able without  it,  yet  I  judge  that  it  may  be  brought  about  if, 
the  minds  of  the  people  being  prepared,  the  opportunity  is  taken 
advantage  of." 

In  conclusion  Revenga  requested  Bolivar  to  explain  with 
"  precision  and  exactness  "  what  were  his  wishes  relative  to  the 
proposed  arrangement  with  Great  Britain.52  Without  waiting 
for  a  reply,  however,  he  set  to  work  and  prepared  a  plan  which, 
with  the  approval  of  the  cabinet,  he  communicated  to  the  Liber- 
ator in  the  shape  of  additional  stipulations  or  objects  for  the 
consideration  of  the  Congress  of  Panama.  They  were  in  sub- 
stance as  follows : 

52  O'Leary,  Memorias,  VI,  499-501. 


384       PAN-AMEEICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

1.  That  the  penalty  for  failure  to  conform  to  the  decisions 
of  the  confederation,  serving  as  arbitrator  between  two  of  its 
members,  should  be  exclusion. 

2.  That  none  of  the  confederates  should  be  permitted  to 
form  an  alliance  with  a  foreign  power  or  with  one  or  more  of 
their  own  number  independently  of  the  rest. 

3.  That  the  confederation  should  necessarily  be  the  mediator 
in  disputes  arising  between  one  of  the  confederates  and  a  for- 
eign power. 

4.  That  the  assembly,  or  a  person  or  persons  to  whom  it 
might  delegate  the  necessary  authority,  should  negotiate  and 
conclude  in  the  name  of  the  confederation  one  or  more  treaties 
of  alliance,  purely  defensive,  whose  aim  should  be  the  conserva- 
tion of  peace. 

5.  That  it  should  be  the  duty  of  the  assembly  to  meet  at 
fixed  periods.63 

In  the  letter  in  which  this  plan  is  set  forth,  Revenga  states 
that  he  had  requested  the  representative  of  Colombia  near  the 
government  of  Peru  to  explain  to  the  Liberator  the  reasons  for 
the  adoption  of  the  additional  stipulations  and  to  inform  him 
of  the  measures  that  had  already  been  taken  for  securing  the 
proposed  alliance  between  "  our  confederation  and  the  very  noble 
and  very  powerful  King  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland."  When 
that  should  be  accomplished,  "  the  whole  of  America,"  he  said, 
"  being  united  by  motives  of  common  interest  will  rest  without 
fear  in  its  adhesion  to  justice  and  will  flourish  tranquil  and  con- 
tent in  the  shade  of  peace."  In  a  private  letter  dated  the  next 
day  he  declared :  "  I  have  conceived  the  project  without  an  ap- 
parent protector,  though  there  is  one  in  reality;  and  to  allay 
the  fears  which  an  alliance  with  such  a  strong  power  inspires, 
provision  is  made  for  easy  separation  from  the  confederation. 
Nevertheless  I  have  aimed  at  embracing  the  whole  hemisphere, 
for  the  least  of  the  benefits  that  would  result  from  the  project 

53  Revenga  to  Bolivar,  November  6,  1825.  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIII, 
351. 


BKITISH  INFLUENCE  385 

would  be  that  there  should  never  be  occasion  for  those  fears. 
I  tried  at  the  same  time  to  strengthen  the  bonds  of  the  con- 
federation, not  only  with  a  view  to  the  conservation  of  peace  but 
with  a  view  to  protecting  the  independence  of  small  states.  I 
communicate  the  scheme  as  being  exclusively  Colombian,  be- 
cause you  are  a  Colombian  and  do  not  need  the  glory  of  being  its 
author,  and  because  it  will  be  more  acceptable  in  the  other  states 
if  you  support  it  as  the  initiative  of  some  one  else  rather  than 
your  own.  It  seems  to  me  that  we  are  going  to  renew  with 
greater  glory  the  ancient  Hanseatic  League."  54 

There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  government  of  Colombia, 
in  spite  of  its  formal  protestations  to  Bolivar,  did  not  enter  with 
enthusiasm  into  this  scheme  of  political  union  with  Great 
Britain.  In  communicating  the  additional  stipulations  to  the 
Colombian  delegation  at  Panama,  Revenga  declared  that  the 
extension  which  it  was  desired  to  give  to  the  objects  of  the  fed- 
eration, however  advantageous  such  a  move  might  appear  to  be, 
ought  not  to  be  too  readily  acceded  to.55  It  cannot  be  definitely 
affirmed  that  this  was  taken  as  a  hint  not  to  push  the  matter,  but 
for  some  reason  the  Colombian  delegates  did  not  manifest  great 
interest  in  the  project.  Though  informed  of  it  in  November, 
1825,  they  do  not  mention  it  in  their  correspondence,  beyond 
an  acknowledgment  of  the  receipt  of  the  papers,  until  the  latter 
part  of  April,  when  their  interest  was  momentarily  aroused  by 
hearing  from  Hurtado  that  Great  Britain  had  appointed  a  rep- 
resentative to  the  congress.  This  led  Gual  and  Briceiio  Mendez 
to  believe  that  the  British  Government  had  accepted  the  pro- 
posed plan  and  that  as  representatives  of  Colombia  they  would 
be  required  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  British  agent 
upon  his  arrival  at  Panama.  As  a  measure  therefore  of  pre- 
vision they  asked  for  instructions  relative  to  certain  points  upon 
which  they  were  not  clear.56  The  desired  instructions  never 

"Revenga  to  Bolivar,  November  6,  1825.  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIII, 
351. 

55  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  289. 
id.,  296,  316. 


386       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

were  sent.  The  delegates  of  Peru  were  wholly  without  instruc- 
tions on  the  subject,  and  while  those  of  Central  America  were 
authorized  to  solicit  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  they  were 
not  empowered  to  carry  the  negotiations  to  a  definite  conclu- 
sion.57 It  was  assumed  that  the  Mexican  delegates,  who  had 
not  yet  arrived,  would  not  be  favorably  instructed,  because  of 
the  disagreeable  impression  produced  in  Mexico  by  the  failure 
of  Great  Britain  to  ratify  a  treaty  which  had  been  concluded 
between  the  two  countries  shortly  before.58  There  was,  how- 
ever, no  occasion  for  the  Mexican  delegates  to  intervene  in  the 
matter,  for  Dawkins  who  arrived  two  or  three  days  ahead  of 
them,  had  no  instructions  on  the  subject,  and  he  apparently  put 
to  rest  all  talk  of  such  an  alliance  as  had  been  proposed.  Thus 
the  additional  stipulations  never  became  matter  of  formal  dis- 
cussion in  the  Congress  of  Panama,  and  it  is  unlikely  that  they 
would  have  been  seriously  considered,  in  view  of  the  attitude  of 
the  other  republics,  even  if  the  government  of  Colombia  had 
been  sincerely  striving  to  obtain  their  adoption. 

It  appears  on  the  other  hand  that  a  mere  defensive  alliance 
such  as  was  provided  for  in  the  additional  stipulations  was  not 
what  Bolivar  had  in  mind.  It  is  true  that  in  replying  to 
Revenga's  communications  on  the  subject,  he  seemed  to  agree 
with  the  interpretation  which  had  been  given  to  his  suggestions 
and  to  share  with  the  government  of  Colombia  its  fear  of  too 
close  a  union  with  England.  "  It  now  appears  to  me,"  he 
wrote,  "  that  the  alliance  with  Great  Britain  will  considerably 
add  to  our  influence  and  to  our  respectability;  for  enjoying  her 
protection  we  would  grow  to  man's  estate,  and  acquiring  en- 

57  ibid.,  321. 

ss  Ibid.,  VI,  515.  The  treaty  referred  to  was  signed  at  Mexico  City  on 
April  6,  1825.  Great  Britain  refused  to  ratify  it  because  of  certain  articles 
which  it  contained  favorable  to  Mexico  and  contrary  to  principles  which 
England  did  not  wish  to  abandon.  A  new  treaty  was  concluded  between 
the  two  countries  at  London  on  December  26,  1826,  and  was  duly  ratified  by 
the  respective  governments  the  following  year.  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic 
Relations  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  70;  Derecho  Interna- 
tional Mexicano,  Tratados  y  Conventiones,  I,  445. 


BKITISH  INFLUENCE  387 

lightenment  and  strength  take  our  place  among  the  nations  pos- 
sessed of  the  civilization  and  power  which  characterize  a  great 
people.  But  these  advantages  do  not  dissipate  the  fear  that 
that  powerful  nation  might  become  in  the  future  sovereign  of 
the  counsels  and  decisions  of  the  assembly ;  that  her  voice  might 
become  one  of  command  and  that  her  will  and  her  interests 
might  become  the  soul  of  the  confederation,  which  would  not 
dare  to  displease  nor  to  come  into  conflict  with  an  enemy  so 
irresistible.  This,  in  my  opinion,  is  the  greatest  danger  in 
allowing  a  nation  so  powerful  to  become  involved  with  others 
so  weak."  Continuing,  Bolivar  declared  that  the  additional 
objects  appeared  to  be  as  proper  and  as  useful  as  the  main  part 
of  the  project,  and  he  agreed  with  Revenga  that  if  the  plan 
were  adopted  by  the  whole  American  continent  and  by  Great 
Britain  it  would  present  an  immense  mass  of  power  which  would 
necessarily  produce  stability  in  the  new  states.59  What  Bolivar 
really  thought  is  more  adequately  set  forth  in  the  memorandum 
which  he  wrote  in  February,  1826,  either  shortly  before,  or 
just  after,  the  date  of  the  letter  above  quoted.  This  memoran- 
dum, until  recently  unpublished,  is  found  in  the  "  Archives  of 
the  Liberator  "  at  Caracas.60  Here  he  appears  to  be  not  in  the 

59  Bolivar  to  Revenga,  February  17,  1826.  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXXI, 
164. 

eo  Simon  Bolivar  —  Un  Pensamiento  Sobre  el  Congreso  de  Panamd.  06- 
scquio  de  Vicente  Lecuna  a  los  delegados  al  Segundo  Congreso  Cientifico 
Pan-Americano,  Washington,  D.  C.,  1916. 

First  published  with  an  English  translation  (of  which  the  part  quoted  is 
a  copy)  and  presented  to  the  Second  Pan-American  Scientific  Congress  at 
Washington  in  January,  1916.  On  account  of  its  importance  the  Spanish 
text  is  given  below  in  full : 

UN  PENSAMIENTO  SOBRE  EL  CONGRESO  DE  PANAMA 

(Inedito  —  El  original  se  halla  en  el  archivo  del  Liberator,  Caracas.) 
El  Congreso  de  Panama  reunird  todos  los  representantes  de  la  America  y 
un  ajente  diplomdtico  del  Oobierno  de  S.  M.  B.  Este  Congreso  parace  des- 
tinado  a  formar  la  liga  mas  vasta,  mds  estraorlinaria  y  mds  fuerte  que  ha 
aparecido  hasta  el  dia  sobre  la  tierra.  La  Santa  Alianza  sera  inferior  en 
poder  a  esta  confederacidn,  siempre  que  la  Gran  Bretana  quiera  tomar  parte 
en  ella,  como  Miembro  Constituyente.  El  jenero  humano  darta  mil  ben- 
diciones  a  esta  liga  de  salud  y  la  America  como  la  Gran  Bretana  cojerian 
cosechas  de  beneficios. 


388       PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

least  moved  by  the  fear  of  British  domination.     The  memoran- 
dum is  as  follows : 

"  The  congress  of  Panama  will  bring  together  all  the  repre- 
sentatives of  America  and  a  diplomatic  agent  of  H.  B.  M.  This 
congress  seems  to  be  destined  to  create  a  further  reaching,  more 

Las  relaciones  de  las  sociedades  politico*  recibirian  un  codigo  de  derecho 
publico  por  regla  de  conduota  universal. 

1.  El  nuevo  mundo  se  constituirfa  en  naciones  independientes,  ligadas 
todas  por  una  ley  comtin  que  fijase  sus  relaciones  esternas  y  les  ofreciese 
el  poder  conservador  en  un  Congreso  jeneral  y  permanente. 

2.  La  existencia  de  estos  nuevos  Estados  obtendrla  nuevas  garantfas. 

3.  La  Espafia  harfa   la  paz   por   respeto   a  la  Inglaterra  y   la  Santa 
Alianza  prestarfa  su  reconocimiento  a  estas  naciones  nacientes. 

4.  El  orden  interno  se  conservarfa  intacto  entre  los  diferentes  Estados 
y  dentro  de  cada  uno  de  ellos. 

5.  Ninguno  serf  a  de"bil  con  respecto  a  otro:  ninguno  serla  mas  fuerte. 

6.  Un  equilibrio  perfecto  se  establecerfa  en  este  verdadero  nuevo  orden 
de  cosas. 

7.  La  fuerza  de  todos  concur  rirla  al  auxilio  del  que  sufriese  por  parte 
del  enemigo  esterno  o  de  las  facciones  anarquicas. 

8.  La  diferencia  de  orijen  y  de  colores  perderla  su  influencia  y  poder. 

9.  La  America  no  temerfa  mas  a  ese  tremendo  monstruo  que  ha  devorado 
a  la  isla  de  Santo  Domingo ;  ni  tampoco  temerla  la  preponderancia  numdrica 
de  los  primitives  habitadores. 

10.  La  reforma  social,  en  fin,  se  habrfa  alcanzado  bajo  los  santos  aus- 
picios  de  la  libertad  y  de  la  paz  —  pero  la  Inglaterra  deberla  tomar  necesa- 
riamenta  en  sus  manos  el  fiel  de  esta  balanza. 

La  Gran  Bretafia  alcanzara,  sin  duda,  ventajas  considerables  por  este 
arreglo. 

1.  Su  influencia  en  Europa  se  aumentarfa  progresivamente  y  sus  deci- 
siones  vendrfan  a  ser  las  del  destine. 

2.  La  America  le  servirfa  como  de  un  opulento  dominio  de  comercio. 

3.  Serfa  pa.  ella  la  America  el  centro  de  sus  relaciones  entre  el  Asia 
y  la  Europa. 

4.  Los  ingleses  se  considerarfan  iguales  a  los  ciudadanos  de  America. 

5.  Las  relaciones  mutuas  entre  los  dos  pafses  lograrfan  con  el  tiempo 
ser  unas  mismas. 

6.  El  carficter  britftnico,  y  sus  costumbres  los  tomarfan  los  americanos, 
pr.  los  objetos  normales  de  su  existencia  futura. 

7.  En  la  marcha  de  los  siglos,  podrfa  encontrarse  quizft  una  sola  naoidn 
cubriendo  al  Universe  —  la  federal. 

Tales  ideas  ocupan  el  animo  de  algunos  Americanos  constituldos  en  el 
rango  mas  elevado;  ellos  esperan  con  impaciencia,  la  iniciativa  de  este 
proyecto  en  el  Congreso  de  Panama,  que  puede  ser  la  ocasi6n  de  consolidar 
la  uni6n  de  los  nuevos  Estados  con  el  imperio  Britanico. 

BOLTVAB. 

(Lima:  febrero  de  1826.) 


BKITISH  INFLUENCE  389 

extraordinary,  stronger  league  than  has  ever  been  formed  in 
the  world.  The  Holy  Alliance  will  be  less  powerful  than  this 
confederation  should  England  be  willing  to  be  a  party  as  a  con- 
stituent member.  Mankind  will  bless  a  thousand  times  such  a 
league  for  the  public  weal,  and  America  as  well  as  Great  Britain 
will  reap  its  benefits. 

"  The  relations  of  political  communities  would  obtain  a  code 
of  public  law  for  their  universal  rule  of  conduct. 

"  1.  The  New  World  would  be  formed  by  independent  na- 
tions bound  together  by  a  common  set  of  laws  which  would  fix 
their  foreign  relations  and  would  give  them  a  conservative  power 
in  a  general  and  permanent  congress. 

"  2.  The  existence  of  these  new  states  would  obtain  new  guar- 
antees. 

"  3.  Spain  would  make  peace  through  respect  for  England 
and  the  Holy  Alliance  would  recognize  these  new  rising  na- 
tions. 

"  4.  Internal  order  would  be  preserved  untouched,  both  among 
and  within  each  of  the  different  states. 

"5.  No  one  would  be  weaker  than  the  other,  no  one  the 
stronger. 

"  6.  A  perfect  balance  would  be  established  in  this  true  new 
order  of  things. 

"  7.  The  strength  of  all  would  come  to  the  aid  of  one  suffer- 
ing from  a  foreign  enemy,  or  anarchical  factions. 

"  8.  Difference  of  origin  and  color  would  lose  their  influ- 
ence and  power. 

"  9.  America  would  have  nothing  more  to  fear  from  that 
awful  monster  which  has  devoured  the  island  of  Santo  Domingo, 
nor  would  there  be  any  fear  of  the  preponderance  in  numbers 
of  the  primitive  inhabitants. 

"  10.  Social  reform,  in  short,  would  have  been  attained 
under  the  blessed  auspices  of  liberty  and  peace  —  but  Eng- 
land should  necessarily  take  in  her  hands  the  beam  of  the 
scales. 


390      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

"  Great  Britain  would  undoubtedly  attain  considerable  ad- 
vantages through  this  arrangement. 

"  1.  Her  influence  in  Europe  would  progressively  increase 
and  her  decisions  will  be  like  those  of  destiny. 

"  2.  America  would  serve  her  as  a  wealthy  commercial  do- 
main. 

"  3.  America  would  be  to  her  the  center  of  her  relations  be- 
tween Asia  and  Europe. 

"  4.  English  subjects  would  be  considered  equal  to  the  citi- 
zens of  America. 

"  5.  The  mutual  relations  between  the  two  countries  in  time 
would  become  the  same. 

"  6.  British  characteristics  and  customs  would  be  taken  by 
Americans  as  standards  of  their  future  life. 

"  7.  In  the  advance  of  the  centuries,  there  would  be,  per- 
haps, one  single  nation  covering  the  world  —  the  federal  na- 
tion. 

"  These  ideas  are  in  the  mind  of  some  Americans  of  the  most 
prominent  class;  they  are  awaiting  impatiently  the  initiation 
of  this  project  in  the  Panama  Congress,  which  may  be  the  occa- 
sion of  consolidating  the  union  of  the  new  states  with  the  Brit- 
ish Empire." 

On  February  10,  1826,  Bolivar  arrived  in  Lima  after  a  so- 
journ of  nearly  a  year  in  the  south  of  Peru  and  in  the  new 
republic  of  Bolivar.  Immediately  on  reaching  Lima,  he  sent 
for  the  British  consul  general,  Ricketts,  and  had  a  long  con- 
ference with  him.61  A  few  days  later  Ricketts  sent  an  account 
of  the  conference  to  his  government  and  included  with  his  re- 
port a  memorandum  in  Spanish  substantially  the  same  as  the 
one  quoted  above,  though  differing  from  it  in  some  parts  in 
phraseology.62 

Bolivar  was  then  deeply  absorbed  in  the  question  of  the  in- 
ternal organization  of  the  new  states,  and  the  object  of  the  con- 

«i  Villanueva,  El  Imperio  de  lot  Andet,  97-108. 
«2/bfcZ.,  144-146. 


BEITISH  INFLUENCE  391 

ference  was  in  part  to  make  his  ideas  on  the  subject  known  to 
the  British  Government.  Thus  the  proposal  for  an  alliance  or 
a  species  of  protectorate  was  closely  related  to  the  question  of 
monarchy,  which  has  been  duly  considered  in  a  previous  chap- 
ter and  need  not  be  dwelt  upon  here.  But  there  is  an  important 
question  which  remains  to  be  answered. 

What  was  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain  toward  the  project  ? 
It  has  already  been  intimated  that  Canning  probably  did  not 
go  so  far  at  any  time  as  to  approve  of  the  plans  for  placing 
the  new  states  under  British  protection.  He  had  declared, 
however,  in  his  instructions  to  Dawkins  that  Great  Britain 
would  not  object  to  "  a  league  of  the  states,  lately  colonies  of 
Spain,  growing  out  of  their  common  relations  to  Spain,"  but 
that  "  any  project  for  putting  the  United  States  of  North 
America  at  the  head  of  an  American  Confederation,  as  against 
Europe/7  would  be  highly  displeasing  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment. In  so  far,  therefore,  as  the  project  dispensed  with  the 
leadership  of  the  United  States  and  was  intended  to  assure  to 
England  the  degree  of  influence  which  she  hoped  to  exercise  in 
the  affairs  of  the  new  states,  Canning  must  have  regarded  it  at 
least  with  sympathy.  But  it  is  unlikely  that  he  would  have 
imperiled  the  friendly  relations  existing  between  Great  Britain 
and  other  sections  of  America  recently  emancipated,  particularly 
Buenos  Aires,  Brazil,  and  Mexico,  by  making  his  government 
a  party  to  an  arrangement  which  was  viewed  with  suspicion  in 
each  of  those  sections.  Indeed  he  could  have  adopted  no  more 
effective  means  for  dividing  the  new  states  into  hostile  groups 
than  by  supporting  the  Liberator's  grand  project.  Canning's 
policy  aimed  at  maintaining  harmonious  relations  with  all 
these  nascent  powers  and  between  them  all.  His  diplomacy 
had  been  especially  directed  toward  bringing  about  a  friendly 
settlement  of  the  differences  between  Buenos  Aires  and  Brazil 
and  toward  preventing  Bolivar  from  interfering  in  the  quarrel 
between  those  countries.63  And  he  was  even  more  desirous  of 

es  Cf .  the  Minute  of  a  conference  which  Hurtado,  the  minister  of  Colom- 


392       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

avoiding  a  course  which  would  have  surely  resulted  in  an  in- 
terruption of  the  friendly  relations  then  existing  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States.  In  accordance  with  this  pol- 
icy he  rejected  the  overtures  which  were  finally  made  by  the 
Colombian  minister  in  London.64 

bia  at  London,  had  with  Canning  on  November  7,  1825  (O'Leary,  Memorias, 
352-354)  ;  Hurtado  to  Revenga,  November  16,  1825  (O'Leary,  Memoriae, 
358-360) ;  Revenga  to  Bolivar's  secretary  general  (O'Leary,  Memoriae, 
478-479). 

e*  In  a  letter  to  Bolivar,  dated  December  23,  1826,  Santander  said: 
"  Hurtado  has  at  last  spoken  to  Mr.  Canning  concerning  the  alliance 
and  the  protectorate.  The  minister  [Canning]  fears  that  the  rest  of  the 
nations  will  view  the  league  unfavorably,  and  particularly  the  United 
States  of  the  North.  He  declared  that  England  aspired  only  to  maintain 
the  relations  which  she  had  established  with  the  American  states,  unless 
some  unforeseen  event  should  oblige  her  to  adopt  some  other  course." 
O'Leary,  Memorias,  III,  341. 


CHAPTER  X 

ATTITUDE)    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES 

ATTENTION  must  now  be  directed  to  the  fuller  consideration 
of  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  the  Panama  Con- 
gress, as  well  as  of  the  attitude  of  the  great  protagonist  of  that 
congress  toward  the  United  States. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  circular  of  invitation  which  Bol- 
ivar sent  out  under  date  of  December  7,  1824,  was  directed 
specifically  to  the  "  republics  formerly  colonies  of  Spain/' 
Nevertheless,  two  months  previously  the  government  of  Colom- 
bia had  instructed  Salazar,  its  minister  at  Washington,  "  to 
sound  gradually  and  in  a  manner  confidential  and  private,  the 
opinion  and  desires  of  the  government  of  the  United  States  rela- 
tive to  the  proposed  American  confederation,"  with  a  view  to 
extend  an  invitation  to  that  government  if  it  should  show  a 
disposition  to  accept.1  In  replying  to  Bolivar's  circular,  San- 
tander,  the  acting  president  of  Colombia,  wrote  early  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1825,  that  he  had  deemed  it  expedient  to  invite  the 
United  States  to  send  representatives  to  the  assembly,  and  that 
he  was  firmly  convinced  that  the  allies  of  Colombia  would  not 
fail  to  see  with  pleasure  friends  so  enlightened  and  sincere  tak- 
ing part  in  deliberations  for  their  common  interest.  Santander 
sent  with  his  communication  to  Bolivar  a  copy  of  the  instruc- 
tions to  Salazar.2  In  April,  Bolivar  wrote  expressing  the  fear 
that  the  invitation  to  the  United  States  would  not  be  favorably 
regarded  by  Great  Britain,3  to  which  objection  Santander  re- 

1  Gual  to  Salazar,  October  7,  1824.     O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXII,  615. 

2  Santander  to  Bolivar,  February  6,    1825.     O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXIV, 
255. 

s  The  letter  referred  to  has  not  been  published.    The  inference  is  drawn 
from  Santander's  reply. 

393 


394       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

plied  that  if  the  United  States  entered  the  confederation  it 
would  be  only  after  having  arrived  at  an  understanding  with 
Great  Britain,  as  he  was  sure  had  been  done  when  President 
Monroe  announced  his  opposition  to  the  American  projects  of 
the  Holy  Alliance.4 

The  government  of  Colombia  was  not  alone  in  inviting  the 
United  States  to  participate  in  the  Congress  of  Panama.  Re- 
plying to  Bolivar's  circular  of  December  7,  1824,  President 
Victoria  declared  that,  as  he  was  persuaded  that  the  cause  of 
independence  and  liberty  was  the  cause  not  only  of  the  repub- 
lics formerly  colonies  of  Spain  but  also  of  the  United  States, 
he  had  instructed  the  Mexican  minister  at  Washington  to  broach 
the  subject  of  the  congress  to  the  President  and  to  inquire 
whether  he  would  desire  to  send  representatives  to  take  part 
in  its  deliberations.5  During  the  spring  of  1825,  Clay  held 
separate  conferences  on  the  same  day  with  the  ministers  of 
Mexico  and  Colombia,  at  their  request,  in  the  course  of  which 
each  of  them  stated  that  his  government  was  desirous  that  the 
United  States  should  send  representatives  to  the  proposed  con- 
gress. Clay  informed  the  ministers  that  if  certain  preliminary 
points  relative  to  the  subjects  to  be  considered,  the  substance 
and  form  of  the  powers  of  the  delegates,  and  the  mode  of 
organizing  the  congress  could  be  arranged  in  a  satisfactory 
manner,  the  President  would  be  disposed  to  accept  in  behalf  of 
the  United  States  the  invitation  which  had  been  provisionally 
tendered.  Thus  the  matter  rested  until  early  in  November, 
when  Obregon  and  Salazar,  the  ministers  of  Mexico  and  Co- 
lombia, presented  formal  invitations,  which  were  soon  followed 
by  a  similar  communication  from  the  minister  of  the  republic 
of  Central  America,  who  had  not  been  a  party  to  the  previous 
conferences.  In  an  identical  note  to  Obregon  and  Salazar, 
Clay,  while  lamenting  the  fact  that  the  preliminary  conditions 

*O'Leary,  Memoriae,  III,  189. 

5  Victoria  to  Bolivar,  February  23,  1825.  O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XXIV, 
256-257. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        395 

had  not  been  satisfactorily  arranged,  declared  that  the  President 
had  resolved,  subject  to  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate, 
to  send  commissioners  to  the  congress,  and  that,  while  these 
commissioners  would  not  be  authorized  to  enter  upon  any  de- 
liberations nor  to  concur  in  any  acts  inconsistent  with  the  neu- 
trality of  the  United  States,  they  would  be  fully  empowered 
and  instructed  on  all  questions  likely  to  arise  in  which  the  na- 
tions of  America  had  a  common  interest.  On  the  same  day 
Clay,  in  a  shorter  note,  accepted  the  invitation  which  the  min- 
ister from  Central  America  had  extended  in  behalf  of  his  gov- 
ernment.6 

In  his  first  annual  message  of  December  6,  1825,  President 
Adams  referred  briefly  to  the  proposed  assembly  at  Panama 
and  made  known  the  fact  that  he  had  accepted  the  invitation 
which  had  been  extended  to  the  United  States  to  be  repre- 
sented in  it.7  On  December  26,  he  sent  to  the  Senate  his  spe- 
cial message  nominating  Anderson  and  Sergeant  as  delegates. 
Accompanying  this  message  there  was  a  report  from  the  secre- 
tary of  state,  together  with  copies  of  the  correspondence  with 
the  ministers  of  Mexico,  Colombia,  and  Central  America.  On 
January  9,  1826,  he  sent  to  the  Senate,  in  compliance  with  a 
resolution  of  that  body,  yet  another  report  of  the  secretary  of 
State,  furnishing  translations  of  the  conventions  which  Colom- 
bia had  entered  into  with  Peru,  Mexico,  Central  America,  and 
Chile ;  8  and  with  these  there  were  transmitted  such  parts  of 
the  correspondence  of  the  United  States  with  Russia,  France, 
Colombia,  and  Mexico  as  were  supposed  to  bear  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  the  resolution.  These  messages  and  the  accompanying 
papers  were  referred  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
from  which,  on  January  16,  Senator  Macon  made  a  report  con- 
cluding with  the  recommendation  that  the  following  resolution 

e  American  State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  V.  835-839. 

7  Kichardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  II,  302. 

8  The  convention  was  never  ratified  by  Chile. 


396       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

be  adopted :  "  Resolved,  that  it  is  not  expedient,  at  this  time, 
for  the  United  States  to  send  ministers  to  the  Congress  of  Amer- 
ican Nations  assembled  at  Panama."  9 

On  February  1,  to  which  day  the  consideration  of  the  reso- 
lution was  postponed,  the  President  transmitted  to  the  Senate, 
at  its  request,  extracts  from  the  correspondence  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain,  relative  to  the  interposition  of  the 
Emperor  of  Russia  to  induce  Spain  to  recognize  the  independ- 
ence of  the  South  American  states.10  No  action  of  importance 
was  taken  by  the  Senate  until  February  15,  when,  on  motion 
of  Van  Buren,  it  was  resolved,  first,  that,  upon  the  question 
whether  the  United  States  should  be  represented  in  the  Con- 
gress of  Panama,  the  Senate  ought  to  act  with  open  doors, 
unless  it  should  appear  that  the  publication  of  the  documents 
would  be  prejudicial  to  existing  negotiations;  and  secondly, 
that  the  President  be  requested  to  inform  the  Senate  whether 
such  objection  existed.  The  President,  in  reply,  declared  that 
the  communications  relating  to  the  Congress  of  Panama  had 
been  made  in  confidence,  and  that,  as  he  believed  in  maintain- 
ing the  established  usage  of  free  confidential  intercourse  be- 
tween the  executive  and  the  Senate,  he  deemed  it  his  duty  to 
leave  to  the  Senate  itself  the  decision  of  the  question.11  On 
February  23  a  resolution  was  passed  declaring  that,  although 
the  Senate  had  the  right  to  publish  confidential  communica- 
tions, yet  circumstances  did  not  then  require  the  exercise  of 
that  right.  With  this  question  disposed  of,  the  Senate  pro- 
ceeded to  consider  the  resolution  reported  by  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  and  after  a  long  debate  it  was  defeated  on 
March  14  by  a  vote  of  19  to  24.  The  confirmation  of  the 
President's  nominations  followed  without  further  difficulty,  the 

»  Executive  Proceedings  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  on  the  Subject 
of  the  Mission  to  Panama,  3-14,  15-56,  57-76. 

10  Executive  Proceedings  of  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  on  the  Sub- 
ject of  the  Congress  of  Panama,  77-86. 

« Ibid.,  87. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        397 

vote  being  2Y  to  17  and  26  to  18  for  Anderson  and  Sergeant 
respectively.12 

Agitation  over  the  Panama  Congress  began  in  the  lower  house 
even  earlier  than  in  the  Senate.  On  December  16,  1825,  Ham- 
ilton of  South  Carolina  introduced  a  resolution  calling  upon 
the  President  for  information  concerning  the  invitation  ex- 
tended to  the  United  States  to  take  part  in  the  congress.  Three 
days  later,  however,  having  heard  that  the  President  intended 
in  due  time  to  send  to  the  House  all  papers  bearing  upon  the 
matter,  he  postponed  the  consideration  of  his  resolution,  re- 
serving, nevertheless,  the  right  to  call  it  up  later  if  he  should 
conceive  this  to  be  necessary.13  On  January  25,  1826,  Miner 
of  Pennsylvania  introduced  resolutions  expressing  sympathy 
with  the  new  states  and  declaring  that  provision  ought  to  be 
made  by  law  for  defraying  any  expenses  which  might  result 
from  the  appointment  of  ministers  to  the  assembly  on  the 
Isthmus.  But  at  the  request  of  their  author  the  resolutions 
were  ordered  to  lie  on  the  table.14  On  January  31  Hamilton's 
resolution  was  called  up,  and  after  a  debate  occupying  a  large 
part  of  the  time  of  the  House  for  four  days  it  was  adopted.15 
On  March  15  Adams  sent  to  the  House  the  desired  documents ; 
and,  as  the  nominations  of  Anderson  and  Sergeant  had  been 
confirmed  the  day  before,  he  asked  the  House  to  make  an  ap- 
propriation to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  mission.16 

On  March  25  Crowinshield  from  the  Committee  on  For- 
eign Affairs,  to  which  the  President's  message  and  the  accom- 
panying documents  were  referred,  made  a  favorable  report.17 
But  when,  on  April  4,  the  House  in  committee  of  the  whole 

12  Hid.,  98,  101-104.  For  the  debates,  see  Register  of  Debates  in  Con- 
gress (1826),  II,  152-342. 

is  Register  of  Debates  in  Congress,  1826,  II,  817-819. 
i*  Ibid.,  1116-1118. 
is  Ibid.,  1208-1301. 

16  Ibid,    (appendix),    9.     Other   documents   were   sent   to   the   house   on 
March  30,  on  April  5,  and  on  April  15.     Ibid.,  83,  89,  91. 

17  Ibid,  (appendix),  100-105. 


398       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

took  up  the  report,  McLane  of  Delaware  offered  an  amendment 
which  was  designed  to  place  upon  the  executive  certain  limi- 
tations respecting  the  powers  and  instructions  to  be  given  to 
the  envoys.18  The  debate  which  followed  was  long  and  spirited 
and  involved  every  phase  of  the  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  other  American  countries.  There  were,  how- 
ever, as  Webster  pointed  out,  only  two  questions  for  the  House 
to  decide:  First,  whether  it  would  assume  the  responsibility 
for  failure  to  make  the  appropriation;  and  secondly,  whether 
it  should  interpose  with  its  opinions,  directions,  or  instructions 
as  to  the  manner  in  which  that  particular  executive  measure 
should  be  conducted.19  When  the  amendment  came  to  a  test 
on  April  21,  it  was  lost  by  a  vote  of  54  to  143.  Three  days 
later  the  appropriation  was  passed  by  a  somewhat  smaller  ma- 
jority.20 

It  is  no  part  of  the  purpose  of  the  present  study  to  review  the 
debates  which  took  place  in  the  United  States  Senate  and  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  on  the  subject  of  the  Panama  mis- 
sion ;  for  those  debates  had  little  if  any  influence,  either  directly 
or  indirectly,  upon  the  Congress  of  Panama.  The  internal  con- 
ditions of  the  new  states,  and  their  relations  not  only  with  one 
another  but  also  with  other  countries,  particularly  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain,  were  factors  which  had  already  deter- 
mined the  character  of  the  assembly  and  its  probable  outcome. 
As  has  been  intimated  elsewhere  in  these  pages,  the  discussions 
in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  are  of  interest  chiefly  on 
account  of  their  bearing  upon  the  condition  of  domestic  politics. 
The  opposition  to  the  mission  to  Panama,  in  so  far  as  it  was 
genuine,  was  based  upon  Washington's  precept  against  entan- 
gling alliances;  but  it  was  in  fact  largely  factitious,  and  indi- 

is  Register  of  Debates  in  Congress,  1826.     II,  2011.     For  the  debates,  see 
ibid.,  2011-2098;  2135-2514. 
i»  Ibid.,  2254. 

i(J.,  2490,  2514. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        399 

cated  hostility  to  the  administration  much  more  than  disap- 
proval of  the  idea  of  cooperation  with  the  new  states. 

The  question  of  slavery  was  brought  into  the  discussion  for 
the  purpose  of  inflaming  party  passion,  but  it  had  practically  no 
effect  upon  the  policy  either  of  the  United  States  or  of  the 
other  American  states  regarding  Haiti,  Cuba,  and  Porto  Rico.21 
~No  American  state  had  recognized  the  independence  of  Haiti, 
or  had  manifested  a  disposition  to  receive  the  black  republic 
on  terms  of  equality.  And  as  to  Cuba,  the  policies  of  the 
United  States,  Colombia,  and  Mexico  had  been  determined  in 
the  main  independently  of  the  question  of  slavery,  long  before 
the  discussions  began  in  the  United  States  Congress.  It  is 
difficult  to  believe  that  the  United  States  would  have  been  less 
opposed  to  the  transfer  of  Cuba  to  another  power,  or  that  Co- 
lombia and  Mexico  would  have  been  less  anxious  to  acquire 
it,  had  there  been  no  slaves  on  the  island.  It  is  true  that,  if 
the  congressional  debates  had  not  caused  delay,  the  delegates 
of  the  United  States  might  have  set  out  in  time  to  reach  the 
Isthmus  before  the  assembly  adjourned.  But,  even  so,  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  the  issue  would  have  been  more  successful. 
It  is  possible,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  presence  of  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  might  not  have  contributed  to  the 
harmonious  carrying  out  of  the  aims  of  the  congress. 

Nevertheless,  in  the  papers  sent  by  President  Adams  to  the 

21  The  vote  in  the  Senate  followed  strictly  party  lines  and  not  sectional 
lines,  as  would  have  been  the  case  if  slavery  had  been  a  determining  factor. 
Of  the  nineteen  senators  who  maintained  by  their  votes  that  it  was  inex- 
pedient to  send  ministers  to  Panama  seven  were  from  non-slave  holding 
states  and  of  the  twenty-four  who  voted  in  favor  of  the  mission,  eight  rep- 
resented slave  states.  The  seven  Northern  senators  who  cast  their  votes 
against  the  mission  were:  Chandler  and  Holmes  of  Maine;  Woodbury  of 
New  Hampshire ;  Van  Buren  of  New  York ;  Dickerson  of  New  Jersey ;  Find- 
lay  of  Pennsylvania,  and  Kane  of  Illinois.  The  slave-state  senators  in 
favor  of  the  mission  were:  Benton  of  Missouri;  Bouligny  and  Johnston  of 
Louisiana;  Chambers  and  Smith  of  Maryland;  Clayton  and  Van  Dyke  of 
Delaware;  Johnson  of  Kentucky.  Cf.  Executive  Proceedings  of  the  Senate 
of  the  U.  8.  on  the  Subject  of  the  Mission  of  the  Congress  of  Panama, 
(1826),  101;  Roosevelt,  Thomas  Hart  Benton,  65. 


400       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

two  branches  of  the  national  legislature  and  occasionally  in  the 
speeches  of  senators  and  representatives,  there  are  passages  of 
great  significance  regarding  the  place  the  United  States  should 
occupy  in  the  American  system.  Thus,  in  a  letter  of  Adams, 
who  was  then  Secretary  of  State,  to  Rodney,  the  first  United 
States  minister  to  Buenos  Aires,  dated  May  17,  1823,  the 
following  interesting  reference  to  the  subject  is  found: 

"  In  the  meantime  a  more  extensive  confederation  has  been 
projected  under  the  auspices  of  the  new  government  of  the  re- 
public of  Colombia.  In  the  last  dispatch  received  from  Mr. 
Forbes,  dated  the  27th  January  last,  he  mentions  the  arrival 
and  reception  at  Buenos  Aires  of  Mr.  Joaquin  Mosquera  y  Ar- 
boleda,  senator  of  the  republic  of  Colombia,  and  their  min- 
ister plenipotentiary  and  extraordinary  upon  a  mission,  the 
general  object  of  which,  he  informed  Mr.  Forbes,  was  to  en- 
gage the  other  independent  governments  of  Spanish  22  America 
to  unite  with  Colombia  in  a  congress,  to  be  held  at  such  point 
as  may  be  agreed  on,  to  settle  a  general  system  of  American 
Policy,  in  relation  to  Europe,  leaving  to  each  section  of  the 
country  the  perfect  liberty  of  independent  self-government. 
For  this  purpose  he  had  already  signed  a  treaty  with  Peru  of 
which  he  promised  Mr.  Forbes  the  perusal ;  but  there  were  some 
doubts  with  regard  to  the  character  of  his  associations,  and  the 
personal  influence  to  which  he  was  accessible  at  Buenos  Aires, 
and  Mr.  Forbes  had  not  much  expectation  of  his  success  in 
prevailing  on  that  government  to  enter  into  his  project  of  exten- 
sive federation. 

"  By  letters  of  a  previous  date,  November,  1822,  received 
from  Mr.  Prevost,  it  appears  that  the  project  is  yet  more  exten- 
sive than  Mr.  Mosquera  had  made  known  to  Mr.  Forbes.  It 
embraces  North,  as  well  as  South  America,  and  a  formal  pro- 
posal to  join  and  take  the  lead  in  it  is  to  be  made  known  to  the 
government  of  the  United  States. 

"  Intimations  of  the  same  design  have  been  given  to  Mr. 

«« Italics  as  in  the  printed  instructions. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        401 

Todd,  at  Bogota.  It  will  be  time  for  this  government  to  de- 
liberate concerning  it  when  it  shall  be  presented  in  a  more  defi- 
nite and  specific  form.  At  present  it  indicates  more  distinctly 
a  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  Colombian  republic  to  assume  a 
leading  character  in  this  hemisphere,  than  any  practicable  ob- 
jects of  utility  which  can  be  discovered  by  us.  With  relation 
to  Europe  there  is  perceived  to  be  only  one  object  in  which  the 
interests  and  wishes  of  the  United  States  can  be  the  same  as 
those  of  the  Southern  American  nations,  and  that  is,  that  they 
should  all  be  governed  by  republican  institutions,  politically 
and  commercially  independent  of  Europe.  To  any  confedera- 
tion of  Spanish  American  provinces,  for  that  end,  the  United 
States  would  yield  their  approbation  and  cordial  good  wishes. 
If  more  should  be  asked  of  them,  the  proposition  will  be  re- 
ceived and  considered  in  a  friendly  spirit,  and  with  a  due  sense 
of  its  importance."  23 

Ten  days  later,  in  his  instructions  to  Anderson,  who  was 
being  dispatched  as  minister  to  Colombia,  Adams  again  refers 
to  the  question  of  confederation,  as  follows :  "  Of  this  mighty 
movement  in  human  affairs,  mightier  far  than  that  of  the  down- 
fall of  the  Roman  Empire,  the  United  States  may  continue  to 
be,  as  they  have  been  hitherto,  the  tranquil  but  deeply  attentive 
spectators.  They  may,  also,  in  the  various  vicissitudes,  by 
which  it  must  be  followed,  be  called  to  assume  a  more  active 
and  leading  part  in  its  progress.  Floating,  undigested  pur- 
poses of  this  great  American  Confederation  have  been  for  some 
time  fermenting  in  the  imaginations  of  many  speculative  states- 
men, nor  is  the  idea  to  be  disdainfully  rejected,  because  its 
magnitude  may  appall  the  understanding  of  politicians  accus- 
tomed to  the  more  minute,  but  more  complicated  machinery  of 
a  contracted  political  standard. 

"  So  far  as  the  proposed  Colombian  Confederacy  has  for  its 
object  a  combined  system  of  total  and  unqualified  independence 

23  Register  of  Debates  in  Congress   (1826),  Vol.  I,  Part  II,  90    (App.); 
American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  V,  918. 


402       PAN- AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

of  Europe,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  partial  compositions,  of  any 
one  of  the  emancipated  colonies,  with  Spain,  it  will  have  the 
entire  approbation  and  good  wishes  of  the  United  States,  but 
will  require  no  special  agency  of  theirs  to  carry  it  into  effect. 

"  So  far  as  its  purposes  may  be  to  concert  a  general  system  of 
popular  representation  for  the  government  of  the  several  inde- 
pendent states  which  are  floating  from  the  wreck  of  the  Spanish 
power  in  America,  the  United  States  will  still  cheer  it  with  their 
approbation  and  speed  with  their  good  wishes  its  success. 

"  And  so  far  as  its  objects  may  be  to  accomplish  a  meeting, 
at  which  the  United  States  should  preside,  to  assimilate  the  poli- 
tics of  the  South  with  those  of  the  North,  a  more  particular  and 
definite  view  of  the  end  proposed  by  this  design,  and  of  the 
means  by  which  it  is  effected,  will  be  necessary  to  enable  us  to 
determine  upon  our  concurrence  with  it."  24 

In  the  foregoing  instructions  Adams  touches  upon  what  is 
perhaps  the  most  vital  point  in  the  whole  question  of  the  con- 
federation of  independent  American  states;  namely,  which  of 
the  several  governments  should  be  the  preponderant  factor  in 
the  formation  and  maintenance  of  the  proposed  league?  Bol- 
ivar had  raised  the  question  nearly  a  decade  before  and  his 
efforts  from  that  time  onward  had  been  directed  toward  build- 
ing up  a  state,  in  which  he  himself,  perhaps,  should  be  the 
dominant  figure,  sufficiently  strong  to  assume  the  position  of 
leadership.  Adams  would  have  been  unwilling,  it  may  be  de- 
duced from  the  instructions  to  Rodney  and  Anderson,  to  com- 
mit the  United  States  to  participation  in  a  league  in  which  the 
influence  of  some  other  power  should  preponderate.  Not  only 
so,  but  he  would  give  no  assurance  as  to  the  course  his  govern- 
ment would  adopt  if  invited  to  head  the  movement.  In  his  own 
language,  it  was  necessary  to  have  first  a  more  definite  view  of 
the  end  proposed  and  of  the  means  by  which  it  was  to  be  ef- 
fected. 

24  Register  of  Debates  in  Congress  (1826),  Vol.  I,  Part  II,  80  (App.)  ; 
American  State  Papers,  For.  ReL,  V,  896. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        403 

As  has  already  been  shown,  during  the  two  years  from  1823 
to  1825  but  little  was  heard  of  the  project  for  confederating 
the  American  states.  Toward  the  close  of  1824,  however,  the 
Congress  of  Panama  began  to  be  discussed  anew  and,  shortly 
after  Adams  became  President,  was  the  subject  of  diplomatic 
interchanges  at  Washington  and  of  discussion  in  the  public 
press  of  the  country.  Henry  Clay,  who  had  been,  in  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States,  the  ardent  advocate  of  the  cause 
of  the  southern  republics,  was  now  Secretary  of  State;  but 
Adams,  while  acting  as  his  predecessor  in  that  office,  had,  dur- 
ing the  period  of  agitation  in  favor  of  the  new  states,  stood  in 
the  way  of  the  realization  of  Clay's  policy  of  a  more  benevolent 
attitude  toward  them.  The  two  men  had  not  changed  their 
opinions.  Clay,  ever  enthusiastic  with  respect  to  the  possibili- 
ties of  an  intimate  political  association  of  the  free  states  of  the 
continent,  saw  in  the  Congress  of  Panama  an  opportunity  to 
realize  his  dream  of  an  American  system.  Adams,  cold,  judi- 
cial in  his  attitude  toward  the  southern  neighbors,  critical  of 
their  accomplishments,  and  skeptical  of  their  capacity  for  self- 
government,  inclined  to  adhere  to  the  traditional  policy  of  no 
entangling  alliances.25  And^  strange  to  say,  when  the  adminis- 

25  In  March,  1821,  Adams  wrote  in  his  diary  as  follows:  "  That  the  final 
issue  of  their  present  struggle  would  be  their  entire  independence  of  Spain 
I  had  never  doubted.  That  it  was  our  true  policy  and  duty  to  take  no  part 
in  the  contest  I  was  equally  clear.  The  principle  of  neutrality  to  all  for- 
eign wars  was,  in  my  opinion,  fundamental  to  the  continuance  of  our  liber- 
ties and  of  our  union.  So  far  as  they  were  contending  for  independence, 
I  wished  well  to  their  cause;  but  I  had  seen  and  yet  see  no  prospect  that 
they  would  establish  free  or  liberal  institutions  of  government.  They  are 
not  likely  to  promote  the  spirit  of  either  freedom  or  order  by  their  example. 
They  have  not  the  first  elements  of  good  or  free  government.  Abitrary 
power,  military  and  ecclesiastical,  was  stamped  upon  their  education,  upon 
their  habits,  and  upon  all  their  institutions.  Civil  dissension  was  infused 
into  all  their  seminal  principles.  War  and  mutual  destruction  was  in  every 
member  of  their  organization,  moral,  political,  and  physical.  I  had  little 
expectation  of  any  beneficial  result  to  this  country  from  any  future  con- 
nection with  them,  political  or  commercial.  We  should  derive  no  improve- 
ment to  our  institutions  by  any  communion  with  theirs.  Nor  was  there 
any  appearance  of  a  disposition  in  them  to  take  any  political  lessons  from 
us."  Memoirs,  V,  324. 


404       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

tration  was  less  than  two  months  old,  the  President  and  his 
Secretary  of  State  set  forth,  or  caused  to  be  set  forth,  their 
respective  views  in  articles  published  in  the  daily  press.  These 
articles  were  cited  a  year  later  in  the  debate  on  the  Panama 
mission  in  the  House  of  Representatives.26 

The  article  attributed  to  Clay  first  appeared  in  the  Democratic 
Press  of  Philadelphia  and  was  copied  by  the  National  Intelli- 
gencer of  Washington  in  its  issue  of  April  26,  1825.  The 
writer  of  the  article,  adverting  to  the  fact  that  it  had  been 
announced  by  the  government  of  Colombia  that  a  congress  of 
the  states  of  South  America  would  be  held  at  Panama  during 
the  course  of  the  year,  inquired  whether  or  not  the  United 
States  would  be  represented  there.  "If  we  do  not  appear 
there,"  the  writer  declared,  "  we  shall  most  probably,  and  very 
deservedly,  find  those  feelings  that  ought  to  unite  all  America 
transferred  to  other  governments  which  know  better  how  to 
appreciate  the  singular  importance  of  reunion,  and  which  will, 
by  their  forethought,  derive,  to  our  exclusion,  the  advantages 
arising  from  affectionate  feelings,  and  from  relations  which 
we  will  have  justly  forfeited.  At  this  congress,  will,  no  doubt, 
be  suggested  the  natural  idea  of  a  coalition,  perhaps  confedera- 
tion, of  all  the  South  American  states. 

26  Ingham  of  Pennsylvania,  speaking  in  the  House  of  Representatives  on 
April  18,  1826,  quoted  extracts  from  the  articles  in  question.  "  I  will 
not,"  he  said,  "  conceal  my  belief  as  to  the  authorship  of  the  two  papers : 
so  far,  at  least,  as  to  declare  that  I  am  convinced  that  in  the  Philadelphia 
paper  was  written  under  the  eye  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  that  in  the 
National  Intelligencer  under  the  eye,  if  not  by  the  pen,  of  the  President 
himself.  I  pretend  not  to  have  any  other  evidence  of  this  fact  than  what 
will  be  found  in  the  articles;  the  circumstances  of  their  appearance  and 
the  known  opinion  of  these  two  gentlemen  on  the  subject  discussed  in  the 
papers;  I  will  not,  therefore,  be  suspected  of  having  betrayed  any  con- 
fidence in  relation  to  any  supposed  knowledge  of  their  authorship.  I 
will  only  add  that  the  last  contains  more  good  sense,  upon  a  subject  some- 
what intricate,  than  I  have  ever  seen  comprised  in  so  small  a  space.  It  is 
in  my  judgment  one  of  the  ablest  papers  that  I  ever  put  my  eye  upon.  If 
I  am  correct  in  my  supposition  as  to  the  authorship,  these  two  papers  will 
give  us  the  free  and  untrammeled  opinions  of  the  two  statesmen  at  the 
head  of  the  executive  department  of  the  government  at  that  time."  Regis- 
ter of  Debates  in  Congress  (1826)  Vol.  I,  Part  11,  2363. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        405 

"  Let  them  propose  to  all  the  American  nations  a  confedera- 
tion. The  details  of  so  magnificent  a  work  would  require  long 
and  laborious  consideration;  but  the  leading  principle  should 
be  the  establishment  of  a  constitution  something  like  our  own, 
by  which  an  Areopagus  or  congress  should  watch  over  the  mu- 
tual relations  of  the  confederated  states,  without  interfering 
with  their  several  or  internal  regulations  or  governments  — 
which  should  govern  to  a  limited  extent  the  relations  with  for- 
eign powers,  of  the  whole,  and  of  the  several  confederated 
states  —  and  which  should  wield  the  force  of  the  confederated 
states  in  defense  of  any  member  that  may  be  attacked. 

"Is  it  objected  that  foreign  nations  will  view  the  confedera- 
tion with  jealousy?  I  answer,  first,  it  will  be  strong  enough 
to  conciliate  the  good,  and  to  regard  the  rage  of  unjust  men  with 
indifference.  Treaties  of  mere  alliance  have  not  hitherto  been 
found  sufficient ;  they  have  almost  always  terminated  in  disgust, 
and  have  been  broken.  Secondly,  I  answer  that  in  modern 
times  the  example  has  been  repeatedly  set  us;  the  Holy  Alli- 
ance is  itself  an  example;  the  Germanic  Confederation  as  it 
was,  and  as  it  stands  is  a  case  in  point,  the  Confederation  of 
the  Rhine  another;  the  former  union  of  the  three  Crowns  of 
England,  Scotland,  and  Ireland  another ;  as  are  also  the  former, 
and  perhaps  in  a  certain  degree  the  present  condition  of  the 
dominions  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria;  the  heptarchy  of  Eng- 
land; and  nearly  all  the  nations  of  Europe  in  the  dark  ages; 
to  say  nothing  of  the  Greek  confederation  in  ancient  times. 
The  errors  of  these  exemplars  are  before  us,  to  warn  us  against 
their  repetition,  and  to  instruct  us  how  to  organize  our  con- 
federation. The  fate  of  most  of  them,  that  of  fusion  into  one 
mass,  can  never  result  from  our  confederation ;  the  regions  are 
too  enormous,  and  the  distance  too  vast;  they  were  within  the 
compass  of  boundaries  less  than  almost  any  of  the  states  we 
propose  to  unite,  and  by  language  and  many  other  causes,  nat- 
urally formed  to  make  one  nation  —  but  it  would  be  the  height 
of  absurdity  to  attempt  to  form  one  government,  or  one  na- 


406       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

tion,  out  of  the  two  Americas,  or  even  out  of  one  of  them ;  and 
impossible,  because  absurd.27 

"  This  scheme  of  a  general  confederation  of  the  Americas, 
is  submitted  to  the  public  as  means  of  securing  peace  and  power 
abroad,  peace  and  happiness  at  home.  Every  argument  of 
humanity,  policy  and  reason,  calls  upon  us  to  rivet  the  bonds  of 
fraternal  affection  between  the  inhabitants  of  the  same  con- 
tinent, and  to  guard  with  a  sacred  vigilance  against  the  rupture 
of  a  single  link. 

"  A  confederation  alone  is  competent  to  this  duty,  and  with- 
out it  we  must  submit  to  the  ordinary  fate  of  other  nations, 
jealousy,  discord  and  war,  whenever  any  nation  thinks  itself 
strong  enough  to  wage  one  with  impunity."  28 

The  article  attributed  to  Adams  appeared  in  the  same  issue 
of  the  National  Intelligencer,  as  a  reply  to  the  proposals  con- 
tained in  the  article  from  which  the  foregoing  extracts  are 
taken.  Declaring  that  the  United  States  had  no  concern  with 
the  policy  of  the  governments  of  the  other  independent  nations 
of  America,  in  their  relations  to  one  another,  further  than 
to  wish  to  see  them  in  amity,  the  writer  said :  "As  concerns 
this  nation,  we  know  not  what  might  be  the  answer  of  the 
executive  to  an  invitation  to  join  the  proposed  confederation, 
but  we  know  what  we  should  wish  it  to  be  —  what  we  hope 
nine  tenths  of  the  American  people  would  desire  it  to  be.  If 
the  public  sentiment  be  in  accord  with  ours  on  this  point,  we 
shall  never  send  a  representative  to  any  congress  of  nations 
whose  decisions  are  to  be  law  for  this  nation.  Our  own  con- 
federacy insures  us  the  power  and  the  mode  of  asserting  our 
rights,  and  vindicating  our  wrongs.  By  an  alliance  with  any 
other  nation  or  nations,  it  is  obvious  we  shall  not  strengthen 
but  expose  ourselves.  We  shall  lose,  by  such  an  alliance,  the 
independence  which  is  our  boast.  For  what  is  independence 

27  Compare  the  ideas  here  expressed  with  those  set  forth  by  Bolivar  in 
his  prophetic  letter  of  a  decade  earlier. 

28  National  Intelligencer,  April  26,  1825. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        407 

but  a  name,  if  the  question  of  peace  or  war,  and  other  questions 
equally  as  important,  are  to  be  determined  for  us,  not  by  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States,  but  by  a  stupendous  confederacy, 
in  which  the  United  States  have  but  a  single  vote  ? 

"  It  will  be  seen  that  we  consider  the  proposed  congress,  or 
confederation,  as  being  intended  to  possess  the  powers,  as  well 
as  the  name  which  has  been  given  to  it,  of  the  ancient  council 
of  Amphictyons,  having  the  power  to  coerce  obedience  to  its 
decrees.  The  proposition  from  the  Democratic  Press  looks  to 
a  body  having  such  powers,  if  the  Bogota  proposition  does  not, 
and  our  objections  apply  still  more  strongly  to  our  own  govern- 
ment moving  in  this  matter,  than  they  would  to  its  meeting  the 
overtures  on  the  subject  from  the  government  of  Colombia,  or 
from  any  other  government. 

"  It  is  surely  not  necessary  here  to  urge  arguments  against 
any  departure  from  that  cardinal  principle  in  our  foreign  in- 
tercourse which  distrusts  and  rejects  alliances  with  foreign 
nations,  for  any  purpose.  We  do  not  mean,  of  course,  volun- 
tary cooperation  with  other  nations  for  definite  objects  but 
that  sort,  which,  by  an  alliance,  becomes  compulsory.  Every 
one  will  see,  at  a  glance,  the  vital  objections  there  are  to  this 
government's  coupling  its  destinies  with  those  of  any  other 
people  on  earth.  The  Amphictyons  of  Greece  were  a  body 
perhaps  necessary  in  that  age,  among  other  objects,  to  keep 
alive  its  religious  institutions,  and  to  protect  its  oracle.  We 
have,  thank  Heaven,  escaped  the  bondage  of  such  follies  and 
are  regenerated  from  such  superstitions.  We  have  no  sacred 
wars  to  wage,  nor  occasion  for  a  Holy  Alliance,  to  protect 
either  our  religion  or  our  political  rights.  It  is  no  reason,  be- 
cause such  a  measure  has  found  favor  among  the  nations  of 
Europe,  that  it  should  be  resorted  to  by  the  nations  of  Amer- 
ica." 

Continuing,  the  writer  declared  that  if  nothing  more  were 
meant  than  a  conference  of  ministers  to  consult  upon  the  in- 
terests of  the  whole,  there  would  be  no  other  objection  to  it 


408       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

than  that  it  could  be  productive  of  nothing  beneficial.  But 
if  such  a  conference  were  proposed,  perhaps  mere  courtesy 
might  induce  an  assent  to  it  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
were  it  only  to  assert,  in  that  conference,  the  doctrine  that  in 
becoming  independent  of  the  metropolitan  governments,  the 
governments  of  America  ought  not,  and  as  far  as  the  people  of 
the  United  States  were  concerned,  would  not,  be  dependent  on 
one  another.  Against  the  magnificent  scheme  set  forth  in  the 
Philadelphia  paper  the  writer  made,  therefore,  a  decided  pro- 
test, concluding  as  follows :  "  We  want  not  his  Areopagus  any 
more  than  we  do  the  Amphictyons.  For  our  Areopagus  we  are 
satisfied  with  our  bench  of  judges,  and  for  our  council  of  Am- 
phictyons we  choose  our  own  congress.  We  desire,  in  fine,  to 
be  members  of  no  confederation  more  comprehensive  than  that 
of  the  United  States  of  America."  29 

The  articles  in  question,  whether  or  not  they  were  correctly 
attributed  to  Clay  and  Adams,  respectively,  nevertheless  ex- 
pressed certain  ideas  of  which  those  statesmen  had  previously 
been  exponents.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  either  of 
them  had  at  this  time  essentially  changed  his  attitude  toward 
the  new  states.  A  slight  accommodation  of  ideas,  perhaps, 
made  it  possible  for  them  to  proceed  at  first  without  apparent 
friction.  And  as  it  soon  became  clear  that  the  United  States 
was  not  expected  to  form  a  part  of  the  confederacy  whose  foun- 
dations were  to  be  laid  at  Panama,  a  source  of  possible  disagree- 
ment between  the  President  and  his  Secretary  of  State  was 
thereby  removed;  for  Clay  by  force  of  circumstances  was  now 
driven  to  assume  an  attitude  substantially  the  same  as  that 
which  had  from  the  beginning  characterized  the  policy  of 
Adams.  On  the  other  hand  Adams,  without  altering  in  a 
fundamental  way  his  own  policy,  was  able  to  champion  the 
cause  of  the  assembly  with  something  of  Clay's  enthusiasm.80 

2»  National  Intelligencer,  April  26,  1826. 

so  Adams  thought  that  it  would  be  indulging  too  sanguine  a  forecast  of 
events  to  promise  that  the  Panama  Congress  would  accomplish  all,  or  even 
any,  of  the  transcendent  benefits  to  the  human  race  which  warmed  the  con- 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        409 

Indeed  the  President  now  warmly  urged  upon  the  legislative 
branch  of  the  government  the  adoption  of  the  measures  neces- 
sary to  enable  the  executive  to  dispatch  representatives  to  the 
Isthmus.  Speaking  in  his  special  message  of  March  15,  1826, 
to  the  House  of  Representatives,  of  the  motives  which  led  him 
to  accept  the  invitation  to  take  part  in  the  deliberations  of  the 
congress,  he  declared  that  his  "  first  and  great  inducement  was 
to  meet  in  the  spirit  of  kindness  and  friendship  an  overture 
made  in  that  spirit  by  three  sister  republics  of  this  hemisphere." 
He  did  not  consider  it  a  conclusive  reason  for  declining  the  in- 
vitation that  the  proposal  for  assembling  such  a  congress  had 
not  first  been  made  by  the  United  States.  The  project  had 
"  sprung  from  the  urgent,  immediate,  and  momentous  common 
interests  of  the  great  communities  struggling  for  independence 
and,  as  it  were,  quickening  into  life.  From  them  the  proposi- 
tion to  us  appeared  respectful  and  friendly;  from  us  to  them 
it  could  scarcely  have  been  made  without  exposing  ourselves 
to  suspicions  of  purposes  of  ambition,  if  not  of  domination, 
more  suited  to  rouse  resistance  and  excite  distrust  than  to  con- 
ciliate favor  and  friendship."  The  first  and  paramount  prin- 
ciple, he  concluded,  upon  which  it  was  deemed  wise  and  just 
to  lay  the  corner  stone  of  future  relations  between  the  United 
States  and  the  new  states  was  disinterestedness;  the  next  was 
cordial  good  will  to  them ;  and  the  third  was  a  claim  of  fair  and 
equal  reciprocity.31 

It  was  in  harmony  with  the  general  principles  laid  down  by 
Adams  that  Clay's  instructions  of  May  8,  1826,  to  Anderson 
and  Sergeant  were  prepared.  "  It  is  distinctly  understood  by 
the  President,"  said  Clay,  "  that  it  [the  Congress  of  Panama] 

ceptions  of  its  first  proposers.  But  he  said,  "  it  looks  to  the  melioration 
of  the  condition  of  man.  It  is  congenial  with  that  spirit  which  prompted 
the  declaration  of  our  independence,  which  inspired  the  preamble  of  our 
first  treaty  with  France,  which  dictated  our  first  treaty  with  Prussia  and 
the  instructions  under  which  it  was  negotiated,  which  filled  the  hearts  and 
fired  the  souls  of  the  immortal  founders  of  our  revolution,"  Richardson, 
Messages  and  Papers,  II,  340. 
si  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  II,  330-331. 


410       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

is  to  be  regarded  in  all  respects  as  diplomatic  in  contradistinc- 
tion to  a  body  clothed  with  powers  of  ordinary  legislation ;  that 
is  to  say,  no  one  of  the  states  represented  is  to  be  considered 
bound  by  any  treaty,  convention,  pact,  or  act  to  which  it  does 
not  subscribe  and  expressly  assent  by  its  acting  representative, 
and  that,  in  the  instance  of  treaties,  conventions,  and  pacts  they 
are  to  be  returned  for  final  ratification  to  each  contracting  state 
according  to  the  provisions  of  its  particular  constitution.  .  .  . 
All  notion  is  rejected  of  an  amphictyonic  council  invested  with 
power  finally  to  decide  controversies  between  the  American 
states  or  to  regulate  in  any  respect  their  conduct.  .  .  .  The 
complicated  and  various  interests  which  appertain  to  the  na- 
tions of  this  vast  continent  cannot  be  safely  confided  to  the 
superintendence  of  one  legislative  authority."  Continuing, 
Clay  declared  that  with  this  necessary  restriction  upon  the  ac- 
tion of  the  congress  great  advantages  might  nevertheless  be  de- 
rived from  an  assembly  of  American  ministers.  Such  an  as- 
sembly would  afford  great  facilities  for  free  and  friendly 
conferences,  for  mutual  and  necessary  explanations,  and  for 
discussing  and  establishing  some  general  principles  applicable 
to  peace  and  war,  to  commerce  and  navigation,  with  the  sanction 
of  all  America.  Treaties  might  be  concluded  in  the  course  of 
a  few  months  at  such  a  congress,  laying  the  foundation  of  last- 
ing amity  and  good  neighborhood,  which  it  would  require  many 
years  to  consummate,  if,  indeed,  they  would  be  at  all  practicable 
by  separate  and  successive  negotiations  conducted  between  sev- 
eral powers  at  different  times  and  places.82 

Proceeding  to  give  the  delegates  instructions  upon  the  spe- 
cific subjects  which  would  probably  engage  the  consideration 
of  the  congress,  Clay  warned  them,  first  of  all,  to  refrain  from 
taking  part  in  discussions  of  matters  relating  to  the  future  prose- 
cution of  the  war  with  Spain.  But  while  it  was  perfectly  un- 
derstood, said  Clay,  that  the  United  States  could  not  jeopardize 
its  neutrality,  it  might  be  urged  to  contract  an  alliance,  offensive 

32  International  American  Conference   (1889-90),  IV,  115-116. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        411 

and  defensive,  on  the  contingency  of  an  attempt  by  the  powers 
of  Europe,  commonly  called  the  Holy  Alliance,  either  to  aid 
Spain  to  reduce  the  new  American  republics  to  their  former 
colonial  state  or  to  compel  them  to  adopt  political  systems  more 
conformable  to  the  policy  and  view  of  that  alliance.  "  If,  in- 
deed," said  Clay,  "  the  powers  of  continental  Europe  could  have 
allowed  themselves  to  engage  in  the  war  for  either  of  the  pur- 
poses just  indicated,  the  United  States,  in  opposing  them  with 
their  whole  force,  would  have  been  hardly  entitled  to  the  merit 
of  acting  on  the  impulse  of  a  generous  sympathy  with  infant, 
oppressed,  and  struggling  nations.  The  United  States,  in  the 
contingencies  which  have  been  stated,  would  have  been  com- 
pelled to  fight  their  own  proper  battles,  not  less  so  because  the 
storm  of  war  happened  to  rage  on  another  part  of  this  con- 
tinent at  a  distance  from  their  borders ;  for  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  the  presumptuous  spirit  which  would  have  impelled  Eu- 
rope upon  the  other  American  republics  in  aid  of  Spain,  or  on 
account  of  the  forms  of  their  political  institutions,  would  not 
have  appeared  if  her  arms  in  such  an  unrighteous  contest  should 
have  been  successful  until  they  were  extended  here,  and  every 
vestige  of  human  freedom  had  been  obliterated  within  these 
states."  33 

There  was  a  time,  added  Clay,  when  such  designs  were  seri- 
ously apprehended.  But  the  declaration  of  the  late  President 
to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  had  had  a  powerful  effect 
in  disconcerting  them ;  and,  after  Great  Britain  had  manifested 
a  determination  to  pursue  the  same  policy,  thus  showing  that 
those  two  great  maritime  powers  would  not  see  with  indifference 
any  forcible  interposition  in  behalf  of  Spain,  it  became  evident 
to  the  European  alliance  that  no  such  interposition  could  be 
undertaken  with  any  prospect  of  success.34 

Clay  also  adverted  to  the  negotiations  formerly  initiated  by 
the  United  States  with  the  Emperor  of  Kussia  looking  to  the 

33  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  118-119. 
119. 


412       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

establishment  of  peace  between  Spain  and  her  former  colonies 
through  his  mediation.  An  alliance  between  the  United  States 
and  the  new  republics  would  therefore  be  worse  than  useless, 
since  it  might  tend  to  excite  feelings  in  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
and  his  allies  which  should  not  be  needlessly  touched  or  pro- 
voked. Another  reason  which  concurred  to  dissuade  the  United 
States  from  entering  into  an  alliance  was,  declared  Clay,  the 
fact  that  illustrious  statesmen,  from  the  establishment  of  the 
Constitution,  had  inculcated  the  avoidance  of  foreign  alliances 
as  a  leading  maxim  of  the  nation's  foreign  policy.  Without 
asserting  that  an  exigency  might  not  occur  in  which  an  alli- 
ance of  the  most  intimate  kind  between  the  United  States  and 
the  other  American  republics  would  be  highly  proper  and  ex- 
pedient, it  might,  he  said,  be  safely  affirmed  that  only  an  occa- 
sion of  great  urgency  would  warrant  a  departure  from  that 
established  maxim,  and  none  such  was  believed  then  to  exist. 
There  was,  besides,  less  necessity  for  such  an  alliance,  because 
no  compact,  by  whatever  solemnities  it  might  be  attended,  or 
whatever  name  or  character  it  might  assume,  could  be  more 
obligatory  upon  the  nation  than  the  irresistible  motive  of  self- 
preservation,  which  would  be  instantly  called  into  operation  in 
the  supposed  contingency  of  a  European  attack  upon  the  liber- 
ties of  America.  If,  however,  it  should  appear  that  the  posi- 
tive rejection  of  the  proposed  alliance  would  be  likely  to  be 
regarded  by  the  representatives  of  the  other  states  in  an  un- 
friendly light,  the  delegates  of  the  United  States  were  author- 
ized to  receive  written  proposals  on  the  subject  ad  referendum.*5 
With  reference  to  the  noncolonization  principle  proclaimed 
in  President  Monroe's  message  of  December  2,  1823,  the  dele- 
gates were  authorized  to  propose  a  joint  declaration  of  the  sev- 
eral American  states,  each,  however,  acting  for  and  binding 
only  itself,  that  within  the  limits  of  their  respective  territories 
no  new  European  colony  would  thereafter  be  allowed  to  be 
established.  It  was  not  intended  to  commit  the  parties  who 

u*.,  120-123. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        413 

might  concur  in  that  declaration  to  the  support  of  the  particular 
boundaries  which  might  he  claimed  by  any  one  of  them;  nor 
was  it  proposed  to  commit  them  to  a  joint  resistance  against  any 
future  attempt  to  plant  a  new  European  colony.  It  was  be- 
lieved that  the  moral  effect  alone  of  a  joint  declaration,  emanat- 
ing from  the  authority  of  all  the  American  nations,  would  ef- 
fectually serve  to  prevent  the  effort  to  establish  any  such  new 
colony;  but  if  it  should  not,  and  the  attempt  should  actually 
be  made,  it  would  then  be  time  enough  for  the  American  pow- 
ers to  consider  the  propriety  of  negotiating  between  themselves, 
and,  if  necessary,  of  adopting  in  concert  the  measure  which 
might  be  necessary  to  check  and  prevent  it.  It  would  not  be 
necessary  to  give  to  the  proposed  declaration  the  form  of  a 
treaty.  It  might  be  signed  by  the  several  ministers  of  the  con- 
gress, and  promulgated  to  the  world  as  evidence  of  the  sense  of 
all  the  American  powers.36 

On  the  subject  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  the  instructions  ad- 
hered closely  to  the  previous  policy  of  the  United  States  regard- 
ing those  islands,  and  especially  so  as  to  Cuba.  As  that  policy 
has  already  been  set  forth  in  these  pages  it  need  not  be  restated. 
On  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  Haiti,  the  instructions 
were  likewise  free  from  innovation.  Considering  the  nature  of 
the  governing  power,  the  manner  of  its  establishment,  and  the 
little  respect  shown  to  other  races  than  the  African,  the  question 
of  acknowledging  its  independence  was,  said  Clay,  far  from  be- 
ing unattended  with  difficulty.  In  this  connection,  he  mentions 
an  arrangement,  then  lately  made,  under  which  the  parent  coun- 
try, France,  had  acknowledged  a  nominal  independence  in  her 
former  colony,  in  consideration  of  the  latter' s  agreeing  forever 
to  receive  French  products  at  a  rate  of  duty  one  half  below  that 
which  was  exacted  from  all  other  nations.  This  was,  declared 
Clay,  a  restriction  upon  its  freedom  of  action  to  which  no  sover- 

se  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  137.  Between 
Clay's  discussion  of  the  noninterference  principle  and  of  the  noncolonization 
principle  there  intervene  several  pages  devoted  to  other  matters. 


414      PAN-AMEEICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

eign  power,  really  independent,  would  ever  subscribe.  But  lie 
intimated  that,  while  the  United  States  did  not  think  it  proper 
to  recognize  Haiti  as  a  new  state,  the  question  of  its  recognition 
was  not  one  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  require  a  concert  of  all 
the  American  powers.37 

Next  to  the  pressing  object  of  putting  an  end  to  the  war  be- 
tween the  new  republics  and  Spain,  Clay  placed  that  of  devising 
means  for  the  preservation  of  peace  among  the  American  na- 
tions, and  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  "  No  time  could  be  more 
auspicious,"  he  declared,  "  than  the  present  for  a  successful  in- 
quiry by  the  American  nations  into  the  causes  which  have  so 
often  disturbed  the  repose  of  the  world,  and  for  an  earnest  en- 
deavor, by  wise  precaution,  in  the  establishment  of  just  and 
enlightened  principles  for  the  government  of  their  conduct,  in 
peace  and  in  war,  to  guard,  as  far  as  possible,  against  all  mis- 
understandings. They  have  no  old  prejudices  to  combat,  no 
long-established  practices  to  change,  no  entangled  connections 
or  theories  to  break  through.  Committed  to  no  particular  sys- 
tems of  commerce,  nor  to  any  selfish  belligerent  code  of  law, 
they  are  free  to  consult  the  experience  of  mankind,  and  to  estab- 
lish without  bias  principles  for  themselves,  adapted  to  their  con- 
dition, and  likely  to  promote  their  peace,  security,  and  happi- 
ness. Kemote  from  Europe,  it  is  not  probable  that  they  will 
often  be  involved  in  the  wars  with  which  that  quarter  of  the 
globe  may  be  destined  hereafter  to  be  afflicted.  In  these  wars, 
the  policy  of  all  America  will  be  the  same,  that  of  peace  and 
neutrality,  which  the  United  States  have  heretofore  constantly 
labored  to  preserve."  38 

Clay  furthermore  declared  that  if  the  principles  which  that 
probable  state  of  neutrality  indicated  as  best  for  the  interests 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere  were  just  in  themselves  and  calcu- 
lated to  prevent  wars  or  to  mitigate  their  rigor,  they  would 

ST  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  138,  145. 
as  Ibid.,  124. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        415 

present  themselves  to  the  general  acceptance  with  a  union  of 
irresistible  recommendations.  Observing  that  uncontrolled 
power,  on  whatever  element  it  was  exerted,  was  prone  to  abuse, 
and  that,  when  a  single  nation  found  itself  possessed  of  a  power 
which  no  one  nation,  nor  all  the  other  nations  combined,  could 
check  or  countervail,  such  nation  grew  presumptuous,  impatient 
of  contradiction  or  opposition,  and  found  the  solution  of  na- 
tional problems  by  the  sword  easier  and  more  grateful  to  its 
pride  than  the  slow  and  less  brilliant  process  of  patient  investi- 
gation, he  declared  that,  if  the  superiority  was  on  the  ocean, 
the  excesses  in  the  abuse  of  such  power  became  intolerable. 
And  since  the  progress  of  enlightened  civilization  had  been 
much  more  advanced  on  land  than  on  the  ocean,  there  could 
scarcely  be  any  circumstance  which  would  tend  more  to  exalt 
the  character  of  America  than  that  of  uniting  its  endeavors  to 
bring  civilization  on  the  ocean  to  the  same  forward  point  that 
it  had  attained  on  land. 

On  these  grounds  the  representatives  of  the  United  States 
were  instructed  to  bring  forward  a  principle  for  which  the 
United  States  had  ever  contended  —  the  abolition  of  war  against 
private  property  and  noncombatants  on  the  ocean.  If,  by  the 
common  consent  of  nations,  private  property  on  the  ocean  were 
no  longer  liable  to  capture  as  lawful  prize  of  war,  the  prin- 
ciple that  free  ships  make  free  goods  would,  said  Clay,  lose  its 
importance  by  being  merged  in  the  more  liberal  and  extensive 
rule.  But  inasmuch  as  some  nations  might  be  prepared  to 
admit  the  limited,  who  would  withhold  their  assent  from  the 
more  comprehensive  principle,  the  delegates  were  authorized  to 
propose  the  adoption  of  the  rule  that  free  ships  make  free  goods, 
and  its  converse,  that  inimical  ships  make  inimical  goods.  And 
in  order  that  nations  might  be  rendered  still  more  secure  in 
time  of  war  against  abuses  at  sea,  the  delegates  were  directed 
to  propose  a  plain  and  intelligible  definition  of  blockade,  the 
want  of  which  had  been  the  source  of  many  difficulties,  espe- 


416       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

cially  between  the  United  States  and  the  nascent  American 
powers.39 

Among  the  most  important  matters  to  which  the  attention  of 
Anderson  and  Sergeant  was  drawn  was  that  of  the  establish- 
ment of  some  general  principles  of  intercourse  applicable  to  all 
the  powers  of  America  for  the  mutual  regulation  of  their  com- 
merce and  navigation.  The  United  States  had  on  all  proper 
occasions,  said  Clay,  disclaimed  any  desire  to  procure  for  itself 
from  the  new  powers  peculiar  commercial  advantages.  This 
disinterested  doctrine  would  be  adhered  to,  and  in  the  joint  ne- 
gotiations at  Panama  no  privileges  would  be  sought  by  the 
United  States  which  were  not  equally  extended  to  all  the  Amer- 
ican states.  Indeed  the  United  States  was  prepared  to  extend 
to  the  powers  of  Europe  those  same  liberal  principles  of  com- 
mercial intercourse  and  navigation.  Two  general  principles 
were  in  particular  to  be  observed.  The  first  was  that  no  nation 
should  grant  any  favor  in  commerce  or  navigation  to  any  for- 
eign power  whatever,  either  upon  this  or  any  other  continent, 
which  should  not  extend  to  every  other  American  nation;  and 
the  second,  that  whatever  might  be  imported  into  or  exported 
from  any  American  nation  in  its  own  vessels  might  in  like  man- 
ner be  imported  or  exported  in  the  vessels  of  other  nations,  the 
vessel,  whether  national  or  foreign,  and  the  cargo  paying  in  both 
instances  exactly  the  same  duties  and  charges  and  no  more. 

Since  nations  were  equal,  common  members  of  a  universal 
family,  why,  asked  Clay,  should  there  be  any  inequality  between 
them  in  their  commercial  intercourse?  Why  should  one  grant 
favors  to  another  which  it  withheld  from  a  third  ?  If  this  prin- 
ciple were  correct  in  its  universal  application,  it  must,  he  said, 
be  allowed  to  be  particularly  adapted  to  the  condition  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  American  powers.  The  United  States  had 
had  no  difficulty  in  negotiating  on  this  point  with  the  republics 
of  Colombia  and  Central  America,  and  the  principle  had  been 

as  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  125,  127. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        417 

accordingly  inserted  in  the  treaties  which  had  been  made  with 
both  those  powers.40  Other  American  nations  were  believed  to 
have  a  disposition  to  adopt  it.  The  United  Mexican  states 
alone  had  opposed  it,  and  in  their  negotiations  with  the  United 
States  had  brought  forward  the  inadmissible  exception  of  the 
Spanish  American  states,  to  which  the  government  of  Mexico 
insisted  upon  being  permitted  to  grant  commercial  favors  which 
it  might  refuse  to  the  United  States.  On  this  point  Clay  spoke 
with  some  impatience.  The  minister  of  the  United  States  at 
Mexico  had,  he  said,  been  instructed  to  break  off  the  negotia- 
tions if,  contrary  to  expectation,  the  Mexican  Government  should 
persist  in  the  exception.41  What  rendered  it  more  extraordi- 
nary was  that,  while  they  pretended  that  there  was  something 
like  an  understanding  between  the  new  republics,  no  such  ex- 
ception was  insisted  upon  by  either  Colombia  or  Central  Amer- 
ica. The  delegates  were  accordingly  instructed  to  resist  any 
attempt  to  bring  forward  such  an  exception  and  to  subscribe 
to  no  treaty  which  should  admit  it.42 

40  The  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Colombia,  which  was  the 
first  treaty  to  be  concluded  by  any  of  the  new  states  with  a  foreign  power, 
was  signed  at  Bogota  on  October  3,  1824.     Article  II  of  that  treaty  was  as 
follows :     "  The  United  States  of  America  and  the  republic  of  Colombia,  de- 
siring to  live  in  peace  and  harmony  with  all  the  other  nations  of  the  earth, 
by  means  of  a  policy  frank  and  equally  friendly  with  all,  engage  mutually 
not  to  grant  any  particular  favor  to  other  nations,  in  respect  of  commerce 
and  navigation,  which  shall  not  immediately  become  common  to  the  other 
party,  who  shall  enjoy  the  same  freely  if  the  concession  was  freely  made, 
or  on  allowing  the  same  compensation  if  the  concession  was  conditional." 
The  treaty  with  Central  America  which  was  concluded  at  Washington  on 
December  5,  1825,  contained  an  article  identical  with  the  one  just  quoted. 
Cf.  Davis,  Treaties  and  Conventions,  108,  117,  169-177. 

41  The  negotiations  began  in  August,  1825.    Mexico  insisted  on  the  ex- 
ception and  negotiations  were  after  a  time  broken  off.     They  were  renewed, 
however,  in  April,  1826,  and  a  treaty  containing  the  most  favored  nation 
clause  was  concluded  on  July  10  of  that  year.     This  treaty  was  never  rati- 
fied.    A  treaty  of  limits  was  concluded  on  April  5,  1828,  but  not  until  ex- 
actly three  years  later  was  a  treaty  of  amity,  commerce,  and  navigation 
containing  the  most  favored  nation  clause  finally  concluded  between  the 
two  republics.     Cf.  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  VI,   578- 
613;  Manning,  Early  Diplomatic  Relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Mexico,  205-251. 

« International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  129-131. 


418       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

The  representatives  of  the  United  States  were  urged  to  press 
the  general  principle  of  reciprocal  freedom  of  navigation,  with 
an  earnestness  and  zeal  proportionate  to  its  high  value.  But 
while  they  were  to  emphasize  its  reciprocity,  which  was  thought 
to  be  perfect,  they  were  warned  against  any  proposal  to  impose 
precisely  the  same  rates  of  duty  on  vessels  and  cargoes  in  all 
the  ports  of  the  American  nations.  Such  a  procedure  would, 
it  was  declared,  subject  each  state  to  inconvenient  restrictions 
upon  its  power  of  taxation  instead  of  leaving  it  free  to  consult 
its  own  peculiar  position,  its  habits,  its  constitution  of  govern- 
ment, and  its  most  fitting  sources  of  revenue.  If  it  should,  on 
the  other  hand,  be  objected  that  the  other  American  nations 
were  not  ready  for  reciprocal  liberty  of  navigation,  because  their 
marine  was  still  in  its  infancy,  they  should  be  urged  to  seek 
the  elements  of  its  increase,  not  in  a  narrow  and  contracted 
legislation  neutralized  by  the  counteracting  legislation  of  other 
nations,  but  in  the  abundance  and  excellence  of  their  materials 
for  shipbuilding,  in  the  skill  of  their  artisans  and  the  cheapness 
of  their  manufactures ;  in  the  number  of  their  seamen,  and  their 
hardy  and  enterprising  character  formed  by  exposure  in  every 
branch  of  a  seafaring  life  and  by  adventure  on  every  ocean, 
and  invigorated  by  a  liberal,  cheerful,  and  fearless  competition 
with  foreign  powers.  If,  in  spite  of  these  considerations,  oppo- 
sition to  the  principle  should  be  found  to  be  unyielding,  the 
delegates  were  instructed  to  propose  a  modification  of  it,  com- 
prehending at  least  the  products  and  manufactures  of  all  the 
American  nations,  including  the  West  Indies.  While  the  rea- 
soning used  in  support  of  the  general  principle  was  believed  to 
sustain  it  in  this  restricted  form,  the  further  consideration  was 
suggested  that  the  great  similarity  in  the  produce  of  the  Amer- 
ican states  made  it  difficult  to  trace  articles,  imported  in  differ- 
ent vessels  or  blended  in  the  same  vessel,  to  the  countries  of 
their  origin  for  the  purpose  of  subjecting  them  to  different  rates 
of  duty.  And  finally  if  the  principle  as  thus  modified  was 
still  opposed,  the  delegates  were  to  endeavor  to  secure  its  ac- 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        419 

ceptance  by  any  two  American  nations  who  might  agree  to  apply 
it  to  their  own  navigation,  when  employed  in  transporting  their 
respective  produce  and  manufactures.43 

In  urging  upon  the  Panama  Congress  the  adoption  of  the 
foregoing  principles  of  maritime  war  and  of  commerce  and 
navigation,  Clay  was  following  authoritative  precedents.  In 
1785,  more  than  forty  years  before  the  Panama  instructions 
were  written,  Franklin  had  declared  it  to  be  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  to  endeavor  to  abolish  the  practice  of  privateer- 
ing by  offering  to  incorporate  in  all  its  treaties  an  article  en- 
gaging that  in  case  of  future  war  no  privateer  should  be  com- 
missioned on  either  side  and  that  unarmed  merchant  ships 
on  both  sides  should  pursue  their  voyages  unmolested.  In  the 
same  year  this  principle  was  embodied  in  a  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and  Prussia.  During  the  years  which  followed 
the  United  States  continued  to  advocate  the  principle,  and  in 
1823  opened  negotiations  with  several  of  the  maritime  powers 
of  Europe  looking  to  the  adoption  of  a  convention  to  make  it 
effective.44  The  United  States  had  also  long  advocated  a  defi- 
nition of  blockade,  and  had  from  the  beginning  of  its  existence 
as  a  nation  striven  to  establish  by  treaty  the  liberal  principles 
of  commerce  and  navigation  which  Clay  was  now  urging  upon 
the  congress  of  American  nations.45  Nevertheless,  in  advo- 
cating concerted  action  on  these  subjects  by  the  American  na- 
tions at  Panama,  Clay  could  not  have  been  unmindful  that  such 
action  would  constitute  a  great  advance  toward  the  ideal  of 
continental  solidarity,  nor  that  it  would  tend  to  diminish  Brit- 
ish influence  in  the  concerns  of  the  new  states. 

In  1829,  after  the  Panama  instructions  were  made  public, 
the  opinion  seems  to  have  prevailed  in  England  that  the  latter 
consideration  furnished  a  controlling  motive  in  their  prepara- 
tion, and  that  the  United  States  aimed  to  secure  for  itself  an 

43  International  American  Conference   (1889-90),  IV,  131-135. 

44  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  VII,  461,  463-465. 

45  lUd.,  788-789. 


420       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

undisputed  place  of  leadership  in  the  New  World,  with  a  view 
to  enjoy  certain  commercial  privileges  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
powers  of  Europe.  The  London  Times  declared :  "  There  is 
an  obvious  anxiety  throughout  these  long  documents  to  assume, 
as  a  sort  of  political  datum,  that  all  i  American  '  states  are  to 
constitute  a  system  and  a  community  of  their  own,  recognizing 
interests,  and  establishing  maxims  for  their  common  regulation 
as  affects  each  other,  and  for  their  separate,  exclusive,  nay,  re- 
pulsive use,  as  regards  the  other  nations  of  the  world.  The 
first  obvious  consequence  of  such  a  scheme,  if  adopted  by  Mex- 
ico and  the  states  of  South  America,  would  be  to  place  the 
United  States  at  the  head  of  the  new  federation,  in  virtue  of 
superior  strength,  maturity,  safety,  commercial  and  political 
resources."  46 

An  anonymous  writer  who  published  in  1829  a  pamphlet 
containing  Clay's  instructions,47  accompanied  with  observations 
of  his  own,  expressed  in  a  manner  no  less  positive  the  opinion 
that  the  instructions  plainly  avowed  the  design  of  placing  the 
United  States  "  at  the  head  of  the  American  family."  If,  said 
this  writer,  the  United  States  should  do  this  in  a  magnanimous 
spirit,  without  any  exclusive  views,  Great  Britain  would  not  be 
likely  to  take  offense.  But  what  did  the  United  States  do? 
"  To  infant  states  without  maritime  force,  without  the  possi- 
bility of  becoming  maritime  powers  for  many  generations,  if  at 
all,"  the  United  States,  he  declared,  urged  the  adoption,  in 
their  intercourse  with  Europe,  of  the  "  highest  pretensions, 
which,  in  the  maturity  of  her  naval  strength,  the  United  States 
herself  ever  ventured  to  urge  —  and  even  then,  without  the 
remotest  hope  of  success,"  and,  instead  of  advising  those  states 

*e  The  Times   (London),  May  18,  1829. 

*i  Spanish  America.  Observations  on  the  instructions  given  by  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  United  States  of  America  to  the  representatives  of  that  re~* 
public,  at  the  congress  held  at  Panama  in  J826. 

The  pamphlet  is  inscribed  to  the  Earl  of  Aberdeen,  "  in  the  hope  that 
no  sentiment  will  In-  found  in  these  pages  at  variance  with  those  high 
principles  of  national  justice  of  which  his  Lordship  is  the  uncompromising 
advocate." 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        421 

to  cultivate  the  most  friendly  relations  with  the  powers  of  Eu- 
rope, to  be  wise  and  not  meddle  with  questions  which  did  not 
affect  their  interests,  said  to  them,  "  Take  the  highest  ground 
in  your  negotiations  with  Europe,  that  an  old-established,  power- 
ful state  would  propose.  Insist  that  free  ships  shall  make  free 
goods.  Demand  also  a  definition  of  blockade."  48 

"  What,"  continues  this  writer,  "  must  have  been  the  effect  of 
counsel  such  as  this,  if  it  had  been  followed,  but  to  have  pro- 
duced embarrassment  and  coldness  between  the  new  states  and 
the  European  powers,  and  between  them  and  Great  Britain  in 
particular  ?  .  .  .  Having  recommended  to  the  new  states  that 
they  should  call  upon  us,  to  renounce  in  their  favor,  a  belliger- 
ent right  which  we  have  never  yet  conceded  to  any  other  power, 
the  elder  branch  of  the  American  family  further  suggests  to 
them  the  experiment  of  prevailing  upon  us  to  make  a  slight 
inroad  into  our  navigation  act.  One  of  the  principles  of  this 
code  is,  that  we  admit  from  other  nations  their  own  produce, 
in  their  own  shipping,  or  in  our  own;  but  in  no  other,  unless 
such  produce  be  again  exported  from  this  country.  Thus,  a 
ship  of  the  United  States  brings  us  cotton  or  tobacco  from  New 
York ;  but  she  cannot  do  so  from  Colombia ;  it  must  come  from 
the  latter  country  either  in  a  Colombian  or  a  British  ship. 
Now,  the  government  of  the  United  States  says  to  these  young 
republics,  *  America  is  one  continent  —  insist  in  your  treaties 
with  Europe  that  it  is  one  nation  —  and  that  it  shall  be  so  con- 
sidered for  all  commercial  purposes  —  that  we,  your  elder 
brethren,  may  come  to  your  ports,  and  be  the  carriers  of  your 
produce.' "  49 

In  the  instructions  to  the  delegates  to  Panama,  Clay  did  not 
fail  to  discuss  the  subject  of  an  interoceanic  canal.  This  vast 
object,  if  it  should  ever  be  accomplished,  would,  he  declared, 
be  interesting  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  to  all  parts  of  the 
world.  But  to  this  continent  would  accrue  the  largest  amount 

«  Op.  tit.,  8-9. 
49  Op.  tit.,  9,  12. 


422      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

of  benefit  from  its  execution ;  and  to  Colombia,  Mexico,  Central 
America,  Peru,  and  the  United  States  more  than  to  any  of  the 
other  American  nations.  What  was  to  redound  to  the  advan- 
tage of  all  America  should,  in  his  opinion,  be  effected  by  com- 
mon means  and  united  exertions,  and  should  not  be  left  to  the 
separate  and  unassisted  efforts  of  any  one  power.  With  the 
limited  information  then  at  hand  as  to  the  practicability  and 
probable  expense  of  the  object,  Clay  thought  that  it  would  not 
be  wise  to  do  more  than  make  some  preliminary  arrangements. 
The  best  routes  would,  he  thought,  be  most  likely  to  be  found 
in  the  territory  of  Mexico  or  in  that  of  Central  America.  He 
stated  that  the  latter  republic  had  made,  the  year  before,  a  lib- 
eral offer  to  the  United  States  respecting  the  construction  of 
a  canal  through  its  territory;  but  the  answer  had  gone  no  fur- 
ther than  to  make  suitable  acknowledgment  of  the  friendly 
overture  and  to  assure  the  central  republic  that  measures  would 
be  adopted  to  place  the  United  States  in  possession  of  the  in- 
formation necessary  to  enlighten  its  judgment.  Finally,  the 
delegates  were  instructed  to  receive  and  to  transmit  to  their 
governments  any  proposals  or  plans  that  might  be  suggested  for 
the  joint  construction  of  the  canal,  with  the  assurance  that  they 
would  be  attentively  examined,  with  the  earnest  desire  to  recon- 
cile the  interests  and  views  of  all  the  American  nations.50 

A  word  may  be  said  in  explanation  of  the  "  liberal  offer  " 
of  the  republic  of  Central  America.  On  February  8,  1825, 
C arias,  the  minister  of  that  republic  at  Washington,  addressed 
a  communication  to  the  Secretary  of  State  soliciting  the  co- 
operation of  the  United  States  in  the  construction  of  an  inter- 
oceanic  canal  upon  the  ground  that  the  noble  example  of  the 
elder  republic  was  a  model  and  a  protection  to  all  the  Amer- 
icas and  entitled  it  to  a  preference  over  any  other  nation  in  the 
merits  and  advantages  of  the  proposed  undertaking.  Williams, 
the  American  charge  d'affaires  at  Guatemala,  was  instructed  to 

eo  International  American  Conference  (1889-90),  IV,  143. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES       423 

assure  the  Central  American  government  of  the  great  interest 
taken  by  the  United  States  in  an  enterprise  "  so  highly  calcu- 
lated to  diffuse  a  favorable  influence  on  the  affairs  of  man- 
kind/' and  to  investigate  carefully  the  facilities  afforded  by 
the  route  and  transmit  the  intelligence  acquired  to  the  govern- 
ment at  Washington.  But  Williams  never  made  any  report  of 
his  action  under  these  instructions. 

During  the  year  1825  a  number  of  propositions  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  canal  were  received  by  the  Central  American 
government  from  Europe.  None  of  these  was  accepted ;  but,  on 
June  14,  1826,  a  contract  was  entered  into  with  a  company  in 
the  United  States,  called  "  The  Central  American  and  United 
States  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Canal  Company."  Under  this  con- 
tract the  company  was  to  open  a  canal  through  Nicaragua, 
which  should  be  navigable  for  large  ships.  The  sum  of  two 
hundred  thousand  dollars  was  to  be  deposited  in  the  city  of 
Granada,  within  six  months,  for  the  payment  of  preliminary 
expenses.  The  company  was  to  erect  fortifications  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  canal,  and  was  to  begin  its  construction  within  a 
year.  Not  having  sufficient  capital  for  the  purpose,  the  con- 
tractors addressed  a  memorial  to  the  United  States  Congress, 
praying  the  assistance  of  the  government  in  their  work,  which 
they  represented  to  be  of  national  importance.  The  memorial 
was  referred  to  a  committee,  but  was  never  reported  upon.  A 
subsequent  attempt  to  secure  capital  in  England  having  failed, 
the  enterprise  was  abandoned.51 

A  few  remaining  points  in  Clay's  instructions  may  be  briefly 
mentioned.  On  the  subject  of  religious  toleration  the  dele- 
gates of  the  United  States  were  authorized  to  propose  a  joint 

51  Bancroft,  History  of  Central  America,  III,  741-742,  citing  Daniel 
Cleveland's  Across  the  Nicaragua,  Transit,  MS.  Cf.  also  a  short  article  en- 
titled Ship  Canal  through  Central  America  in  Niles'  Register  for  May  7, 
1825,  and  another  in  the  same  paper  entitled  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Canal  in 
the  issue  for  September  30,  1826;  also  National  Intelligencer  for  April  26, 
1825. 


424       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

declaration  to  the  effect  that  within  the  limits  of  the  several 
states  there  should  be  freedom  of  worship.  Should  the  con- 
gress attempt  an  amicable  adjustment  of  questions  of  boundary 
and  other  matters  of  controversy  among  the  American  powers, 
the  delegates  were  instructed  to  manifest  a  willingness  to  give 
their  counsel  and  advice  or  to  serve  as  arbitrators,  whenever 
their  assistance  should  be  required.  A  dispute  was  under- 
stood to  exist  between  Mexico  and  Central  America  as  to  the 
province  of  Chiapas.52  It  was,  said  the  instructions,  the  de- 
sire of  the  President  that  the  commissioners  of  the  United 
States  should  give  this  matter  their  particular  investigation, 
and  if  justice  should  be  found  on  the  side  of  Central  America, 
they  were  to  lend  to  its  cause  all  the  countenance  and  support 
which  they  could  give  without  actually  committing  the  United 
States.  "  This  act  of  friendship  on  our  part/'  declared  Clay, 
"  is  due  as  well  on  account  of  the  high  degree  of  respect  and 
confidence  which  the  republic  has  on  several  occasions  dis- 
played toward  the  United  States,  as  from  its  comparative  weak- 
ness." 

The  attention  of  the  delegates  was  next  directed  to  the  sub- 
ject of  forms  of  government  and  the  cause  of  free  institutions 

52  It  will  be  recalled  that  the  provinces  of  Central  America,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  Salvador,  became  incorporated  voluntarily  in  the  empire  of 
Mexico  in  1823,  and  that  upon  the  downfall  of  Iturbide  they  withdrew  and 
set  up  an  independent  republic.  Mexico  did  not  resist  the  separation,  and 
on  August  20,  1824,  issued  a  decree  recognizing  the  independence  of  the  new 
republic,  but  declaring  that  the  border  province  of  Chiapas  was  not  in- 
cluded in  the  territory  recognized  as  independent.  Central  America  in 
negotiating  the  recognition  of  its  independence  by  Mexico  requested  that 
Chiapas  be  left  to  choose  its  allegiance  as  between  the  two  republics. 
Chiapas  chose  Mexico  and  the  Central  American  republic  protested  on  the 
ground  that  the  province  had  been  coerced,  the  troops  which  General  Fil- 
Isola  had  maintained  in  Guatemala  and  Salvador  having  been  transferred 
to  Chiapas.  In  the  constitution  adopted  by  Central  America  in  1824  it  was 
provided  the  province  of  Chiapas  would  be  received  into  the  federa- 
tion as  a  state  whenever  it  should  freely  seek  such  a  union.  This  was 
the  condition  of  affairs  when  Clay's  instructions  were  written.  Cf.  La  Di- 
plomacia  Mexicana,  II,  215,  223;  Alamfin,  Hiatoria  de  Mexico,  V,  759;  Me- 
moriae para  la  Hiatoria  de  la  Revoluoidn  de  Centra  America  (Montflfar), 
XVI. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        425 

in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  United  States,  it  was  de- 
clared, was  not  and  never  had  been  animated  by  any  spirit  of 
propagandism.  Allowing  no  foreign  interference  either  in 
the  formation  or  the  conduct  of  its  own  government,  it  was 
equally  scrupulous  in  refraining  from  all  interference  in  the 
original  structure  or  subsequent  interior  movement  of  the  gov- 
ernments of  other  independent  nations.  Its  interest  in  the 
adoption  and  execution  of  their  political  systems  was  rather 
a  matter  of  feeling  than  a  principle  of  action ;  and  the  general 
habit  of  cautiously  avoiding  a  subject  so  delicate  would  be 
adhered  to  in  the  present  instance.  But  there  was,  it  was  inti- 
mated, reason  to  believe  that  one  European  power,  if  not  more, 
had  been  active  both  in  Colombia  and  in  Mexico,  if  not  else- 
where, in  efforts  to  substitute  the  monarchical  for  the  republi- 
can form,  and  to  plant  on  the  newly  erected  thrones  European 
princes.  It  was  due  the  sister  republics,  said  Clay,  to  state 
that  this  design  had  met  with  a  merited  and  prompt  repulse; 
but  the  scheme  might  be  revived.  It  has  been  plausibly  sug- 
gested that  the  adoption  of  monarchical  institutions  would  con- 
ciliate the  European  powers,  and  hasten  their  recognition  of 
the  new  states.  Such  recognition  could  not,  however,  be  much 
longer  postponed.  It  was  not  worth  buying;  nor  could  any- 
thing be  more  dishonorable  than  to  purchase  by  mean  compli- 
ances the  formal  acknowledgment  of  what  had  actually  been 
won  by  so  much  valor  and  so  many  sacrifices.  While,  there- 
fore, it  was  not  anticipated  that  there  would  be  any  difficulty  in 
dissuading  the  new  states  from  entertaining  or  deliberating  on 
such  propositions,  the  delegates  were  instructed  to  take  advan- 
tage of  every  fit  opportunity  to  strengthen  the  political  faith  of 
the  new  republics  and  to  inculcate  the  solemn  duty  of  every 
nation  to  reject  all  foreign  dictation  in  its  domestic  concerns. 
At  the  same  time  they  were  to  manifest  a  readiness  to  satisfy 
inquirers  as  to  the  theory  and  practical  operation  of  the  fed- 
eral and  state  constitutions  of  the  United  States  and  to  illus- 
trate and  explain  the  manifold  blegsings  which  the  people  of  the 


426      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

United  States  had  enjoyed  and  were  continuing  to  enjoy  under 
them.53 

Finally,  Clay  referred  to  the  war  which  had  recently  broken 
out  between  Brazil  and  the  United  Provinces  of  the  Rio  de  la 
Plata  as  being  a  cause  of  most  sincere  regret.  In  that  war,  he 
said,  the  United  States  would  be  strictly  neutral.  But  the  dele- 
gates were  to  avail  themselves  of  every  suitable  opportunity  to 
represent  to  the  parties  how  desirable  it  was  to  put  an  end  to 
the  conflict  and  with  what  satisfaction  the  United  States  would 
see  the  blessings  of  peace  restored.54 

The  foregoing  summary  of  Clay's  instructions  serves  to  make 
clear  the  policy  of  the  Adams  administration  with  reference  to 
the  other  American  countries.  The  United  States  would  take 
no  part  in  an  assembly  whose  object  was  to  legislate  for  the 
whole  continent;  would  form  no  alliance  with  the  new  powers 
for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  their  independence,  nor  for  the 
purpose  of  preventing  European  interference  in  their  affairs; 
would  enter  into  no  arrangement  by  which  its  freedom  of  action 
in  any  contingency  might  be  restricted ;  and  finally,  would  not 
lend  its  aid  to  the  formation  of  a  powerful  neighboring  confed- 
eration, which  might  become  a  menace  to  republican  institu- 
tions, or  which  might  succeed  in  assuming  the  position  of  leader- 
ship which  the  United  States  desired  to  retain  for  itself. 
Adams  had  declared  in  1823  that  to  any  confederation  of 
Spanish  American  provinces  which  had  for  its  aim  the  estab- 
lishment of  republican  institutions,  politically  and  commer- 
cially independent  of  Europe,  the  United  States  would  yield 
its  approbation  and  cordial  good  wishes.  But  the  confederation 
which  it  was  proposed  to  constitute  at  Panama  appeared  not  to 
be  limited  to  the  objects  enumerated  by  Adams.  There  was 
some  doubt  about  Bolivar's  designs.  One  of  the  cardinal  points 
of  his  policy  was  the  establishment  of  intimate  relations,  not 
only  commercial  but  also  political,  with  Great  Britain. 

ea  International  American  Conference   (1889-90),  IV,   148-149. 
150, 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES       427 

Whether  this  fact  was  definitely  known  to  the  government  at 
Washington  is  not  clear.  The  United  States,  however,  would 
hardly  have  departed  in  any  event  from  its  settled  policy  of 
avoiding  entangling  alliances,  although  knowledge  of  Bolivar's 
plans  would  necessarily  have  tended  to  intensify  distrust  of 
the  scheme  of  a  southern  confederacy. 

Nevertheless,  the  spirit  of  American  unity  pervades  Clay's 
instructions.  Dangers  to  be  met,  interests  to  be  promoted, 
problems  to  be  solved,  were  common  to  all  and  demanded  com- 
mon counsel  and  united  action.  Remoteness  from  the  scenes  of 
European  conflicts  permitted  the  establishment  of  an  American 
policy  of  peace  and  neutrality.  No  old  prejudices,  no  long- 
established  practices,  no  entangled  connections,  prevented  the 
states  of  the  New  World  from  adopting  for  themselves  princi- 
ples of  international  intercourse  suited  to  their  peculiar  condi- 
tion and  calculated  to  promote  their  peace  and  happiness.  In 
short,  the  idea  of  continental  solidarity,  in  so  far  as  it  could 
be  attained  by  means  short  of  the  alliance  or  the  political  union 
of  the  separate  states,  was  strongly  advocated. 

While  it  is  of  interest  to  know  what  was  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  toward  the  Panama  Congress,  it  is  of  no  less  im- 
portance to  know  what  was  the  attitude  of  the  other  countries 
toward  the  participation  of  the  United  States.  Much  has  al- 
ready been  disclosed  from  which  deductions  may  be  drawn. 
We  have  seen  that  in  Colombia  a  party  led  by  the  acting  presi- 
dent, Santander,  early  developed  in  opposition  to  what  was 
thought  to  be  the  imperial  designs  of  the  Liberator.  This  party, 
strongly  republican  in  its  sympathies,  was  inclined  to  look  to 
the  United  States  rather  than  to  any  European  power  for  po- 
litical guidance.  Moreover  the  predominant  sentiment  in  Mex- 
ico and  Central  America  had  come  to  be  strongly  republican 
in  its  tendencies,  in  spite  of  the  powerful  British  influence  in 
Mexico.  Much  light  remains  to  be  thrown  on  the  circum- 
stances surrounding  the  invitation  which  was  extended  to  the 
United  States  by  Colombia,  Mexico,  and  Central  America  be- 


428      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

fore  anything  can  be  positively  affirmed  with  reference  to  the 
significance  of  that  invitation.  The  fact  that  the  three  repub- 
lics acted  in  concert  might  have  been  due  to  a  common  distrust 
of  Bolivar's  political  designs,  and  to  a  common  belief  that 
the  presence  of  delegates  from  the  United  States  would  be,  in 
a  measure,  a  guaranty  of  their  respective  national  aspirations 
under  a  republican  form  of  government.  The  adoption  of  a 
clause  in  the  general  treaty  of  union,  league,  and  confederation 
concluded  at  Panama,  by  which  any  member  changing  substan- 
tially the  form  of  its  government  should  by  that  act  be  excluded 
from  the  league,  lends  color  to  this  surmise. 

No  revelation  has  ever  been  made  of  the  instructions  by  the 
Spanish  American  governments  to  their  respective  delegates 
regarding  the  position  to  be  held  by  the  United  States  in  the 
proposed  confederation.  The  general  instructions  to  the  dele- 
gates of  Peru  —  no  special  instructions  have  been  published  — 
do  not  refer  to  the  northern  republic  except  in  an  incidental 
way.  The  general  instructions  to  the  delegates  of  Colombia 
do  not  allude  to  the  United  States;  but,  by  direction  of  Vice 
President  Santander,  Revenga,  the  Colombian  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  late  in  May  or  early  in  June,  1826,  appears  to 
have  dealt  with  the  subject  in  special  instructions,  of  which,  un- 
fortunately, only  a  fragment  seems  to  be  extant.  In  this  frag- 
ment, which  is  printed  in  the  Memorias  of  General  O'Leary, 
Revenga,  after  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  a  number  of  com- 
munications from  the  Colombian  delegates  at  Panama,  and  ad- 
verting briefly  to  the  new  aspect  which  the  conduct  of  the 
Peruvian  delegates  had  placed  upon  the  affairs  of  the  assem- 
bly, takes  up  the  subject  of  the  United  States.  "  The  opposi- 
tion in  the  United  States,"  he  said,  "  to  sending  plenipoten- 
tiaries to  the  Panama  Congress  has  been  sustained  principally 
by  the  representatives  of  the  states  of  the  south.  The  object 
may  have  been  to  discredit  the  assembly  and  thus  to  prevent  an 
agreement  among  the  countries  as  to  the  emancipation  of  the 
Spanish  Antilles,  to  the  end  that  the  tranquillity  of  the  south- 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES       429 

ern  part  of  the  United  States  might  not  as  a  consequence  be 
disturbed.  It  was  probably  proposed  that  their  govern- 
ment .  .  ."  55  Here  the  extract  abruptly  ends.  A  footnote 
states  simply  that  the  conclusion  of  the  letter  is  not  found  in 
the  archives. 

Whatever  may  have  been  the  instructions  to  the  delegates  of 
Colombia,  Mexico,  and  Central  America,  it  is  not  likely  that 
they  contained  anything  indicating  a  desire  to  exclude  the 
United  States  from  contributing  with  its  counsel,  at  least,  to 
the  formation  of  the  proposed  league.  But  altogether  different 
was  the  attitude  of  the  great  protagonist  of  the  movement  of 
confederation.  Bolivar  was  anxious  to  have  a  representative 
of  Great  Britain  present  at  Panama,  and  he  was  apparently  not 
averse  to  the  presence  there  of  commissioners  from  other  Eu- 
ropean countries;  yet  he  did  not  welcome  the  participation  of 
the  United  States  in  the  congress.  Of  this  there  can  scarcely 
be  any  doubt;  for,  although  he  did  not  openly  express  his  dis- 
approval, yet  his  writings  may  be  searched  in  vain  for  any 
approbation  of  the  action  of  Colombia,  Mexico,  and  Central 
America  in  extending  an  invitation  to  the  United  States.  What 
is  the  explanation  of  this  attitude  of  the  Liberator?  The  an- 
swers given  by  certain  Latin  American  writers  may  be  briefly 
examined. 

Gil  Fortoul,  in  his  Historia  C  onstitucional  de  Venezuela** 
published  in  1907,  concludes  his  treatment  of  the  Panama  Con- 
gress with  a  paragraph  reading  as  follows :  "  Thus  was  frus- 
trated the  double  purpose  of  Bolivar:  that  of  saving  from  the 
domination  of  Spain  —  and  of  the  United  States  —  the  islands 
of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  and  that  of  establishing  a  permanent 
balance  between  the  great  republic  of  English  origin  and  the 
republics  of  Spanish  origin.  This  probably  would  have  made 
impossible  the  hegemony  of  the  United  States  and  would  have 
prevented  that  power  from  exercising  a  protectorate  over  the 

ss  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIV,  323. 
561,  386. 


430      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

other  countries  of  this  hemisphere.  In  any  case  the  accom- 
plishment of  Bolivar's  purpose  would  have  been  the  means  of 
developing  among  the  Latin  American  people  the  position  of 
influence  in  the  world  which  they  lack  to-day." 

Vargas,  in  his  Historia  del  Peru  Independiente,57  declares 
that  Bolivar  instantly  comprehended  the  danger  to  which  the 
ambiguous  protection  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  subjected  Hispanic 
America,  and  that,  recognizing  the  necessity  of  emancipating 
the  Hispanic  states  from  the  power  of  the  Anglo-American  re- 
public, he  desired  to  oppose  to  that  power  an  insuperable  barrier 
in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  With  the  foregoing  opinions  Villanueva 
seems  to  agree  when  he  says  that  the  Bolivar  doctrine  was, 
Spanish  America  for  the  Spanish  Americans.58 

Jacinto  Lopez,  in  a  recent  number  of  La  Re  forma  Social, 
declares  that  the  idea  of  the  Liberator  in  assembling  the  Con- 
gress of  Panama  was  to  prevent  foreign  domination,  and  that, 
believing  the  United  States  to  be  a  menace  to  the  other  Ameri- 
can states,  he  desired  to  preserve  the  latter  from  the  domination 
of  the  former  as  well  as  from  the  domination  of  the  powers  of 
Europe.  The  invitation  extended  to  the  United  States  to  take 
part  in  the  congress  was,  in  Lopez's  opinion,  a  mistake.  There 
was  no  place  in  that  body  for  any  but  the  confederates  —  that 
is,  Mexico,  Central  America,  and  the  nations  of  the  southern 
continent.  It  was  a  congress  essentially,  exclusively,  Hispano- 
American.  This,  Lopez  thinks,  being  the  cardinal  point  in  the 
history  of  the  Panama  Congress,  cannot  be  too  much  insisted 
upon.  The  departure  from  the  plan  of  the  Liberator,  which 
was  implied  in  the  invitation  to  the  United  States,  was  the 
source  of  a  train  of  evil  consequences.  The  United  States  was 
thus  led  to  form  a  concept  of  the  congress  entirely  different  from 
Bolivar's  and  to  entertain  aims  relative  to  it  altogether  con- 
trary to  those  which  the  Liberator  entertained.  If  the  idea  of 
Bolivar  had  been  realized  —  that  is,  if  the  grand  American 

57  in,  69. 

68  El  Imperio  de  los  Andes,  140. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        431 

confederation  had  been  consummated,  with  all  its  great  re- 
sults —  it  would  have  been  time  then  to  think  of  a  congress 
of  all  the  nations  of  America  for  the  solution  of  their  common 
problems. 

Between  the  American  states,  continues  Lopez,  from  Mexico 
to  Buenos  Aires,  there  was  no  conflict  of  interests.  There 
might  have  been  petty,  vulgar  rivalries  between  the  men  who 
held  the  reigns  of  government,  such  as  prevented  the  United 
Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata  from  participating  in  the  Con- 
gress of  Panama,  but  no  such  spirit  existed  between  the  peoples 
themselves.  On  the  other  hand,  between  the  United  States  and 
the  American  countries  still  at  war  with  Spain,  there  was  an 
irreconcilable  conflict  of  interests  and  aims,  of  which  the  ques- 
tion of  Cuba  and  the  manifesto  which  the  congress  was  to  formu- 
late in  accordance  with  the  Liberator's  instructions  59  were  im- 
portant signs.  The  United  States  was  not  confederable.  Bol- 
ivar never  allowed  himself  to  be  deceived  on  this  point.  He 
knew  that,  even  if  the  United  States  could  have  joined  the  con- 
federation, it  would  have  been  too  powerful  and  its  influence 
would  have  been  too  preponderant  to  make  desirable  an  alliance 
between  it  and  the  other  states.60 

According  to  these  writers,  the  aim  which  was  uppermost  in 
Bolivar's  mind  was  that  of  interposing  a  barrier  to  the  future 
expansion  of  the  United  States  and  of  disputing  its  pretensions 
to  a  position  of  leadership  in  the  western  world.  That  Bolivar 
really  entertained  such  an  idea  has  not  been  clearly  demon- 
strated. On  the  other  hand,  it  does  seem  clear  that  the  fear  of 
the  growing  power  of  the  United  States  was  never  the  controlling 
motive  in  the  determination  of  his  national  and  international 

59  The  delegates  of  Peru  were  instructed  (Int.  Am.  Conf.,  1889-90,  IV, 
170)  to  secure  the  great  compact  of  union,  league,  and  perpetual  confedera- 
tion against  Spain,  and  against  foreign  rule  of  whatever  character. 
L6pez,  in  the  article  referred  to,  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  manifesto  which 
the  delegates  were  instructed  to  issue,  similar  to  that  made  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  was  accordingly  aimed  to  prevent  the  domination 
of  the  United  States  as  well  as  that  of  the  powers  of  Europe. 

so  La  Reforma  Social,  VI,  376. 


432       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

policies.  More  than  once  he  expressed  doubts  as  to  the  abil- 
ity of  a  nation  to  progress,  or  indeed  long  to  exist  under  such 
a  political  system  as  the  United  States  had  adopted.  This  he 
may  have  done  with  a  view  to  discourage  what  he  conceived  to 
be  the  too  prevalent  tendency  of  his  countrymen  to  look  to 
the  United  States  for  their  political  doctrines;  and  he  may 
have  had  at  bottom  a  higher  opinion  of  the  governmental  sys- 
tem of  the  United  States  than  he  was  willing  to  admit.  But 
to  affirm  that  his  chief  purpose  in  calling  together  the  Congress 
of  Panama  was  to  prevent  the  United  States  from  taking  a  posi- 
tion of  leadership  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  to  do  him  an 
injustice,  is  to  detract  from  his  greatness,  is  to  deny  him  that 
breadth  of  vision  and  that  nobility  of  ideal  which  have  marked 
him  as  one  of  the  great  men  of  all  time. 

The  chief  purpose  of  the  Liberator  was  not  negative  but  posi- 
tive. He  had  much  less  interest  in  challenging  the  leadership 
of  the  United  States  than  in  assuming  a  commanding  place  for 
the  confederation  in  which  his  own  Colombia  should  be  the 
dominant  power  —  a  consummation  which,  in  his  opinion,  de- 
pended infinitely  more  upon  the  behavior  of  Great  Britain  than 
upon  any  action  which  might  be  taken  by,  or  in  relation  to,  the 
United  States.  Bolivar,  no  doubt,  believed  that  the  presence 
of  delegates  from  that  republic  might  interfere  with  the  free- 
dom of  negotiations  with  Great  Britain;  and  that  it  might 
deepen  the  tendency  toward  particularism,  which  was  the  prin- 
cipal obstacle  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  immediate  political 
designs.  Hence,  if  he  had  been  able  to  control  the  situation,  the 
United  States  would  have  been  permitted  to  remain  in  the  back- 
ground until  his  American  confederation  had  been  definitely 
established  under  some  satisfactory  arrangement  with  Great 
Britain.  But  there  was  no  intention  on  his  part  permanently 
to  exclude  either  the  United  States  or  any  other  section  of  the 
continent  from  a  share  in  the  grand  project  of  which  the  Ameri- 
can confederation  was  to  be  only  a  part.  The  whole  of  America 
was  to  stand  with  Great  Britain  against  the  Holy  Alliance. 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES        433 

Liberalism  was  to  be  pitted  against  absolutism ;  freedom  against 
despotism.  Bolivar's  great  aim  was  not  an  American  balance 
of  power  but  a  world  balance  of  power,  and  ultimately  a  fed- 
eral nation  of  the  world,  whose  capital,  perhaps,  should  be  lo- 
cated upon  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  The  author  of  so  mag- 
nificent a  conception  cannot  be  fairly  charged  with  minor  aims 
incommensurate  with  the  realization  of  his  grand  ideal. 


CHAPTER  XI 

ARGENTINA,    BRAZIL,    AND    CHILE 

THE  international  situation  in  the  southern  part  of  the  con- 
tinent, particularly  in  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile,  must  now 
be  considered  more  at  length.  Argentina  —  that  is,  the  loose 
confederation  then  known  under  the  name  of  the  United  Prov- 
inces of  Rio  de  la  Plata  —  was  represented  in  its  foreign  affairs 
by  the  province  of  Buenos  Aires.  Under  the  able  guidance  of 
Mariano  Moreno,  the  provincial  junta  early  adopted,  as  we 
have  seen  in  a  previous  chapter,  a  distinctive  policy  in  relation 
to  the  other  belligerent  communities  of  America.  Jealous  of 
the  national  autonomy,  the  junta  declined  in  1810  an  invita- 
tion of  the  government  of  Chile  to  send  representatives  to  a 
general  congress,  and  proposed,  instead,  defensive  alliances  as 
the  most  effective  means  of  cooperation  between  the  govern- 
ments of  the  revolted  colonies.  To  this  policy  the  Buenos 
Aires  authorities  continued  to  adhere,  and  when  the  Colombian 
envoy,  Mosquera,  arrived  early  in  1823  on  his  mission  of  ne- 
gotiating the  preliminary  treaties  which  were  intended  to  pave 
the  way  to  definite  union  at  Panama,  he  was  obliged  to  put 
aside  the  extensive  Colombian  project  and  conclude  with  Buenos 
Aires  merely  a  brief  treaty  of  friendship  and  defensive  alli- 
ance. 

A  few  months  later  this  treaty  was  sent  by  the  executive  to 
the  junta  of  representatives,  the  legislative  body  of  the  province, 
for  action  authorizing  its  ratification.  It  appears  from  the  dis- 
cussion which  arose  in  the  junta  that  Rivadavia,  who  was  then 
serving  as  Minister  of  Government  and  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
who  represented  Buenos  Aires  in  the  negotiations  with  Mos- 
quera, upon  declining  to  accept  the  Colombian  draft  as  a  basis 

434 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE          435 

of  discussion,  presented  a  counter  project  containing  two  arti- 
cles which  Mosquera  in  turn  rejected.  By  the  first  of  these 
articles  the  two  contracting  parties  engaged  not  to  accept  from 
Spain,  or  from  any  other  power,  the  recognition  of  independ- 
ence unless  it  was  extended  simultaneously  to  both,  and  by  the 
second  they  entered  into  a  mutual  guarantee  of  the  integrity 
of  their  respective  territories  against  all  powers  except  those 
which,  like  themselves,  were  formerly  possessions  of  Spain.1 
Around  these  two  rejected  articles  the  discussion  chiefly  re- 
volved, for  in  them  were  expressed  the  two  great  immediate 
ends  of  Argentine  policy  —  leadership  in  the  southern  continent 
and  the  consolidation  of  the  old  viceroyalty  of  La  Plata  into  a 
single  state. 

Leadership  and  the  integration  of  the  national  territory  as 
features  of  Argentine  policy  were  intimately  connected.  If 
integration  were  consummated,  leadership  would  be  assured; 
and  if  leadership  were  first  attained,  national  consolidation 
would  more  surely  follow.  The  greatest  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  the  attainment  of  these  aims  seemed  at  the  moment,  at  least, 
to  be  the  extraordinary  progress  of  Colombia  and  the  plan  of 
union  which  it  advocated.  In  1822,  when  the  Colombian 
agents  first  set  out  to  negotiate  the  treaties  preliminary  to  carry- 
ing this  plan  into  effect,  the  Buenos  Aires  government,  in  al- 
liance with  Chile,  had  in  hand  an  undertaking  by  which  it  ex- 
pected to  checkmate  the  growing  influence  of  Colombia  and  to 
promote  at  the  same  time  its  own  ends.  This  undertaking  was 
the  liberation  of  Peru.  In  accord  with  its  foreign  policy  the 
Argentine  Government  had  long  maintained  an  entente  cordiale 
with  Chile,  and  in  1819,  it  will  be  recalled,  concluded  a  treaty 
with  that  government  under  the  terms  of  which  the  two  countries 
sent  an  expedition  into  Peru,  under  the  Argentine  general,  San 
Martin.  But  San  Martin,  after  expelling  the  Royalists  from 
Lima  and  creating  the  republic  of  Peru,  found  himself  unable 

i  Diario  de  Sesiones  de  la  Junta  de  Representates  d$  Iq,  Provincia  de 
Buenos  Aires,  Ano  de  1823,  44,  51. 


436       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  the  interior  of  the  country.  Having 
appealed  in  vain  to  Bolivar  for  assistance,  and  having  become 
aware  that  his  authority  over  the  discordant  elements  in  Peru 
was  being  gradually  undermined,  the  Argentine  leader,  in 
September,  1822,  abandoned  the  great  enterprise,  leaving  the 
expeditionary  forces  to  continue  the  struggle  as  best  they  could 
in  cooperation  with  the  Peruvians.  Such  was  the  situation 
when  Mosquera  reached  Buenos  Aires  in  the  course  of  his  mis- 
sion. As  Bolivar  had  not  yet  taken  up  San  Martin's  unfinished 
task,  Argentine  statesmen  were  still  hopeful  of  maintaining 
their  influence  in  Peru  and  through  that  means  of  achieving 
their  national  aims. 

Specifically  the  government  of  Buenos  Aires  aimed,  by  means 
of  the  expedition  under  San  Martin,  to  liberate  Upper  Peru  and 
thus  to  assure  its  incorporation  in  the  Argentine  nation.  There 
had  prevailed  throughout  Spanish  America  a  tacit  under- 
standing that  the  boundaries  of  the  new  states  should  conform 
to  those  which  marked  the  limits  of  the  major  divisions  in  1810, 
when  in  the  most  of  them  the  movement  of  revolt  began.  This 
was  in  accordance  with  a  principle  described  in  international 
law  by  the  term  uti  possidetis.  Its  meaning  is  made  clear  by 
the  complementary  phrase,  ita  possidetis,  the  whole  then  sig- 
nifying, "  As  you  possess,  so  you  may  possess."  2  Under  this 
principle,  the  empire,  and  afterward  the  republic,  of  Mexico 
conformed  to  the  later  boundaries  of  the  viceroyalty  of  Mexico, 
and  the  Central  American  republic,  after  a  brief  voluntary 
union  with  Mexico,  to  those  of  the  captaincy-general  of  Guate- 
mala. The  vice-royalty  of  New  Granada  was  comprised  within 
the  bounds  of  a  single  state,  the  republic  of  Colombia.  Volun- 
tarily associated  with  it  under  the  same  flag  were  the  captaincy- 
general  of  Venezuela  and  the  presidency  of  Quito.  Chile  had 
established  itself  within  the  bounds  of  the  former  captaincy- 
general  of  that  name;  and  the  viceroyalty  of  Peru,  with  the 

2  Moore,  Costa  Rica-Panama  Arbitration.    Memorandum  on   Uti  Posst- 
detis,  9. 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE          437 

help  of  its  neighbors,  was  now  struggling,  with  every  prospect 
of  success,  to  convert  its  domains  into  a  single  independent  na- 
tion. The  viceroyalty  of  La  Plata  alone  stood  in  danger  of 
permanent  dismemberment  of  its  territory.3  The  province 
lying  on  the  eastern  shore  of  the  estuary  of  La  Plata,  and 
variously  known  as  the  Banda  Oriental,  the  province  of  Uru- 
guay, or  the  province  of  Montevideo,  had  been  seized  by  Portu- 
guese forces  in  1817,  and  four  years  later  had  been  definitely 
incorporated  into  the  united  kingdoms  of  Portugal  and  Brazil. 
Paraguay,  a  province  of  the  old  union,  had  rebelled  against  the 
central  government  at  Buenos  Aires,  and,  having  declared  its 
independence,  had  successfully  maintained  it.  Upper  Peru, 
comprising  the  four  provinces  of  the  former  presidency  of 
Charcas,  also  an  undisputed  part  of  the  viceroyalty  of  La  Plata, 
was  still  in  the  hands  of  the  Royalists.  If  it  were  freed  through 
the  agency  of  Argentine  troops  there  was  every  hope  of  its 
joining  the  confederation.  Success  in  that  quarter  would  give 
the  government  at  Buenos  Aires  the  influence  and  prestige  re- 
quired to  restore  by  peaceable  means  the  other  dismembered 
parts  of  its  territory.  Failure,  on  the  other  hand,  meant  not 
only  the  loss  of  Upper  Peru,  but  its  attraction  to  the  ever  grow- 
ing Bolivarian  system. 

The  rejection  by  Mosquera  of  the  proposed  articles  on  recog- 
nition and  territorial  integrity,  together  with  San  Martin's 
abandonment  of  the  undertaking  in  Peru,  placed  the  Buenos 
Aires  government  in  an  embarrassing  and  difficult  situation. 
In  a  vain  endeavor  to  extricate  the  nation  from  this  situation 
and  to  recover  in  part  at  least  its  lost  prestige,  the  junta  of  rep- 
resentatives, on  July  19,  1823,  passed  an  Act  authorizing  the 
executive  to  employ  whatever  means  he  might  "  find  most 
efficacious  to  hasten  the  termination  of  the  war  and  to  secure 
the  recognition  of  independence."  But  the  Act  forbade  the  es- 

3  Cf.  La  desmembracidn  del  territorio  Argentina  en  el  siglo  XIX.  Con- 
fer-encia  dada  en  la  Real  Sociedad  Geogrdfica  en  su  sesidn  ptiblica  del  3  de 
diciembre  de  1914. 


438      PAN-AMEKICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

tablishment  of  treaty  relations  with  the  mother  country  except 
on  two  conditions  —  the  termination  of  the  war  throughout 
America,  and  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  new 
states.  If,  however,  one  or  more  governments  should  treat 
with  Spain  independently  of  Buenos  Aires  or  should 
establish  conditions  for  recognition  different  from  those  of 
the  Argentine  Government,  the  Act  authorized  the  executive  to 
negotiate  in  behalf  of  the  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata 
alone.4  For  a  year  or  more  past  informal  negotiations  had 
been  going  on  between  the  Buenos  Aires  Government  and  the 
Peninsular  authorities  looking  to  some  form  of  accommodation. 
Toward  the  middle  of  1823  two  Spanish  agents  arrived  at 
Montevideo,  and,  entering  into  correspondence  with  the  Argen- 
tine Government,  were  permitted  to  pass  over  to  Buenos  Aires 
where,  under  the  Act  of  June  19,  negotiations  were  begun,  re- 
sulting shortly  in  the  conclusion  of  a  preliminary  treaty  of 
peace,5  which  provided  for  the  suspension  of  hostilities  for  a 
period  of  eighteen  months,  and  bound  the  government  of  Buenos 
Aires  to  negotiate  between  Spain  and  the  American  states  a 
definitive  treaty  of  peace.  After  authorizing  the  ratification 
of  the  preliminary  treaty,  the  junta  of  representatives  em- 
powered the  government,  in  case  the  definitive  treaty  were  con- 
cluded, to  negotiate  with  the  new  states  an  agreement  to  vote 
twenty  million  pesos,  ostensibly  as  a  grant  to  enable  the  mother 
country  to  maintain  her  independence,  but  really  as  an  indem- 
nity for  the  loss  of  her  colonies.8  At  the  Panama  Congress, 
three  years  later,  the  British  agent,  Dawkins,  it  will  be  recalled, 
proposed  the  payment  of  a  similar  sum  as  a  part  of  the  peace 
settlement  which  he  urged  the  delegates  to  enter  into  with  the 
Spanish  Government.  The  Argentine  proposal,  though  not 
originating  with  the  British  Government,  doubtless  had  its  ap- 
proval. 

This  plan  for  terminating  the  conflict  in  America  without 

*Diario  de  la  Junta,  1823,  51. 

sRegistro  Oficial  de  la  Republica  Argentina,  II,  38,  41,  42. 

e  Coleccitin  de  Tratados  celebrados  por  la  Reptiblica  Argentina,  I,  71. 


ARGENTINA,  BKAZIL,  AND  CHILE          439 

further  bloodshed  proved  to  be  illusory.  The  ministers  sent 
out  from  Buenos  Aires  to  negotiate  with  Chile,  Peru,  and 
Colombia  failed  to  obtain  the  desired  results;  for  Bolivar's 
agents  had  already  created  an  atmosphere  of  hostility  to  the 
Argentine  plan.  In  September,  1823,  the  Liberator  himself  ar- 
rived at  Lima  and  took  personal  charge  of  the  operations  in 
Peru.  Opposed  to  any  species  of  compromise  with  the  enemy, 
he  believed  that  the  independence  of  the  new  states  could  only  be 
achieved  and  made  secure  by  an  unrelenting  prosecution  of  the 
war.  This  he  undertook,  with  what  success  is  already  known. 
His  political  achievements  kept  pace  with  his  military  successes. 
In  February,  1824,  Eivadavia  tried  once  more  by  diplomacy  to 
stem  the  rising  tide  of  Colombian  influence  in  Peru.7  It  was 
of  no  avail ;  the  victories  of  Junin  and  Ayacucho  made  Bolivar's 
name  resound  throughout  the  civilized  world,  and  established 
his  influence  in  the  lands  which  he  had  liberated,  beyond  the 
possibility  of  any  rival  to  shake.  Early  in  1825,  his  veterans 
under  General  Sucre  marched  into  Upper  Peru  and  dispersed 
the  remaining  bands  of  Royalists  in  that  quarter.  Meanwhile 
the  Patriot,  General  Lanza,  had  taken  possession  of  the  city  of 
La  Paz  and  declared  the  country  independent.8  Sympathizing 
with  the  national  aspirations  of  the  people,  Sucre  convoked  an 
assembly  which,  after  reaffirming  the  declaration  of  indepen- 
dence, undertook  the  provisional  organization  of  the  new  state. 
In  honor  of  the  Liberator,  the  name  chosen  for  it  was  the 
republic  of  Bolivar,  which  was  later  changed  to  Bolivia. 

The  government  of  Buenos  Aires,  accepting  the  fait  accompli, 
made  no  protest  against  the  independence  of  Upper  Peru.  On 
the  contrary,  it  sent  thither  a  mission,  composed  of  Carlos 
Alvear  and  Jose  Miguel  Diaz  Velez,  to  congratulate  the  Liber- 
ator, who  was  expected  soon  to  visit  the  new  state,  on  "  the 
high  and  distinguished  services  "  which  he  had  rendered  the 
"  cause  of  the  world,"  and  to  arrange  with  him  all  questions 

7  Guastavino,  San  Martin  y  Simon  Bolivar,  420. 
s  Barros  Arana,  Compendia,  495. 


440      PAN-AMEEICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

that  might  arise  as  a  result  of  the  liberation  of  these  provinces. 
The  envoys  were  instructed  also  to  invite  the  Bolivian  assembly 
to  send  representatives  to  the  constituent  congress  sitting  at 
Buenos  Aires,  with  the  assurance  that  although  the  provinces 
of  Upper  Peru  had  always  belonged  to  the  Argentine  state,  yet 
it  was  desired  that  they  should  exercise  full  liberty  to  make 
such  choice  as  might  best  accord  with  their  own  interests  and 
happiness.9  This  invitation  was,  doubtless,  merely  a  matter  of 
form;  for  the  aim,  momentarily  at  least,  appears  to  have  been 
to  conciliate  the  Liberator  and  to  obtain  his  assistance  in  the 
impending  struggle  with  the  empire  of  Brazil  over  the  Banda 
Oriental.  The  loss  of  Upper  Peru  was  to  be  balanced  by  the 
recovery  of  the  important  province  guarding  the  entrance  to  the 
Rio  de  la  Plata.  "  The  Emperor  of  Brazil/'  said  the  Argentine 
representatives  in  an  address  to  the  Liberator  at  Potosi,  "  has 
dared,  in  violation  of  every  right,  to  provoke  the  free  peoples 
of  America  by  attempting  to  rob  the  Argentine  nation  of  its 
eastern  province  and  to  insult  the  immortal  Colombia  and  the 
government  of  Peru  by  aggressions  in  Upper  Peru,  which  is 
under  the  protection  of  these  two  illustrious  republics.  It  is 
high  time,"  they  said,  "  that  American  honor  be  stirred  and 
that  the  Liberator  of  Colombia  and  Peru  undertake  to  compel 
the  Brazilian  Government  to  desist  from  a  course  no  less  dis- 
loyal to  the  rest  of  America  than  contrary  to  its  own  interests." 
Bolivar  in  replying  expressed  surprise  that  an  American  prince, 
who  had  raised  his  throne  upon  the  indestructible  foundations 
of  popular  sovereignty  and  of  law,  a  prince  who  was  destined, 
it  would  appear,  to  be  the  friend  of  the  neighboring  republics, 
should  nevertheless  be  guilty  of  holding  without  right  a  province 
dominating  the  very  existence  of  a  neighboring  state.  Not  only 
so,  but  the  invasion  by  his  troops  of  one  of  the  provinces  of 
Upper  Peru,  with  the  consequent  illegal  seizure  of  its  property 
and  citizens,  had  greatly  added  to  his  offenses  against  the  law 
of  nations.  And  yet  those  officers  had  remained  unpunished. 

»  Regiatro  Oficial  de  la  Reptiblica  Argentina,  II,  77. 


AKGENTINA,  BKAZIL,  AND  CHILE          441 

"  But,"  said  the  Liberator,  "  let  us  be  thankful  that  events 
have  made  the  ties  which  bind  us  together  so  strong  that  we 
shall  be  able  to  vindicate  our  rights  as  successfully  as  we  have 
acquired  them."  10 

It  is  evident  that  Bolivar  wished  to  intervene  in  the  dispute 
between  Argentina  and  Brazil.  Some  months  before,  in  a 
letter  to  Santander,  he  had  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
Colombian  Congress  would  authorize  him  to  "  tread  upon  Ar- 
gentine soil,"  if  his  presence  there  should  be  demanded  by  cir- 
cumstances.11 The  repeated  references  to  the  matter  in  subse- 
quent letters  leave  no  doubt.  With  the  arrival  of  the  Ar- 
gentine mission  the  opportunity  for  which  he  had  longed  seemed 
to  be  at  hand.  It  only  remained  to  reach  an  agreement  upon 
the  conditions  under  which  he  should  lend  his  support.  As  in 
the  case  of  Peru,  legal  objections  would  doubtless  have  been 
easily  overcome,  if  every  other  difficulty  were  removed.  Ac- 
cordingly in  a  series  of  interviews  which  he  held  with  the  Ar- 
gentine representatives  efforts  were  made  to  surmount  the  ob- 
stacles which  presented  themselves  and  reach  a  common  ground 
of  understanding.  Alvear  and  Diaz  Velez  proposed  an  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance  of  the  four  republics  of  Colombia,  Peru, 
Bolivia,  and  the  United  Provinces  against  the  Empire  of  Brazil. 
In  support  of  their  proposal  they  mentioned,  in  addition  to  the 
aggressions  of  the  Brazilian  Government,  the  pernicious  in- 
fluence of  monarchical  institutions  upon  the  neighboring  re- 
publics, and  the  tendency  of  the  Brazilian  court  to  introduce 
into  America  ideas  of  absolutism  and  of  intervention  based  upon 
the  European  principle  of  legitimacy.  The  Liberator,  avowing 
the  justice  of  the  cause,  assured  the  Argentine  envoys  of  his 
willingness  to  lend  his  assistance,  if  the  laws  of  Peru  and  of 
Colombia  would  permit.  But  as  to  entering  into  such  an  al- 
liance as  they  proposed,  he  could  not  fail  to  remind  them  of 
the  indifference  with  which  Colombia's  invitation  to  enter 

loOdriozola,  Documentos  Histdricos  del  Peril,,  VI,  318-320, 
11  February  18,  1825.     O'Leaiy,  Memories,  XXX,  40, 


442      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

into  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  had  been  received  by 
Buenos  Aires.  To  that  invitation  Buenos  Aires  had  responded 
with  an  insignificant  treaty  which,  in  the  existing  crisis,  was 
of  no  value  whatever.  The  United  Provinces  had  now  to  suf- 
fer, declared  the  Liberator,  for  Rivadavia's  lack  of  prevision. 
Nothing  would  conduce  more  efficaciously  to  the  security  and 
prosperity  of  America,  he  said,  than  the  union  of  all  the  re- 
publics to  defend  their  rights.  From  the  beginning  of  the  revo- 
lution he  had  been  advocating  an  alliance  and  he  still  believed 
it  to  be  the  only  means  of  giving  the  new  states  consistency  and 
respectability.  That  was  the  aim  of  the  Panama  Congress,  and 
all  he  could  promise  the  Argentine  representatives  was  to  recom- 
mend their  case  to  that  body  for  favorable  action.12 

What  Bolivar's  attitude  would  have  been  if  the  freedom  of 
action  which  he  demanded  and  finally  obtained  in  Peru  had 
been  offered  in  Argentina  can  hardly  be  a  matter  of  surmise. 
But  the  situations  were  altogether  different.  Peru,  when  Boli- 
var intervened  there,  had  been  but  partly  liberated.  Anarchy 
menaced  the  life  of  the  new  state.  Reconquest  was  imminent. 
The  Argentine  provinces,  on  the  contrary,  with  the  exception  of 
Upper  Peru,  had  been  among  the  first  to  shake  off  foreign  domi- 
nation. They  had  successfully  maintained  their  independence. 
No  enemy  threatened  to  resub jugate  them.  No  interference 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  republic  was  desired,  therefore, 
or  would  be  tolerated.  Cooperation  of  equal  states  on  equal 
terms  alone  was  sought,  as  a  means  to  restore  to  one  of  the 
provinces  of  the  old  union,  the  union  under  the  viceroyalty,  the 
liberty  to  determine  its  own  destiny.  There  were  other  obsta- 
cles also  which  stood  in  the  way  of  the  Liberator's  further  con- 
quests. Public  sentiment  at  Buenos  Aires  was  decidedly  hos- 
tile to  him.18  On  the  other  hand,  opinion  in  Colombia  was 
little  inclined  to  favor  such  an  undertaking.  Santander  wrote 

i2(yLeary,  Memoriae,  XXVIII,  425-435. 

is  Mitre,  Hiatoria  de  San  Martin,  IV,  118;  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII, 
439. 


AKGENTINA,  BKAZIL,  AND  CHILE          443 

to  caution  that  under  Colombian  laws  the  Liberator  had  no 
authority  to  go  beyond  the  territory  of  Peru.  "  Our  intermed- 
dling in  the  war  with  Brazil,"  he  said,  "  is  certainly  a  very 
grave  and  delicate  matter,  and  it  would  be  still  more  so  if  you 
should  take  part  in  it  formally.  .  .  .  You  should  under  no  con- 
ditions think  of  directing  the  contest  in  person."  This  he 
advised,  first,  because  the  Liberator's  presence  was  indispen- 
sable in  Colombia;  and  secondly,  because  Great  Britain  would 
not  take  well  a  war  against  a  government  which  owed  so  much 
to  British  influence,  and  whose  very  existence  rested  upon  Brit- 
ish consent.14 

In  referring  to  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain,  Santander  hit 
upon  what  was,  doubtless,  the  most  influential  factor  in  the 
whole  situation.  He  did  not  overrate  the  importance  of  British 
influence  in  Brazil ;  and  Buenos  Aires  sought  with  eagerness  its 
exercise  in  favor  of  the  United  Provinces.  Bolivar,  ever  con- 
stant in  his  admiration  of  British  institutions  and  in  his  desire 
to  conciliate  British  favor,  would  undertake  no  enterprise  of 
such  magnitude  without  the  approval  of  the  British  Government. 
Writing  to  Santander,  he  said,  "  We  shall  save  the  New  World 
if  we  act  in  accord  with  Great  Britain  in  political  and  military 
matters.  This  simple  clause  should  say  to  you  more  than  two 
volumes."  15  Doubt  as  to  the  British  attitude  would  have 
made  Bolivar  hesitate  even  though  satisfactory  arrangements 
had  been  made  with  Buenos  Aires.  He  suspected,  but  did  not 
know,  that  Great  Britain  frowned  upon  any  tendency  of  the 
South  American  republics  to  unite  for  the  purpose  of  over- 
throwing monarchy  in  Brazil.  The  matter  was,  in  effect,  under 
consideration  by  the  British  Cabinet.  In  February,  1826,  Lord 
Ponsonby  was  appointed  minister  plenipotentiary  to  Buenos 
Aires,  and  in  instructions  to  him  Canning  defined  his  view  of 
the  normal  relations  and  attitude  of  England  toward  the  new 
states  as  that  of  "  anxiety  to  restore  and  preserve  peace  "  among 

i*  November  25,  1825.     O'Leary,  Memorias,  III,  215. 
is  March  11,  1825.     O'Leary,  Hemorias,  XXX,  49. 


444      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

them  with  a  view  to  prevent  the  "  interference  of  foreigners  in 
their  political  concerns."  In  a  subsequent  instruction,  the 
British  minister  declared :  "  Important  as  the  question  of  Mon- 
tevideo may  be  to  the  Brazilian  Government,  it  is  scarcely  less 
important  that  the  discussion  of  that  question  should  not  be 
conducted  on  such  principles,  or  supported  on  their  side  by  such 
arguments,  as  to  array  against  the  monarchy  of  Brazil  the  com- 
mon feeling  and  common  interests  of  all  the  republican  states 
of  Spanish  America."  He  went  on  then  to  warn  the  Brazilian 
Government  against  trying  "  too  high  "  the  patience  of  Bolivar, 
who  was  being  incited  to  undertake  a  war  against  Brazil,  "  for 
the  express  purpose  of  overturning  a  monarchy  which  stands 
alone  on  the  vast  continent  of  America,  and  which  is  considered 
by  those  enamored  of  democratical  forms  of  government,  as  es- 
sentially inconsistent  with  the  existence  of  the  American  re- 
publics." 16 

Uncertainty  as  to  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain  led  Bolivar 
to  suggest  an  alternative  project,  which  greatly  appealed  to  his 
spirit  of  romance.  This  was  a  scheme  to  create  a  diversion  in 
favor  of  the  United  Provinces  by  invading  Paraguay,  with  the 
ostensible  object  of  liberating  the  scientist,  Bonpland,  who  was 
being  held  a  prisoner  there,  and  of  compelling  the  tyrant 
Francia  to  restore  to  the  people  of  the  country  the  political 
freedom  of  which  he  had  deprived  them.17  The  phase  of  the 
scheme  which  most  strongly  challenged  the  Liberator  was,  doubt- 
less, the  liberation  of  Bonpland.  In  1821,  Bonpland,  the  com- 
panion of  Humboldt  on  his  famous  voyages  to  America,  having 
entered  the  territory  of  Paraguay  by  way  of  the  United  Prov- 
inces of  Rio  de  la  Plata,  was  arrested  and  held  by  the  Dictator 
as  a  spy.  The  scientist  had  been  invited  by  Bolivar  to  reside 
in  Colombia  and,  it  appears,  had  come  to  America  with  that 
intention.  His  excursion  into  Paraguay  and  his  detention 

i«  Temperley,  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning,  in  Am. 
Hist.  Rev.,  XI,  783. 

"O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXVIII,  426;  Mitre,  Historia  de  San  Martin,  IV, 
120. 


AKGENTINA,  BKAZIL,  AND  CHILE          445 

there,  however,  had  interfered  with  his  plans  and  caused  no 
little  annoyance  to  his  great  patron.  Great  Britain  and  Brazil 
interceded  in  behalf  of  the  unfortunate  traveler,  and  France 
sent  a  special  commissioner  to  pray  for  his  release,  but  despite 
all  remonstrances  Dr.  Francia  remained  firm.18  Nothing 
daunted,  Bolivar  added  his  protest.  "  From  my  early  youth," 
he  wrote  in  the  midst  of  his  campaigns  in  Peru,  "  I  have  had 
the  honor  of  cultivating  the  friendship  of  M.  Bonpland  and  of 
Baron  von  Humboldt,  whose  learning  has  been  of  greater 
benefit  to  America  than  all  the  deeds  of  its  conquistadores." 
Pained  to  learn  that  his  "  adored  friend,"  Bonpland,  was  de- 
tained in  Paraguay,  and  convinced  that  the  charges  against 
him  were  false,  Bolivar  urged  Francia  to  set  the  scientist  at 
liberty.  "  I  induced  him  to  come  to  America,"  declared  Boli- 
var, adding :  "  This  learned  man  can  enlighten  my  country  with 
his  knowledge."  Upon  these  grounds  the  Liberator  rested  his 
claim.  Suggesting  that  Bonpland  could  give  assurances  that 
his  departure  would  in  no  way  be  prejudicial  to  the  interests 
of  Paraguay,  Bolivar  added :  "  I  await  him  with  the  anxiety  of 
a  friend  and  the  respect  of  a  pupil.  I  would  march  all  the 
way  to  Paraguay  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  liberate  this 
best  of  men  and  the  most  celebrated  of  travelers."  19 

To  this  letter  Bolivar  probably  never  received  a  reply.  He 
ventured,  however,  three  or  four  months  before  the  negotiations 
in  Upper  Peru  began,  to  send  another ;  but  this  time  he  wrote  in 
a  different  vein  and  made  no  mention  of  Bonpland.  Great 
events  had  occurred  in  the  meantime.  The  Liberator  had 
reached  the  height  of  his  glory.  The  emancipation  of  the  vast 
territory  from  the  Orinoco  to  the  bounds  of  Chile  and  the 
Argentine  provinces  had  been  completed,  and  throughout  its 

is  Rengger  y  Longchamp,  Ensayo  Histdrico  sobre  la  revolucitin  del  Pa- 
raguay, 101 ;  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XI,  145. 

is  Bolivar  to  Francia,  October  22,  1823,  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXIX,  317. 
Humboldt,  writing  from  Paris  under  date  of  November  28,  1825,  thanked 
Bolivar  for  the  efforts  which  he  had  made  to  liberate  "  poor  Bonpland, 
who  continues  a  prisoner  in  the  mysterious  empire  of  Dr.  Francia." 
O'Leary,  Memorias,  XII,  236. 


446      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

whole  extent  Bolivar's  influence  was  supreme.  He  had  now 
high  hopes  of  being  called  to  further  achievement  in  the  southern 
part  of  the  continent.  The  Spaniards  still  held  out  in  the  island 
of  Chiloe  and  he  had  made  a  proposal  to  the  government  of 
Chile  to  reduce  that  stronghold  with  his  veteran  forces.  Con- 
ferences with  representatives  of  the  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de 
la  Plata,  out  of  which  might  grow  the  liberation  of  the  Banda 
Oriental  and  the  overthrow  of  the  Brazilian  monarchy,  were 
soon  to  begin.  Why  should  not  the  rich  section  lying  isolated 
under  the  despotic  rule  of  Dr.  Francia  also  be  brought  under  his 
influence?  With  a  view  to  accomplish  this  end  Bolivar  wrote 
the  Dictator  inviting  him  to  abandon  the  policy  of  neutrality 
and  isolation  under  which  he  had  governed  the  country  for  the 
past  twelve  years.  The  letter  was  sent  by  Captain  Ruiz  with 
a  detachment  of  twenty-five  men.  Setting  out  from  La  Paz, 
the  detachment,  after  a  month's  travel,  reached  the  Paraguayan 
frontier.  There  it  was  halted  and  Captain  Ruiz  alone,  under 
guard,  was  permitted  to  proceed  to  Asuncion.  Two  hours  after 
his  arrival  there  Captain  Ruiz,  still  under  guard,  was  started 
back  toward  the  frontier  bearing  Francia's  reply.  It  read: 
"  Patrician :  The  Portuguese,  Argentine,  English,  Chileans, 
Brazilians,  and  Peruvians  have  expressed  to  this  government 
desires  similar  to  those  of  Colombia,  without  other  result  than 
to  confirm  the  foundation  principle  of  the  happy  regime  which 
has  liberated  this  province  from  rapine  and  other  evils,  and 
which  it  will  continue  to  follow  until  that  tranquillity  is  restored 
to  the  New  World  which  it  enjoyed  before  the  apostles  of  revo- 
lution appeared,  concealing  with  a  branch  of  olive  the  per- 
fidious dagger,  to  water  with  blood  the  liberty  which  the  am- 
bitious proclaim ;  but  Paraguay  understands  the  situation  and, 
if  it  can  help  it,  will  not  abandon  its  system,  at  least  so  long 
as  I  am  at  the  head  of  the  government,  even  though  it  be  neces- 
sary to  draw  the  sword  of  justice  to  compel  respect  for  such 
sacred  ends,  and  if  Colombia  would  assist  me  I  would  be  pleased 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE          447 

to  devote  my  efforts  to  her  good  sons,  whose  life  may  God  pro- 
tect for  many  years."  20 

It  was  after  receiving  this  curt  reply  that  Bolivar  proposed 
an  invasion  of  Dr.  Francia's  domains.  But  the  Argentine  repre- 
sentatives interposed  objections.  Even  though  the  government 
should  wish  to  accede  to  it,  congress,  they  said,  would  hardly 
lend  its  approval,  for  that  body  had  adopted  the  principle  of 
not  compelling  by  force  any  territory  to  join  the  national  asso- 
ciation.21 The  Colombian  agent  at  Buenos  Aires,  Dean  Funes, 
wrote  Bolivar  that  the  government  was  extremely  averse  to  the 
scheme.  In  the  first  place,  he  said,  it  was  thought  to  be  an 
odious  procedure  to  force  Paraguay  to  join  the  union;  sec- 
ondly, at  the  first  show  of  force  there  was  danger  of  its  rushing 
into  the  arms  of  Brazil ;  and  thirdly,  there  was  good  reason  to 
hope  that  it  could  be  won  over  by  peaceable  means.22  Thus  this 
proposal  came  to  nothing.  Other  plans  were  discussed,  among 
them  an  overture  by  the  Argentine  representatives  to  Bolivar  to 
obtain  his  support  for  an  intimate  alliance  between  Bolivia  and 
the  United  Provinces,  and  a  suggestion  by  Bolivar  that  he  medi- 
ate in  the  dispute  over  the  Banda  Oriental.  But  the  negotia- 
tions finally  came  to  an  end  without  having  accomplished  any- 
thing. 

Early  in  January,  1826,  Bolivar  started  on  the  laborious 
journey  back  to  Lima,  and  Alvear  turned  southward  to  Buenos 
Aires,  Diaz  Yelez  remaining  at  Chuquisaca.  A  few  days  after 
Bolivar  reached  Lima  he  wrote  Revenga,  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  at  Bogota,  that  he  had  no  hope  of  seeing  Chile  and 
the  Argentine  provinces  enter  the  confederation  which  it  was 
proposed  to  establish  at  Panama.  "  These  two  countries,"  he 
said,  "  are  in  a  lamentable  situation,  and  almost  without  gov- 
ernment." 23  To  remedy  the  situation  he  had  interposed  his 

20  Rengger  y  Longchamp,  Essayo  Historico,  227. 

21  Mitre,  Historia  de  San  Martin,  IV,  122. 

22  O'Leary,  Memorias,  XI,  143. 

2'3  February  17,  1826.     O'Leary,  Memorias,  XXX,  165. 


448       PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

good  offices,  but,  he  added,  without  result.  A  few  days  later 
he  wrote  Santander,  referring  to  the  importunities  of  certain 
members  of  the  Peruvian  congress  who  wished  him  to  remain  in 
Peru.  "  There  are  also  others/'  he  declared,  "  who  would  like 
for  me  to  be  absolute  chief  of  the  south.  They  expect  Chile 
and  Buenos  Aires  to  need  my  protection  this  year,  for  war 
and  anarchy  is  devouring  these  countries.  The  emperor  and 
Chiloe  will  make  an  end  of  them."  24  And  though  the  Liber- 
ator declared  that  to  play  such  a  part  did  not  enter  into  his  cal- 
culations, a  faint  hope,  doubtless,  still  lingered  in  his  mind 
that  some  turn  of  fortune  might  yet  make  him  the  arbiter  of  the 
destiny  of  the  whole  continent.  Such,  however,  was  not  to  be 
his  fortune.  He  was  already  entering  upon  the  period  of  his 
decline. 

The  failure  of  the  negotiations  in  Upper  Peru  was  the  death- 
blow to  Bolivar's  dream  of  American  union.  For  a  time  there 
had  been  some  hope  of  winning  the  adherence  of  the  provinces 
of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata.  At  about  the  time  Alvear  and  Diaz 
Velez  were  sent  to  treat  with  the  Liberator,  the  constituent  con- 
gress, then  in  session  at  Buenos  Aires,  voted  funds  for  the  ex- 
penses of  a  mission  to  Panama.  Though  the  unsatisfactory  out- 
come of  the  negotiation  with  Bolivar  definitely  precluded  the 
active  participation  of  the  United  Provinces,  yet  the  government 
of  Buenos  Aires,  late  in  April,  1826,  appointed  Manuel  Jose 
Garcia,  who  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  had  been  the 
dominant  figure  in  the  government  for  nearly  two  years  past, 
to  represent  the  provinces  at  Panama.  A  few  days  later  he 
resigned,  and  Diaz  Velez,  still  in  Upper  Peru,  was  appointed 
in  his  stead.25  Some  weeks  later  Diaz  Velez  wrote  Bolivar 
that  the  Argentine  Government  would  surely  be  represented  at 
Panama,  that  he,  Diaz  Velez,  had  been  appointed  minister,  and 
that  his  acceptance  had  been  forwarded  to  Buenos  Aires.28 

2*  February  21,  1826.     Ibid.,  167. 

25  Regiatro  Oficial  de  la  Kepublica  Argentina,  II,  123,  125. 

20  June  16,  1826.     O'Leary,  Memoriae,  XI,  325. 


ARGENTINA,  BKAZIL,  AND  CHILE          449 

But  it  was  too  late.  The  congress  at  Panama  had  already  con- 
vened, and  would  have  adjourned  before  the  Argentine  repre- 
sentative could  reach  the  Isthmus,  even  though  he  had  proceeded 
at  once  and  with  all  haste.  It  does  not  appear,  however,  that 
he  ever  started  on  the  journey,  and  there  is  little  reason  to 
believe  that  the  authorities  at  Buenos  Aires  intended  that  he 
should  go.  Moreover,  had  he  attended  the  congress,  his  par- 
ticipation in  its  deliberations,  under  instructions  from  his  gov- 
ernment, would  have  been,  doubtless,  extremely  limited. 

The  half-hearted  policy  of  conciliation  toward  Bolivar  which 
the  government  at  Buenos  Aires  had  temporarily  pursued  had 
been,  in  fact,  definitely  abandoned.  In  October,  1825,  Riva- 
davia  returned  from  England,  where  for  some  months  past  he 
had  been  serving  as  Argentine  minister  at  the  court  of  St. 
James's.  As  soon  as  he  arrived  he  began  to  advocate  open  war 
upon  Brazil;  and  it  was  due,  in  part  at  least,  to  his  decided 
stand  that  the  congress  publicly  declared  what  had  long  been 
timidly  considered  in  secret  —  the  "  reincorporation  "  of  the 
Banda  Oriental  in  the  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata.27 
This  amounted  to  a  declaration  of  war,  and  to  support  it  Riva- 
davia  was  elected  to  the  chief  magistracy  of  the  union.  Thus 
there  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  state  "  the  man,"  according 
to  Dean  Funes,  "  most  opposed  to  the  views  "  of  the  Liberator.28 
"  For  some  time,"  wrote  Bolivar's  faithful  agent  at  Buenos 
Aires,  "  I  have  noted  not  without  great  surprise  the  profound 
silence  which  has  been  observed  on  the  subject  of  sending  dele- 
gates to  the  Congress  of  Panama.  As  they  should  have  already 
been  on  their  way,  this  silence  led  me  to  believe  that  the  min- 
istry had  changed  its  policy,  departing  from  that  upon  which 
it  agreed  with  me  when  I  presented  the  invitation  of  Colombia. 
In  order  to  make  sure  of  this,  I  approached,  a  few  days  ago, 
Dr.  Manuel  Moreno,  who  I  knew  had  already  been  appointed 

27  Funes  to  Bolivar,  October  26,  1825.     For  the  Act  of  the  congress  see 
Registro  Oficial,  II,  89. 

28  Funes  to  Bolivar,  January  10,  1826.     O'Leary,  Memorias,  XI. 


450      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

to  the  post.  He  is  worthy  of  the  place  and  his  appointment  is 
desirable  because  of  his  decided  adhesion  to  your  Excellency. 
With  me  he  agreed  there  had  really  been  a  change  of  policy, 
and,  searching  for  its  origin,  we  could  find  no  other  than  the 
influence  of  the  former  minister,  Rivadavia."  29 

At  Panama  the  action  of  the  United  Provinces  was  a  matter 
of  concern,  especially  to  Colombia's  delegates.  Early  in  1826, 
a  report  reached  the  Isthmus,  by  way  of  Peru,  that  the  gov- 
ernment of  Buenos  Aires  had  reconsidered  its  resolve  not  to 
take  part  in  the  congress.  To  meet  the  situation,  Gual  and 
Briceno  Mendez  wrote  to  Bogota  for  special  instructions.  The 
sudden  change  of  policy,  they  thought,  was  intended  to  involve 
Colombia  in  the  war  with  Brazil.  It  was  indispensable,  there- 
fore, to  examine  two  cardinal  points:  First,  whether  Brazil 
planned  to  attack  the  independence  of  the  United  Provinces; 
and  secondly,  whether  Colombia  was  under  obligations  to  lend 
the  Argentine  Government  assistance  in  the  maintenance  of  its 
rights.  In  other  words,  was  this  the  casus  foederis  contemplated 
under  the  treaty  of  May  8,  1823,  between  Colombia  and  Buenos 
Aires  ?  Under  the  terms  of  this  treaty,  the  Colombia  delegates 
pointed  out,  the  alliance  was  defensive  and  was  to  become 
effective  in  the  maintenance  of  independence  only.  Moreover, 
the  conditions  of  the  alliance  in  any  particular  case  were  to  be 
arranged  according  to  the  circumstances  and  resources  of  each 
of  the  contracting  parties.  If,  then,  the  question  should  come 
up  in  the  congress,  would  Colombia  reject  any  proposal  tending 
to  involve  it  in  the  war,  or  would  it  regard  active  participation 
on  the  side  of  Buenos  Aires  as  "  conducive  to  the  general  in- 
terests of  our  hemisphere,  and  to  the  establishment  of  some 
sort  of  balance  between  the  American  states  "  ?  30 

Revenga,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in  his  reply 
promptly  dispelled  all  doubt  as  to  the  attitude  of  Colombia. 

2»  Funes  to  Bolivar,  January  26,  1826.  Ibid.  The  appointment  of  Mo- 
reno was  not  published  in  the  Registro  Oficial. 

3°  Zubieta,  Congresoa  de  1'anamd  y  7'acubaya,  25-6. 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE  451 

The  situation  which  had  arisen  between  Brazil  and  the  Prov- 
inces of  La  Plata  was  not,  he  declared,  the  casus  fcederis  contem- 
plated under  the  treaty;  for  Brazil,  far  from  attacking  the  in- 
dependence of  the  United  Provinces,  was  merely  disputing  the 
possession  of  a  territory  which  it  had  occupied  and  held  with- 
out protest  on  the  part  of  Buenos  Aires.  Moreover,  the  in- 
habitants of  the  disputed  province  had  voted  to  unite  with  Brazil 
and  had  been  given  a  voice  in  the  legislation  of  the  empire. 
These  same  people  now  being  free  of  the  evils  from  which  the 
Brazilian  forces  had  liberated  them,  were  seeking  to  return 
to  the  Argentine  confederation.  To  accede  to  their  wishes,  to 
permit  a  province  or  section  to  belong  to-day  to  one  association 
and  to-morrow  to  another,  without  other  motive  than  a  "  versa- 
tile inclination "  would  be  to  sanction  irregularity  and  dis- 
order. And  though  Revenga  admitted  that  the  uprising  of  the 
Uruguayans  favored  Buenos  Aires,  yet  he  saw  in  the  conflict 
between  the  two  claimants  for  the  possession  of  the  disputed 
territory  nothing  but  "  a  war  of  state  against  state  "  in  which 
the  government  of  Colombia  should  in  no  way  be  involved.31 

As  has  been  pointed  out  above,  no  Argentine  representatives 
ever  reached  Panama,  and  the  congress  therefore  had  no  occasion 
to  take  action  upon  the  dispute  between  the  United  Provinces 
and  Brazil.  Had  the  government  at  Buenos  Aires  been  willing 
to  abandon  its  traditional  policy  of  relative  aloofness,  and  had 
it  been  able  to  overcome  its  aversion  to  Colombian  leadership, 
its  advances  might  have  resulted  in  consolidating  the  whole  of 
Spanish  America  against  the  Brazilian  monarchy.  But  the  Ar- 
gentine authorities,  despite  the  overtures  which  they  made, 
never  had  any  serious  intention  of  entering  frankly  and  unre- 
servedly into  the  Colombian  scheme  of  continental  union. 
This  was  made  clear  in  a  series  of  articles  published  at  Buenos 
Aires,  apparently  setting  forth  in  a  semiofficial  manner  the  at- 
titude of  the  government  toward  the  plan  of  confederation.32 

si  Zubieta,  Congresos  de  Panamd  y  Tacubaya,  28. 

32  Op.  cit.     Unfortunately  Zubieta  does  not  give  the  name  of  the  paper 


452       PAN-AMEEICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

The  following  extracts  embody  the  essential  points: 
"  We  have  demonstrated  that  the  idea  of  establishing  a  su- 
preme or  sublime  authority  to  regulate  the  most  important 
affairs  between  the  states  of  the  New  World  is,  from  every  point 
of  view,  dangerous,  and  it  would  not  be  strange  if  such  an  es- 
tablishment should  become  the  source  of  destructive  wars  be- 
tween peoples  much  in  need  of  the  tranquillity  of  peace.  Con- 
sequently, if  this  is  the  great  and  chief  object  of  the  reunion  of 
an  American  Congress  at  Panama,  we  believe  that  the  republic 
of  the  United  Provinces  should  decline  frankly  and  firmly  to 
send  representatives,  and  indeed,  if  hitherto  it  may  have  been 
thought  that  Colombia,  the  first  to  conceive  the  idea  of  a  su- 
preme authority,  had  given  it  up,  such  is  known  now  not  to  be 
the  case,  for  the  treaty  which  she  has  just  concluded  with  the 
provinces  of  Central  America  involves  the  idea  with  the  same 
interest  and  ardor  with  which  it  was  proposed  to  us  in  1822. 
It  might  be  said,  therefore,  that  for  us  the  matter  is  ended. 
Nevertheless,  we  wish  to  go  a  little  deeper  into  it.  ... 

"  We  cannot  fail  to  realize  that  there  may  be  points  of  general 
interest  which  it  would  be  convenient  to  settle  in  a  common 
treaty,  in  the  conclusion  of  which  plenipotentiaries  of  all  the 
states  should  participate,  in  a  gathering  equivalent  to  what 
is  to-day  called  an  American  Congress.  But  even  this,  which 
under  other  circumstances  might  appear  to  be  advantageous, 
at  present  would  be  dangerous.  The  reason  which  we  have 
given  for  resisting  the  creation  of  a  supreme  authority  with 
respect  to  the  whole  of  the  New  World,  apply  with  scarcely  less 
force  to  the  negotiation  of  a  common  treaty  under  such  condi- 
tions as  will  prevail  in  the  projected  Congress  of  Panama.  The 
influence,  real  or  potential,  of  Colombia  in  the  deliberations 
would  be  sufficient  to  inspire  jealousy  and  cause  to  be  viewed 
with  suspicion  any  treaty,  however  rational  or  beneficial  it 

nor  the  dates  of  publication.  The  reference,  however,  to  the  treaty  be- 
tween Colombia  and  Central  America  which  was  ratified  by  Colombia  in 
1825  places  the  publication  some  time  after  that  date. 


ARGENTINA,  BKAZIL,  AND  CHILE          453 

might  be,  or  however  scrupulously  it  might  establish  the  equal- 
ity of  rights  and  duties  of  the  states  of  the  league.  This  leads 
us  to  regard  it  as  imprudent  for  the  American  states  to  com- 
promise themselves  so  soon  in  such  a  pact.  But  such  is  the 
mania  for  an  American  Congress  that,  if  the  other  states  agree 
to  participate,  we  cannot  stand  apart  without  making  our  posi- 
tion very  conspicuous.  Even  though  we  should  not  send  delegates, 
therefore,  we  should  at  least  agree  to  what  is  stipulated  if  our 
particular  interests  permit.  In  such  case,  since  it  is  out  of  the 
question  to  consider  the  establishment  of  a  common  sovereignty, 
we  shall  discuss  some  of  the  other  objects  which  the  congress 
may  consider. 

"  The  government  of  Colombia,  in  its  note  cited  above,  sug- 
gests two  objects,  in  our  opinion,  the  principal  and  perhaps  the 
only  ones  which  merit  the  trouble  to  send  delegates  such  long 
distances  to  discuss.  We  single  these  out  because  of  their  par- 
ticular importance,  the  rest  being  so  obvious  that  for  all  the 
states  of  America  to  assemble  in  congress  to  discuss  them  would 
lead  to  no  useful  result.  The  two  objects  of  which  we  speak, 
the  importance  of  which  cannot  be  denied,  are  the  wise  princi- 
ples proclaimed  by  the  enlightened  government  of  the  United 
States;  namely,  that  which  proclaims  that  in  future  no  part 
of  America  shall  be  subject  to  colonization  by  foreign  powers, 
and  that  which  deprecates  and  resists  every  pretension  on  the 
part  of  Europeans  to  intervene  in  American  affairs.  But,  let 
us  repeat,  these  two  principles  are  so  clearly  accepted  by  Amer- 
ica that  the  convening  of  a  congress  to  establish  them  and  agree 
upon  them  would  create  the  idea  at  once  that  the  real  objects  in 
view  are  other  than  these.  As  to  the  first  of  these  principles, 
there  is  no  need  to  comment.  As  to  the  second,  resistance  to 
the  intervention  of  European  powers  in  our  affairs,  now  that 
this  point  is  touched  upon,  it  is  worth  while  to  give  it  all  the 
extension  to  which  it  is  susceptible.  In  effect,  in  the  actual 
state  of  things,  the  American  republics  have  little  or  no  fear 
of  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  European  powers,  nor  would 


454      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

these  powers  aspire  to  intervene  in  our  affairs  unless  we  should 
commit  the  imprudence  of  soliciting  it  in  our  differences.  Im- 
prudence, yes;  this  point  is  worth  considering.  We  have 
hitherto  abstained  from  entering  into  detailed  discussion.  But 
while  accepting  the  principle  of  no  European  intervention  in 
our  affairs,  we  regard  it  as  no  less  important  to  resist  it  when 
it  is  attempted  under  whatever  name  or  pretext  by  one  or  more 
American  states.  This  kind  of  intervention  is  more  probable 
than  the  European,  and,  in  our  opinion,  would  be,  at  least  in 
our  present  state,  more  harmful.  Everything  is  to  be  feared 
from  new,  inexperienced  peoples  and  nations  united  in  the  noble 
pride  of  recent  triumphs.  The  new  states  of  America,  if  they 
are  to  win  the  good  opinion  of  the  onlooking  world,  must  dis- 
play no  small  amount  of  unselfishness  and  the  greatest  of  mod- 
eration. The  American  state  which  should  presume  to  give 
laws  to  other  peoples  and  to  intervene  in  their  domestic  affairs 
might  perhaps  humiliate  its  neighbor  for  the  moment;  but 
henceforward  it  should  expect  the  hatred  and  execration  of  all 
the  states  of  the  New  World."  33 

Continuing,  the  writer  discusses  the  question  of  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  to  illustrate  further  the  objectionable  tendency  of 
the  Panama  Congress  to  intervene  in  American  affairs.  The 
promotion  by  every  possible  means  of  plans  for  the  liberation 
of  these  unfortunate  peoples  was,  he  thought,  altogether  com- 
mendable, and,  as  the  provinces  of  La  Plata  claimed  the  glory 
of  having  given  liberty  to  two  new  states,  they  would  gladly 
contribute  to  the  emancipation  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico.  But 
it  had  been  declared  that  the  Congress  of  Panama  would  re- 
solve whether  the  islands  would  be  permitted  to  determine  their 
own  fate  or  whether  they  would  be  annexed  to  some  other  state. 
"  See,"  exclaimed  the  writer,  "  how  already,  even  before  the 
congress  meets,  its  unfortunate  results  begin  to  be  felt!  See 
how  already  peoples  are  forced  to  suffer  the  pus  of  American 
intervention,  precisely  when  an  effort  is  being  made  to  estab- 

88  Zubieta,  Congreaoa  de  Panamd  y  Tacubaya,  32. 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE          455 

lish  a  principle  of  resistance  to  the  intervention  of  European 
powers!  "  34 

The  conflict  between  Brazil  and  the  United  Provinces,  which 
has  been  so  constantly  before  our  view  in  the  preceding  pages, 
demands  further  consideration.  The  strip  of  territory  over 
which  the  contest  arose  lies  to  the  eastward  of  the  Rio  de  la 
Plata,  and  for  that  reason  was  commonly  known  as  the  Banda 
Oriental.  In  colonial  times  it  was  often  in  dispute  between  the 
crowns  of  Spain  and  Portugal.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish 
American  wars  of  independence,  however,  its  possession  by 
Spain  had  long  been  recognized  by  Portugal  and  as  it  had  con- 
stituted from  1776  onward  an  integral  part  of  the  viceroy alty 
of  La  Plata,  as  the  province  of  Uruguay,  its  union  with  the 
independent  state  founded  upon  the  old  viceroyalty  was  taken 
as  a  matter  of  course  by  the  revolutionary  authorities  at  Buenos 
Aires.  Civil  war  having  broken  out  between  the  central  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  Provinces  and  the  Uruguayans  under  the 
leadership  of  Artigas,  the  Portuguese  king,  then  residing  with 
his  court  at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  took  advantage  of  the  resulting  dis- 
order to  seize  the  territory.  Buenos  Aires  being  unable,  on  ac- 
count of  its  domestic  troubles,  to  repel  the  invaders,  withdrew 
from  the  contest.  The  Portuguese,  after  taking  possession  of 
the  principal  city,  Montevideo,  continued,  with  greatly  superior 
forces,  the  war  against  Artigas,  and  finally,  having  driven  him 
to  seek  refuge  in  the  neighboring  state  of  Paraguay,  proceeded 
to  take  steps  to  ground  their  title  on  a  basis  of  legality.  Ap- 
parently foreign  occupation  was  not  wholly  unwelcome  to  the 
inhabitants  of  the  province,  for  they  thus  escaped  the  constant 
turmoil  of  civil  war  and  the  fierce,  lawless  sway  of  Artigas. 
Moreover,  the  Portuguese  king  had  declared  that  he  was  moved 
to  occupy  the  territory  not  by  the  spirit  of  conquest,  but  solely 
by  the  desire  to  preserve  order  in  his  own  neighboring  provinces. 
The  inhabitants  were  not  to  be  deprived  of  the  right  freely 
to  determine  their  political  future.  Accordingly  an  opportunity 

a*  Ibid.,   34. 


456      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

was  given  them  to  register  their  will.  This  was  accomplished 
by  means  of  a  representative  assembly,  which  was  convened  at 
Montevideo  in  1821.  It  voted  in  favor  of  annexation  to  the 
united  kingdom  of  Portugal  and  Brazil.  The  next  year,  Brazil 
having  declared  its  independence,  the  province  after  some  hesi- 
tation adhered  to  the  new  order,  and  later  sent  delegates  to  the 
congress  which  met  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  to  frame  a  constitution 
for  the  empire.35 

Meanwhile  the  situation  in  the  United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la 
Plata  had  greatly  improved.  Civil  strife  had  abated  and  a  na- 
tional government  with  clearly  defined  policies,  under  the  in- 
spiration of  Rivadavia,  was  inaugurated.  The  time  was 
thought  opportune  to  press  with  renewed  vigor  the  negotiations 
which  had  been  initiated  with  a  view  to  restore  the  province 
to  the  Argentine  confederation.  Valentin  Gomez,  whose  mis- 
sion to  Europe  in  1819  was  referred  to  in  a  previous  chapter, 
was  now  sent  as  special  commissioner  to  conduct  the  negotiations 
with  the  Brazilian  court.  Under  date  of  September  15,  1823, 
he  handed  the  Brazilian  Government  a  memorandum  in  which 
the  claims  of  the  United  Provinces  to  the  territory  in  dispute 
were  reviewed  at  length.  As  Brazil  grounded  its  claim  chiefly 
upon  the  vote  of  the  representative  assembly  which  met  at  Mon- 
tevideo in  1821,  it  was  upon  this  point  that  Gomez  mainly  di- 
rected his  attack.  The  gist  of  his  argument  was  that  the  as- 
sembly was  illegal.  It  was  convoked,  he  maintained,  by  in- 
competent authority  and  held  in  the  presence  of  a  foreign  army 
interested  in  the  revolution.  Its  deliberations  and  acts  he  con- 
sidered, therefore,  "  as  illegal  as  were  the  famous  transactions 
at  Bayonne,  in  the  year  1808."  Urging  Brazil  not  to  "  depart 
from  that  line  of  conduct  so  honorable  to  her  and  moreover  so 
befitting  her  own  interests,"  Gomez  appealed  to  the  spirit  of 
America.  "  How,"  he  inquired,  "  would  the  other  states  of  the 
continent  contemplate  that  spirit  of  conquest,  developed  thus 
early,  and  the  abandonment  of  those  principles  which,  with 

as  Saldlas,  Historia  de  la  Confederacidn  Argentina,  I,  200-204. 


AKGENTINA,  BKAZIL,  AND  CHILE          45T 

strict  propriety,  may  be  said  to  constitute  American  policy  ?  " 
To  this  he  added  that  the  American  states  "  united  together  by 
the  identity  of  their  principles,  by  the  cause  which  they  uphold, 
and  above  all,  by  the  ideas  of  justice  with  which  their  minds  are 
so  strongly  impressed/'  would  be  "  capable  of  successfully  re- 
pelling any  aggression  "  directed  against  their  "  rights  or  the 
liberties  which  they  have  proclaimed."  In  conclusion,  Gomez 
declared  that  the  United  Provinces  would,  if  necessary,  ad- 
venture their  very  existence  to  obtain  the  reincorporation  of 
the  disputed  territory  and  to  obtain  control  of  the  river  which 
"  washes  their  shores,  offers  channels  to  their  commerce,  and 
facilitates  communication  between  a  multitude  of  points  in  their 
territory."  36 

To  this  memorandum  the  Brazilian  Government  replied  only 
after  repeated  insistence  on  the  part  of  the  Argentine  commis- 
sioner. Finally,  on  February  6,  1824,  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Luis  Jose  Carvalho  Melo,  in  a  letter  addressed  to 
Gomez,  set  forth  the  position  of  the  imperial  government.  The 
Brazilian  minister  pointed  out  the  difficulty  of  reaching  a 
definite  decision  as  to  the  restoration  of  the  province  by  reason 
of  the  fact  that  both  governments  based  their  claims  on  the 
same  principle ;  namely,  the  choice  of  the  province  itself.  There 
was  no  reason  to  believe,  he  maintained,  that  the  inhabitants  de- 
sired separation  from  the  monarchy,  and  even  admitting  the 
right  of  remonstrance  on  the  part  of  Buenos  Aires,  the  ex- 
pedient of  again  ascertaining  their  wishes  could  not  in  justice  be 
resorted  to.  Maintaining  that  the  decision  of  the  Montevideo 
assembly  expressed  the  will  of  the  people,  he  declared  that  his 
imperial  majesty  would  not  wish  to  take  upon  himself  to  de- 
cide peremptorily,  for  in  countries  with  representative  govern- 
ments it  belongs  exclusively  to  the  legislature  to  alienate  terri- 
tory in  actual  possession.  Nevertheless,  should  the  province 
be  again  consulted  and  should  its  wish  be  expressed  (which  was 

36  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  752-756 ;  Coleccidn  de  tratados 
celebrados  por  la  Repiiblica  Argentina,  I,  75-86. 


458      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

scarcely  credible)  in  favor  of  incorporation  with  Buenos  Aires 
or  other  power,  the  imperial  government  could  not  but  regard 
such  a  result  as  a  measure  directed,  not  only  against  the  true 
interests  of  the  province  itself,  but  against  the  rights  acquired 
by  Brazil  at  the  cost  of  so  many  sacrifices ;  because  the  conven- 
tion solemnly  concluded  between  the  province  and  the  empire 
could  not  be  annulled  at  the  option  of  one  of  the  contracting 
parties  alone,  the  consent  of  the  other  being  necessary,  and  with- 
out that  consent  the  empire  would  be  under  the  obligation  of 
defending  its  rights.  These  rights,  the  Brazilian  minister 
maintained,  were  as  sacred  as  the  cause  out  of  which  they  grew, 
as  without  reference  to  the  ancient  treaties  of  limits  concluded 
with  the  crown  of  Spain  it  was  sufficient  to  consider:  (1)  That 
the  inhabitants  of  Montevideo,  being  exposed  to  the  despotism 
of  Artigas,  and  the  province  being  almost  annihilated  by  the 
horrors  of  civil  war,  could  not  find  protection  from  any  other 
power  than  Brazil.  (2)  That  the  Brazilian  Government  had 
since  that  time  expended  immense  sums  of  money  in  the 
province,  for  which  it  has  an  evident  right  to  be  indemnified. 
(3)  That  after  the  province  became  tranquil  and  free,  his 
Most  Faithful  Majesty  enabled  it  to  decide  its  future  condition 
without  restraint,  the  province  having  the  same  right  to  dispose 
of  its  destiny  as  the  other  provinces  of  the  viceroy alty.37 

Convinced  that  to  continue  the  negotiations  would  be  futile, 
Gomez  returned  to  Buenos  Aires.  Meanwhile  the  government 
of  Brazil  took  steps  to  strengthen  the  bonds  uniting  the  disputed 
territory  to  the  empire.  The  constitution,  which  had  just  been 
adopted  at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  was  presented  to  the  Cabildos  of  the 
Cisplatine  province,  which  ratified  it  with  great  pomp  and 
ceremony.  Deputies  were  then  elected  to  the  Cortes.  These 
events  produced  great  excitement  in  Buenos  Aires,  where  many 
emigrados  (exiled  Uruguayans)  were  gathered.  Popular 
clamor  demanded  war ;  but,  in  view  of  the  strong  national  spirit 

a*  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  761-763;   Colecci6n  de  trata- 
dos  celebradoa  por  la  Republic  Argentina,  I,  90. 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE          459 

of  the  Oriental  Province  Buenos  Aires  hesitated  to  enter  upon 
the  enterprise.  If  the  province  were  liberated  there  was  no  as- 
surance that  it  would  freely  join  the  Argentine  confederation. 
When  news  of  the  victory  of  Ayacucho  reached  Buenos  Aires 
early  in  1825,  however,  the  agitation  was  renewed  with  in- 
creased vigor.  As  the  government  still  declined  to  act,  the  emi- 
grados,  with  every  promise  of  the  material  and  moral  support 
of  the  citizens  of  Buenos  Aires,  dispatched  Juan  Manuel  Rosas, 
the  future  Argentine  dictator,  on  a  secret  mission  to  fo- 
ment revolution  among  the  inhabitants  of  the  province.  In 
April,  1825,  General  Antonio  Lavalleja,  who  was  the  leader  of 
the  movement,  followed  with  thirty-two  companions.  This  in- 
trepid band  of  "  thirty-three,"  quickly  growing  to  a  formidable 
military  force,  was  able  from  the  first  to  maintain  itself  in  the 
field.  Lavalleja,  in  order  to  bring  the  government  of  Buenos 
Aires  decisively  into  the  struggle,  organized  a  provisional  gov- 
ernment, which  declared  in  August,  1825,  that  the  general  will 
of  the  Oriental  Province  was  in  favor  of  union  with  the  rest 
of  the  Argentine  provinces.  Some  two  months  later  the  Ar- 
gentine Congress  declared  the  Banda  Oriental  as  "in  fact  in- 
corporated in  the  republic  of  the  United  Provinces,  to  which 
it  has  belonged  and  to  which  it  wishes  to  belong."  Upon  being 
informed  of  this  act  the  Brazilian  Government  immediately  de- 
clared war.38 

For  more  than  two  years  the  war  continued.  Its  details  do 
not  interest  us  here.  Its  outcome  and  its  international  aspects, 
however,  must  receive  our  attention. 

It  has  been  made  clear  in  preceding  pages  that  Brazil  had 
cause  to  fear  a  combination  of  Spanish  American  powers  against 
her.  It  was  not  a  mere  coincidence  that  about  the  time  the 
question  of  the  Banda  Oriental  became  acute,  Rebello,  the  Bra- 
zilian charge  d'affaires  at  Washington,  began  sounding  the 
United  States  on  the  subject  of  a  defensive  alliance.  Upon  the 
invitation  of  Secretary  of  State  Adams,  Rebello  submitted,  early 

as  Saldfas,  Historia  de  la  Confederacidn  Argentina,  I,  215-223. 


460      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

in  1825,  a  definite  proposal,  stipulating  first,  "  that  the  United 
States  should  enter  into  an  alliance  with  Brazil  to  maintain  its 
independence,  if  Portugal  should  be  assisted  by  any  foreign 
power  to  reestablish  her  former  sway  " ;  and  secondly,  "  that  an 
alliance  might  be  formed  to  expel  the  arms  of  Portugal  from 
any  part  of  Brazilian  territory  of  which  they  might  happen  to 
take  possession."  This  proposed  alliance,  though  based  in 
part  upon  the  Monroe  declaration  of  December  2,  1823,  and 
directed  ostensibly  against  resubjugation  by  Portugal,  whether 
with  or  without  European  assistance,  was  doubtless  advocated 
by  Brazil  with  a  view  also  to  its  moral  effect  in  preventing  the 
other  American  states  from  making  a  combined  attack  upon  the 
empire.  Clay,  who  had  succeeded  Adams  as  Secretary  of  State, 
replied  that  while  the  President  adhered  to  the  principles  of 
the  Monroe  declaration,  "  the  prospect  of  a  speedy  peace  between 
Portugal  and  Brazil,  founded  on  the  independence  which  the 
United  States  was  the  first  to  acknowledge,  seemed  to  remove 
the  ground  which  would  be  necessary  to  justify  the  acceptance 
of  the  first  proposition."  He  added,  however,  that  "  if  there 
should  be  a  renewal  of  demonstrations  on  the  part  of  the  Euro- 
pean allies  against  the  independence  of  American  states,  the 
President  would  give  to  that  condition  of  things  every  consider- 
ation which  its  importance  would  undoubtedly  demand."  As 
to  the  second  proposition,  Clay  declared  that  it  was  contrary  to 
the  policy  which  the  United  States  had  pursued,  which  was 
"  that  whilst  the  war  is  confined  to  the  parent  country  and  its 
former  colony,  the  United  States  remain  neutral,  extending  their 
friendship  and  doing  equal  justice  to  both  parties."  89 

The  conflict  over  the  Banda  Oriental  led  Buenos  Aires  also 
to  seek  the  assistance  of  the  United  States.  In  the  fear  that 
the  Holy  Alliance  might  intervene  in  behalf  of  Brazil,  the  Ar- 
gentine government  addressed  an  inquiry  to  the  government 
at  Washington  as  to  the  scope  of  the  declarations  contained  in 
President  Monroe's  message.  In  his  reply,  Clay  restated  the 

a»  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  VI,  437. 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE          461 

principles  of  the  Doctrine  and,  referring  specifically  to  the  war 
which  had  then  broken  out  between  the  United  Provinces  and 
Brazil,  declared  that  that  struggle  could  not  be  conceived  "  as 
presenting  a  state  of  things  bearing  the  remotest  analogy  to  the 
case  which  President  Monroe's  message  deprecates.  ...  It  is  a 
war,"  he  continued,  "  strictly  American  in  its  origin  and  its  ob- 
ject. It  is  a  war  in  which  the  allies  of  Europe  have  taken  no 
part.  Even  if  Portugal  and  the  Brazils  had  remained  united," 
he  declared,  "  and  the  war  had  been  carried  on  by  their  joint 
arms  against  the  Argentine  Republic,  that  would  have  been 
far  from  presenting  the  case  which  the  message  contemplated."  40 
Ear  from  taking  sides  in  the  contest  the  United  States  wisely 
maintained  a  strict  neutrality,  insisting  upon  a  scrupulous  ob- 
servance of  the  rules  of  international  law  in  so  far  as  the  in- 
terests of  the  nation  were  concerned.  In  maintaining  this  posi- 
tion the  United  States  charge  d'affaires  at  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
Condy  Raguet,  unfortunately  brought  his  government  to  the 
verge  of  a  break  with  Brazil  and  destroyed  every  possibility  of 
its  serving  as  a  mediator  in  the  conflict.  The  source  of  difficulty 
was  the  unenforceable  blockade  which  Brazil  declared  of  all 
Argentine  and  Uruguayan  ports.  Against  the  legality  of  this 
blockade  Raguet  made  heated  and  injudicious  remonstrances, 
and  finally,  losing  his  temper,  demanded  his  passports.  They 
were  granted  and  he  returned  to  the  United  States.  Raguet  had, 
on  the  whole,  reason  and  law  on  his  side,  but  his  "  too  hasty  " 
proceedings  made  his  government  "  much  trouble  "  from  which 
it  could  "  derive  neither  credit  nor  profit."  Though  the  Cabinet 
concurred  in  the  opinion  that  his  conduct  had  been  "  deficient 
in  temper  and  discretion,"  the  President  declared  that  it  had 
been  "  dictated  by  an  honest  zeal  for  the  honor  and  interests 
of  his  country"  and  for  that  reason  did  not  disapprove  it.^1 
William  Tudor,  being  appointed  in  Raguet' s  stead,  represented 

*o  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  VT,  434. 

4i  Adams,  Memoirs,  VII,  270.  See  also  Manning,  An  Early  Diplomatic 
Controversy  between  the  U.  8.  and  Brazil,  in  Hispanic  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  I, 
143. 


462      PAST-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

the  nation  creditably;  but  unfortunately  causes  of  complaint 
continued  to  accumulate  as  long  as  the  war  continued. 

Meanwhile,  Great  Britain  took  advantage  of  the  opportunity 
to  strengthen  the  position  of  influence  which  she  so  much 
coveted  in  American  affairs.  Canning,  as  we  have  seen  above, 
was  particularly  interested  in  preventing  the  union  of  Spanish 
America  against  the  Brazilian  monarchy.  Discussing  more 
particularly  in  his  instructions  to  Lord  Ponsonby  the  question 
at  issue  between  Brazil  and  the  United  Provinces,  he  suggested 
that  Buenos  Aires  had  the  stronger  claim  to  Montevideo,  but 
that  if  it  were  transferred  to  the  Argentine  confederation,  it 
would  still  be  reasonable  "  to  secure  to  Brazil  an  uninterrupted 
enjoyment  of  the  navigation  of  the  River  Plate."  And  though 
"  on  the  general  principle  of  avoiding  as  much  as  possible  en- 
gagements of  this  character  "  the  British  Government  would  pre- 
fer to  stand  aside,  it  would  give  this  guaranty  "  if  it  were  de- 
sired by  both  parties.  .  .  .  rather  than  that  the  treaty  should 
not  be  concluded."  Great  Britain,  he  added,  "  while  scrupu- 
lously neutral  in  conduct "  during  the  war,  could  not  fail  to  be 
in  favor  of  the  belligerent  showing  the  readiest  disposition  to 
bring  the  dispute  to  a  "  friendly  termination."  In  a  secret  in- 
struction, Ponsonby  was  told  that  in  case  of  "  any  essential 
change  "  in  the  form  of  government  his  functions  would  be  sus- 
pended. Finally,  he  was  "  studiously  to  keep  aloof  from  all 
political  intrigues  and  all  contentions  of  party  in  Buenoa 
Aires."  Upon  this  point  Canning  again  insisted  in  November, 
1826,  when  he  wrote:  "As  to  taking  part  with  either  side  in 
the  contest,  your  Lordship  cannot  too  peremptorily  repress  any 
expectation  of  that  nature."  42 

Arriving  at  Buenos  Aires  after  the  war  had  broken  out,  Pon- 
sonby  was  unable  to  mediate  between  the  parties  to  the  conflict. 
Of  this  he  duly  informed  his  government.  "  There  is  much," 

*2  Temperley,  The  Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning.  In  Am. 
Hist.  Rev.,  XI,  784. 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE          463 

Canning  wrote,  "  of  the  Spanish  character  in  the  inhabitants  of 
the  colonial  establishments  of  Spain;  and  there  is  nothing  in 
the  Spanish  character  more  striking  than  its  impatience  of  for- 
eign advice,  and  its  suspicion  of  gratuitous  service."  In  his 
original  instructions,  Canning  declared,  it  was  foreseen  that 
the  suggestion  respecting  Montevideo  "  was  not  unlikely  to  ex- 
cite a  jealousy  of  some  design  favorable  to  British  interests. 
Such  a  jealousy,"  he  declared,  "  has  been  openly  inculcated  by 
the  public  press  of  the  United  States  of  North  America,  and  no 
doubt  secretly  by  their  diplomatic  agents."  He  advised  Pon- 
sonby,  therefore,  "  to  let  that  matter  drop  entirely,"  unless 
Buenos  Aires  itself  should  raise  it.  The  best  chance  to  suggest 
their  doing  so,  he  added,  would  be  by  "  some  slight  manifesta- 
tion of  resentment  at  any  such  misconstruction  of  motives." 
Canning's  last  instruction  to  Ponsonby  on  this  subject  was  in 
February,  1827.  He  then  wrote  that  Gordon,  the  new  British 
minister  at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  would  "  press  the  many  consider- 
ations which  render  peace  essential  to  the  interests  and  safety 
of  Brazil.  .  .  .  with  all  the  means  in  his  power  short  of  that 
degree  of  importunity  which,  after  the  repeated  refusal,  would 
become  derogatory  to  the  dignity  of  Great  Britain."  43 

On  May  24,  1827,  there  was  concluded  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  a 
preliminary  treaty  of  peace.  Under  this  treaty  the  United 
Provinces  acknowledged  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the 
empire  of  Brazil  and  renounced  all  rights  to  the  territory  of  the 
Cisplatine  Province.  The  Emperor  of  Brazil  equally  acknowl- 
edged the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  United  Provinces. 
Article  VIII  of  the  treaty  was  as  follows :  "  For  the  purpose 
of  securing  in  the  best  manner  the  benefits  of  peace  and  to 
avoid  temporarily  all  distrust,  until  the  relations  which  ought 
naturally  to  subsist  between  the  two  contracting  states  be  es- 
tablished, their  governments  agree  to  solicit,  jointly  or  separ- 
ately, their  great  and  powerful  friend,  the  King  of  Great 

id.,  785. 


464      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Britain  (Sovereign  Mediator  for  the  establishment  of  this 
peace)  that  he  will  please  to  guarantee  to  them,  for  the  space 
of  fifteen  years,  the  free  navigation  of  the  River  Plate."  44 

This  document  the  government  at  Buenos  Aires  refused  to 
ratify,  on  the  ground  that  the  Argentine  commissioner  had  ex- 
ceeded his  instructions.  The  war  continued,  and  not  until 
August,  27,  1828,  was  a  treaty  concluded  which  finally  brought 
it  to  an  end.  The  two  governments,  desirous  "  of  establishing 
upon  solid  and  lasting  principles  that  good  intelligence,  har- 
mony and  friendship  which  ought  to  exist  between  neighboring 
nations,  who  are  called  by  their  interests  to  live  united  by  the 
bonds  of  perpetual  alliance,"  agreed,  again  through  the  media- 
tion of  Great  Britain,  to  settle  forever  their  differences.  Under 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  both  parties  renounced  all  claim  to  the 
territory  of  the  Cisplatine  Province,  with  a  view  to  its  estab- 
lishment as  an  independent  state,  and  bound  themselves  to  de- 
fend its  independence  and  integrity,  until  it  should  be  duly  con- 
stituted and  for  five  years  thereafter.  It,. was  also  stipulated 
that  should  questions  be  raised  in  the  definitive  treaty  of  peace 
upon  which,  notwithstanding  British  mediation,  they  might  not 
agree,  hostilities  between  the  republic  and  the  empire  should  not 
recommence  until  after  the  five  years  of  the  guaranty  should 
have  elapsed,  nor  should  they  then  be  renewed  without  a  previ- 
ous notice  of  six  months  being  given,  reciprocally,  with  the 
knowledge  of  the  mediating  power.46  To  this  compromise,  set- 
ting up  the  Banda  Oriental  as  an  independent  state,  Brazil  was 
driven  to  agree  by  the  military  success  of  the  Argentine  and 
Uruguayan  forces,  and  doubtless  also  by  the  mediating  influence 
of  Great  Britain.  Buenos  Aires  had  never  been  strongly  in- 
clined to  bring  the  territory  into  the  Argentine  Confederation 
by  force,  and  when,  as  the  war  progressed,  the  Uruguayans  be- 
gan to  manifest  a  strong  spirit  of  nationality,  it  wisely  re- 

**  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIV,  1027-1031. 

«  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XV,  935-943.  This  treaty  remained 
in  force  until  1856,  when  a  definitive  treaty  of  peace,  friendship,  com- 
merce, and  navigation  was  concluded  between  the  two  countries. 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE          465 

linquished  its  claims.  Thus  the  republic  of  Uruguay  came  into 
being. 

In  view  of  the  circumstances  which  have  here  been  related, 
it  is  not  surprising  that  Brazil  was  not  represented  at  the 
Congress  of  Panama.  Before  the  question  of  the  Banda  Orien- 
tal became  acute,  the  government  of  Colombia  invited  the  em- 
pire, however,  to  participate  in  the  congress.  The  invitation 
was  sent  through  the  Brazilian  minister  at  London,  who  replied 
on  October  25,  1825.  "  The  policy  of  the  emperor,"  he  said, 
"  is  so  generous  and  benevolent  that  he  will  always  be  ready  to 
contribute  to  the  repose,  the  happiness  and  the  glory  of  Amer- 
ica." And  he  added  that  as  soon  as  the  negotiations  relative 
to  the  recognition  of  the  empire  should  be  honorably  terminated, 
a  minister  plenipotentiary  would  be  appointed  to  take  part  in 
the  deliberations  of  general  interest  that  would  be  compatible 
with  the  strict  neutrality  which  the  empire  had  observed  be- 
tween the  belligerent  states  of  America  and  Spain.  In  Janu- 
ary, 1826,  Theodoro  Jose  Brancardi,  chief  clerk  of  the  Home  De- 
partment, was  appointed  "  plenipotentiary  "  to  the  congress ;  46 
but  as  war  had  then  begun  with  the  United  Provinces,  the  inten- 
tion doubtless  was  no  other  than  to  have  an  observer  at  the 
Isthmus  in  case  the  Buenos  Aires  representative  should  attend. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  representative  of  neither  government  was 
ever  dispatched  to  the  place  of  meeting. 

In  Chile  the  scheme  of  continental  confederation  was  viewed 
at  first  with  less  suspicion  than  in  Buenos  Aires;  but  distrust 
grew  as  a  result  of  certain  acts  and  declarations  of  the  Liberator 
which  were  believed  to  imply  a  spirit  of  supremacy  contemptu- 
ous of  the  other  states.47  In  replying  to  the  invitation  to  send 
delegates  to  the  congress,  Chile  dissembled  these  feelings  and 
approved  the  idea  of  confederation.  But  the  Chilean  congress 
which  met  in  1825,  whose  approval  was  necessary,  dissolved 
without  taking  action,  and  there  the  matter  rested.  Early  the 

46  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIII,  497. 

47  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XV,  87-93. 


466      PAN-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

next  year  the  government  received  communications  from  the 
Colombian  and  Peruvian  delegates  at  Panama,  urging  that  rep- 
resentatives be  sent  to  the  Isthmus  at  once.  The  Chilean  Minis- 
ter of  Foreign  Affairs,  Blanco  Encalada,  replied  that  while  his 
government  recognized  the  importance  and  the  utility  of  the 
congress,  it  was  impossible  to  send  delegates  without  the  ap- 
proval of  the  national  legislature,  which  was  expected  soon  to 
convene.  On  July  4  this  body  met  at  Santiago,  but  the  ques- 
tion of  representation  at  Panama  was  not  brought  up  until  some 
six  weeks  later.  In  September  the  committee,  to  whom  the 
matter  had  been  referred,  reported,  maintaining  that  the  pacts 
of  "  union,  league,  and  confederation  which  might  be  concluded 
should  not  in  any  way  interrupt  the  exercise  of  the  national 
sovereignty  of  each  of  the  contracting  parties/'  This  commit- 
tee pointed  out  also  the  danger  that  "  some  state  or  its  head, 
taking  advantage  of  its  influence  over  the  majority  of  the  pleni- 
potentiaries, might  arrogate  to  itself  over  the  rest  prerogatives 
and  rights  which  might  be  irresistible  when  supported  by  the 
force  of  the  whole  confederation."  It  was  desired,  therefore, 
that  the  Chilean  delegates  should  be  instructed  to  safeguard  the 
absolute  sovereignty  of  the  nation.  The  report  was  approved, 
and  in  November  Jose  Miguel  Infante  and  Joaquin  Campino 
were  appointed  as  delegates  to  the  congress  and  given  instruc- 
tions in  accordance  with  the  desires  of  the  national  legislature. 
Not  even  then,  however,  were  funds  voted  for  the  expenses  of 
the  mission.  In  the  meantime  the  congress  had  assembled  at 
Panama  and  adjourned  to  reconvene  at  Tacubaya. 

Though  the  government  of  Chile  put  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
the  formation  of  an  American  league  under  the  inspiration  of 
Bolivar,  it  was  favorably  inclined  to  the  idea  of  alliances  in  the 
form  advocated  by  the  government  of  the  United  Provinces  of 
Rio  de  la  Plata.  While  the  question  of  the  Panama  Congress 
was  being  agitated  at  Santiago,  in  fact,  a  treaty  of  alliance  was 
negotiated  with  Buenos  Aires.  This  pact  consisted  of  two 
parts,  the  first  stipulating  the  terms  of  alliance,  and  the  second 


ARGENTINA,  BRAZIL,  AND  CHILE  467 

relating  to  matters  of  commerce  and  navigation.  By  the  terms 
of  the  alliance  the  contracting  parties  bound  themselves  "  to 
guarantee  the  integrity  of  their  territories,  and  to  cooperate 
against  whatever  foreign  power  should  attempt  to  alter,  by 
force,  their  respective  boundaries,  as  recognized  before  their 
emancipation  or  subsequently  in  virtue  of  special  treaties." 
They  also  bound  themselves  not  to  conclude  treaties  with  the 
Spanish  Government  until  the  independence  of  all  the  states 
formerly  Spanish  should  be  recognized  by  the  mother  country. 
It  was  further  agreed  that  in  respect  of  the  alliance  the  cooper- 
ation of  the  contracting  parties  should  be  regulated  conform- 
ably to  their  respective  circumstances  and  resources.48  Upon 
the  interpretation  of  this  latter  provision  there  arose  a  lengthy 
discussion  in  the  Chilean  congress,  which  resulted  finally  in  the 
rejection  of  the  treaty.  Under  the  existing  circumstances,  when 
no  part  of  the  territorial  domain  of  Chile  was  in  dispute,  and 
when  on  the  other  hand  the  United  Provinces  were  engaged  in 
a  war  with  Brazil  to  recover  the  Banda  Oriental  and  were  main- 
taining rights  over  Upper  Peru  and  Paraguay,  it  was  thought 
that  the  terms  of  the  treaty  involved  Chile  in  a  grave  promise 
without  possible  reciprocity.49  Although  public  opinion  had 
been  openly  expressed  in  favor  of  Buenos  Aires  as  against 
Brazil,  yet  it  was  realized  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  Chile 
to  take  part  in  the  struggle.  Hence  the  caution  in  declining 
to  ratify  a  document  generally  expressive  of  the  strong  friend- 
ship and  hearty  cooperation  which  had  always  characterized  the 
relations  of  the  two  countries. 

48  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  XIV,  968-73. 

49  Barros  Arana,  Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile,  XV,  95. 


BIBLIOGEAPHY 

THIS  study  is  based  almost  wholly  upon  printed  sources. 
The  newspapers  and  periodicals  included  in  the  list  below  have 
been  consulted  in  the  library  of  the  Hispanic  Society  of  Amer- 
ica, in  the  New  York  Public  Library,  and  in  the  Library  of 
Congress.  Of  papers  published  in  Spanish  America  between 
1809  and  1830,  none  covers  both  decades,  and  none  of  the  col- 
lections is  complete  for  the  period  of  publication,  however  brief 
that  may  have  been.  The  dates  set  opposite  each  title  should 
be  understood,  therefore,  merely  to  signify  the  years  for  which 
these  incomplete  collections  were  available.  This  limitation, 
however,  does  not  apply  to  the  other  newspapers  and  periodi- 
cals in  the  list. 

Among  the  books  and  pamphlets  are  included  a  few  bound 
volumes  originally  published  in  periodical  form.  Here  are  also 
included,  for  ready  reference,  under  the  authors'  names,  a  num- 
ber of  useful  articles  appearing  in  periodical  publications. 
Owing  to  the  difficulty  of  tracing  a  clear  line  of  demarcation 
between  the  secondary  works  and  the  sources,  both  classes  of 
material  have  been  included  in  a  single  alphabetical  list.  The 
bibliography  does  not  pretend  to  be  exhaustive. 

NEWSPAPERS  AND  PERIODICALS 

La  Abeja  Argentina,  1823. 

Aguila  Mexicana,  1824-1828. 

The  American  Historical  Review,  1895 — 

The  American  Journal  of  International  Law,  1907 — 

Anglo-Colombiano  (changed  to  El  Venezolano),  1822-1823. 

The   Annals   of   the    American    Academy    of   Political    and    Social 

Science,  1890— 

El  Centinela  (Buenos  Aires),  1822-1823. 
La  Concordia  Cubana,  1823-1824. 
Correo  del  Kagdalena,  1826. 

468 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  469 

/Cuba  Contemporanea,  1913 — 

VDiario  de  Documentos  del  Gobierno  (Chile),  1825-1827. 

The  Examiner  (London),  1824. 

Gaceta  de  Colombia,  1822-1827. 

Gaceta  del  Gobierno  (Peru),  1825-1826. 

Gaceta  del  Gobierno  Supremo  de  Guatemala,  1824-1825. 

The  Hispanic  American  Historical  Review,  1918 — 

Iris  de  Venezuela,  1822-1823. 

El  Nacional  (Buenos  Aires),  1824-1826. 

National  Gazette  and  Literary  Register  (Philadelphia),  1821-1830. 

National  Intelligencer  (Washington),  1810-1830. 

Niles'  Weekly  Register  (Baltimore),  1814-1830. 

North  American  Review,  1815 — 

The  Pan  American  Union  Bulletin,  1890— 

El  Patriota  Chileno,  1826. 

El  Patriota  de  Guayaquil,  1821-1825. 

Political  Science  Quarterly  (New  York),  1886 — 

Ileforma  Social  (Habana,  New  York),  1914 — 

Revista  Argentina  de  Ciencias  Politicas,  1910 — 

Revue  Generale  de  Droit  International  Public  (Paris),  1894 — 

El  Sol  (Mexico),  1821-1825. 

The  Times  (London),  1810-1830. 

Weekly  Register,  later  Niles'  Weekly  Register  (Baltimore),  1811-1814. 

BOOKS  AND  PAMPHLETS 

Abranches,  Dunshee  de.     Brazil  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     Rio  de 

Janeiro,  1915.     72  p. 
Adams,  Ephraim  Douglas.     British  interests  and  activities  in  Texas. 

Baltimore,  1910.     267  p. 
Adams,  Henry.     History  of  the  United  States  of  America,  1801-1817. 

New  York,  1889-1891.     9  vols. 
Adams,    John.     The    Works    of    John    Adams.     Boston,    1850-1856. 

10  vols. 
Adams,  John  Quincy.     Memoirs;  comprising  portions  of  his  diary 

from  1795  to  1848.     Philadelphia,  1874-1877.     12  vols. 
Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams;  edited  by  W.  C.  Ford.     New 

York,  1913.     7  vols.     Other  volumes  to  follow.     Those  published 

cover  the  period  from  1779  to  1823. 
Alaman,  Lucas.     Memoria  Presentada  a  las  dos  Camaras  del  Con- 

greso  General  de  la  Federacion,  por  el  Secretario  de  Estado  y 

del  Despacho  de  Relaciones  Exteriores  e  Interiores,  al  abrirse  las 

sesiones  del  ano  de  1825.     51  p. 

Historia  de  Mejico.     Mexico,  1849-1852.     5  vols. 

Alberdi,  Juan  Bautista.     El  Imperio  del  Brasil  ante  la  Democracia  de 

America.    Paris,  1869.    432  p. 


470      PAN-AMEBICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Organizacion  de  la  Confederacion  Argentina.  Nueva  Edicion 

con  un  estudio  preliminar  sobre  las  ideas  politicas  de  Alberdi  por 
Adolfo  Posada.  Buenos  Aires,  1913.  2  vols. 

Alvarez,  Alejandro.  American  Problems  in  International  Law.  Re- 
printed from  the  Journal  and  Proceedings  of  the  American  So- 
ciety of  International  Law.  New  York,  1909.  102  p. 

La  codification  du  droit  international;  ses  tendances,  ses  bases. 

Paris,  1912.  294  p. 

La  Diplomacia  de  Chile  durante  la  Emancipacion  y  la  Sociedad 

Internacional  Americana.  Madrid,  1915.  274  p. 

Le  Droit  International  Americain;  son  fondement,  sa  nature; 

d'apres  1'histoire  diplomatique  des  etats  du  Nouveau  Monde  et 
leur  vie  politique  et  economique.  Paris,  1910.  386  p. 

La  Solidaridad  Americana.  (In :  Revista  Argentina  de  Ciencias 

Politicas.  Tomo  I,  159-168  p.  8  vo.)  Buenos  Aires,  1910. 

American  Annual  Register.     New  York,  1825-1833.     8  vols. 

American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations.  Washington,  1832-1854. 
6  vols. 

American  State  Papers;  Naval  Affairs.  Washington,  1834-1861. 
4  vols. 

Americus.     Cartas  Politicas,  London,  1825.     2  vols. 

Amunategui,  Miguel  Luis.     Santiago  de  Chile,  1893.    4  vols. 

La  Cronica  de  1810.     Santiago  de  Chile,  1911-1912.     3  vols. 

La  Dictadura  de  O'Higgins.     Santiago  de  Chile,  1914.     463  p. 

Ensayos  Biograficos.     Santiago  de  Chile,  1893-1896.    4  vols. 

Vida  de  Don  Andres  Bello.     Santiago  de  Chile,  1882.     672  p. 

Amunategui,  Miguel  Luis  and  Gregorio  Victor.  La  Reconquista  Es- 
panola.  Santiago  de  Chile,  1912.  512  p. 

Antokoletz,  Daniel.  La  Doctrine  de  Monroe  et  TAmerique  latine. 
Paris,  1905.  208  p. 

Histoire  de  la  Diplomatic  Argentine.  Buenos  Aires,  1914. 

528  p. 

Apuntes  para  la  Biografia  del  Exmo.  Sr.  D.  Lucas  Alaman,  Secre- 
tario  de  Estado  y  del  Despacho  de  Relaciones  Exteriores.  Mex- 
ico, 1854.  56  p. 

Aranda,  Ricardo.  Coleccion  de  los  Tratados,  Convenciones,  Capitu- 
laciones,  Armisticios  y  otros  Actos  Diplomaticos  y  PoHticos  cele- 
brados  desde  la  independencia  hasta  el  dia.  Lima,  1890.  16  vols. 

Arcaya,  PeHro  M.  Personajes  y  Hechos  de  la  Historia  de  Venezuela. 
Caracas,  1911.  346  p. 

Arcos,  Santiago.    La  Plata.    Etude  Historique.    Paris,  1865.    588  p. 

Annitage,  John.  The  History  of  Brazil.  From  the  period  of  the 
arrival  of  the  Braganza  family  in  1808  to  the  abdication  of  Dom 
Pedro  the  First  in  1831.  London,  1836.  2  vols. 

Arosemena,  Justo.  Constituci6nes  Politicas  de  la  America  Meri- 
dional. Havre,  1870.  2  vols. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  471 

Estudios   Constitucionales   sobre  los  Gobiernos   de  la   America 

Latina.    Paris,  1878.     2  vols. 

Bagot,  Josceline.  George  Canning  and  his  Friends.  London,  1909. 
2  vols. 

Bancroft,  H.  H.  The  Works  of  Hubert  Howe  Bancroft.  Vol.  8,  His- 
tory of  Central  America,  1801-1887 ;  Vols.  12  and  13,  History  of 
Mexico,  1803-1861.  San  Francisco,  1885-1887. 

Baralt,  Rafael  Maria,  y  Diaz,  Ramon.  Resumen  de  la  Historia  de 
Venezuela  desde  el  ano  1797  hasta  el  de  1830.  Paris,  1841. 
2  vols. 

Barros  Arana,  Diego.  Compendio  de  Historia  de  America.  Buenos 
Aires,  1904.  557  p. 

Historia  Jeneral  de  Chile.     Santiago,  1884-1902.     16  vols. 

Benedetti,  Carlos.     Historia  de  Colombia.     Lima,  1887.     961  p. 

Beneski,  Charles  de.  A  Narrative  of  the  last  moments  of  the  life  of 
Don  Agustin  de  Iturbide,  ex-emperor  of  Mexico.  New  York, 
1825.  41  p. 

Benton,  Elbert  Jay.  International  Law  and  Diplomacy  of  the  Span- 
ish-American War.  Baltimore,  1908.  300  p. 

Benton,  Thomas  Hart.  Thirty  Years'  View.  New  York,  1861-62.  2 
vols. 

Bemis,  George.  American  Neutrality;  Its  honorable  past,  its  expe- 
dient future.  Boston,  1866.  211  p. 

Bigelow,  John.  American  policy;  the  Western  Hemisphere  in  its 
relation  to  the  Eastern.  New  York,  1914.  184  p. 

Biografia  del  Libertador  Simon  Bolivar,  o  la  Independencia  de  la 
America  del  Sud.  Resena  Historico-Biografica  por  L.  C.  Paris 
and  Mexico,  1877.  180  p. 

Blaine,  James  G.  Foreign  policy  of  the  Garfield  Administration. 
Peace  Congress  of  the  two  Americas.  Chicago,  1882.  8  p.  (An 
article  published  in  the  Chicago  Weekly  Magazine,  September  16, 
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Blanco-Fombona,  R.  (editor).  Simon  Bolivar;  Discursos  y  Proc- 
lamas.  Paris.  302  p. 

Cartas  de  Bolivar,  1799  a  1822;  prologo  de  Jose  Enrique  Rodo 

y  notas  de  R.  Blanco-Fombona.    Paris.     459  p. 

Blanco,  J.  F.  and  Azpuriia,  R.  (editors).  Documentos  para  la  His- 
toria de  la  vida  publica  del  Libertador  de  Colombia,  Peru  y  Bo- 
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Blanco  White,  Joseph.  Variedades ;  Mensajero  de  Londres.  London, 
1825.  2  vols. 

Bocanegra,  Jose  Maria.  Memorias  para  la  Historia  de  Mexico  Inde- 
pendiente.  Mexico,  1892.  2  vols. 

Bonnycastle,  R.  H.  Spanish  America;  or  a  descriptive,  historical, 
and  geographical  account  of  the  dominions  of  Spain  in  the  West- 
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472      PAST-AMERICANISM:  ITS  BEGINNINGS 

Brackenridge,  Henry  W.  South  America,  a  letter  on  the  present  state 
of  that  country,  to  James  Monroe.  Washington,  1817. 

British  and  Foreign  State  Papers.     1812-1829.     Vols.  1-16  inclusive. 

Bulnes,  Francisco.  La  Guerra  de  Independencia.  Hidalgo-Iturbide. 
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Argentine.    V.  II.    483-500  p.) 


INDEX 


Aberdeen,  Lord:  reply  of,  to  Co- 
lombia on  establishment  of  mon- 
archy, 123. 

Abreu,  Manuel:  Spanish  agent  to 
Peru,  52. 

Adams,  John:  maintains  neutral 
policy,  138;  on  the  independence 
of  Santo  Domingo,  140  j  prevents 
war  with  France,  266. 

Adams,  John  Quincy:  his  apprecia- 
tion of  Colombia,  39;  advocate  of 
system  of  neutrality,  157;  excep- 
tional preparation  for  office  of 
Secretary  of  State,  157;  calls  at- 
tention to  European  hostility  to 
United  States,  158;  states  prin- 
ciples of  recognition,  164;  on  the 
sympathy  of  United  States  for 
Patriot  cause,  172;  displeasure 
of,  at  violations  of  neutrality, 
174;  instructions  of,  to  Ander- 
son, 297;  views  of,  on  Panama 
Congress,  315;  nominates  dele- 
gates to  Panama  Congress,  395; 
letter  of,  to  Rodney,  400;  to  An- 
derson, 401;  attitude  of,  toward 
Hispanic  America,  403;  article 
attributed  to,  in  National  Intelli- 
gencer, 406;  accommodation  of 
views  to  those  of  Clay,  408; 
states  principles  of  relations  with 
Hispanic  countries,  409. 

A  guild  Hexicana:  prints  first  news 
of  Monroe  declaration,  225. 

Aguirre,  Manuel  H.  de:  mission  of, 
to  United  States,  180;  arrest  of, 
181 


Allen,  Heman:  minister  to  Chile, 
170;  reception  of,  at  Santiago, 
261. 

Alliance:  of  American  States,  pro- 
posed by  Wilkinson,  271;  of  new 
states  with  Great  Britain,  dis- 
cussed, 386;  attitude  of  Great 
Britain  toward,  386;  offensive 
and  defensive,  proposed  against 
Brazil,  441;  defensive,  between 
Buenos  Aires  and  Colombia, 
450. 

Alvarez,  Alejandro:  views  of,  on 
Pan- Americanism,  16;  on  equal- 
ity of  states,  29. 

Alvarez  de  Toledo,  Jose":  mentioned, 
147;  revolutionary  activities  of, 
in  United  States,  148;  name  of, 
connected  with  Amelia  Island 
affair,  190. 

Alvear,  Carlos:  becomes  director  of 
United  Provinces,  85;  sent  on 
mission  to  negotiate  with  Bolivar, 
440. 

Ambrister:    mentioned,   191. 

Amelia  Island:  mentioned,  163; 
suppression  of  insurgent  estab- 
lishment on,  183;  revolutionary 
governments  disclaim  connection 
with,  184;  suppression  discussed 
in  Correo  del  Orinoco,  194. 

American  System:  Moore's  view, 
31;  Correa's  plan,  178;  refer- 
ence of  Tornel  to,  229;  place  of 
United  States  in,  discussed,  400; 
Clay's  advocacy  of,  403. 

"Americus":   see  Maciel  da  Costa. 


Aix-la-Chapelle :     Congress    of,    dis-      Amphictyonic  body:   proposed,  292; 
cusses     arrangement     between          to  sit  at  Habana,  304. 

Anderson,  Richard  C.:  dispatch  of, 
on  reception  of  Monroe  declara- 
tion, 244;  minister  to  assembly 
at  Panama,  314,  395,  397. 


Spain  and  her  colonies,  216. 

Alaman,  Lucas:  biographical  notice 
of,  227;  report  of,  on  interna- 
tional situation,  228. 

Alberdi,  Juan  Bautista:  on  Argen- 
tine foreign  policy,  257. 


487 


Angostura,    Congress   of:    addressed 
by    Bolivar,    102;    adopts    consti- 


488 


INDEX 


tution  creating  Republic  of  Co- 
lombia, 104. 

Arbitration:  provision  for,  in 
treaty  concluded  at  Panama,  242, 
341. 

Arbuthnot:   mentioned,   191. 

Arce,  Juan  Manuel:  mission  of,  to 
United  States,  77;  elected  presi- 
dent of  Central  American  repub- 
lic, 79. 

Arequipa:  proposed  as  capital  of 
one  of  divisions  of  Peru,  108. 

Argentina:  reception  of  Monroe  dec- 
laration in,  254;  opposed  to 
schemes  of  political  union,  284; 
contribution  of,  to  general  cause 
of  independence,  285;  interna- 
tional situation  in,  434,  464. 
See  also  Buenos  Aires  and  United 
Provinces  of  Rio  de  la  Plata. 

Argentine  Government :  entente 
cordiale  with  Chile,  435. 

Argentine  Republic:  see  Buenos 
Aires  and  United  Provinces  of  Rio 
de  la  Plata. 

Army:  convention  relating  to,  con- 
cluded at  Panama,  343. 

Artigas,  Jose":  privateering  enter- 
prises of,  178;  leader  of  Uru- 
guayan forces,  455. 

Assembly  of  plenipotentiaries:  pro- 
posed, 292;  treaty  provision  for, 
294;  designs  of,  contrasted  with 
those  of  Holy  Alliance,  303.  See 
Panama  Congress. 

Aury,  Luis :  "  Commodore  "  of  com- 
bined insurgent  fleet,  151;  not 
agent  of  Bolivar,  187. 

Ayacucho:   victory  of,  37. 


Bagot:  declines  to  intermeddle  in 
Amelia  Island  affair,  192. 

Balance  of  Power:  absence  of,  in 
American  system,  6,  21;  as  a  step 
toward  international  government, 
32;  of  the  world  suggested,  288. 

Baltimore:  becomes  center  of  illicit 
privateering,  174. 

Banda  Oriental:  votes  to  join 
Buenos  Aires,  459.  See  Uruguay. 


Barataria:  base  of  operations  for 
pirates,  151,  152. 

Barros  Arana:  on  Poinsett's  mis- 
sion, 143. 

Battle  y  Ordonez:  views  of,  on  Pan- 
Americanism,  14. 

Belgrano,  Manuel:  mission  of,  to 
Europe,  84;  arrives  in  England, 
86;  negotiations  with  Charles  IV, 
87;  returns  to  Buenos  Aires,  89; 
proposes  resuscitation  of  Inca 
Empire,  89;  said  to  favor  mon- 
archy, 93. 

Bello,  Andre's:  mission  of,  to  Eng- 
land, 286. 

Benton,  Elbert  J.:  on  international 
status  of  Cuba,  24. 

Biddle,  Captain:  takes  issue  with 
Lord  Cochrane  on  salutes,  210. 

Bland,  Theodorick:  commissioner  to 
South  America,  160;  relations 
with  the  Carreras,  176. 

Elaine,  James  G.:  speech  of,  before 
Pan-American  Conference  at 
Washington,  4. 

Blockade:  of  coast  of  Peru,  210; 
United  Provinces  and  Uruguay, 
461. 

Bocanegra,  Jose*  Maria:  on  British 
recognition,  230. 

Bolivar,  Simon:  interview  of,  with 
San  Martin,  55;  takes  command 
in  Peru,  59;  political  plans  of, 
60;  returns  to  Colombia,  61; 
"  prophetic  letter "  of,  99 ;  sug- 
gests government  of  England  as 
model,  101 ;  opinion  of  government 
of  United  States,  102;  address 
to  Congress  of  Angostura,  102; 
Bolivian  constitution,  105;  pro- 
poses federation  of  Colombia, 
Peru  and  Bolivia,  107;  reply  of, 
to  Paez's  "Napoleonic"  proposal, 
109;  expressions  of,  on  monarchy 
in  1823,  110;  in  1824,  111;  con- 
versation of,  with  Captain  Mai- 
ling, 111;  conference  with  Cap- 
tain Rosamel,  114;  remarks  to 
Sutherland,  115;  quits  Peru,  ll.r>; 
attitude  of,  toward  rebellion  in 
Colombia,  118;  opposition  of  San- 


INDEX 


489 


tander  to,  119;  resumes  the  chief 
magistracy  as  dictator,  120;  at- 
tempt to  assassinate,  120;  sug- 
gests placing  Colombia  under  pro- 
tection of  Great  Britain,  121 ;  dis- 
approves steps  taken  by  Council 
of  Ministers  to  establish  mon- 
archy, 124;  supposed  instructions 
of,  to  Demarquet,  125;  resigns, 
127;  dies  near  Santa  Marta,  127; 
summary  of  political  views,  127; 
supposed  relations  of,  with 
Amelia  Island  affair,  185,  193; 
break  of,  with  Santander,  240;  on 
Monroe  declaration,  248;  plans 
of,  relative  to  Brazil,  251;  first 
utterances  on  American  Union, 
286;  conception  of  world  balance 
of  power,  288;  letter  to  Pueyrre- 
d6n,  290;  takes  first  definite 
steps  to  organize  a  league,  291; 
revives  project  for  holding  Ameri- 
can Assembly,  312;  views  on, 
316;  influence  of,  in  Bolivia,  330; 
on  situation  in  Peru,  339;  op- 
posed to  ratification  of  Panama 
conventions,  347;  rumored  plans 
of,  respecting  Cuba,  360;  sup- 
porter of  Canning's  policies  in 
America,  378;  seeks  British  pro- 
tection, 379;  memorandum  on 
alliance  with  Great  Britain,  387; 
attitude  toward  United  States, 
393,  429;  view  of  Gil  Fortoul, 
429;  of  Vargas,  430;  of  L6pez, 
430;  of  author,  431;  supremacy 
of,  in  Peru,  439;  desire  of,  to  in- 
tervene in  dispute  between  Buenos 
Aires  and  Brazil,  440;  declines  of- 
fensive alliance  with  Buenos  Aires, 
442;  project  of,  for  invading  Par- 
aguay, 444;  return  of,  to  Lima, 
447;  loses  hope  of  union,  448. 

Bolivarian  republics:  reception  of 
Monroe  declaration  in,  239. 

Bolivia:  independence  of,  41;  pro- 
posed federation  with  Peru  and 
Colombia,  106;  appoints  delegates 
to  Panama  Congress,  330;  in- 
structions, 331;  negotiations  of, 
with  Buenos  Aires,  439. 


Bolivian  Constitution :  discussed, 
105;  proclaimed  in  Peru,  117; 
opposition  to,  in  Colombia, 
119. 

Bonaparte,  Joseph :  placed  on 
throne  of  Spain,  36;  proposal  to 
place  at  head  of  great  His- 
pano-American  Confederation, 
91. 

Bonpland:  held  by  Francia  as  spy, 
444;  Bolivar's  scheme  to  liberate, 
445. 

Boyer,  Jean  Pierre;  unites  Haiti 
under  one  government,  38. 

Brackenridge,  Henry  M.:  Secretary 
to  the  mission  to  South  America, 
160. 

Brancardi,  Theodore  Jose":  Brazil- 
ian delegate  to  Panama,  465. 

Brazil:  declares  independence,  36; 
recognized  by  United  States,  170; 
protests  against  privateering, 
178;  strained  relations  with 
United  States,  179;  position  of, 
in  1824,  with  regard  to  European 
powers,  250;  with  regard  to 
neighbors,  251;  seeks  recognition 
of  United  States,  252;  proposes 
definition  of  Monroe  Doctrine, 
253;  replies  to  Argentine  de- 
mands, 457;  war  with  United 
Provinces,  455-464;  Panama  Con- 
gress, 465. 

Bricefio  M6ndez,  Pedro:  Colombian 
delegate  to  Panama  Congress, 
319;  instructions  to,  325,  326, 
329;  return  of,  to  Colombia,  346; 
views  of,  as  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico,  355,  364;  on  Dawkins'  mis- 
sion, 372-376. 

Bucaramanga:    mentioned,    120. 

Buenos  Aires:  revolt  of,  40;  repre- 
sents the  other  provinces  in  for- 
eign relations,  41;  recognized  by 
United  States,  170;  remonstrates 
with  Chile,  205;  reception  of 
Monroe  declaration  at,  254;  pro- 
poses territorial  guarantee,  255; 
preliminary  treaty  of,  with  Spain, 
257;  dispatches  agents  to  Chile, 
Peru,  and  Colombia,  258;  dis- 


490 


INDEX 


putes  leadership  of  Colombia, 
258;  not  inclined  to  accept  non- 
intervention principle,  259;  oppo- 
sition of,  to  American  league, 
302;  press  of,  against  plan  of 
confederation,  452;  treaty  of  al- 
liance with  Chile,  466;  aims  of, 
in  Peru,  435;  negotiations  with 
Spain,  438;  peace  plan  of,  a  fail- 
ure, 439 ;  public  sentiment  of,  hos- 
tile to  Bolivar,  442. 

Callao:  fortress  of,  surrendered,  37. 

Canada:  included  in  idea  of  Amer- 
ican solidarity,  272. 

Canal,  Interoceanic :  discussed  in 
Clay's  instructions,  421. 

Cafias,  Antonio  Jose":  received  as 
diplomatic  representative  of  Cen- 
tral America,  170. 

Canning,  George:  declaration  of,  on 
American  affairs,  217;  sounds 
Rush,  218;  interview  of,  with 
Polignac,  219;  fame  of,  in  Amer- 
ica, 230;  pompous  language  of, 
232 ;  favorable  to  transfer  of  Cuba 
to  Mexico,  363;  instructions  to 
Dawkins,  365;  American  policy 
of,  supported  by  Bolivar,  378;  de- 
sires harmony  among  American 
states,  391;  policy  in  war  over 
Banda  Oriental,  462. 

Carrera,  Jos6  Miguel:  welcomes 
Poinsett,  144;  mentioned,  207. 

Carrera,  Luis:  visits  the  Essex,  207. 

Casa  Yrujo:    dismissal  of,   146. 

Casasus,  Joaqufn  D. :  on  Pan- 
American  Conferences,  1 1 . 

Castlereagh,  Lord:  mentioned,  166; 
on  attitude  of  Great  Britain  to- 
ward conflict  between  Spain  and 
her  colonies,  168;  declarations  of, 
as  to  Florida,  191. 

Censors:  provision  for,  in  Angos- 
tura project  rejected,  104; 
adopted  in  Bolivian  constitution, 
106. 

Central  America:  little  contact  of, 
with  South  America,  61;  forma- 
tion of  republic,  78;  recognition 
of,  by  United  States,  170;  recep- 


tion of  Monroe  declaration  in, 
235;  treaty  of,  with  Colombia, 
301;  failure  of,  to  ratify  Panama 
conventions,  348;  invites  United 
States  to  Panama  Congress,  394; 
seeks  aid  of  United  States  in 
building  canal,  423. 

Chacabuco:  battle  of,  42. 

Charles  IV:  negotiations  of  Argen- 
tine agents  with,  87;  renounces 
throne  in  favor  of  Ferdinand,  88. 

Chiapas:  province  of,  joins  Mexico, 
73;  dispute  over,  424. 

Chile:  independence  of,  41;  O'Hig- 
gins  made  Supreme  Director,  43; 
constitution  of,  44-47 ;  Freire  as 
Supreme  Director,  45 ;  treaty  with 
United  Provinces,  49;  little  in- 
clined toward  monarchical  sys- 
tem, 96;  welcomes  Poinsett,  144; 
recognized  by  United  States,  170; 
neutrality  of,  in  war  of  1812, 
205;  pays  Macedonian  claims, 
211;  declines  to  join  Buenos 
Aires  in  treaty  with  Spain,  258; 
genuine  response  to  Monroe  dec- 
laration, 260;  why  scheme  of,  for 
union  came  to  nothing,  283; 
treaty  with  Colombia,  296,  309 
(foot  note),  distrust  of  Bolivar's 
plans,  465;  Panama  Congress, 
466;  treaty  of  alliance  with 
Buenos  Aires,  466. 

Chilpancingo:   congress  of,  62. 

Christophe:    mentioned,    156. 

City  of  America:  provided  for,  in 
Thornton's  scheme,  277. 

Claiborne,  Governor :  mentioned, 
142;  on  exclusion  of  European  in- 
fluence, 271. 

Clay,  Henry:  correspondence  with 
Bolivar,  129;  refers  to  the  "am- 
bitious projects"  of  Bolivar,  131; 
opposed  Neutrality  bill  of  1817, 
156;  on  recognition  of  new  states, 
162;  declines  to  enter  into  agree- 
ment with  Brazil,  253;  early 
views  on  American  unity,  281; 
advocates  American  system,  282; 
views  on  Panama  Congress,  316; 
supplementary  instructions  on 


INDEX 


491 


Panama  Congress,  353;  negotia- 
tions of,  relative  to  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  357;  requests  Colom- 
bia and  Mexico  to  suspend  expe- 
dition, 358;  conferences  with 
Colombian  and  Mexican  minis- 
ters, 394;  article  attributed  to, 
in  Democratic  Press,  404;  in- 
structions to  United  States  Dele- 
gates to  Panama,  409-426;  on  na- 
ture of  Congress,  410;  on  efforts 
of  United  States  to  effect  peace, 
411;  on  alliance  with  new  states, 
412;  on  non-colonization,  412;  on 
Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  413;  on  ad- 
vantages of  peace  and  neutrality, 
414;  on  freedom  of  the  seas,  415; 
on  regulation  of  commerce  and 
navigation,  416;  on  definition  of 
blockade,  419;  Panama  instruc- 
tions commented  on  by  London 
Times,  420;  by  anonymous  writer, 
420;  on  inter-oceanic  canal,  421; 
on  religious  toleration,  423; 
Chiapas,  424;  on  form  of  Gov- 
ernment, 425;  on  war  between 
Brazil  and  United  Provinces,  426; 
spirit  of  American  unity  in  in- 
structions, 428;  replies  to  Re- 
bello's  proposal,  460. 

Cochrane,  Lord:  commands  naval 
forces  against  Royalists  in  Peru, 
48;  defies  the  authority  of  San 
Martin,  55;  correspondence  of, 
with  Captain  Biddle,  210;  block- 
ades coast  of  Peru,  210. 

Colombia:  formation  of  republic, 
39,  104;  proposed  federation  with 
Peru  and  Bolivia,  106;  rebellion 
in,  116;  war  with  Peru,  120; 
sounds  England  and  France  on 
monarchy,  122;  union  of,  with 
Venezuela  and  Quito  dissolved, 
127;  recognition  of,  by  United 
States,  170;  declines  to  accede  to 
treaty  with  Spain,  258 ;  takes  lead 
in  organizing  American  League 
of  Nations,  291;  treaties  of,  with 
Peru,  292;  with  Chile  and 
Buenos  Aires,  296;  promotes  the 
plan  of  holding  a  Congress  at 


Panama,  318;  letter  to  Funes  on 
Panama  Congress,  321;  instruc- 
tions to  delegates,  325,  326,  328; 
attitude  toward  Vidaurre's  plan, 
336;  ratifies  Panama  conventions, 
347;  attitude  on  postponement  of 
operations  against  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  358;  against  political 
union  with  Great  Britain,  385; 
invitation  of,  to  United  States  to 
send  delegates  to  Panama  Con- 
gress, 393;  purpose  of,  to  lead 
in  western  hemisphere,  401;  un- 
willing to  intervene  in  behalf  of 
Buenos  Aires,  451. 

Community  of  political  ideals:  as 
principle  of  Pan-Americanism,  33. 

Concert  of  Europe:  leadership  of, 
discussed,  20. 

Confederation  Americana:  article 
on,  301. 

Confederation  of  American  States: 
discussed  in  the  United  States, 
303. 

Congress  of  Aix-la-Ohapelle:  deq- 
laration  of,  regarding  privateer- 
ing in  America,  174. 

Congress  of  Panama:  see  Panama 
Congress. 

Congress  of  Verona:  proposal  to  re- 
store the  absolute  power  of  Ferdi- 
nand, 217. 

Conquest:   principle  of  no,  6. 

Constitution:  outlines  of  a,  by  Wil- 
liam Thornton,  273. 

Cooperation:  as  principle  of  Pan- 
Americanism,  35. 

Cornejo,  Mariano  H.:  views  on  con- 
tinental solidarity,  13. 

Correa,  the  Abb6:  proposes  an 
"American  system,"  178. 

Correo  del  Orinoco:  on  the  cession 
of  Florida,  199-201. 

Costa  Rica:  see  Guatemala  and  Cen- 
tral America. 

Crowinshield,  Representative :  re- 
port of,  on  Panama  Congress, 
0*7 1 . 

Cuba:  international  status  of,  23; 
reported  concentration  of  Span- 
ish forces  in,  108;  interest  of 


492 


INDEX 


Jefferson  in,  141;  instructions  of 
Peru  on,  325;  of  Colombia,  328, 
329;  of  Bolivia,  332;  desire  of 
Mexicans  to  incorporate,  355;  pol- 
icy of  the  United  States  relative 
to,  355  et  seq.;  attitude  of  Colom- 
bia respecting,  358;  of  Mexico, 
360;  negotiations  between  Great 
Britain  and  United  States  re- 
specting, 364;  discussed  at  Buenos 
Aires,  454. 

Cundinamarca :  the  new  state  of, 
98;  one  of  the  divisions  of  Co- 
lombia, 107. 

i 

Dawkins,  Edward  J.:  appointed 
British  agent  to  Panama  Con- 
gress, 313;  Canning's  instructions 
to,  366;  what  he  accomplished  at 
Panama,  370;  opinions  of,  Bri- 
cefio  Me"ndez  and  others  as  to  his 
mission,  372-378;  suggests  an  in- 
demnity to  Spain,  375,  377,  378. 

Del  Real:  Agent  of  New  Granada, 
mentioned,  172. 

Dessolle:  negotiates  with  Spain  on 
Monarchy  in  America,  94. 

Demarquet,  General:  apocryphal  in- 
structions to,  125. 

Diaz  V61ez,  Jose  Miguel:  Bolivia, 
mission  of,  to,  440. 

District  of  America:  provided  for, 
in  Thornton's  scheme,  277. 

Domfnquez,  Jose":  Mexican  delegate 
to  Panama  Congress,  320. 

Downes,  Lieutenant :  commands 
Essex  Junior,  205. 

Drago,  Luis  M. :  views  of,  on  Amer- 
ican solidarity,  14. 

Duke  of  Orleans:  proposed  as  sov- 
ereign at  Buenos  Aires,  93. 

Egafia,  Juan:  proposes  a  plan  of 
union,  283. 

England:  hostility  of,  toward  mon- 
archical plots  in  Argentine  prov- 
inces, 96;  government  of,  re- 
garded by  Bolivar  as  model,  103; 
rejects  Colombian  overture  for 


monarchy,  123.  See  Great  Bri- 
tain. 

Equality:  as  principle  of  Pan- 
Americanism,  6,  35;  doctrine  of, 
as  applied  to  certain  American 
republics,  19-29;  to  commercial 
intercourse,  416. 

Essex,  U.8.8.:  voyage  of,  to  Pacific, 
205;  surrender  of,  209. 

Essex  Junior:  see  Essex,  U.S. 8. 

Europe:  hostility  of,  toward  United 
States,  158-159. 

European  powers:  supposed  propen- 
sity of,  to  intervene  in  America, 
247. 

Evening  Post:  first  to  use  term 
Pan-Americanism,  2. 

Everett,  Alexander:  impresses  on 
Spain  necessity  of  peace,  357 ;  dis- 
patches of,  368. 

Federal  system:  proposed  for  Span- 
ish America,  303. 

Federation:  of  Colombia,  Peru,  and 
Bolivia  projected,  107;  as  means 
to  peace,  280. 

Ferdinand  VII:  dethroned,  36;  re- 
stored, 52;  proposed  asylum  for, 
in  Mexico,  64;  loyalty  of  Amer- 
ican subjects  to,  83;  acclaimed 
by  people  of  Spain,  88;  desire 
of,  to  retain  Cuba  and,  Porto 
Rico,  355. 

Filfsola,  General:  commands  in  Cen- 
tral America,  75. 

Florida:  president  empowered  to 
occupy,  184;  British  activities  in, 
191;  negotiations  for  acquisition 
of,  195;  British  attitude  as  to 
transfer  of,  196-199;  Venezuelan 
attitude,  199-201;  Mexican,  201, 
204. 

Folch,  Governor:  toast  of,  271. 

Forbes,  John  M. :  succeeds  Rodney 
at  Buenos  Aires,  260;  mentioned, 
297. 

Foreign  Enlistment  Act:  mentioned, 
214. 

France:  influence  of,  in  monarchical 


INDEX 


493 


plots,  94;  fails  to  receive  support, 
96;  army  of,  invades  Spain,  218. 

Francia,  Dr.:  dictator  of  Paraguay, 
40;  imprisons  Bonpland,  444; 
reply  of,  to  Bolivar,  446. 

Francisco  de  Paula:  proposal  to 
Crown,  at  Buenos  Aires,  92. 

Franklin,  Benjamin:  on  immunity 
of  private  property  at  sea,  419. 

Franklin,  U.8.8.:  alleged  aid  of,  to 
the  viceroy  of  Peru,  213. 

Freire,  Ram6n:  Supreme  Director 
of  Chile,  45;  convokes  constituent 
assembly,  46. 

Frers,  Emilio:  quoted  on  American 
questions,  26. 

Funes,  Dean:  instructions  to,  on 
Panama  Congress,  321 ;  on  pro- 
posed invasion  of  Paraguay,  447. 


Gaceta  de  Colombia:  on  Monroe 
Doctrine,  241;  on  the  Panama 
Congress,  322. 

Gainza,  Captain-general:  adheres  to 
revolution  in  Guatemala,  73;  at- 
tempts to  reduce  Salvador  to  sub- 
mission, 75. 

Galveston:  government  of  Texas 
organized  at,  151;  base  of  insur- 
gent fleet,  152. 

Galveston  Island:    see  Galveston. 

Gamarra,  Agustfn:  offers  to  sup- 
port Bolivar  in  the  establishment 
of  monarchy,  109;  mentioned, 
126. 

Garcia,  Manuel  Jose":  mission  of, 
to  Rio  de  Janeiro,  85,  91;  men- 
tioned, 256;  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  260. 

Garcia  Calder6n,  Francisco:  quoted, 
on  Pan-Americanism,  17. 

Garcia  del  Rio,  Juan:  Minister  of 
Foreign  Relations  of  Peru,  51 ; 
mission  to  Europe,  53. 

Gelston  v.  Hoyt:  case  of,  mentioned, 
156. 

Genet:  arrival  of,  in  United  States, 
137. 


Gilchrist,  William:  vice  consul  at 
Buenos  Aires,  143. 

Gil  Fortoul,  Jos6:  on  Panama  Con- 
gress, 429. 

G6mez,  Jos6  Valentin:  mission  of, 
to  Europe,  93;  objects  to  Prince 
of  Lucca,  94;  mission  to  Brazil, 
456;  return  of,  to  Buenos  Aires, 
458. 

Government:  form  of,  discussed, 
82-84;  in  Argentine  provinces, 
89;  discussed  by  Bolivar,  102. 

Graham,  John:  commissioner  to 
South  America,  160. 

Great  Britain:  treaty  of,  with 
Spain,  86;  attitude  in  1816,  158; 
supposed  complicity  in  Amelia 
Island  affair,  192;  designs  in 
America,  203;  neutral  policy, 
213;  policy  as  to  independence 
of  Spanish  America,  215;  at- 
tempts mediation  between  Spain 
and  her  colonies,  215-217;  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  217-222;  recog- 
nizes the  new  states,  219;  tend- 
ency of  the  new  states  to  look 
to,  223;  policy  according  to  San- 
tander,  247;  commission  in  Co- 
lombia, 248;  policy  in  Brazil, 
251 ;  invited  to  Panama  Congress, 
312;  alliance  with  the  new  states, 
333;  policy  as  to  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico,  355;  informal  diplomatic 
intercourse  with  Mexico,  361; 
discusses  Cuba  with  Mexico,  362; 
alleged,  indifference  to  peace  in 
America,  367;  aim  in  America, 
371;  aid  to  insurgents,  380;  pro- 
posed protectorate  over  new 
states,  382-384,  391;  against  in- 
tervention in  Brazil,  443;  medi- 
ates between  Buenos  Aires  and 
Brazil,  462. 

Great  Colombia:   see  Colombia. 

Grotius:  on  doctrine  of  equality, 
20. 

Gual,  Pedro:  connection  of,  with 
Amelia  Island  affair,  188-190; 
states  bases  of  American  confed- 


494 


INDEX 


eration,  291;  Colombian  delegate 
to  Panama  Congress,  319;  in- 
structions to,  325,  326,  329;  pro- 
ceeds to  Mexico,  348;  correspond- 
ence from  Mexico,  348-353;  con- 
ference of  Oct.  9,  351;  returns  to 
Colombia,  354;  confers  with  Daw- 
kins,  368;  on  proposed  indemnity 
to  Spain,  377. 

Guatemala :  Captaincy-general  of, 
during  revolt,  72;  declares  inde- 
pendence, 73;  becomes  part  of 
Mexican  empire,  75. 

Guayaquil:  conference  of,  55;  an- 
nexation to  Colombia,  56;  reas- 
sumes  sovereignty,  116. 

Guerrero,  Vicente:  adheres  to  lead- 
ership of  Iturbide,  64. 

Guise,   Admiral:    mentioned,   248. 

Gutie"rrez-Magee  raid:  account  of, 
149. 

Gutierrez  de  Lara,  Jose"  Bernardo: 
represents  Hidalgo  in  United 
States,  149. 

Haiti:  independence  of,  37;  not 
recognized  by  United  States,  237; 
not  mentioned  in  Monroe's  mes- 
sage, 238;  Panama  Congress, 
321;  status  as  viewed  by  Peru, 
325;  by  Colombia,  329. 

Hall,  Basil:  interviews  of,  with  San 
Martin,  54. 

Halsey,  Thomas  Lloyd:  dismissal 
of,  mentioned,  180. 

Hamilton,  Alexander:  on  neutrality, 
137;  favors  Miranda's  plans,  138, 
265;  on  independence  of  Santo 
Domingo,  140. 

Hamilton,  Representative:  resolu- 
tion on  Panama  Congress,  397. 

Harrison,  William  Henry:  minister 
to  Colombia,  130,  131. 

Hegemony:  so-called,  of  United 
States,  29. 

Henley,  Captain:  breaks  up  Amelia 
Island  establishment,  184. 

Henry  IV:  Great  Design  of,  men- 
tioned, 280,  311. 


Herrera,  Jose"  Manuel  de:  activities 
of,  in  United  States,  147,  150; 
correspondence  of  Santa  Maria 
with,  298. 

Heres,  Tomas  de:   mentioned,  324. 

Hervey:  British  commissioner  to 
Mexico,  361. 

Hidalgo,  Miguel:  leads  revolt  in 
Mexico,  62. 

Hillyar,  Commodore :  commands 
British  squadron  in  Pacific,  208; 
mediates  between  Patriots  and 
Royalists,  209. 

Hispanic  America:  attitude  of,  to- 
ward Monroe  declaration,  223- 
262. 

Holy  Alliance:  rumors  concerning, 
108;  plans  of,  218;  American 
counterpoise  to,  proposed,  297. 

Honduras:  see  Guatemala  and  Cen- 
tral America. 

House  of  Representatives,  U.  S.: 
declaration  on  revolt  of  Spanish 
provinces,  145;  discussions  on 
neutrality,  161;  on  recognition, 
166;  discusses  Panama  Congress, 
397. 

Hyde  de  Neuville:  protests  against 
projected  invasion  of  Mexico,  91 ; 
proposes  monarchies  in  Spanish 
America,  92;  finds  insurgent 
cause  popular  in  United  States, 
173;  on  Amelia  Island  affair,  192. 


Inca:  as  title  in  Thornton's  scheme, 
279. 

Inca  dynasty:  proposed  reSstablish- 
ment  of,  91;  revolt  to  reestablish, 
263. 

Indemnity:  proposed,  to  Spain,  375, 
377,  378,  438. 

Independence:  as  principle  of  Pan- 
Americanism,  33;  indifference  of 
Spanish  Americans,  83;  chief  in- 
terest of  new  states,  308;  under 
British  protectorate,  385;  total 
and  unqualified,  desired  by 
United  States,  402. 


INDEX 


495 


Ingham,  Representative :  quoted, 
404  (foot  note). 

International  American  Conference: 
at  Washington,  2;  at  Mexico,  6; 
at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  7;  at  Buenos 
Aires,  15;  significance  of,  33. 

Intervention:  Monteagudo  on,  309; 
attitude  of  Colombia  on,  336;  of 
Peru,  337;  discussed  at  Buenos 
Aires,  453. 

Irisarri,  Antonio  Jose:  mission  to 
England,  96. 

Irvine:  United  States  agent  to 
Venezuela,  189. 

Iturbide,  Agustfn  de:  leader  of  re- 
volt in  Mexico,  64;  proclaims 
Plan  of  Iguala,  65;  made  emper- 
or, 67;  deposed,  68;  executed,  69. 

Jefferson,  Thomas:  on  principles  of 
neutrality,  137;  on  Spanish  re- 
volt against  Bonaparte,  141 ; 
favors  Correa's  American  system, 
179;  conference  of,  with  Maia, 
264;  on  alliance  with  Great  Bri- 
tain, 266;  sends  Wilkinson  on 
mission,  269. 

John  VI:  flight  of,  to  Brazil,  36. 

Kentucky:    resolutions   in   favor   of 

insurgent  cause,  173. 
King  of  Belgium:  arbitrator  in 

Macedonian  case,  211. 
King,  Rufus:  advocates  Miranda's 

plans,  265. 

Lafitte,  Jean:   mentioned,  151. 

La  Fuente,  General:  letter  of 
Bolivar  to,  106;  mentioned,  126. 

Lambe:  British  minister  to  Spain, 
367. 

Lansing,  Robert:  address  of,  on 
Pan- Americanism,  9. 

Lamed,  Samuel:  mentioned,  125. 

Larrazabal,  Antonio:  Central  Amer- 
ican delegate  to  Panama  Con- 
gress, 320. 

La  Serna:  viceroy  of  Peru,  52. 


Las  Heras,  General:  on  the  Monroe 
declaration,  260. 

Lavalleja,  Antonio:  leader  of  the 
"  thirty- three,"  459. 

Law:  as  principle  of  Pan- American- 
ism, 34. 

Lawrence,  T.  J.:  on  primacy  of 
United  States,  31. 

Leadership:  question  of,  involved 
in  Confederation,  402. 

League  of  Nations:  an  American, 
bases  of,  proposed,  291. 

Le  Moyne:  received  by  Pueyrred6n, 
93. 

Liberator,  The:    see  Bolivar. 

Lima:  taken  by  San  Martin,  51; 
recaptured  by  the  Royalists,  58. 

Lino  de  Clemente:  connection  of, 
with  Amelia  Island  affair,  188; 
conduct  not  approved  by  Vene- 
zuelan government,  189. 

Lircay,  Treaty  of:  concluded 
through  mediation  of  Commodore 
Hillyar,  209. 

Longfellow,   H.   W.:    quoted,    1. 

L6pez,  Jacinto:  on  Pan- American- 
ism and  "Monroeism,"  16;  on 
Bolivar  and  the  Panama  Con- 
gress, 430. 

Lopez,  Me"ndez:  mission  of,  to  Eng- 
land, 286. 

Lowry,  Robert  K. :  United  States 
agent  to  Venezuela,  145. 

Lorimer,  James:  on  equality  of  na- 
tions, 19. 

Lyman,  Theodore:  on  neutral  policy 
of  United  States,  134. 

Macedonian:   case    of  the,   210-212. 

MacGregor,  Sir  Gregor:  services  to 
Venezuela,  185;  undertakes  expe- 
dition against  Amelia  Island,  186. 

Maciel  da  Costa,  J.  Severiano: 
Cartas  Politicas  of,  252  (foot 
note). 

Mackie,  Dr.:  first  British  agent  to 
Mexico,  361. 

McLane,  Representative:  mentioned, 
398. 


496 


INDEX 


Macon,  Senator:  resolution  of,  on 
Panama  Congress,  396. 

Madison,  James:  appoints  agents  to 
South  America,  142;  refers  to 
struggle  of  revolted  colonies,  145; 
thinks  of  continent  as  a  whole, 
272. 

Magee,  Augustus  W.:  commands  ex- 
pedition in  Texas,  149. 

Maia:  conference  of,  with  Jeffer- 
son, 264. 

Maipo:   battle  of,  42. 

Maitland,  General :  negotiates 
treaty  with  Toussaint,  139. 

Martinez  de  Rozas:  the  "Politico- 
Christian  Catechism "  of,  282. 

Mediation :  attempted,  between 
Spain  and  her  colonies,  215- 
217. 

Memoria  Politico-Instrtictiva:  on 
cession  of  Florida,  202. 

Mexico:  little  contact  with  South 
America,  61;  revolution  under 
Hidalgo  and  Morelos,  62;  consti- 
tution of  1814,  63;  change  in 
character  of  revolution,  63;  plan 
of  Iguala,  65;  Treaty  of  Cordova, 
66;  Iturbide  proclaimed  emperor, 
67;  establishment  of  federal  re- 
public, 70;  political  parties  in, 
70;  proposed  invasion  of,  from 
United  States,  91;  interest  of 
Jefferson  in,  141;  the  Mina  ex- 
pedition against,  152-154;  recog- 
nition of,  by  United  States,  170; 
supposed  connection  with  Amelia 
Island  affair,  185;  discussions  of 
British  attitude,  226;  reception 
of  Monroe  declaration,  225-235; 
attitude  toward  cession  of  Flor- 
ida, 261;  early  plans  for  inde- 
pendence, 263;  Jefferson's  view 
of,  264;  treaty  with  Colombia, 
299;  attitude  toward  Panama 
Congress,  340;  removal  of  Con- 
gress to,  346;  considers  Panama 
conventions,  348;  rejects  them, 
350;  influence  of  Poinsett,  :i.V2 ; 
proposed  expedition  against  Cuba, 


359;  treaty  with  United  States, 
417. 

Michelena,  Jose  Mariano:  Mexican 
delegate  to  Panama  Congress, 
320;  first  Mexican  minister  to 
England,  361;  negotiations  rela- 
tive to  Cuba,  363. 

Middleton,  Henry:  negotiates  with 
Russia,  357. 

Mier,  Father:  views  on  the  cession 
of  Florida,  202;  attitude  toward 
Great  Britain,  203. 

Mina,  Xavier:  expedition  of,  to 
Mexico,  152-154;  his  failure  dis- 
cussed, 154;  name  of,  connected 
with  Amelia  Island  affair,  190. 

Miner,  Representative :  resolution 
of,  relative  to  Panama  Congress, 
397. 

Miranda,  Francisco  de:  plans  of 
favored  by  Hamilton,  138;  revolu- 
tionary efforts,  265-268. 

Molina,  Pedro:  Central  American 
delegate  to  Panama  Congress, 
320. 

Monarchy:  plots  for  the  establish- 
ment of,  82-133;  mission  of  Bel- 
grano  and  Rivadoria,  84-89;  ne- 
gotiations between  Argentine 
provinces  and  Brazil,  90;  pro- 
posal of  Hyde  de  Neuville,  92; 
preferred  at  Buenos  Aires,  93; 
efforts  to  establish,  discontinued 
at  Buenos  Aires,  96;  Chile  little 
inclined  toward,  96;  attitude  of 
Peru,  98;  in  the  northern  part 
of  South  America,  99;  Bolivar's 
views  on,  100,  et  seq.;  discussed 
in  Clay's  Panama  instructions, 
425. 

Money,  Senator:  article  of,  cited, 
134. 

Monroe  Doctrine:  interpreted  by 
Lansing,  9 ;  by  Olney  and  Cleve- 
land, 22;  by  Roosevelt,  25;  by 
Alvarez,  29;  as  principle  of  Pan- 
Americanism,  33;  message  of  Dec. 
2,  1823,  quoted,  220;  how  re- 
ceived, in  Hispanic  America,  223- 
262;  in  Mexico,  225;  Central 
America,  235;  Haiti,  237;  Boli- 


INDEX 


497 


varian  republics,  239;  Brazil, 
250;  Argentina,  254;  Chile,  260; 
summary,  261;  Panama  Congress, 
323,  324,  326,  328,  342;  in  Clay's 
Panama  instructions,  412;  dis- 
cussed at  Buenos  Aires,  453;  re- 
stated by  Clay,  460. 

Monroe,  James:  on  recognition  of 
the  new  states,  164,  165,  167, 
169;  on  Amelia  Island  affair,  183; 
declaration  of  December  2,  1823, 
220;  less  celebrated  in  Mexico 
than  Canning,  230;  negotiates 
with  Spanish  American  agents, 
271. 

Monteagudo,  Bernardo:  member  of 
provisional  government  of  Peru, 
51;  banished  from  Peru,  57; 
biographical  notice  of,  307;  essay 
on  federation,  308-311. 

Moore,  John  Bassett:  quoted  on 
Pan-Americanism,  9. 

Moore,  Thomas  Patrick:  succeeds 
Harrison  as  minister  to  Colombia, 
131;  conduct  restores  relations 
between  United  States  and  Co- 
lombia, 132. 

Morelos,  Jose"  Maria:  leader  of  re- 
volt in  Mexico,  62. 

Moreno,  Mariano:  political  legacy 
of,  284;  policy  referred  to,  434. 

Mosquera,  Joaqum:  instructions  to, 
291;  negotiates  treaties  with 
Peru,  292;  with  Chile,  296;  with 
Buenos  Aires,  297;  mission  to 
Buenos  Aires,  434. 

Mosquito  Shore:  McGregor  estab- 
lishes himself  on,  187. 

Myers,  Lieutenant  Colonel:  men- 
tioned, 153. 

Nabuco,  Joaquim:  views  of,  on 
Pan-Americanism,  12. 

Napoleon:  intervention  of,  in  Spain, 
36. 

Nation,  The:  on  Olney's  interpre- 
tation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  22. 

Navy:  convention  relating  to,  con- 
cluded at  Panama,  343. 

Nereyda:  captured  by  Captain  Por- 
ter, 208. 


Nesselrode,   Count:    mentioned,   166. 

Netherlands:  sends  agent  to 
Panama  Congress,  312. 

Neutrality:  policy  of  United  States, 
136;  laws  of,  137;  proclamation 
of,  147;  violations,  152;  the  Act 
of  1817,  156;  policy  reiterated, 
161;  difficulties  of  enforcement, 
172;  further  legislation,  176;  mo- 
tive of,  questioned,  200;  on  the 
West  Coast,  205;  alleged  viola- 
tion by  United  States,  213;  policy 
of  Great  Britain,  214;  policy  be- 
comes clearly  defined,  273;  of 
United  States  between  Buenos 
Aires  and  Brazil,  461. 

New  Granada:  constitution  of,  98; 
Union,  with  Venezuela,  101;  sup- 
posed connection  with  Amelia 
Island  affair,  185. 

New  Orleans:  violations  of  neu- 
trality at,  152. 

New  states:   formation  of,  36-81. 

Nicaragua:  canal  route  through, 
423.  See  also  Guatemala  and 
Central  America. 

Nicholls,  Colonel:  attempts  to  per- 
petuate British  influence  in  Flor- 
ida, 191. 

Non-intervention:  as  principle  of 
Pan- Americanism,  34j>^ 

North  American  Review:  articles 
in,  cited,  134. 

Obregon:  arrival  of,  at  Washington, 
362. 

Ocana,  Assembly  of:  fails  to  revise 
constitution  of  Colombia,  119. 

O'Donoju,  Juan:  viceroy  of  Mexico, 
66. 

Oglethorpe,  James:  communications 
of,  with  Mexico,  263. 

O'Gorman:  British  commissioner  to 
Mexico,  361. 

O'Higgins,  Ambrose : '  biographical 
notice,  43. 

O'Higgins,  Bernardo:  Supreme  Di- 
rector of  Chile,  43;  forced  to  re- 
siem,  45;  disclaims  connection 
with  the  Amelia  Island  affair, 
185. 


498 


INDEX 


O'Leary,  Daniel  Florencio:  on  Bol- 
ivar's political  views,  109;  on 
Monroe  declaration,  323. 

Olney,  Richard:  instructions  on 
Anglo-Venezuelan  boundary  dis- 
pute, 22. 

Onis,  Luis  de:  received  by  United 
States,  146;  protests  against  ad- 
mittance of  insurrectionary  flags, 
147. 

Osmond,  Marquis  of:  sends  agent 
to  Buenos  Aires,  93. 


Paez,  Jose"  Antonio:  Bolivar's  reply 
to  monarchical  proposals  of,  109; 
loyalty  of,  to  Bolivar,  119. 

Pan:  as  prefix,  1. 

Panama  Congress:  discussed,  in 
Spanish  America,  301;  in  United 
States,  303;  in  Great  Britain, 
305;  in  France,  306;  revival  of 
project,  312;  personnel,  313,  319; 
errors  concerning,  314  (foot 
note)  ;  views  of  Adams,  Clay,  and 
Bolivar,  315;  sessions,  319;  Co- 
lombia states  objects  of,  321;  in- 
structions of  Peru  on,  324;  of 
Colombia,  328;  of  Bolivia  331; 
informal  conferences,  333;  Vi- 
daurre's  plan,  333;  formal  meet- 
ings begin,  340;  conventions  con- 
cluded by,  340-345;  Colombia 
ratifies  conventions,  347 ;  Mexico 
rejects  them,  350;  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico  discussed,  355,  363; 
United  States  and  the,  393  et 
seq.;  discussed  in  Senate,  396;  in 
the  House,  397;  slavery  and  the, 
399;  attitude  toward  participa- 
tion of  United  States,  427 ;  Buenos 
Aires  appoints  delegate,  449; 
Gual  and  Bricefio  Me"ndez  ask  for 
special  instructions  as  to  Buenos 
Aires,  450;  .objects  discussed  at 
Buenos  Aires,  452. 

Panama,  Isthmus  of:  proposed  as 
meeting  place  of  American  na- 
tionfl,  289,  20.")-,  nnlicalthftilness 
of,  345. 

Pan- Americanism :    meaning   of,    1- 


35;  first  use  of  term,  2;  defini- 
tions of,  3;  views  of  Blaine,  4-6; 
of  Wilson,  8;  Lansing,  9;  Moore, 
9;  Casasus,  11;  of  Nabuco,  12; 
Rio  Branco,  13;  Cornejo,  13; 
Battle  y  Ordonez,  14;  Drago,  14; 
Plaza,  15;  Prado,  16;  Ugarte,  16; 
L6pez,  16;  Alvarez,  16;  as  con- 
ceived by  Garcia  Clader6n,  17; 
as  an  international  policy,  30; 
as  a  political  system,  31;  prin- 
ciples of,  33-35;  Bolivar's  rela- 
tions to,  317. 

Pando,  Jose"  M. :  appointed  minister 
of  foreign  affairs  of  Peru,  108; 
proposes  the  establishment  of  em- 
pire, 109;  delegate  of  Peru  to 
Panama  Congress,  319;  recalled, 
337. 

Paraguay:  independence  of,  40;  re- 
bellion against  Buenos  Aires,  437. 

Paroissen,  Diego:  mission  of,  to 
Europe,  53. 

Pazos,  Vicenta:  defends  Amelia 
Island  seizure,  190. 

Paz  Soldan,  Mariano  Felipe:  cri- 
ticises attitude  of  United  States, 
213. 

Peace:  federation  necessary  to  at- 
tain, 309. 

Pedro  I:  emperor  of  Brazil,  37. 

Peredo,  Antonio  Francisco:  Mexican 
agent  in  the  United  States,  150. 

Perez  de  Tudela,  Manuel:  delegate 
of  Peru  to  Panama  Congress,  319; 
new  instructions  to,  337;  return 
of,  to  Peru,  347. 

Perry,   Colonel:    mentioned,   149. 

Perry,  Commodore:  mission  of,  to 
South  America,  177. 

Peru:  reply  to  first  International 
American  Conference,  11;  Royal- 
ist strong  hold,  50;  independence 
of,  declared,  51;  adopts  popular 
representative  government,  57 ; 
Riva  Agtiero  appointed  President, 
58;  Bolivar  commands  in,  59; 
constitution  of,  61 ;  proposed 
federation  of,  with  Colombia  and 
I'.ulivia.  106;  recognition  by  the 
United  States,  170;  pays  Mace- 


INDEX 


499 


doman  claims,  212;  protests 
against  the  partiality  of  Captain 
Stewart,  213;  declines  to  accede 
to  treaty  with  Spain,  258;  trea- 
ties with  Colombia,  292;  appoints 
delegates  to  Panama,  318;  in- 
structions to,  324;  changed  atti- 
tude, 337;  attitude  toward 
United  States  and  Brazil,  338; 
Bolivar  on  the  situation  in,  339. 

Peru,  Upper:  loss  of,  to  Buenos 
Aires,  437,  440. 

Potion,  resident:  aids  Bolivar,  99; 
aids  Mina,  153. 

Pezuela:  viceroy  of  Peru,  51. 

Phillipson,  Coleman:  on  the  equal- 
ity of  nations,  20;  on  status  of 
Cuba,  23. 

Pinkney,  William:    mentioned,    174. 

Piracy:  on  Louisiana  coast,  151; 
act  to  punish,  176. 

Plan  of  Iguala:  proclaimed  by 
Iturbide,  65. 

Plaza,  Dr.  V.   de  la:    quoted,   15. 

Poinsett,  Joel  Roberts:  appointed 
agent  to  Buenos  Aires,  142;  in- 
structions to,  142,  143;  activities 
in  Chile,  144;  refuses  second  mis- 
sion to  Buenos  Aires,  160;  on 
board  the  Essex,  207;  appointed 
to  replace  Anderson,  314;  does 
not  participate  in  negotiations  at 
Tacubaya,  351;  intervenes  in  in- 
ternal affairs  of  Mexico,  352; 
mission  of,  to  Mexico,  362. 

Political  inequality:  discussed,  20- 
29;  compatible  with  legal  equal- 
ity, 21;  Roosevelt  on,  26. 

Ponsonby,  Lord:  Canning's  instruc- 
tions to,  462. 

Porter,  Captain  David:  cruise  to 
Pacific,  205-209;  friendly  recep- 
tion at  Valparaiso,  206. 

Porto  Bello:  captured  by  McGregor, 
187. 

Porto  Rico:  instructions  of  Peru 
on,  325;  of  Colombia,  328,  329; 
of  Bolivia,  332;  discussed  at 
Panama,  355;  policy  of  the 
United  States  relative  to,  355  et 
seq.;  of  Colombia,  358;  of  Mexico, 


360;    discussed  at   Buenos  Aires, 

454. 
Prado,    Eduardo:     skeptical    as    to 

Pan- Americanism,    16. 
Pradt,     Abbe     de:     suggests     mon- 
archies in  America,  101 ;  pamphlet 

of,  on  Panama  Congress,  306. 
Preponderance:     of    United    States, 

discussed,  29,  402. 
Prevost,  John  B.;    mentioned,  297; 

on   American   Confederation,   400. 
Primacy:    Lawrence's  view,   31. 
Prince     of     Lucca:      proposed     for 

American  throne,  92. 
Privateering:    source   of  annoyance, 

174;     illegal,    at    Amelia    Island, 

184. 

Protector:   see  San  Martin,  Jose  de. 
Pueyrred6n,  Juan  Martfn:   supreme 

director  of  United  Provinces,  90; 

plans  to   place   French  prince   on 

throne  at  Buenos  Aires,  91. 

Quito:  province  of,  liberated  by 
Bolivar,  55;  revolt  against  Co- 
lombian constitution,  116;  sepa- 
rates from  Colombia,  127. 

Raguet,  Condy:  demands  passports 
of  Brazil,  461. 

Rayon,  Ignacio  L6pez:  organizes 
revolutionary  government,  62. 

Rebello,  Jose"  Silvestre:  received  at 
Washington,  170;  proposes  offen- 
sive and  defensive  alliance,  253, 
459. 

Recognition:  of  belligerency  of  new 
states,  146;  of  independence 
urged,  160;  mission  to  Buenos 
Aires,  160;  becomes  a  pressing 
question,  161 ;  advocated  by  Clay, 
163;  principles  as  set  forth  by 
Adams,  164;  discussed  by  the 
President,  164,  165;  discussed  by 
Clay,  166-167;  Monroe's  views, 
168;  accorded,  169;  effect  of,  in 
Hispanic  America,  170;  impor- 
tance compared  with  Monroe 
declaration,  226. 

Republic:  federal  and  unitary  dis- 
cussed, 101. 


500 


INDEX 


Republicanism :  Bolivar  partisan 
of,  56;  decline  of,  in  Europe, 
89;  championed  by  Sarratea, 
9,1. 

Revenga,  Jose  R.:  instructs  Colom- 
bian delegates  to  Panama,  325, 
328,  329;  on  Vidaurre's  plan, 
335;  on  Peru's  defection,  340;  on 
postponement  of  operations 
against  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  358 ; 
on  British  protection,  382;  sends 
additional  stipulations  to  Pa- 
nama, 383;  on  United  States  and 
Panama  Congress,  428. 

Richelieu,  Due  de:  favors  establish- 
ment of  monarchies  in  America, 
92. 

Ricketts,  Consul  General:  confer- 
ence of,  with  Bolivar,  390. 

Rio  Branco,  Baron  de:  on  Inter- 
national American  Conferences, 
13. 

Rio  de  la  Plata:  see  United  Prov- 
inces of  Rio  de  la  Plata  and 
Buenos  Aires. 

Riva  Agiiero,  Jose  de  la:  president 
of  Peru,  58;  forced  into  exile,  60. 

Rivadavia,  Bernardino:  mission  of, 
to  Europe,  84;  arrives  in  Eng- 
land, 86;  negotiations  with 
Charles  IV,  87;  represents  Buenos 
Aires  in  negotiations  with  Span- 
ish agents,  257;  addresses  other 
insurgent  governments,  258;  ne- 
gotiates treaty  with  Colombia, 
297 ;  advocates  war  on  Brazil, 
449;  president  of  the  United 
Provinces,  456. 

Rives,  William  Cabell :  on  Victoria's 
partiality  for  Great  Britain,  234. 

Robinson,  W.  D. :  historian  of  Mina 
expedition,  154,  191. 

Rocafuerte,  Vicente :  mentioned, 
202. 

Rodney,  Cesar  A.:  commissioner  to 
South  America,  160;  minister  to 
Buenos  Aires,  170;  on  reception 
of  Monroe  declaration  at  Buenos 
Aires,  254. 

Rodriguez,  Martin:   mentioned,  256. 

Romero,    Mattes:    on    assistance    of 


United  States  to  cause  of  inde- 
pendence, 134. 

Rondeau:    compelled   to   resign,   85. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore :  instructions 
to  delegates  to  Pan-American  Con- 
ference at  Mexico,  6;  on  relations 
with  Dominican  Republic,  24;  on 
political  inequality,  26. 

Root,  Elihu:  on  Pan-American  Con- 
ferences, 7;  speech  at  Rio  de 
Janiero,  8. 

Rosas,  Juan  Manuel:  dictator  of 
Argentine  provinces,  41;  foments 
revolution  in  Uruguay,  459. 

Roscio,  Juan  Germim:  finds  people 
of  United  States  favor  the  insur- 
gent cause,  173;  on  cession  of 
Florida,  199. 

Rozas,  Juan  Martinez  de:  views  of, 
83. 

Rush,  Richard:  conversations  of, 
with  Canning  on  American  af- 
fairs, 218. 

Ruuth,  Colonel  Count  de:  takes  part 
in  the  Mina  expedition,  153. 

St.   Domingue:    see  Haiti. 

Salazar,  Jose  Maria:  instructed  to 
sound  United  States  on  confed- 
eration, 393. 

Salvador:  resists  incorporation  in 
Mexican  empire,  73;  proposes  an- 
nexation to  United  States,  76. 

Samouel,  Naval  Lieutenant:  quoted, 
on  British  influence  in  Mexico, 
224. 

San  Juan  de  Ulua:  surrender  of, 
37. 

San  Martin,  Jose"  de:  biographical 
sketch  of,  41;  wins  the  battles 
of  Chacabuco  and  Maipo,  42; 
prepares  expedition  against  Peru, 
47;  takes  Lima,  51;  ideas  on  form 
of  government,  52;  unpopularity 
of,  55;  interview  with  Bolivar, 
55;  abandons  Peru,  57;  effect  of 
failure  in  Peru,  436. 

Santa  Anna,  Antonio  L6pez  de: 
revolts  against  Tti^rbide,  68. 

Santa  Cruz,  Andres:  in  supreme 
command  in  Peru,  61. 


INDEX 


501 


Santa  Marfa,  Miguel:  appointed 
Colombian  minister  to  Mexico, 
298;  dismissed  by  imperial  gov- 
ernment, 299;  recalled,  299. 

Santander,  Vice-President :  opposes 
Bolivar,  119,  240;  message  on 
Monroe  declaration,  243;  attitude 
toward  Great  Britain,  245;  on 
United  States  in  1825,  247 ;  favors 
inviting  United  States  to  Panama 
Congress,  393;  against  inter- 
meddling in  war  between  Buenos 
Aires  and  Brazil,  443. 

Santo  Domingo:  independent  repub- 
lic formed,  38;  French  part  of, 
and  neutrality,  139;  Panama 
Congress  and,  322. 

Sarratea,  Manuel:  agent  of  Buenos 
Aires  in  London,  87 ;  champions 
republicanism,  95. 

Security :  Monteagudo's  discussion 
of,  310. 

Senate,  U.  S. :  declaration  of,  on  re- 
volt of  Spanish  provinces,  145; 
discusses  Panama  Congress,  396. 

Sergeant,  John:  minister  to  assem- 
bly at  Panama,  314,  395,  397. 

Slavery:  discussed,  in  relation  to 
Panama  Congress,  399. 

Smith,  Captain  Eliphalet:  alleged 
aid  of,  to  Royalists,  211. 

Spain:  the  invasion  of,  in  1823, 
218,  233. 

Spanish  authorities:  hostile  atti- 
tude, in  America  toward  the 
United  States,  206. 

Spanish  constitution:  cast  aside  by 
Ferdinand  VII,  52. 

State  Department:  conferences  of, 
with  insurgent  agents,  149. 

Stevens,  Dr.  Edward:  diplomatic 
agent  of  United  States  to  Santo 
Domingo,  139. 

Stewart,  Captain:  alleged  aid  of, 
to  viceroy  of  Peru,  213. 

Strangford,  Lord:  British  minister 
at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  85,  86. 

Stuart,  Sir  Charles:  mentioned,  251. 

Sucre,  Antonio  Jose"  de:  liberates 
Upper  Peru,  41;  biographical 
sketch,  58, 


Supreme  Court:  in  Thornton's 
scheme,  280. 

Tacubaya:  American  Assembly  ad- 
journed to,  344. 

Temperley,  H.  W.  V.:  on  the 
Panama  Congress,  365. 

Temps,  Le:  on  Anglo- Venezuelan 
boundary  dispute,  22. 

Territorial  integrity:  as  principle 
of  Pan-Americanism,  33;  in 
Gual's  bases,  291;  in  treaty  be- 
tween Colombia  and  Mexico,  299; 
in  Panama  treaty,  342;  Revenga's 
views  on,  343  (foot  note)  ;  Ar- 
gentine policy,  435,  437. 

Texas:  the  invasion  of,  in  1812,  149. 

Thompson,  Martin:  dismissal  of, 
mentioned,  180. 

Thornton,  William:  biographical 
sketch  of,  273;  scheme  for  United 
North  and  South  Colombia,  275- 
281. 

Times,  The  (London)  :  on  Olney's 
interpretation  of  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 22;  on  cession  of  Florida, 
196-199;  on  the  Panama  Con- 
gress, 305. 

Todd,  Charles  S.:  mentioned,  297; 
on  American  confederation,  401. 

Tornel,  Jose  Marfa:  on  policies  of 
United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
229. 

Torre  Tagle,  Marquis  de:  chief 
executive  of  Peru,  56. 

Torrens:  Mexican  charge"  d'affaires 
at  Washington,  77,  362. 

Torres,  Manuel:  received  as  Colom- 
bian charge  d'affaires,  170. 

Treaty:  of  Cordova,  concluded,  66; 
rejected  by  Spain,  67;  secret,  be- 
tween Toussaint  and  Maitland, 
139-140;  of  Morfontaine,  140;  of 
cession  of  Floridas,  195;  of  Lir- 
cay,  209;  preliminary,  between 
Buenos  Aires  and  Spain,  257; 
general,  between  Colombia  and 
Peru,  292;  special,  294;  between 
Colombia  and  Chile,  296;  between 
Colombia  and  Buenos  Aires,  296, 
434,  435;  between  Colombia  an4 


502 


INDEX 


Mexico,  299;  Colombia  and  Cen- 
tral America,  301 ;  concluded  at 
Panama,  340;  between  the  United 
States  and  Colombia  (1824),  417; 
preliminary,  of  peace  between 
Brazil  and  Buenos  Aires,  463; 
definitive,  464;  of  alliance  be- 
tween Chile  and  Buenos  Aires,  466. 

Tucuman,  Congress  of:  declares  Ar- 
gentine independence,  89;  ap- 
points agent  to  treat  with  Brazil, 
90. 

Tudor,  William:  appointed  to  re- 
place Raquet,  461. 

Toussaint  L'  Ouverture:  negotia- 
tions of,  with  United  States,  139; 
secret  treaty  with  General  Mait- 
land,  140. 

Ugarte,  Manuel:  against  Pan- Amer- 
icanism, 16. 

Unanue,  Hip61ito:  member  of  pro- 
visional government  of  Peru,  51. 

Union,  projects  of:  the  conspiracy 
of  1741,  263;  Miranda's  scheme, 
265;  Jefferson's  ideas,  269; 
Thornton's  "United  North  and 
South  Columbia,"  273;  views  of 
Clay,  281;  proposal  of  Martinez 
de  Rozas,  282;  plan  of  Egana, 
283;  views  of  Moreno,  284;  of 
Bolivar,  286;  the  Panama  Con- 
gress, 292. 

United  Provinces  of  Rio  de  la 
Plata:  revolt  of,  40;  disorganiza- 
tion, 41;  constitution,  41,  95; 
Congress  meets  at  Buenos  Aires, 
256;  war  with  Brazil,  455-464. 

United  States:  leadership  of,  20- 
22,  29;  attitude  toward  monarchy 
in  Hispanic  America,  128-132; 
relation  to  Hispanic  American 
struggle  for  independence,  134- 
171;  neutral  policy,  136;  negotia- 
tions with  Toussaint,  139;  recog- 
nizes the  new  states,  170;  sym- 
pathy for  Patriots,  172;  strained 
relations  with  Brazil,  179;  pres- 
tige declines  on  Pacific,  209;  al- 
leged aid  to  RoyaliHts  in  Peru, 
213;  Santander'g  opinion  of,  in 


1825,  247;  rejects  Brazil's  pro- 
posal of  alliance,  253;  suggested 
alliance  with  Great  Britain,  266; 
269;  receives  reports  of  proposed 
confederation,  297;  Panama  Con- 
gress, 326,  393  et  seq.;  policy  as 
to  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico,  355  et 
seq.;  early  diplomatic  relations 
with  Mexico,  362;  Canning's  atti- 
tude toward,  391;  place  of,  in 
American  system,  400;  treaties 
with  Colombia  and  Mexico,  417; 
rejects  Brazilian  proposal  for  alli- 
ance, 460;  neutrality  of,  in  war 
over  Banda  Oriental,  461. 

Upper  Peru:  independence  of,  41; 
proposed  union  with  Lower  Peru, 
108. 

Uti  possidetis:  basis  of  territorial 
integrity,  291;  defined,  436. 

Uruguay:  occupied  by  Portuguese, 
40,  437;  Brazilian  claims  in,  95; 
plans  to  recover,  440;  independ- 
ence, 464. 

Valeneay,  treaty  of:   mentioned,  87. 

Valle,  Jos6  del:  advocate  of  Ameri- 
can unity,  79. 

Van  Buren,  Martin:  instructions  to 
Thomas  Patrick  Moore,  131;  reso- 
lution on  Panama  Congress,  396. 

Van  Veer,  Colonel:  representative 
of  the  Netherlands  at  Panama, 
313;  quits  Mexico,  348. 

Vargas,  Nemesio:  on  Bolivar's  aims 
in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  430. 

Venezuela:  boundary  dispute  with 
Great  Britain,  21;  adopts  federal 
constitution,  98;  reconquered  by 
Royalists,  99;  adopts  new  consti- 
tution, 102;  unites  with  New 
Granada,  104;  secedes,  127. 

Versailles,  Covenant  of:  mentioned, 
311. 

Viceroyalty  of  La  Plata:  dismem- 
berment of,  437. 

Victoria,  General:  elected  president 
of  Mexico,  72;  on  relations  of 
Mexico  with  powers  of  Europe, 
233;  calls  extra  session  to  con- 
sider the  Panama  treaties,  349; 


INDEX 


503 


plans  to  take  Cuba,  360;  invites 
United  States  to  Panama  Con- 
gress, 394. 

Vidal:  vice  consul  at  New  Orleans, 
270. 

Vidaurre,  Manuel  Lorenzo:  delegate 
of  Peru  to  Panama  Congress,  319; 
proposes  plan  of  union,  333;  plan 
rejected,  335;  return  of,  to  Peru, 
346;  speech  of,  at  Panama,  365 
(foot  note). 

Von  Gentz:  on  the  balance  of 
power,  32. 

Ward:  British  Commissioner  to 
Mexico,  361. 

Washington,  George :  neutrality 
proclamation  of,  136;  farewell  ad- 
dress, 138. 

Washington's  Precept:  referred  to, 
398. 

Webster,  Daniel:  on  Panama  mis- 
sion, 398. 


Wellesley,  Marquess :  mentioned, 
215. 

West   Florida:    occupation   of,    183. 

Westlake,  John:  on  the  equality  of 
nations,  20. 

Whitcomb:  on  the  international 
status  of  Cuba,  24. 

Wilkinson,  James:  mission  to  the 
Southwest,  269;  proposes  alliance 
of  American  States,  271. 

Wilson,  President:  views  on  Pan- 
Americanism,  8. 

Worthington,  W.  G.  D.:  dismissal 
of,  mentioned,  180. 


Zavala,  Lorenzo:  biographical  no- 
tice of,  231;  on  policies  of  Great 
Britain  and  United  States,  232. 

Zea:    on  Amelia  Island  affair,   190. 

Zozaya,  Manuel:  first  Mexican  min- 
ister at  Washington,  170,  362. 

Zubieta:  quoted,  452. 


THE   END 


FEINTED    IN    THE    UNITED    STATES    Or    AMERICA 


